Nom-de-plume – ‘PURAM’ INDIAN COAST GUARD: HOW TO DEVELOP AS A MAJOR MARITIME FORCE FOR THE FUTURE INTRODUCTION 1. India is a country that is known for the ocean and its effective use since the Vedic period. The dominant physical features of the country, its topography and tactical location with respect to Indian Ocean indicate the dependence of the country on the water mass surrounding it. AT Mahan in his historic book, “The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1” has highlighted the importance attached to the Indian Ocean by saying that, “The Indian Ocean is a key to the seven seas, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters”. 2. The country’s booming economy, sea borne trade, maritime threats and International Obligations are expected a take multiple leap in years to come 2. These developments will have a direct bearing on the Coast Guard functioning and growth. The potential threats interfering with our maritime interests will have to be overcome, firmly and resolutely and efforts made to coax regional players into maritime co-operation for mutual protection of economic interests. This environment diktat service visionaries to perceive ICG as the major maritime force for the future and embarked on the conscious comprehensive implementation programme with stringent time-line. 1. AT Mahan,“The Influence of Sea Power upon History“ & also mentioned in Roy Choudhay, “Sea Power and India’s Security” Brassey’s Publication, England, 1995. P. 154. 2. Roy Choudhay, R, “Indian’s Maritime Security” (IDSA & Knowledge world Publication), New Delhi, 2004. PP 12-18. “For a service to transform into a major force, only two ingredients are essential i.e Vision and conscious comprehensive implementation”

2 3. When we talk of ICG as a major force, we perhaps means, self sustainable force having required capacity and capability to undertake all her mandated duties effectively and efficiently including assistance to our neighboring states as part of International cooperation. 4. Although the topic of the essay sound simple and clear, but in reality, it posses many questions to our inquisitive minds, such as, what is the needs to develop ICG as major maritime force. Does our country have the capacity & capability and whether this is our national priority. 5. If answer to above qestions are ‘Yes’, then what is the future force levels required to undertake all assigned roles and responsibility considering the vast sea area and future challenges. What type of infrastructure, maintenance setup and manpower strength is required for sustaining such large force levels, and how should we go about developing such futuristic maritime force in a targeted manner. Through this essay an attempt has been made to analyze in detail these queries and to work out the way ahead for comprehensive development of the ICG. WHY WE A NEED MAJOR FORCE FOR THE FUTURE 6. “It is important that the nation should not allow its soldiers to fight from a position of disadvantage and thus the Armed Forces must relentlessly develop and transform itself at right time to counter the future challenges” 7. The need to develop ICG as a major force stem from the Coast Guard charter / its increasing role and areas of responsibility, various factors affecting it such as changing maritime threats, international relations, and progressive evolution of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) diktats , economic situation, increase in offshore activity and changing face of related crimes at sea.

3 8. India is centrally located in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It has a coast line of 7500 Km and about 1200 islands in two distinct group’s 3 i.e, Andaman & Nicobar to the East, and Lakshadweep & Minicoy to the West. India’s long coastline harbours 09 Coastal States and 04 Union Territories which are clearly at the vanguard of development, and both trade and infrastructure is growing exponentially. 9. The coastline also harbours a host of ports, industrial units, military installations, oil refineries and some nuclear power plants. Similarly, there is enormous offshore development, investment and infrastructure. All these are susceptible to attack and disruption, and thus needs to be safeguarded 24 X 7. 10. The Coast Guard has been given the major responsibility of guarding the Exclusive Economic Zone of India, which covers an area of about 2.01 million sq. kilometers. The area of responsibility is expected to increase by another one million sq km after delineation of the 350 NM of continental shelf for exploitation of sea bed resources (Refer Table I for additional data). The vast sea areas off the coast in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal are very rich in marine resources and therefore, not immune to illegal encroachment by the foreign fishing vessels besides possible infiltration. TABLE I: MARITIME JURISDICTION OF INDIA4 S.NO MARITIME JURISDICTION UNCLOS RATIFIED- 29 JUN 1995 (a) Territorial Waters 45,450 Sq Nm/155,889 Sq Km (b) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 587,600 Sq Nm/2,013410 Sq Km (c) Continental Shelf (being demarcated) Approx 530,000 Sq Km (d) Deep Sea Mining Area Position-180 Cape Camorin 1080 Nm) 150,000 Sq Km, Indian is Pioneer Investor - Aug 1987 3. Roy Choudhay, R, “Indian’s Maritime Security” (IDSA & Knowledge world Publication), New Delhi, 2004. PP. 12-18. Also see “Indian Coast Guard-25 Glorious Years” P.16. 4. Indian Maritime Doctrine (2009), INBR 8, p.67

4 11. Next, the sea by its very nature is not amenable to borders, zones or any other demarcations. Due to the complexities of the Laws of the Seas, laying down boundaries is fraught with disputes. Also India’s IMBL with Pakistan and Bangladesh is not yet defined 5. Since the seas cannot be marked out by pillars, fences, flags etc, there is only a diffused sense of straying into a prohibited zone or jurisdiction, especially on the part of fishermen. 12. Ethnic similarities are utilized by fishermen and terrorists alike to cross-over with ease. This is a matter of grave concern as the hundreds of fishing boats, most of them unregulated, can be utilised by anti-national elements such as terrorists, smugglers, etc. At this stage, it would be appropriate to underscore that anti-national elements do not have to cross any vast ocean spaces to commence mayhem. India geography allows infiltration along the coast by anti-India elements located in the general region. There is no panacea to wipe away these challenges at sea. However, the threats can be kept under check by effective surveillance which any way is the raison-ď-être of the ICG. 13. Further, countries globally admired economy is highly dependent on oceanic trade, with over 90 % of India’s trade by volume and 77 % by value being sea borne. Maritime trade and shipping is booming, and ports of all sizes and ownerships are being created. By last count, there were 13 major ports and 187 minor ports in India 6. All have a central role to play in our economic growth, and all are vulnerable to a variety of threats from non-state actors. 14. The Indian fishing industry is the sixth largest in the world. It has the largest number of fishing boats viz. approx ½ a million. It may be strategically appreciated that whilst this is a great national asset and needs protection, it also poses a live threat, as indeed witnessed during the 26/11. 3. Roy Choudhay, R, “Indian’s Maritime Security” (IDSA & Knowledge world Publication), New Delhi, 2004. PP. 56-57. 4. Paleri P., “Role of Indian Coast Guard in Maritime Security of Indian”. Knowledge World Publication, New Delhi, 2004 P. 116

5 15. India’s maritime interests in this vast expanse of water include oil, offshore oil installations, non-conventional energy potential, and the living and non-living resources of the sea, including fish and the mineral wealth on the seabed 7. 16. ICG task includes not just about defending all these valuable assets in and around the coast and within the Maritime Zones of India, but also is prevention of access to the Indian hinterland by all types of anti-nationals, criminals and nefarious elements including terrorists, through the medium of the coast using ships, fishing vessels or other small craft. 17. Thus, the threat scenario has been increasing in both scale and scope, and it can be summarily grouped into three broad categories:- (a) Security Issues (i) Asymmetric Treats, Gun running & Piracy (ii) Security of Islands & off shore installations (iii) Security of maritime traffic and fishing community (b) Safety Issues (i) Human life & Property at sea (ii) Oil Pollution at sea (iii) Endangered marine species (c) Economic Offence (i) Poaching (ii) Smuggling (iii) Illegal exploitation of marine resources Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunity & Threats (SWOT) Analysis 18. So, have seen our area of responsibility and the perceived threats in the area, an effort has been made to undertake SWOT analysis for appreciating, strategically the 7. Paleri P., “Changing Concept of National Security & maritime Model for India”. P. 165. Also see article by Jasjit Singh on maritime security, available on Internet.

6 need for developing ICG as a Major force of the future:- (a) Strengths (i) The strategic location of the country (ii) Centre of major trade/oil routes passing (iii) Growing economy (iv) Strong amidst Indian Ocean Region countries (v) Representation in Regional alignments (vi) Requisite wherewithal and reach (b) Weaknesses (i) Lack of recognition of the ICG service (ii) Poor funding, legislation, administrative and infrastructural set up. (iii) Lack of joint functioning for maritime stakeholder (iv) Vastness of the sea expanse (v) Porous nature of our sea borders and coastal areas (c) Opportunity (i) Govt. Support post 26/11 (ii) International Maritime Organisation Imperatives (iii) National and International relief tasks (iv) Regional alignments & International cooperation (v) Expression of our benign roles (SAR, Relief Operations, etc.) (d) Threats (i) Maritime terrorism & other asymmetrical threats (ii) Maritime Piracy (iii) Pollution response (iv) Protection of natural resources (Illegal exploitation) (v) Maritime disasters (vi) Threat to oilfields and nuclear/atomic installations on the coast

7 19. The need for strengthening ICG can also perceived from the fact that Coast Guard because of its non-military 8 tag is more accepted for cooperation internationally than the military forces like Navy. It is because; behavior of the states and dynamics of their relations is strongly affected by the military factors. This subject matter has been analyzed in detailed in the succeeding paragraphs. ADVANTAGES OF ICG OVER NAVAL FORCES "The arrest of a foreign vessel by a warship may be highly provocative, whereas arrest by a Coast Guard ship may be accepted as legitimate law enforcement". Sam Bateman 20. Greater use of the sea, increased illegal activities and concern for the marine environment have increased the number and diversity of the international regime and made the business of maritime management and policing more complex. In this scenario, the use of Coast Guard is more effective than warships, view the military dilemma associated with warship may fuel the political sensitive areas between the states 9. 21. It is well known that even innocuous naval port visit by warship of another state provide an opportunity for gathering intelligence both by the host nation about visiting ship and by the visiting warships about host nation. Tensions are also evident with regard to the latent, and from time to time not so latent, suspicions held by some countries about the capabilities and intentions of others. It is interesting, that even if intentions of the state is clear, the Gunboat factor will definitely complicate and confuse the security signal, send to others. 8. Coast Guard Act 1978, Chapter III, Section 14 depict the duties of ICG. The act does not describe the war time role of the service. Thus the non-military tag. 9. Barry Buzan. “People state and fear, the National security problems in the International Relations”, Tranasia Publishers, New Delhi, 1987 (first Indian Edition), P. 175

8 22. This restricts cooperation between military forces, view intentions and ideology in international relations governs the power struggles and security matters of the state 10. On that factor Malaysia and Indonesia rejected the proposal of the United States for patrolling their strategic straits. The presence of US naval forces in their water raised the question of their sovereignty 11. Had it been the proposal of the USCG, then the situation might have been different. 23. Similarly, the meaning of the term innocent passage through the territorial waters has been differently interpreted for warships by many nations. The varied interpretations are the potential source of conflicts. According to Indonesia, interpretation of these norms is that, “Submarine must sail on the surface, weapons and surveillance radars must be switched off and aircraft carriers must keep their planes on decks" But warships of United States of America (USA) does not agree to this interpretation. 24. Thus, it is difficult to find solution for strengthening naval cooperation in the IOR. However, the Coast Guard like organization is proving beneficial in overcoming some of the political sensitivities and strengthening International cooperation. 25. Moreover, there also involve the issue of costs; Coast Guard vessels and aircraft are generally less expansive then naval warships. Hence, it fits well within the underdeveloped economy of the regional littorals for countering non-military threat. This is one of the main reason why more and more nations has been establishing such peace time maritime law enforcement agencies, and many nations are looking towards ICG for assistance in establishing there Coast Guard like organization eg. Sri Lanka. 26. Having analyzed the need for development of ICG, the next logical step is ‘what we want in addition to what we have for transforming ICG into a major force’. 8. See note 7, P.187 and SK Singh, “Indian Ocean Security” Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Aug 2005, PP. 168-169. 9. Khurana, GS, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Convergence plus Cooperation equals Resonance” Strategic Analysis (Journal of IDSA), Vol 28 Jul-Sep 2004, P. 420.

9 WHAT WE NEED: ENVISAGED ICG VISION “A vision is not a planned target; it is an articulation of the desired end result in broader terms”. APJ Abdul Kalam 27. ICG vision should be both comprehensive and harmonious. It must encompass all the myriad aspects for self reliance force of the future. It must be balance and synthesize all the divergent views that complete in the pursuit of self fulfillment. 28. The proposed vision statement of ICG should be, “The Indian Coast Guard in future will contribute maximum towards maintaining maritime order and security, promote stable regime in the EEZ, for ensuring free and interrupted flow of sea borne trade, so as to enable country to pursue her maritime interests and manage marine resources in an ecologically sustainable manner in accordance with agreed principles of international law” 29. It is can be perceived that the Coast Guard by the end of XIV Development Plan (2022-27) will achieve the essential growth required for emerging as a major maritime force, which will not only cater the security needs of maritime India, but also, will play a key role in the security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) against non-military challenges. FIGURE I: ICG MAIN AREAS OF DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES INFRA SUPPORT LEGISLATION MANPOWER PLATFORMS MAINTENANCE

10 30. The performance of an organization will depend upon perfect harmony all major facet of an organization as indicated in Figure I. Any mismatch will cause failure. 31. Therefore, we need to strike a balance regarding the number of platforms vis-à-vis manpower & other allied infrastructure and maintenance & logistics facilities required. The broad requirements of the future ICG as perceived by the author of the essay are as follows:- Force Level (a) We need to develop force to maintain each operations-winning capability that is relevant and effective against the future challenges. A Coast Guard ship will be always at vigil at sea, a few Sanskrit lines will be apt for highlighting her strength, Ya Nisha Sarvabhutanam Tasya Jagarti Sayyami. Thus, we need to adopt a de novo approach to face development with emphasis on capability build. For the future this means:- (i) Greater focus on capability rather than no. of platforms (ii) Increasing precision of effect (iii) Flexibility and agility in terms of platform and equipment (b) We cannot have a situation when our ships rendered impotent just because the weather becomes unkind. This dictates the need to have ships of certain size. Size is also relevant in the context of capability. (c) About 80 Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) will be the ideal work force for the future ICG. This will not only cater the requirement on two coast and A&N Island, but also have required reach for diplomatic requirements in the IOR. These ships can carry helicopters which further enhance their reach and surveillance potential. Further about 150 Fast Patrol Vessels (FPVs)/ Interceptor Boats of C-141 class will be apt high speed platform for close coast patrol and the coastal security requirements.

11 (d) In addition we needs about 100 fixed wing surveillance aircraft with the state-of-the-art equipment and sensors like ELTA, FLIR, AIS, SATCOM, etc. We also require a fleet of 150 ship and shore based helicopters (Single/ twin engine). Further, about 25 specialized SAR version helicopters 12 should be in our inventory. The rational for the number of platform mentioned here can be proved with correct strategic appreciation of the situation taking into account the vastness of our area of responsibility and the future challenges. (e) The daunting task of 24/7 surveillance in our area of responsibility can be eased by taking advantage of the evolving technologies, especially, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles / Underwater Unmanned Vehicles 13 in future. (f) The support ships like pollution response vessels, seagoing tugs, Salvage vessels, barges and fire fighting vessels, etc., are also required for carrying out our mandated tasks effectively and efficiently, and thus need to be acquired as quickly as possible. Infrastructure & Allied Facilities (a) The ICG is on its way to establish 42 stations in near future. Considering the 75 Nm distance between station, we may envisage a few more station in the next two plans. It is apparent that in any case our station number is not likely to increase beyond 50 till 2025, which include logistic support base for the Indian Coast Guard Academy at Azhikal, Kerala. The 15 air units will be adequate for covering our entire coast and our areas of maritime Interest, including SAR requirements in the Indian Search and Rescue Region. 12. United States of America Coast Guard has a fleet of state-of-the-art SAR helicopters. This information has been available on Internet. 13. Military Technology, Vol XXIXX Issue 3, 2005 & ‘Military Training-Army & Marine Corps facing Challenges to address future requirement’, US Publication Journal - Jul 2010

12 (b) If we have to create a meaningful infrastructure and allied facilities, we need to acquire adequate land in all ICG bases. It is irony, that till date, the land holding of the Coast Guard taking into account all stations and units is only about 2100 acres. Our immediate infrastructure requirements include creation of state-of-the-art Coast Guard Headquarters (which is long overdue, OTM/married accommodation & basic amenities, and berthing facilities in all CG bases. Maintenance Facilities (a) The timely maintenance of surface platforms is paramount for around the clock readiness of the fleet. The ICG at present has no dockyard/ repair facility or Aircraft repair yard of its own, which is affecting assets availability period. Thus, considering the future maintenance requirements for handing huge force level, there is a need for creation of CG dockyards with shiplift and transfer facilities one each on both the coasts (Ratnagiri on the West & Dhamra on the East). (b) The aircraft repair yards can be established one each in the existing 05 Coast Guard Regions. There will also be a need to establish Base Maintenance Unit (BMU) at all District Headquarters and Coast Guard Afloat Support Unit (CASU) co-located with the independent ICG station. Logistic support (a) Sound logistic support is essential for sustaining operational and availability of assets. Toward this endeavour there is a need to develop ICG Store Depot co-located with all District Headquarters. The critical stores can be stocked up in these store deport, which will ensure less down time of assets during OPDEF/STA. The air store deport can be co-located with aircraft repair yard. All CG stores deport should have the state-of-the-art infrastructure, which will be interconnected through ‘Hub’ established at the CGHQ, New Delhi.

13 Training (a) Training will be the major focus area of our dynamic service, if we have to tap opportunities on our way. Mindful of the perceived challenges, the service has charted its course and embarked on an ambitious plan for revamping its training capabilities. For this vision to become reality there is an immediate need for dedicated training organization with creation of SAG level posts, both at the field and for the Headquarters for effective administration and coordination of training activities (Figure II). Figure II: Future ICG Training Organization (b) It should be the endeavour of ICG to have the proposed organization in place by the end of Coast Guard Perspective Plan (2012-27) and caters infrastructure and other requirements for ab-initio training of Officers and Men in the XIV Development Plan (2022-27). Director General Indian Coast Guard DDG CG (ADG) DDG (Trg) at CGHQ IG (Sea Trg) DIG (Air Trg) ADG(W) CG Workup Team (CGWT) Trg Ship (s) Comdt (IG) ICG Academy CGTC (Kochi) PD/Dir (Trg)

14 Legislation Powers (a) Unless we have a strong legislation backup, we will not be able to perform our duties at sea effectively. We need stringent law and powers, particular for pollution response, piracy, maritime terrorism, etc. All this process will require a long lead time thus need to be initiated concurrently. Human Resource Management (a) The ICG is likely to achieve a manpower target of 30,000 till 2025. Our future recruitment would have to be more aggressive as well as selective. The overall intellectual capability of personnel would have to be of a higher order from the inception stage itself and would later have to be honed with superior and efficient training methodologies, to handle challenges of the future. B. Tech entry scheme for the GD Officer is considered essential. The same has already been started in the Navy. All persons would have to be technically training and vertically specialized in a particular field for maximisation of the force multiplication effort. (b) Today, soldiers look beyond, ‘Pay, food and Patiala peg’ and look forward quality of like and comparative pay packet with other services. Thus, constraints with offering lucrative pay packets would have to be made up for by improvements in the quality of services provided to personnel in order to attract quality personnel and keep them satisfied. This is most important factor and we should not overlook it. Cadre Management (a) Despite the best efforts to prevent accidents, manmade and natural disaster will inevitably occur. The sea is an unforgiving environment, and mariner will find in distress in all conditions. Since, Inception, Coast Guard has undertaken more than 1600 SAR mission and saved lives of about 6000 mariners besides

15 critical medical evacuations at sea. The ICG SAR requirements will increases manifold in future, which dictates the need for a separate dedicated SAR cadre in the ICG, which will also address our disaster management obligations. FIGURE III: INDIAN SEARCH AND RESCUE REGION (b) Approximately 120 million tonnes of crude oil arrives at our ports each year as import (Figure IV). The industry deploys mammoth tank ships such as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) and Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) to achieve economy of scales14. Technological advancements in ship design notwithstanding, the traffic density, volumes of import, and volumes per ship are all factors that place us at a very significant risk of an oil spill of phenomenal proportions in the event of an accident, collision or grounding of these oil tankers. (c) The pollution response incidents may be less frequent, but potentially more severe because of the increased volumes and broader array of hazardous material carried by ships. Specially designated sanctuaries and zones to protect marine life will require closer monitoring by the specially trained and equipped ICG team. Therefore, there is also a need for Creation of a dedicated Pollution Response Cadre for the ICG. 14. Roy Choudhay, R, “Indian’s Maritime Security” (IDSA & Knowledge world Publication), New Delhi, 2004 in topic economic dimension of maritime India. PP. 06-30.

16 FIGURE IV: OIL IMPORTS V/S PRODUCTION IN MT (2002 - 09) (d) The Government has sanctioned ICG for creation of a highly specified Rapid Response Team (RRT) post 26/11. It should be our endeavour to developed RRT on the bases of Marine Commando (MARCOS) and it should form separate cadre as being in the case of Navy. Organizational Changes (a) The geographically extent of the different ICG region is dissimilar. More so, the theatre commanders of two maritime services, the Navy and ICG are not co-located. The two services have to work in close co-ordination in war & peace to synergizing the security efforts at sea. The lessons learnt from the Falkland Campaign regarding the essence of joint planning and coordination further justify the statement made above. Thus, to have an effective operational management of the two seaboards there is a need for creation of exclusive Regional Headquarters to look after the seaward security of the two or three maritime state (Figure V). This necessitates geographical bifurcation of the existing Coast Guard Regions. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 oil consumption production imports

17 (b) We may consider upgrading the existing Coast Guard Regional Headquarters at Mumbai and Chennai as ‘Coast Guard Western Command Headquarters’ and ‘Coast Guard Eastern Command Headquarters’, which will be headed by HAG level Officer of the rank of Addl Director General (ADG). (c) The ADG being 03 Star Officer, will be called Coast Guard Commander-inChief (CG C-IN-C) and will be the apex authority exclusively for the respective seaboards. He will exercise the overall operational and administration command & Control through the two Regional Commander functioning under him. 32. Summing up, it can be said that the vision for the ICG, need to be documented and promulgated to all field units, so that they strive to remain on track by undertaking regular introspection, honest audits and apply course corrections as necessary. FIGURE V – FUTURE ICG REGIONAL STRUCTURE CG C-IN-C (West) ADG Level Officer at Mumbai co-located with FOC-IN-C West CG C-IN-C (East) ADG Level Officer at Vizag co-located with FOC-IN-C East CG C-IN-C (W) CG C-IN-C (E) COMCG (NE) COMCG (A&N) COMCG (SW) COMCG (NW) COMCG (SE) CINCAN

18 DO WE HAVE THE CAPACITY : OUR PAST EXPERIENCES 33. The management sciences indicate that for any decision on development projects is based on only two factors as follows:- (a) Need (b) Capacity 34. In the first few paragraphs of the essay, it has been established that the first requirement i.e the need for ICG to develop has already exists. The next requirement is capacity, which depends upon the following factors:- (a) Government support in term of sanctions and Finances (b) Effectiveness of ICG leadership (c) External Factors like Government policies, capacity of DPSUs, support of state Government for land availability and berthing facilities, etc. 35. The question that attracts the attention of our mind, ‘Is the development of ICG as a major maritime force for the future is Priority’ of the Govt. Our past experience says that defence has been traditionally been low on the scale of national priorities and Coast Guard is no exception. But it has been seen in the past that whenever we have approached MoD, the required support has been extended to the service. The Govt. has accorded loads of sanction and budget post 26/11 for ICG to strengthening in a time bound manner, only thing we must ensure is that we consume our entire annual capital budget, because of the obvious reasons we all know. 36. The GDP growth can perhaps be optimistically pegged at 6-8% over the next twenty years or so. Inflation also would be at about 6-8% 15. Thus, in future the budget availability will be more or less in same proportionate, what we have been seeing in the present time. The Coast Guard since does not form part of the defence budget will have its standard annual incremental budget. 15. GM Hiranandani, Coping with a “Logically Uncertain” Defence Budget. Indian Defence Review. Vol. 19(4) Oct- Dec 2004.

19 37. Peeping into the past, it can be seen that the Coast Guard has had a sluggish growth over the 30 years of its existence. The service has only achieved less than 50 percent of the force levels envisaged in terms of ships, smaller crafts, aircraft and helicopters. CAG report of 2011 on, ‘The role and function of Indian Coast Guard’ also highlighted that ICG in the IX Plan was able to achieve only about 50 percent of the planned acquisitions and only 43 percent in the X plan. Whatever, may be the reason, it means that we have missed our planned targets in these two development plans. 38. The intention here is not to discuss the whys of what has happened in the past. The emphasis is on the need for realistic long term vision document and its implementation with periodical reviews/updation without changing the basis focus. This was apparent in the XI plan (2007-12) where 100% planned targets and schemes were achieved with effective leadership and efforts of the ICG. 39. The last few paragraphs clearly reveal that we do have the capacity also, only exception being external factors like Government policies, capacity of DPSUs, support of state Government, etc., which also can be overcome with close liaison and persistent efforts. The next thought that tinkle our minds is that, since we have the need and we have the capacity too for development of ICG as a major force for the future, then at present where we are and which direction we are heading. WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE HEADING 40. Let us review the present platform availability and capacity to carry out such a complex task. The present force level of 15 Offshore Patrol Vessels along with 50 other associated vessels and Hovercraft is considered highly inadequate for effective surveillance at sea. The present inventory of air assets, stands at 28 Dorniers, 17 single engine chetaks and three advance light helicopters, is also not enough for air surveillance of wide area of India’s EEZ.

20 41. The assets are not equally distributed; ICG at A&N is attending to maritime security commitments with only 06 ships, 03 boats, 02 fixed wings aircraft and 01 helicopter for an area of responsibility which is equal to 1/3 of that of total India’s EEZ. The subsequent paragraph will justify this statement. 42. Considering the maintenance programme of the ICG assets, at a time only 10-12 ships can be expected to be operational. Moreover, these ships are distributed between two coasts and the island territories. Except the Hovercraft and Interceptor boats the average minimum speed of these ships is not more than 20 knots, which means it would reach the other perimeter of the EEZ in not less than nine hours. Further, if one calculates the radar range of about twelve ships at same distance from each other, the area of surveillance in relation to size of the entire EEZ is diminutive indeed. 43. The Dornier with an operational speed of 200 knots can stay at outer perimeter of EEZ for about an hour only. The single engine Chetaks can operate in the visual range of ship only. These aircraft also lack ability to enforce the law when required to do so. Even when they detect a legal violation in the EEZ, they can at best communicate the location, speed and direction of the ship/trawler to the Headquarters/ships in the area to actually apprehend the violators. This makes Coast Guard presently an inadequate force for effective maritime surveillance of our sea areas. We have landed up in this situation because; over a period of time the expansion has not kept pace with the time. 44. However, the period from Jan 2009 onwards has been a historic phase in the annals of the service, wherein, large number of sanction for acquisition of platforms both ship & Aircraft, establishment of two new Regional Headquarters, one District Headquarters, many stations & Air units, land acquisition, expansion of logistic facilities, ICG Academy, manpower, Coastal Surveillance Network, works & Infrastructure, manpower, etc., has been accorded by the Government. Now, the service is well on its way to double its capabilities in next 5-6 years, and tripling in 10-12 years or so.

21 45. Therefore, the energetic beginning has already been made for strengthening and expansion of the ICG in a holistic manner. That means, the service is heading in the right direction. So, what we just need to do is to draw our road maps for the future growth and follow it up diligently dedicatedly. THE WAY AHEAD 46. The expansion of the service needs to be planned very carefully in a progressive manner taking into consideration the requirement of manpower, logistics & maintenance and infrastructure development. Towards this, we must arm our self by formulation separate templates for force level planning, manpower, infrastructure planning and logistic and maintenance needs, which will be dovetailed in the comprehensive development vision and expansion plan of the ICG. Our development flow chain should include check points of conception of vision, document and implementation (Figure VI). 47. The well thought off comprehensive vision document encompassing all aspects of development will be our’ Bible and Guiding tool’ to transform our service into a major force of the future. The time is short and, thus we don’t have the luxury to rest on our ores. All actions towards capacity building have to be initialed on fast track and in a project mode. FIGURE VI – FLOW CHAIN OF ICG DEVELOPMENT ICG Vision Documentation Implementation ICG transformation into a Major Force

22 48. During the course of transformation there will be difficulties and challenges for which we need appropriate actions at right time. Swami Vivekananda, once said, “If what we are now has been the result of our past actions, it certainly follows that whatever we have envisaged for the future can be achieved by our present actions”. Thus, we all need to put our shoulders to the wheel & forge ahead as a team. 49. In major cities like Chennai, Kolkata, New Mangalore, Gandhinagar, Port Blair, Karwar, etc., the state government will not be able to meet the land requirements of the ICG. However, at these places Army/ Navy/Air Force are in possession of huge quantity of land. To mitigate our land problems, we may explore the feasibility of transferring about 30-35 acres of land for ICG development. No doubt, it is easier said than done, it will not be easy sail, there will be difficulties, but we have no other choice, we have to continue our effort in the larger interest of our service growth. 50. Any Organisation would like to have state-of-the-art infrastructure in place as quickly as possible. However, considering the process involved in sanctions, environmental clearances, consolidation of resources, construction work by MES and other factors like complexity of the project, etc. it will require lead time of about a decade or two for full-fledged infrastructure to be in place. 51. Most of our units will be functioning from remote locations like Minicoy, Androth, Murud Janzira, Frezergunj, Dahanu, Mayabunder, Kamorta, Jakkhu, etc., all these units by default have been categorized as family stations. However, in these locations we will not be able to provide basic amenities, because of less manpower strength as required in accordance with the Defence Works Procedure (DWP) 2007 and the scales of Accommodation (SoA) 2009. Towards this we may seek special approval of the MoD for weaving off manpower criteria for development of infrastructure in remote locations or alternatively remote stations may be categorized as non family stations, and housing needs for these stations may be catered in the nearby major ICG stations/Air units.

23 52. The future force level induction and establishment of stations/air units should commensurate with the manpower induction. If there is mismatch, the projects may be deferred accordingly, otherwise, people will be stress out, without any fruitful result. 53. We need to focus on working out the targets and time-line for all our cardinal check points of ICG development. A 25-30 year period is considered suitable, that means our target period is till the end of the XIV Development Plan (2022-27). Table II: Proposed Time-Line for ICG Development Sl. Project Timeline (a) Formulation of detailed road map for each facet of CG development like Operational imperative vis-à-vis Force Level requirement, Infrastructure, Logistic & Maintenance setup, Manpower & Legislation. 2014 (b) Finalization of ‘Concept Paper’ and formulation ICG Vision Document for comprehensive development of the service 2015 (c) Manpower sanction for modernization monitoring team & positioning of such teams at nodal points for accord of various sanction, clearances and monitoring of Infrastructure and other capacity building projects 2016 (d) Changes in the organization structure and regional setup 2016 (e) Land Acquisition as per authorized land holding at all bases 2013-20 (f) Platform Induction alongwith manpower. Establishment of CGGIS 2013-25 (g) Development of Infrastructure including maintenance facilities, dockyards, aircraft yards & logistic chain management 2013-25 (h) Establishment of full-fledged ICG Academy with training Courses for EP, Personnel of other Services & Foreign Nationals 2017 (j) Creation of separate braches like SAR, Pollution Response, Law & RRT. Creation of Directorate of Strategic Planning at CGHQ 2018 (k) Establishment of state-of-the-art Coast Guard Headquarters, CDA(CG) 2018 (l) MoU for Cooperation with all Coast Guards and other such agencies in the Indian Ocean Region and conduct of annual exercises 2018 (m) Emergence of ICG as major maritime force (At the end of XIV Plan) 2027 54. At times the time-line may seem unattainable, but our endeavour should be to continue with our effort to achieve it within the time limit (The broad time-line proposed for the growth & development of the ICG as major force has been indicated at Table II).

24 55. Experience says that, if we have broad targets with time-line than only all resources and energy will be concentrated by one and all to achieve it. One such example was America’s President John F. Kennedy’s statement in the year 1962 that, ‘America would put a man on the moon by 1969’. It surely seemed unlikely at that time, but it motivated private industry and Government agencies alike to marshal their resources, lay out a plan, then coordinate and cooperate to make it happen. In fact, although President John F. Kennedy did not live to see it, on 20 Jul 1969, Niel Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed at moon. RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS 56. There is no cut-and-dried solution for accomplishment of our Vision. A few suggestions/recommendations for developing ICG as a major maritime force for the future are as follows:- (a) Formulation of ICG vision Document (b) Establishment of the state-of-the-art Coast Guard Headquarters (c) Re-distribution of geographical area of the regions and creation of Coast Guard Command Headquarters at Mumbai & Vizag. (d) Introduction of new branches in ICG (Pollution Response, SAR, etc.) (e) MoU for Cooperation with all Coast Guards in the Indian Ocean Region (f) Establishment of dedicated ICG Academy (g) Creation of Directorate of Strategic Planning at CGHQ (h) Project and task based teams at nodal points (j) Acquisition of land for development of the ICG on top priority (k) Acquisition of platforms in time bound manner (l) Specialized training for Rapid Response Team (RRT) (m) ICG Store Depot & logistic hubs co-located with all District Headquarters (n) CG dockyards one each on two coasts & slipway in A&N Islands

25 (p) Platform induction & establishment of new units with sanctioned manpower (q) Creation of infrastructure & allied facilities in a time bound manner (r) Joint exercises with littorals as part of the confidence building (s) Berthing facilities at all Stations & Hoverports at selected stations. (t) Aircraft Repair Yard in each of the existing 05 Coast Guard Regions (u) Pacing with the technology, rather than catch up (v) Inclusion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & Underwater Unmanned Vehicles in the CG Plan (w) Perfect harmony of CG resources/tools for development of the service (x) Mid Term review of our development plans for course correction (y) Continues efforts for Improvement conditions of the service & allowance at par with the defence forces/civil world CONCLUSION 57. Unless separate roadmaps of each directorate at CGHQ is evolved and dovetailed into comprehensive ICG vision document, we may not be able to yield the desired growth and may land up in catch 22 situation. 58. Mr MJ Akbar, Editorial Director, India Today once said, ‘We are by temperament a shot cut people, we do not like waiting for due process, whether in a plan, project or towards a destination’. We must keep this golden statement in mind, our expansion planning must be well coordinated progressive exercise with focus on all parameters for comprehensive development of the service. This is, by no measure, a small task and will require a greater support from all other stakeholders and Government. 59. There is no second thought that it is the present leadership which has to decide where we are and where we should be in the times to come. There will be pressure on ICG but we must not lose our focus. There is an old saying that, “It is more pressure

26 and hard grinding which carves the diamond to a beautiful shape’. Nothing is impossible to achieve if we have the positive attitude, right team well thought off plans and synergy between field functions. 60. Notwithstanding the burgeoning set of challenges, the Indian Coast Guard has always responded to all challenges at sea. Nothing epitomizes the enduring duty of the Coast Guard more appropriately than the epic verse, ‘Paritranaya Sadhunam Vinashaya Cha Dushkrutam’ - the good and pious are kept under my care and protection, the wicked and cruel, will be pushed on the way to elimination. 61. All measures taken for strengthening and expansion will take a few years to translate our vision into reality and in the interim, we have to do our best with the limited resources available, through innovation and synergizing the efforts with all stake holders. 62. The way our projects presently, is being progressed for fructification by our committed and dedicated teams positioned at nodal points, and the support expended by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), it will not be overwhelming to say that the, ‘ICG is well on its way to become a professional and balanced maritime force of the future’, which will have the capability and capacity for meeting the increasing maritime challenges truly in sync with its motto, “WE PROTECT”. (Total Words- 4992 excluding Index, foot notes, bibliography & single alphabet words)

27 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books/Journals 1. AT Mahan,“The Influence of Sea Power upon History” Brassey’s Publication, England, reprinted in 1995. 2. GM Hiranandani, Coping with a “Logically Uncertain” Defence Budget. Indian Defence Review. Vol. 19(4) Oct- Dec 2004. 3. Roy Choudhary, R “India’s Maritime Security” (IDSA and knowledge world publication), New Delhi, 2004 4. Paleri, P, “Role of Coast Guard in Maritime Security of India”, Knowledge World Publication) New Delhi, 2004 5. India Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8, IHQ, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2009 6. Roy Choudhay, R, “Sea Power and India’s Security” Brassey’s Publication, England, 1995. 7. Coast Guard Act 1978 & CAG Report on ICG, 2011, available on internet. 8. Khurana, GS, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Convergence plus Cooperation equals Resonance” Strategic Analysis (Journal of IDSA). 9. Indian Vision: 2020, GoI report available on Internet. Periodicals 1. Proceedings, (US Navy Publication), December 2008 2. Military Technology, Vol XXIXX Issue 7, 2009 3. Trishul, Services Staff College No.1, 2012 4. Report on proceedings of the Coast Guard Commanders Conferences 5. Military Training-Army & Marine Corps facing Challenges to address future requirement, US Publication Journal - Jul 2010 6. Dur Drishti, The Defence Management Journal, CDM, Vol XII, Jun 2012 Electronic/Print Media 1. Times of India (Reports/Editorials on Maritime/Coastal Security) 2. The Hindustan Times (Editorial-“Foundation stone laying ceremony of ICG Academy by the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri”) Informal Interaction 1. Officers of Indian Coast Guard & Indian Navy 2. Commanding Officers of CG ships 3. Indian Maritime Foundation (IMF) officials

28 BLANK (For Comments of the Judges)