INDIA AMONG NATIONS

VENKATA MOHAN

Copyright © Venkata Mohan All Rights Reserved. ISBN 978-1-68538-132-5 This book has been published with all efforts taken to make the material error-free after the consent of the author. However, the author and the publisher do not assume and hereby disclaim any liability to any party for any loss, damage, or disruption caused by errors or omissions, whether such errors or omissions result from negligence, accident, or any other cause. While every effort has been made to avoid any mistake or omission, this publication is being sold on the condition and understanding that neither the author nor the publishers or printers would be liable in any manner to any person by reason of any mistake or omission in this publication or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this work. For any defect in printing or binding the publishers will be liable only to replace the defective copy by another copy of this work then available.

I Mallikarjuna Rao, my social studies teacher in High School who convinced me long ago that "Na Nations tions beha behavve lik likee individuals. individuals."

Contents Preface

ix

China 1. Aksai Chin

3

2. The Mcmahon Line

7

3. 1962 War

13

4. Roads Along Indo-chinese Border

18

5. Politics Of Water Between India And China

22

6. Is India’s China Story Self-harmful?

26

7. Can India Make Border Dispute With China

33

Insignificant? J&K Related 8. Was Not Religion The Basis Of Partition?

39

9. A Patriotism Test – Is Kashmir An Integral Part Of India?43 10. The Musharraf Formula: An Innovative Solution To

48

Kashmir Problem 11. Is Removing Art. 370 Legal?

54

Pakistan 12. Timeline: Pakistan

63

13. Indo-pak Wars

66

14. China–pakistan Economic Corridor

77

15. Terrorism

80

16. Indus Water Treaty

84

Afghanistan 17. Timeline: Afghanistan

91

18. The Afghan Papers

95

19. India’s Policy

97

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Contents With Great Powers 20. Nuclear Issues

101

21. Indo-american Relations

111

22. Indo-russian Relations

117

23. Nam

119

Bangladesh 24. Timeline: Bangladesh

125

25. Sharing Ganga

127

26. China Factor

130

27. India-bangladesh Enclaves

133

28. Teesta Water Sharing

136

29. Border Deaths

139

Sri Lanka 30. Timeline: Sri Lanka

143

31. Ipkf

145

32. Issues In India-sri Lanka Relations

150

Nepal 33. Timeline: Nepal

155

34. 1950 Treaty

158

35. New Constitution

161

36. Border Dispute

164

Israel 37. Timeline: Israel

169

38. Indo-israeli Relations

172

Iran 39. Timeline: Iran

179

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Contents 40. Nuclear Deal

181

41. Indo-iran Relations

184

Myanmar 42. Timeline: Myanmar

191

43. India-myanmar Relations

193

Maldives 44. Timeline: Maldives

201

45. India And China Compete

202

With Others 46. India-africa Ties

207

47. India – Latin America Ties

210

48. Trade With The Eu

213

49. Un Peacekeeping

215

50. In The Unsc

217

ASIA PACIFIC 51. Ties With Japan

221

52. Ties With Australia

224

53. Asean

226

54. South China Sea Dispute

229

55. Quad

232

Books Consulted

235

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Preface We often hear the phrase ‘India has a right to pursue its national interest’, but deciding to pursue the national interest is far removed from successfully pursuing it. This book argues India’s problems with its neighbours are easily solvable if only India can disentangle itself from the stories itself created to convince others. The book argues successful pursuit of self-interest calls for wisdom, freedom from the past and above all compassion. Things have not improved very much since 2000 when then American President Bill Clinton described the Kashmir border as the "most dangerous place in the world." Considering the explosive mix of nuclear weapons, religious radicalism and instability in Afghanistan, it may not be an exaggeration to consider India’s foreign policy as least imaginative and unwise. The whole world may have to pay a heavy price for this policy based on primitive nationalism. This book covers the background and contemporary developments in India’s foreign policy-making, which will help the reader have a critical grasp of the subject. Venkata Mohan, August 2021

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China

CHAPTER ONE

Aksai Chin

Borderlines China claimed Aksai Chin, which is a part of the Ladakh region of Indian J&K. This has been the bone of contention between the two countries. Ladakh was part of Tibet till the 10thcentury, after which it became an independent kingdom. In the 16th century, it became a

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part of the Mughal empire. With the decline of the Mughals, Ladakh reasserted its independence. By the 19th century, Ladakh was a part of Tibet. In 1834, Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler, invaded Ladakh. His general went beyond natural barriers and was killed. The Tibetans then advanced but stopped short of Leh. A non-aggression pact was signed in 1842 between Tibetans and Dogras. It bound both to respect ‘the old, established frontiers,’ though they did not specify any borderline. They had an idea of where their borders ended and there was no man’s land between these borders. In those days, zones could be seen as borders, without any clear delineation. The British did not want Gulab Singh to make another such attack on Tibetan territory. The Treaty of Amritsar forbade him from expanding his territory without British consent. The British also thought of marking a clear boundary between Tibet and Ladakh. The British asked China and Tibet to cooperate in drawing a border, but they did not do it. So there was no demarcation of the Tibet-Ladakh boundary in 1846.

Johnson Line Some part of the Tibet-Ladakh boundary was drawn during 1846-47, but the gaps were filled only in 1865 by W.H. Johnson. It was he who first showed Aksai Chin and some territory to the north of Karakoram within the Kashmir map. Aksai Chin – ‘the desert of white stones’ – is a plateau 17,000 ft above sea level, extending between the ranges of the Karakoram and Kuen Lun. Nothing grows there, no one lives there, but it had once served as a trade route for some part of the year. The Johnson Line was simply a borderline drawn by an explorer, and not a result of any agreement between states. It added a huge chunk of land to the Maharaja’s territory. Johnson was appointed as Kashmir’s commissioner in Ladakh. Johnson’s territorial claims were questioned by some people, an Englishman wrote, for example: ‘The maharaja has no more rights north of

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Karakoram than I have.’ But in 1868, the map of Kashmir was published with the Johnson Line, and subsequent maps depicting this region were drawn on the basis of this map. India’s claim over Aksai Chin is based on this Johnson map. When borders are drawn one-sided, wouldn’t a state give itself as much area as possible? It may usually but not always. The decision about the extent of a boundary also depends on the military strategy of the state. A ‘forward policy’ means claiming the maximum land, and a ‘moderate policy’ means claiming a lesser area.

Macartney–MacDonald Line The Chinese rejected the Kashmir map shown as per Johnson Line and claimed Aksai Chin as theirs. In 1896, they voiced their claim to the British representative, George Macartney. He thought part of Aksai Chin could go to China and part of it could remain in the British territory. But Major General Sir John Ardagh in London proposed a boundary that included the whole of Aksai Chin. The Viceroy Lord Elgin, however, said that any attempt to implement Ardagh’s line would strain relations with China since China had already claimed Aksai Chin. He said that there was no strategic advantage in going beyond the mountains: “An advance would interpose between ourselves and our outposts a belt of the most difficult and impracticable country; it would unduly extend and weaken our military position without securing any corresponding advantage. No invader has ever approached India from this direction, where nature has placed such formidable barriers.” After rejecting Ardagh’s solution, Elgin put forward his own proposal for the border. He said Britain should settle the issue of the Tibet-Kashmir boundary by direct negotiation with Beijing. In 1898, Elgin adopted Macartney’s suggestion that Aksai Chin should be divided between Britain and China along a boundary following the Lak Tsang range. London approved this and it was proposed to China in March 1899 by Sir Claude MacDonald, the British

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