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Africa-s Economic Recovery Africa-s Economic Recovery

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Dr Donald Kaberuka on Africa's prospects for post covid-19 economic recovery. Why is Rwanda in Mozambique? The BIG Interview Martin Ngoga says electoral justice is needed not term limits. Economy Politics Security Africa's Economic Recovery Quarterly, March - june, 2022 Price: 5USD www.panafricanreview.rw


33 1 70 81 20 70 [email protected] ABIDJAN KIGALI PARIS www.southbgroup.com Fostering Pan-African Champions • Corporate financial services • Connecting capital and financing needs • Structuring ambitious PPP projects • Strategic sovereign advisory and implementation in order to maximize assets, investments, and opportunities Innovative Advisory and Investment Services Firm SouthBridge SouthBridge Investments (SBI) • A new major development, incorporated in December 2020 • Asset Management • Development & promotion of investment vehicles with a long-term view on Africa • Innovative solutions in technology, finance, industry, women entrepreneurship, green & blue infrastructure solutions • Direct investment with long-term capital • More than 40 experienced staff coming from almost 20 countries across the continent • A strong network of engaged principals, experts and business connections in Africa and around the world A Dedicated and Creative Team of Professionals


250 782520302 [email protected] PanAfricanRevie CONTRIBUTORS Martin K. Ngoga Jonathan Said Jean-Luc Galabert Eric Mwakibete Copy Editor Dr Kingsley Ugwuanyi Layout Nizigiyimana Hassan Umande Prospects for Africa’s Economic Recovery After Covid-19 | Page 04 One Year of The WTO Under Okonjo-Iweala: Challenges of Access to Medicine for Africa | Page 07 Politics at Centre of Poor Agriculture Performance | Page 10 Why We Must Redesign Our Food Production Systems | Page 13 Medical Tourism – Why Not Africa? | Page 16 Rwanda’s Economic Diplomacy and the Opportunities for Enhanced South-South Cooperation | Page 20 From Sankara to Soludo: Positioning Africa’s Economies for Recovery, Resilience and Regeneration | Page 23 It Is Time to Switch on the Transformative Power of Industrial Policy | Page 25 Africa Should Not Have Infrastructure It Cannot Maintain | Page 28 Covid-19 and the Return to Life's Essentials | Page 30 POLITICS SECURITY ECONOMY Term Limits Is a defeatist Approach that Escapes the Major Question of Electoral Justice | Page 34 The RPF and Moral Legitimacy | Page 37 Magufuli Did Stumble While Running But Never Slowed Down or Stopped | Page 40 ANC No Longer Assured of Victory in South Africa | Page 43 COP 26: This Time, Africa Must Not Accept Being Bullied | Page 45 Human Rights Watch Should Know that Victims’ Rights Are Human Rights | Page 47 CCM Could Rule Tanzania Forever But For the Enemy Within | Page 52 France, ECOWAS: The Blind Leading the Deaf in Mali’s Troubled Transition | Page 56 The Belligerents in the Ethiopian Conflict Have Failed the Moral Test | Page 59 Why is Rwanda in Mozambique? The BIG Interview with Colonel Ronald Rwivanga Rwanda Defense Forces Spokesperson | Page 64


Prospects for Africa’s Economic Recovery After Covid-19 Dr Donald Kaberuka ECONOMY The coronavirus pandemic has inflicted heavy damage to households and businesses – large and small – to an extent never seen before. As governments tried to marshal resources to protect lives, it quickly became apparent that, in many cases, livelihoods were affected as economies came to a standstill as a result of different measures, including lockdowns. In many countries, social safety nets were inadequate, and this created all sorts of vulnerabilities. It is important to place the covid pandemic in its proper perspective before delving into what economic recovery will require. First, we must bear in mind that although Covid-19 has had a severe Photo from Google Image Africa must turn its challenges into economic opportunities 04


impact, Africa is still confronted with pre-existing pandemics, such as HIV/AIDs, TB, and Malaria, which continue to kill more people than Covid. Those pandemics are still not receiving the attention they deserve in terms of a global response because they are essentially a problem for the Global South. In the 1990s, it took a long time, a decade, for anti-retroviral drugs to become affordable and accessible. The question before us, therefore, becomes: Is there a risk that covid replicates the same trajectory? That is to say, once the Global North has vaccinated a critical number of its people, covid becomes an endemic problem for low-income countries like pre-existing pandemics. If so, that will have a significant impact on the economies as they suffer the burden of both the old pandemics and the new pandemic. The economic recovery of the countries in the Global South will essentially depend on four factors: i) the path of the coronavirus ii) the rate of vaccination iii) global supply chains iv) multilateral action. At this point, no one is certain as to the path of the covid virus as it continues to mutate. Moreover, the rate of vaccination is still low, less than 10% in Africa as a whole. On the economic side, the virus has interrupted the global supply chains, the cost of transporting goods has increased dramatically, and the impact is being felt by importers and consumers alike at the marketplace. So, there’s enormous work that needs to be done for the kind of recovery that will address these vulnerabilities. But where will the resources, both public and private, come from at a time of massive social needs and contracting fiscal base? The ability of countries to galvanise domestic (and to attract foreign) investment will determine whether we can widen the tax base, build social inclusion through massive job creations, and create social safety nets. In this regard, investment will be key. To return to growth, Africa needs to have a rate of investment – public and private – above 30% of GDP. Moreover, it will be time to turn economic growth into economic transformation. After all, there is evidence that since independence in the 1960s Africa’s extractive economies (rich in minerals) have not performed any better than those that are not endowed with vast natural resources. Dependency on natural resources will have to steadily give way to participation in the global supply chain at higher levels. We are entering a phase where some of the commodity producers will have a huge advantage: copper prices are the highest ever; and there are similar trends for cobalt, etc. This trend is mainly driven by the energy transition – from fossil fuels. However, the need to diversify our economies remains paramount for obvious reasons. For one thing, relying on commodity prices to foster growth is risky because producers are vulnerable to market volatility. In addition to fostering inclusive and non-volatile growth, Africa needs to turn its challenges into opportunities for investment. For instance, this pandemic has exposed the continent’s overreliance on the global supply chain in diagnostics, therapeutics, and especially vaccines. So, it’s quite correct for countries to begin to explore opportunities such as those in vaccine manufacturing. Synergy in multilateral responses This crisis has demonstrated the inadequacy of the multilateral architecture both in preparedness and response. Countries in the Global North galvanized massive stimulus packages. Those in the Global South have no means to do so. Therefore, there is need to synchronize the return to growth such as the recent release of 650 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR). However, a lot of these SDRs have gone to wealthy countries – the G8 and G20 – that do not need them and only 33 billion SDRs were released to African governments. The ideal in terms of economic stimulus would be the implementation of the decision to recycle 100 billion SDR to these countries that need them. Whether one looks at it through the prism of global solidarity or through that of self-interest for the wealthiest countries, synchronizing the return to growth 05


to include the financial needs of developing countries is the fastest path to global recovery. There is a simple reason for that: in the long run, real growth can only come from the most demographically dynamic parts of the world, which are Africa and Asia. What we call megatrends in Africa – growing population, young population, and rural-to-urban migration – are still there. For anyone focused on the long term (not these shortterm issues like commodity prices), these three megatrends alone create huge economic opportunities in Africa, which no other part of the world has, except perhaps the Middle East and parts of Asia. On its part, Africa needs to invest more in human capital to increase and leverage these demographic opportunities. So now, what have we learned? One, Africa must work to become part of the supply chain for some of the key products that Africans need. Interestingly, some countries like Rwanda and Senegal have taken this lesson seriously – they are now planning to get mRNA technology for malaria and tuberculosis. Two, Africa’s integration must accelerate via the African Continental Free Trade Area. However, these efforts must be complemented with deepening trade. For example, the recently launched Pan African Payment Settlement System (PAPSS), perhaps the most significant development for Africa in recent years, will go a long way in facilitating intra-Africa trade by removing impediments related to settlement of payments via third party foreign currency. In the same light, there’s a need to agree on the single air market and on the visa on arrival scheme for bona fide African business operators. The pandemic has stalled economies across the world and interrupted Africa’s growth path since the early 2000s. GDP has shrunk, the tax base has dwindled, and expenditure needs – driven, in part, by the need to heavily invest in the health sector – are higher at the time when debt service has increased. However, global recovery – not just African recovery – is what is needed in the larger scheme of things. If by some stroke of miracle global policymakers take a decision that brings about our synchronized return to growth as it happened in 2008, and if Africans themselves make the right choices at the continental and domestic levels, the possibility to recover and return to the path of growth is still there. But before everything else, we must focus on three things: vaccination, vaccination, and vaccination! However, and this is fundamental, none of the above will matter until we “Silence the Guns” and keep out the fires in some of these conflict-affected areas, such as in the Greater Sahel. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Donald Kaberuka is a Rwandan economist and the former president of the African Development Bank. Since 2020, he is the African Union's Special Envoy in charge of mobilising international economic support for the continent in the fight against COVID-19 06


I n the 1990s, millions of HIV/ AIDS patients in Africa died as a result of patents placed on the manufacturing of medications by pharmaceutical companies in the Global North. Since the past two decades, however, the WTO has worked with representatives of developing countries, advocacy groups and regional organizations to ensure that pharmaceuticals prioritize public interest over profit-making. Progress has been made, but thefinal destination in that conversation is still an appreciable distance away. South Africa and India are currently pushing for a waiver of patents on COVID vaccines to enable them to produce cheaper, generic versions for distribution to less financially viable economies. While it took heavy global convergence to extract compliance from pharmaceuticals in the case of HIV/AIDS, it appears a consensus will be more easily reached this time. A WTO chief who is not afraid to speak out in favour of Africa and other developing countries does make a lot of difference. Hopefully, African countries will be spared the worst effects of the pandemic, if access to vaccines and other medications cease to prize capitalist accumulation over human life and suffering. One Year of The WTO Under Okonjo-Iweala: Challenges of Access to Medicine for Africa Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu Photo from Sanchez SMTN5 07


Although the WTO Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is referred to as an agreement, it is everything short of that term, especially where Africa is concerned. The final draft of TRIPs was adopted in 1995 with minimum input by African countries who could not afford the highly skilled and expensive representation needed during the negotiation of trade issues at the WTO. Under the TRIPs agreement, it became possible to place international patents on medicines for the first time. What this means is that once a pharmaceutical company in any WTO member state has patented a pharmaceutical process or product, it can no longer be produced by any other pharmaceutical company in any member state. The WTO TRIPs agreement prevents member countries from producing medicines patented in another member country even if half of a country’s citizens are being wiped out by a plague. Once the country cannot afford to buy medication from a pharmaceutical production company in the West, usually, they would be allowed to perish. Following the adoption of TRIPs, there was an astronomical increase in the cost of life-saving medications originating from Europe and the United States. Countries with little or no research and development base were losing sick citizens in hundreds of thousands; African countries were the worst hit. Countries like India that could manufacture generic versions of these medications were barred from doing so. With an emphasis on pharmaceuticals, American doctors for centuries taught that medical knowledge should be shared freely for the benefit of patients and never for private commercials’ benefits. Anyone who can muster technological know-how to help the suffering of humanity should not be discouraged from doing so. The American Medical Association made it a basis of its earliest Code of Medical Ethics in 1847, with a declaration that considered it “derogatory to professional character” for a physician “to hold a patent for any surgical instrument, or medicine.” This was a Photo from Flickr/WTO 08


matter of licensing for practice with serious professional consequences if violated. Having built a strong foundation in medicine and pharmaceuticals as a result of this humane approach, the ultra-capitalist pharmaceutical companies in the1995 TRIPs agreement, muscled the rest of the world out to insist that patients who cannot afford expensive versions of life-saving medications should be allowed to die. American pharmaceutical’s embargo on access to production of affordable, generic versions of life-saving medications is in stark contrast to the intellectual property history of the United States, a country well documented for state-sponsored production of other nations’ technology. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the American government actively encouraged citizens to pirate technology from other countries and patent and commercialize same in the United States. In his book, Hot Property: The Stealing of Ideas in an Age of Globalization, author Pat Choate notes that “Any American could bring a foreign innovation to the United States and commercialize the idea, all with total legal immunity.” This made the United States, “by national policy and legislative act, the world’s premier legal sanctuary for industrial pirates.” Today, through borrowing ideas and learning from other nations, the United States has been transformed into a global leading industrial power. In the words of respected trade historian, Doron Ben-Atar, writing in his book, Trade Secrets, “the United States emerged as the world's industrial leader by illicitly appropriating mechanical and scientific innovations from Europe. When the world gathered in Durban, South Africa for the very first International AIDS Conference to be held on the continent, only one in 1,000 persons living with HIV in Africa had access to AIDS treatment. That was because only Euro-American companies were allowed to produce Antiretrovirals (ARV) and their cost was US$10,000 to $15,000 per patient per year. The global outcry against the injustice of the TRIPs agreement led to some changes in 2001 during the Doha Round of Trade Talks. It was at that meeting that low- and middle-income countries were given the go ahead to produce cheaper, generic versions of life saving medications. Upon her resumption of office as the DG of the World Bank, Okonjo-Iweala met at her table a proposal from South Africa (co-sponsored by India), requesting a waiver of Intellectual Property Rights from COVID Vaccine for 3 years, which is enough time to produce and distribute generic versions of the presently expensive vaccine in order to make it more accessible to a wider global population. Other African countries (as well as other non-African countries) have since joined South Africa and India in making the demands. Western pharmaceuticals are fighting this proposal, insisting on being allowed to make as much profit as possible from life-saving medicines. In this conversation, the most important point is that Dr Okonjo-Iweala, through her utterances, has shown great courage in standing up for equal access to life-saving medications for all. In an interview, she granted to the CNBC, Dr Okonjo Iweala stated that “The level of inequity is quite high,” since access to vaccines is tied to the rate of economic recovery in the wake of the pandemic. “I am very concerned that if we continue with the inequity… [it] will have a dampening effect on (the) recovery in those countries,” said the Director-General of the WTO. Dr Okonjo Iweala’s courage has inspired many leaders to stand up and join hands with her, South Africa, India and other countries in demanding a waiver. Indeed, in a surprising turn of events, the President of the United States, Dr Joe Biden, is standing up to his own pharmaceutical companies by speaking out in support of the call for a waiver. It is hoped that under Dr Okonjo Iweala’s courageous leadership, the necessary waiver for COVID drugs will be secured, and beyond that, other questions of inequality being faced by African countries will be addressed during her tenure. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Chika Ezeanya Esiobu is a Nigerian writer and academic. 09


What ails smallholder agriculture, the dominant type of agriculture in Africa? Smallholder farmers count among the poorest Africans. How could they be pulled out of poverty? Many factors contribute to the poor performance of agriculture in Africa, but politicians’ lack of intentionality in enabling smallholder agriculture to become productive appears as the most important one. It is easy to think of increasing small farmers’ incomes through technical fixes. Economists tend to think of incentives to spur farmers into producing for the market. Politicians almost always think that smallholder farming is by nature incapable of pulling the poor out of poverty, that the road to success is via the creation of large farms and the mechanisation of agriculture. They usually talk up the imperative to aggregate land and create large commercial farms to create employment and boost production for local consumption and export. There are numerous stories of ambitious agricultural modernisation projects and programmes across Africa during the early years of independence. They invariably failed and when they did, all they left behind were carcasses of tractors, combine harvesters and other machinery, as well as shattered aspirations. Interestingly, across East Asia, many agriculture success stories show that governments were intentional in focusing on enabling smallholder agriculture to become productive. It was a strategy not only to ensure that people were well-fed, but also that they had money in their pockets. The money would enable them to purchase imported and locally-produced goods and services which were necessary in raising their living standards and quality of life. Stories are told that this is how communism was rendered unattractive and prevented from spreading across the entire region. This kind of intentionality has been lacking across the African Politics at Centre of Poor Agriculture Performance Frederick Golooba-Mutebi Photo from Getty Images 10


continent, leaving smallholder farmers struggling. These farmers have been the targets of anti-poverty programmes usually run by NGOs and donors for a long time. However, efforts by outsiders to plug the gaps left by inattentive governments have made little difference. By way of illustration, some years ago, while on a research trip to the Northern Uganda District of Kope (not actual name), I encountered an interesting event as I went about looking for local people to talk to about a well-funded post-war reconstruction programme whose results and impact were highly contested in media and academia. I had set off early. On the way to a trading centre not so far away from the main town, I saw a large number of people walking along the highway that connects the district to Uganda’s capital, Kampala. They were accompanied by animals of different kinds. Some carried chickens in their hands, others in baskets. Some had dogs on chains. Others were carrying cats. Others had goats, sheep, pigs and cattle on ropes. Some were chaperoning whole herds of livestock, goats and sheep with sticks and canes. I wondered what had happened. Was it market day? Soon enough I came across an open field where they were all gathering. I looked closely. This was no market scene. I stopped and asked a young man with a handful of goats on ropes, what was happening. The crowd before me had brought their animals to be vaccinated. In the distance, I caught sight of white people in military uniforms. They were the ones doing the vaccinating. Overcome by curiosity, I decided to go and take a closer look. It was a group of American soldiers. They belonged to Africom, the US army’s Africa Command. They were on some kind of outreach. Why here, though? And why livestock vaccination? They were busy, so I decided not to bother them with questions. Off I went, feeling intrigued, and contemplating further what I had just witnessed. I had not witnessed anything similar in the many years I had been traversing the country on research trips. And I knew from personal experience and from observation that the lack of veterinary services in rural areas was a serious impediment to successful animal husbandry by small-scale farmers. That afternoon, after I had finished chatting with villagers about their lives and livelihoods and the controversial reconstruction programme, I headed back to town. I wanted to locate the district veterinary officer and ask him some questions about what I had witnessed that morning. When I eventually found him, the district veterinary officer graciously agreed to set aside time for a conversation. After the usual greetings and introductions, I narrated the story of what I had seen that morning. He listened attentively. How did the Americans come to be in the district, doing what was supposed to be the work of the district administration? Why had he or others from his department not been at the scene when the Americans were working? Did his department carry out similar exercises across the district? The Americans had approached the district administration and volunteered to do what they were doing. His department did not carry out such exercises. The main reason for not doing so was that the veterinary department did not have the financial resources necessary to engage in such an exercise. They had no money for the required drugs. They had no vehicles that could transport staff around the district. They had only one motorcycle which was for his use as head of the department. They might have borrowed vehicles from other departments. However, the district administration did not always have money for fuel. Also, there was the challenge of remuneration. For such an exercise to be carried out by local government personnel, there had to be money for field allowances for his staff. There was no money for that. The reason I had seen such a large number of people turning up to have their animals vaccinated was twofold. First, like elsewhere in the country, it was quite common for animals to die of diseases that mass vaccination easily prevents. So, when people heard that there was an opportunity to have their animals vaccinated, they saw a chance to save their animals. It was therefore not surprising that they turned up in such large num11


bers. Perhaps most significant was that the vaccination was free of charge. Had the Americans been charging money, fewer people would have turned up. Few people in rural areas where the majority are subsistence farmers, have much disposable cash and can afford paid-for services. All this brought to mind things that are usually said about agriculture in Africa, but which are rarely cognisant of the realities of rural life, and of local-level governance. Hardly a day goes by without someone in a position of power or authority mentioning how agriculture is “the biggest employer” and “the backbone of our economy”. However, in Africa agriculture as an employer and as a generator of income performs way below its potential. There are several reasons for this, lack of intentionality being key. Take the example of extension services. Almost everywhere, these services suffer significant neglect. In addition to neglect, where services are available, however limited, they tend to be priced beyond what ordinary farmers farming mainly for subsistence can afford on an on-going basis. The consequences of this are clear and visible. Many years ago, I asked a farmer in a district not so far away from Kampala: “when did you last see or interact with an agricultural extensionist (omulimisa)?” As far as he could remember, it was nearly 30 years before he and I met in his village, where I was looking at the impact of decentralising power, resources and responsibility for service delivery from the national government to elected local authorities. The absence of extensionists or the un-affordably high cost of their services means that few small- to medium scale farmers are unable to respond appropriately to disease and pest infestations that reduce productivity. When diseases or pests strike, farmers may not respond in good time to allow for appropriate intervention to make the necessary difference. And even when they respond in time, critical advice regarding appropriate response is usually lacking. There are simply too few extensionists to go round, and the services of those that are self-employed are too expensive for poor farmers. For farmers engaged in animal husbandry, disease outbreaks are all too common. The most common diseases are those that are easily preventable through vaccination or the administration of de-wormers and acaricides. There is a time, in Uganda at least, when communal cattle dips providing free services guaranteed that farmers’ animals were protected. It is many years since these disappeared. Clearly, at the centre of the poor performance of agriculture in Africa and the key explanation for farmers getting stuck in poverty is politics. Politicians simply lack the incentives to focus on agriculture with the kind of intentionality that their Asian counterparts did, at a time when poverty posed a major political threat to the elites in power and was also an existential threat to anti-communist regimes of the time. It is therefore perhaps not farfetched to argue that agriculture in Africa will not receive the attention it deserves until its continued neglect becomes a political threat for power holders and a potential source of destabilisation for sitting governments. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Frederick GoloobaMutebi is a Ugandan-Rwandan independent researcher and former academic. 12


Why We Must Redesign Our Food Production Systems Jean-Luc Galabert The last COP in Glasgow confirmed the reluctance of rich countries to assume their historical responsibility for the degradation of the planet’s climate and to honor their commitment to finance the adaptation of the most vulnerable countries to the inevitable consequences of climate change. Current reports show in particular that the countries of the tropical and subtropical zones with low greenhouse gas emissions will be and have begun to be the most impacted by the consequences of global warming. Agriculture being dependent on climatic conditions, this vital economic sector will be the first victim of climate degradation and hazards. Humanity in general and Africa, in particular, are therefore challenged to redesign our food production system and to promote productive, resilient, non-destructive and even regenerative agrosystems for agricultural land and ecosystems. The good news is: this is an achievable objective. Agriculture is at the core of 21st-century problems. The map below shows that a significant decline in agricultural yields is expected to affect most, if not all, tropical and subtropical areas. Humanity in general and Africa, in particular, are challenged to redesign our food production system. Potential evolution of agricultural productivity by 2080. 13


In the middle of the dry season, the luxuriance of Faustin Nyirinkwaya’s garden plot in Shanga (Rwanda’s Southern Province) contrasts with the desolation of the neighboring parched plots, demonstrating the surprising productivity that can be achieved in a small, agroecologically managed garden. This projection is only a hypothesis, but it is strongly supported by various scientific studies. The inertia of the climate system combined with that of the political decision-making systems regarding the effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions forces us to take it seriously and to wonder how to avoid this catastrophic scenario. Building resilient and productive agroecosystem While agriculture is a sector particularly vulnerable to climate change, the current dominant mode of food production is also responsible for about a third of greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, it is one of the major causes of climate disruption. Agro-industrial practices also contribute to environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. A series of large-scale experiments involving hundreds of thousands of farmers on all continents demonstrate that the immense challenge to redesign our food production system is not a utopia. The “Zero Budget Natural Farming” movement in India and the “Campesino to Campesino” movement in Central America, the conversion of Cuban agriculture under embargo into a sector that ensures food self-sufficiency for the population, or agroforestry practices in East Africa, are just a few examples of a much broader set of new agricultural practices that have been called agroecology, demonstrating that it is possible to build a resilient, productive agriculture that improves the living conditions of peasants and the food security of populations. These experiences have common features: they are based on exchanges of experience and cooperation among peasants and between farmers and researchers, and growers’ use of locally available organic inputs and diversified seeds adapted to local contexts; they apply locally produced organic fertilizers and bioprotectors; they maximize biomass production and soil organic matter content; they enhance soil biological life, nutrient cycling, rainwater harvesting and management…In brief, they protect and regenerate the environment while providing livelihoods to families. 14


Interestingly, although common principles can be found from one agroecological practice to another, there is no technical kit that can be replicated identically throughout the world. The relevance, but also the complexity of implementing agroecology lies in the fact that the solutions it can inspire are always local; they are always “home grown solutions” that strive to make the most of the natural, human, social and cultural resources of the environment. I saw this crucial point very clearly when the “Inter-Cultural” consultancy firm that I helped evaluate the impact of a project conducted with some eight thousand vulnerable and land-poor peasant households in the Southern Province of Rwanda. The project’s dynamics were inspired by the ancient Rwandan tradition of giving and receiving cows to manifest and seal alliances and friendships. The project, led by two Rwandan organizations (Adenya and Duhamic-Adri) and supported by an international NGO (Frères des Hommes), relied on the donation of pigs or goats to a few people who committed to donate part of the offspring of their animals in turn. The donation of animals was accompanied by training in good animal husbandry practices, in the use of manure and in the techniques of bio-intensive market gardening on a small area, in the utilization of diversified seeds, and in the cultivation of fodder trees to feed the animals. As expected, the multiplication of animal donations has allowed an ever-increasing number of households to have access to new financial resources and organic inputs to improve the fertility of their plots; but it has also and above all been the support of new solidarities, of the organization of peasant collectives that have been able to organize themselves and obtain the support of local authorities to manage fruit and fodder tree nurseries, to obtain new collectively managed land, and to cultivate model plots to disseminate their good practices. The families involved in this project have not only been able to increase the productivity of their plots, to stop suffering hunger and malnutrition and to earn an income from their food surpluses, but they have also regained their dignity and confidence in themselves, in their community and in the future. The acquisition of agroecological, social and pedagogical skills has also allowed some of the people involved in the project to become trainers of other farmers. In others words, the benefits associated with these projects imbibed with local realities, practices, and ways of life are unquantifiable. A credible way to achieve the objectives of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 The most systematic study of ecological practices published to date evaluated 286 recent projects covering 37 million hectares in 57 developing countries. It found increased productivity on 12.6 million farms, with an average increase in yields of 79%. Analysis of the study >[email protected] www.cooperation.rw @cooperation_rw Get in touch with us A&P Building, 21 KG 7 Avenue, Kigali collaboration opportunities through:


The Human Development Report, recently published by the Rwanda Country Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), highlighted the important contributions of home-grown Initiatives to improving Rwanda’s Human Development Index (HDI) across social, economic and health indicators. Yet, as the world enters the final decade of Agenda 2030 - when the global community aims to have eradicated extreme poverty - and for the first time since the HDI was utilised, many countries have either seen their human development indicators stagnating or going backwards amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This guarantees that much of the emphasis in Africa and the world will be on the prospects for economic recovery and supporting efforts towards overcoming the health and economic effects of the pandemic. Much of the focus will also turn to the need to support the creation of regional value chains in Africa and the global South in order for the continent to be in a more resilient position to face future pandemics, thus necessitating mutually beneficial relations in development cooperation, trade, and investment. All of these will play a complementary role in reinforcing the importance of economic diplomacy not only as an imperative for Rwanda but also as an imperative for Rwanda’s neighbours and partners beyond Africa. International Development Cooperation (including South-South & triangular cooperation) is a core component of International Cooperation. Rwanda’s engagement in South-South Cooperation (SSC) Rwanda’s Economic Diplomacy and the Opportunities for Enhanced South-South Cooperation Dr. Philani Mthembu Rwandan ambassador to the UAE, H.E Emmanuel Hategeka, represents Rwanda Cooperation for the signing of a cooperation MoU with APC Colombia (South-South and Triangular Cooperation Forum, Dubai, Jan 2022) Rwanda Cooperation Address: 18, KG 7 Avenue, Kigali, [email protected], www.cooperation.rw Partner Content 20


brings unique experiences on how to overcome challenges with limited resources. This gives Rwanda an important comparative advantage to play a proactive role and add its voice to an evolving international development landscape. As one of the institutions in charge of Rwanda’s development cooperation implementation, Rwanda Cooperation has the mandate to promote Rwanda’s Innovative Development Initiatives (home-grown initiatives and good practices) within the global South, which is embedded within the objectives of Rwanda’s economic diplomacy. The institution works in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, as well as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, in scaling up various development programmes and projects through knowledge exchange on Rwanda’s Innovative Development Initiatives. In offering programmes geared towards promoting and sharing Rwanda’s home-grown initiatives and good practices, Rwanda Cooperation aligns itself not only to Rwanda’s Economic Diplomacy objectives but also to the country’s South-South Cooperation (SSC) Strategy, which puts emphasis on the utility of triangular cooperation as a complement to SSC. Hon. Dr. Sithembiso Nyoni, Zimbabwean Minister of Women Affairs, Community and SME Development, visits manufacturing cooperatives in Kigali during a study tour. Furthermore, the nature and scope of Rwanda Cooperation’s work also allow it to take an active role in building negotiating capabilities within Rwanda’s diplomatic network and other stakeholders. It is also important to note that the sharing of Rwanda’s know-how is an integral part of the institution’s activities. Expanding the knowledge cooperation programmes will thus act as a catalyst for attracting more tourism and investment in the economy, through providing a platform to explore mutually beneficial economic activities. Indeed, in contemporary times, development cooperation is not only limited to least developed countries but also to middle-income countries that continue to grapple with development challenges and the persistence of poverty. A number of these countries, which are also close trade partners with Rwanda and are seeking to increase their knowledge of the country and its systems, often have available resources for knowledge exchange programmes and cooperation, with a view to better understanding Rwanda’s emerging economic landscape and its governing regulatory frameworks. 21


While the demand-driven approach is important to the work of Rwanda Cooperation, the nature of the said mandate gives the institution the ability and agility to proactively establish relations and partnerships with governments, public institutions, and civil society organisations in the global South, as well as with development partners in the global North, creating greater interest in its programmes, expertise, and services. The organisation’s ability to proactively initiate and participate in new South-South and triangular cooperation projects allows it to perform an important dual role of meeting the demands of its existing development partners through knowledge cooperation, study visits, and training, while also initiating new projects and partnerships by providing research and advisory support, as well as project implementation services through various areas of expertise. Rwanda Cooperation is also forging partnerships with academic institutions and think tanks in Rwanda and abroad, especially given the alignment with Rwanda’s Economic Diplomacy’s priorities of enhancing the attractiveness of the country’s higher education and knowledge sector. Indeed, much of the work of Rwanda Cooperation is rooted in the belief that, through knowledge exchange, Rwanda and partner countries can benefit from each other’s knowledge and experiences to support their continued growth and development, which is a key tenet to economic diplomacy. With the growth of economic diplomacy in the country’s foreign policy orientation, Rwanda Cooperation envisions to include offering exchanges and programmes in the area of aid for trade. These exchanges are geared towards finding mutual opportunities to unlock the economic potential in a continent that is set to increase its population to above 2 billion by 2050 and is on the verge of creating the largest free trade area in the world through the AfCFTA. Exchanges can thus also be geared towards sharing how Rwanda has managed to become an increasingly important business and technology hub while also conducting exchanges on trade facilitation to ensure a more open and efficient trading landscape for a landlocked country needing open access to larger markets. Rwanda’s economic diplomacy and SSC strategy both lay a foundation for an outward-looking engagement that brings in Rwanda’s diplomatic missions and foreign missions accredited in Rwanda. In aligning these two frameworks, Rwanda will also be in a position to emphasise the importance of triangular cooperation, which should not be seen in isolation, but as part of a wider range of tools that could possibly be deployed in realising various development goals at both the national and international levels. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Philani Mthembu is the Executive Director at the Institute for Global Dialogue, an independent foreign policy think tank based in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa. Delegates from Nigeria’s Corporate Affairs Commission tour the Kigali Special Economic Zone 22


From Sankara to Soludo: Positioning Africa’s Economies for Recovery, Resilience and Regeneration Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu I n the efforts to rebuild economies following the effects of the Pandemic, African countries have yet another opportunity to re-strategize by focusing on an Africa-centric economic advancement trajectory. What the region needs are radical, grassroots-based policy changes that can yield wide and far-reaching transformations. To achieve this goal, an endogenously established thriving manufacturing sector, strong agricultural base, strengthened social sectors of health and education, among others, are fundamental. President Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, within the short period of time he ruled, tried to re-position Burkina Faso’s flagging economy on a path of enduring growth. Emerging pandemic leaders such as Professor Chukwuma Soludo of Anambra State Nigeria have made policy pledges that mirror Sankara’s. Historically, copy-and-paste approaches to national advancement have been established to be, over the longer term, detrimental to economic growth. Decades of procuring oftentimes expensive, ever-changing external solutions from the West and the East have dissipated Africa’s drive to achieve its economic aspirations. Begging for or borrowing money, ideas and expertise outside of Africa has consistently proven abortive in securing the strength of the kind of national economies that Africans are working hard to build. What is needed in Africa today is the kind of policies implemented by the Burkina Faso president, Thomas Sankara, in the few years he led the country in the 1980s. Some of the leaders emerging in the (post-)Pandemic era in Africa, such as the renowned Pan-African economist and intellectual, Professor Chukwuma Soludo, have adopted such endogenous approach as the centrepiece of their economic policy. In recent times, Professor Soludo made some policy statements that no leader or politician in Nigeria’s recent history has made. Pointing at his outfit, he reminded listeners that it is the Akwete fabric, which Photo from Wikimedia 23


originated and has been made in the nearby Abia State of Nigeria, which he said would be his official outfit as governor of the state. In my view, this is meant to send a strong message about his mindset, as far as the state’s economic policies are concerned. Additionally, Professor Soludo declared that the official vehicles for the government of Anambra State will henceforth be sourced from the Nigerian car manufacturing company, Innoson, and that, indeed, whatever needs to be done in Anambra State, down to the food for official occasions, will be sourced locally. Only in extenuating situations, where there are no locally available options, will the government go beyond the state, beyond the region or beyond the country and Africa - in that order - to source for product or expertise. Soludo made it seem like a no-brainer – that a seating government official should take the lead in supporting local production and manufacturing. Yet, that has not been the story of many African governments since Independence. A penchant for acquired tastes, conspicuous consumption and the belittling of indigenously African goods and services have been the root cause of Africa’s economic predicament. These are qualitative values and no amount of quantitative national studies, macro- and micro-economic interventions, aids, loans and grants can address that peculiar crisis in Africa. While instituting transformation in Burkina Faso’s agricultural sector, Thomas Sankara asked the question, ‘Where is imperialism? Look at your plates when you eat. The imported rice, maize and millet; that is imperialism.’ He implored his people thus: ‘Let us try to eat what we control ourselves.’ Beyond the rhetoric, President Sankara went on to empower rural farmers through rural land redistribution policies. Enough supplies, as well as infrastructure, were made available to local farmers, boosting their confidence and building hope across rural communities. In a matter of a few years, Burkina Faso’s agricultural terrain massively improved. Within three years, wheat cultivation grew exponentially from 1700 kg per hectare to 3800 kg per hectare and Burkina Faso got to be included in the global list of countries that are self-sufficient in food production. Agricultural growth is often synonymous with overall economic growth, historically. In the United States, for instance, from 1948 to 2017, the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in agriculture, which is the rate of growth of agricultural output such as crops, livestock products and others, increased at the rate of 1.47% per annum.  In Burkina Faso, the turnaround in agricultural fortunes also spilled over to such crops as cotton, emboldening the President to ban the importation of clothing and textiles while canvassing support for made-in-Burkina Faso fabric and clothing. Burkinabes dusted off the France-imposed shame on their local fabric, Faso dan Fani, and followed their President in proudly wearing the cotton-based outfit. In short, Thomas Sankara framed his economic policies around the central conviction that all government projects must, as much as possible, utilize local materials, labour/expertise, and financing. Thomas Sankara tightened the financial reporting mechanism of state-run enterprises, as well as increased taxes on such elite products and services as tobacco and car registration. With that, the contribution of tax revenue to the GDP of Burkina Faso grew from 13.5% in 1983 to 16.3% in 1987. This recorded economic progress in many sectors of the economy was matched by strong investments in the social sectors of health, education and housing such that within the short period of five years, progress in basic education far exceeded what was achieved in the 22 years of Burkina Faso’s Independence. Although the central government still wields a lot of power, Nigeria’s federal system is such that states are like mini-countries within Nigeria, with agitations by citizens for even more devolution of powers to the state. With the current level of state autonomy, however, Professor Soludo is in a position to follow in the footsteps of Sankara and remarkably transform Anambra state’s economy during the period of his leadership. 24


S ince the 1970s many African nations have missed out on the most important economic policy of them all. Export-oriIt Is Time to Switch on the Transformative Power of Industrial Policy Jonathan Said ented industrial policy has been essential to the success of most high-income and rapidly emerging nations. Whether in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Japan, China, Costa Rica, Chile, India, Morocco, Mauritius or Vietnam, this policy tool Decades back, when leaders like Thomas Sankara rose up to make changes that emphasized a homegrown, endogenous and people-oriented approach to economic expansion, he was silenced by the forces that benefitted from Africa’s continued dependency. In present times, with more enlightened Africans, as well as a more liberalized information space offered by the internet and social media, it is not envisaged that Professor Soludo will come under the same attack. Like Thomas Sankara, Professor Soludo’s avowed passion is Africa’s advancement and he has taken up the governance of Anambra State as a sub-field to implement his understanding of the necessary changes needed to transform Africa. His successes will surely translate to a country-wide adaptation of an inward-oriented economic expansion trajectory for Africa’s biggest economy and hopefully for the rest of the region in the coming years. ❧ ❧ ❧ 25


has been indispensable, and the evidence on the critical importance of what you export to your development trajectory is clear. Export-led industrial policy comes across to many as highly technical and complicated, including many well-versed global leaders and development practitioners. Yet actually it is a simple concept: it is merely the coordination of policies across governments to ensure the facilitation of investment in sectors that have the greatest potential to develop an economy by growing the number of value-adding, job-creating, foreign exchange-earning businesses. Whether Chilean wine, Vietnamese electronics, British textiles in the 1600s, Israeli agriculture or UAE’s tourism, these all required the coordination of enablers like energy, land, roads, market development, technology, investor facilitation and regulations. Countries in which these align around the right sectors have often transformed. Clearly, industrial policy is the tool to allow this if led by a responsible head of government. It is now increasingly established that industrial policy is needed to manage and address the market and government failures that we all know are perverse in every economy of the world, let alone low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). However, many global policymakers have shied and continue to shy away from it. There are many reasons given for this – all of which are weak. Some people still argue that the government is incapable of picking winners, despite the evidence that it can back winning sectors, even with large institutional limitations. Some argue that it may be a route to elite capture and corruption, even though elite capture and corruption are already there without strong industrial policy and is often the result of the vacuum caused by policy incoherence. Some argue that it is unfair to favour certain investors over others – although the reality is that one of the functions of government is to arbitrate these issues: limited resources mean you cannot, for example, develop all the roads in a country at once, meaning that government decisions will favour some firms and sectors over others either way. Another reason given is that industrial policy is a coordination job, and this is just too hard, so many think it is best avoided. Government agencies’ inability to provide policy coherence to private investors in the most transformative sub-sectors is exactly what maintains the status quo and undermines all other development efforts, whether SDGs, RCTs, technology rollout, democracy & improved governance or climate change. Lately, a new argument has emerged, which is based on the misguided concerns that Africa is suffering from pre-mature de-industrialisation – a weak argument that ignores the reality that industrial policy has essentially been missing for the past 40 years in African countries and many other LICs and LMICs. Finally, others argue that China’s economic model and automation will undermine the success of the industrial policy. However, China’s large investment in Ethiopian industrial parks refutes the former claim, while the lack of evidence of the negative impact of automation on job creation refutes the latter. Even if automation did lower job creation, the answer is to double down on an industrial policy that gives you a bigger chance to create jobs and counter any potential negative impacts of automation. Despite all the technical arguments against export-led industrial policy being refuted and its importance being accepted by mainstream global and local policymakers, industrial policy is still being shied away from. It is important to understand the reasons why an industrial policy is key to preventing African nations and other LICs/ LMICs from continuing to be left behind by the global economy. There are two main reasons. First is the legacy of the Structural Adjustment Programmes and Washington Consensus. As Cramer, Okubay and Sender document, African policymakers – particularly in Ministries of Finance and Development Planning, President’s Offices and Ministries of Trade and Industry – have been influenced and trained to deprioritise the implementation of a robust industrial policy. I have worked with Departments of Industry in countries like Malawi, Liberia and Guyana, and engaged in various others and seen how they are es26


sentially backwaters in terms of policy, making them far removed from the real decision-makers in the centre of government, with their industrial policy documents gathering dust. The typical Ministry of Finance and Development Planning officer, much less Minister, still doesn’t show much interest in an export-led industrial policy that can bring to life the ‘real economy’ vision they have for their nation or acknowledge that fiscal policy and monetary policy – let alone trade, labour, TVET, land and investment policy – should all follow its lead. I’ll give a personal example: when I worked with the government of a particular country for 3 years, the Minister of Finance showed no interest in the industrial policy the Ministry of Trade and Industry and of Agriculture were promoting. But after I left the country, I learnt – via a Facebook post of his – that he was a big fan of the product space model developed by Hausman and Rodrik. He didn’t show any interest because the conversation around him by stakeholders such as the IMF, World Bank and his own technicians in the Ministries didn’t allow space for it. This appears to be improving today, and some countries such as Ghana are making good headway, although there remains a long way to go. The second reason is the cause of the first and probably the cause of all the weak technical arguments presented above against industrial policy. African nations and many other LICs/LMICs continue to suffer from an extractive political economy. The global economy has historically – since before colonisation and accelerated exponentially by colonisation – come to engage with many of today’s LICs and LMICs in two ways: extracting raw or semi-raw resources from Africa and exporting finished goods back to African nations. The evidence of this is extensive – such as how the British empire dismantled factories in Eritrea and took them to the UK – to the commoditised primary source of exports of many nations, such as copper in Zambia, iron ore in Sierra Leone, oil in Angola and uranium in Niger. Even in countries without major natural mineral resources, trade has been extractive: think of the export of raw coffee from Ethiopia, tea from Kenya and cocoa from Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. And in terms of the exportation of finished goods back to African nations, consider the political power in African capital cities that import traders have: be it of cars, fertiliser, fish, rice, machines and so on. For example, France has over 350 companies in Cote d’Ivoire, but few of these are investors in the productive sectors. Many – probably fairly – argue that it remains in the interest of most high-income countries to maintain this type of extractive and import-based relationship with African nations. Many economic and political strategists in Washington DC, Paris, London and Brussels still argue that they want to retain the value-added benefits in global value chains in their countries. The good news is that some countries, such as China, Netherlands and Germany, have recognised that it is in their own enlightened self-interest to prioritise investment in factories, value-added agriculture, call centres, value-adding forest economies and tourism in African nations. An increased focus by nations like the US on tech start-ups and telecoms is an important step in the positive direction, although modern tech must be seen as an integral part of industrial policy, not a be-all and end-all, as most of it is at present. Data alone doesn’t create jobs and increase foreign exchange and tax revenues at scale unless embedded in the growth of firms on a national scale. Yet, to change these constraining dynamics and unlock the transformational power of export-led industrial policy across Africa, and thus unleash Africa’s true economic and political potential, the drive has to come from African nations. African leaders are increasingly recognising the importance of job creation, export-generation and tax base widening strategies. Beyond the front-runners like Mauritius, Morocco, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia, others such as Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire and Uganda are accelerating their focus on investor-led and export-oriented industrial policy, driven by agencies at the centre of government instead of just letting it lie idle in the Ministries of Industry, Agriculture or Tourism. It is essential for African nations to continue to build this momentum. The more the 5 key agencies 27


Africa Should Not Have Infrastructure It Cannot Maintain Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu Photo from Wikimedia The delivery of infrastructure constructed with borrowed skills and funds has been flaunted as indicators of progress by many of Sub-Saharan Africa’s post-Independence leaders and applauded by citizens. Sixty years after independence, this misconception continues to thrive, driving Africans farther and farther away from authentic, deep rooted and sustainable advancement. This article reinforces the historically proven truth that a people who are developed are able to build and maintain infrastructure, in addition to other more outward advancement markers within their national territories. People development is foundational to national prosperity and there is no shortcut for Africa. Strategic investment in systems, processes and knowledge bases targeted at the intellect and emoof government – the Presidency, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Investment Agency, and the key line ministry of the priority sectors – can align around this, the more African governments can unlock the power of export-led industrial policy. This will also help African economies to chart their own course for turning their own vision for the socio-economic transformation of their nations into actual reality, just like high-income countries have done. It is also important for well-meaning global policymakers and development practitioners – particularly those concerned about global inequality and entrenched poverty in African and other LICs and LMICs – to come to grips with this and develop a supportive mechanism to assist these countries to implement a robust export-oriented industrial policy. After all, know how to. Jonathan Said is the Head of Sector Practices at the Tony Blair Institute. ❧ ❧ ❧ 28


tions of citizens is the pedestal for endogenous infrastructural, technological and other forms of advancement. Ancient Egypt was the greatest education centre in the ancient world; concomitantly,the infrastructural achievements of ancient Egyptians remain a wonder to date. The thirst for knowledge exhibited by ancient Egyptians, and the investment in knowledge production during that era, are yet to be matched by any other epoch. In more recent times, Western countries of Europe and North America have built a modest civilization on an investment in allround education that emphasizes character, culture, the arts, politics, science and technology etc. The same history is a landmark of the path of every country that is considered infrastructurally advanced today, including China and other Asian economies. One thing that is often overlooked about ancient Egypt and the present global world powers is the connection between culture and knowledge. In order to build the knowledge it used to develop infrastructure, ancient Egypt had the deepest reverence for the land and the culture. It was a land of people who were emotionally intelligent and looked inwards for inspiration for personal and community growth and national advancement. Ancient Egyptians viewed their locally generated knowledge with deference and de-emphasized the sole consumption of other people’s culture, knowledge and resources. The same applies to modern civilizations of today. One of Africa’s greatest challenges to date is the intellectual strength and willpower to rid itself of the consumer mindset entrenched during colonialism. Indeed, hardly had the newly hoisted independence flags started flying over the land before African leaders began to embark on huge white elephant projects, for which their citizens lacked the technological know-how to construct and maintain, and the national treasury lacked the financial muscle to build. While many projects were abandoned halfway ‘for good,’ many were completed and functioned for a few years with heavy dependence on unaffordable external expertise and imported reinforcements. By the 1980s, a time when many such projects had turned into a shadow of themselves and their host countries were gasping for breath economically, the International Money Fund (IMF) came like a deluge, bearing the ill-conceived, ill-fated Structural Adjustment Programme, with unfortunate results for the continent. If history was granted its proper place in the African clime, the futile loan of over three decades ago, forced on African countries by IMF and its Paris Club partners, for which many have little to show for today, will have served as a deterrent. That is not so. Many African countries continue to borrow to fund infrastructural development. Africa has spread its debt tentacles beyond the Paris Club countries to include other countries mainly in Asia. The consequences for Africa are getting direr with each new loan partner becoming more exacting. The continued trend of borrowing money, knowledge and skills for infrastructural advancement must be strongly resisted by all well-meaning Africans. Borrowing for infrastructural advancement does not yield lasting benefits for the present and future generations of Africans, as exemplified in the continent’s post-independence history. It has chiefly served to empower the rich, perpetuate the class divide across the region and leave Africans’self-esteem hanging at the lowest point in history. As in ancient Egypt, formal, informal and non-formal education across Africa of today must be firmly built upon respect for the land, the people and culture. The aim being to transform the mindset of the average person to such a point where innovation, creativity, character and the social-emotional connection necessary for accelerated advancement will occur spontanously. Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems, across all sectors and disciplines, are necessary for policy action and in education. In this era of knowledge liberalization which the internet has brought, the emphasis should be on governments strongly supporting Africans to access enough knowledge to build their infrastructure themselves with locally 29


sourced materials and resources. Achieving this demands much more than setting up institutes of research and development. The moral values of the people, for instance, will need to be strengthened through exemplary leadership and education. On the part of its citizens, Africa(ns) must embark on a desperate period of self-education spanning intellectual expansion in subject-specific fields, social-emotional learning, community, national, regional and global history, the arts and social sciences, to mention but a few. Citizens will have to begin to respectfully demand and advocate the building of their community and national knowledge base and the development of the human person on a holistic education aimed at transforming the human mind. Additionally, every concerned African should be a voice speaking against continued borrowing; we should work with the government to achieve this aim. Infrastructural and technological advancement has rarely been a product of technology transfer nor of borrowing to build. Africa’s futile chase for advancement via the superimposed and debt-ridden infrastructure route can only result in ridicule for this generation of Africans, with untold hardship added to that for the coming generations. Africa’s sustainable advancement rests squarely on Africans building their own infrastructure, using mostly locally sourced physical and intellectual materials, as well as labour. Yet, that is the easiest thing to say, since building and maintaining infrastructure at the level envisaged can only be made possible where the human person has been developed on all fronts. The emphasis, therefore, should be on the social, emotional and intellectual training of the African to achieve accelerated advancement. Covid-19 and the Return to Life's Essentials Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu A Kenyan proverb says that a flea can cause a lion more trouble than a lion can cause a flea. The upheaval caused by Covid-19 is still unfolding. Already, certain jobs not previously considered with much regard, are becoming more prestigious, while certain careers that once went with glamour and pomp have been consigned to the periphery, at best. This period in time calls for careful reflections and soul-searching, and one area that warrants sufficient investment of mental deliberation is what should constitute essential businesses in one’s life and community, in a post-lockdown era. This piece attempts to offer some thinking points to readers. Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theorized to the Western world some fundamental principles that had guided the traditional way of life on the continent of Africa since ancient times; that at the basic foundation of a man’s needs are natural necessities for human survival, e.g. air, food, drink, shelter, clothing, warmth, sleep. In that regard, traditional African societies ensured that every member of the community had food – through the availability of ample farmland for cultivation for the largely agrarian societies. ❧ ❧ ❧ 30


Africa’s indigenous food production system is founded on principles that centered on respect for the environment. Waste is alien to that food culture. If the inner part of banana was eaten by humans, goats ate the peels, while the leaves were used in wrapping food and other necessities. The same banana tree provided organic, biodegradable materials for shelter, the sort that decomposed into manure and neither clog the waterways with synthetic waste nor pollute underground water with cancer-causing substances. Fewer people fell sick in traditional Africa, and those who did already knew what Hippocrates the Greek Physician popularized in the West, which is, “Let food be your medicine and medicine your food.” African communities generously utilized medicinal herbs and plant components in health management. Further, African indigenous food production system values the interdependence of all life, be it plant, animal or human. It does not uphold the principle of mass destruction of the species and the environment in the pursuit of wealth for a privileged few. Contrast the situation in Africa’s traditional setting with the outright disdain for the environment that pervades the cultivation of food for profit in the name of modernity. Take fishing, for instance, where methods such as the use of blasts and cyanide to kill fish have brought much harm to the global water body, while being at the root cause of several human health challenges. Global biodiversity is seriously threatened as a result of these harmful practices, and the rest of the species suffer ill-health and death because life is interdependent. Many might argue that today’s Africans are sicker and die younger than their forbears. If that were so, a contributory factor is surely the glitzy marketing of cheap, harmful chemicals manufactured in laboratories and sold as food. Africans must desist from copying the Western models of food production, which are not necessarily for the sake of providing nourishment to the community and replenishing the environment, but often for the sole purpose of amassing wealth. Indeed, food as an essential commodity in the global eco-system has been hijacked by big corporations whose Photo from The NewTimes 31


interests rest squarely in the continuous growth of elite shareholders’ profit. The result includes huge amount of food waste in the Global North, artificially induced hunger among urban and rural populations in Africa and the continued use of hazardous chemicals in the name of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers. In indigenous Africa, every man was a farmer, whether of plant or animal. This is because Africans have always known that there is no wisdom in completely outsourcing something as basic as the food that sustains one’s life. But what we have today in abundance is a generation of Africans, living in cities, working so-called “modern” jobs, but who have consigned the business of agriculture to governments, corporations and organizations. Africans need to rediscover and re-invest in the age-old nutritious indigenous foods and beverages that abound across the region. Innovation in the field of food production must be centered on the African philosophy of deep respect for the environment and the Ubuntu philosophy of the utmost regard for community. Novel food preservation methods should also be sought, which can simultaneously extend both shelf life and the life of the consumer. The challenge for the African in a post-Covid-19 world should be how to reclaim the responsibility for food as an essential commodity. Agriculture should no longer be left in the hands of corporations, governments and institutions. The colonial mindset that still pervades much of Africa made it such that far too many Africans are trained to pursue so-called white-collar jobs that do not feature in the base of man’s needs. As an African, one should ask how s/he is contributing to one’s community’s food system. Every able-bodied African should seriously explore the idea of farming, even if as a part-time endeavor. Cooperatives of farmers can come together and develop a rural area with enough amenities to ensure a good life even for families with young, school-age children. While Africans look forward to the day when governments within the region will be strengthened to invest in building infrastructure across rural communities, citizens can look for ways to work together and provide the comfort needed for self and community advancement at each point in time. It is hoped that the post-Covid-19 lockdown era will be a time when Africa’s ‘citizen leaders’ will emerge, armed with the realization that every African should be an active participant in creating the world s/he wishes to see in their lifetime. ❧ ❧ ❧ This article has been reprinted due to the issue theme 32


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POLITICS S ince the 1990s, western governments have been pushing for democratisation in Africa. They often express frustration that Africans are not “getting it.” Even their capacity building Term Limits Is a defeatist Approach that Escapes the Major Question of Electoral Justice Martin K. Ngoga The liberal one-size-fits-all template was never going to work. seminars and conferences have not helped the democratisation project the way they thought of it. However, there could have been much progress had those who lecture Africans about democracy considered the possibility that they are the ones who are not getting it. The liberal one-size-fits-all template was never going to work. The reasons for that seem obvious, and it would take a dictatorship to 34


continue pushing a failed model. Here’s why. For something to work, context matters. The same is true for democracy, which is presented as one form, among others, of a governing framework guided by a number of principles and values, and culminating in elections. Any system of government ought to evolve within a society’s historical context and as a response to those unique challenges that democracy is designed to solve. This is how democracy evolved in the West. Consider the contentious issue of term limits. For much of the slightly over 240 years since the American constitution was ratified in June 1778, there were no term limits in that country’s political system. It wasn’t until February 1951 that the 22nd amendment that limits presidents to two terms in office was introduced. For perspective, this is over 170 years later, and also before any African country was independent. Franklin D. Roosevelt served four presidential terms from 1933 to 1945 and died in office. Indeed, it is conceivable that, had it not been for poor health, Roosevelt could have served more terms, especially given his popularity at the time. Getting Americans triumphantly out of World War II and the Great Depression, and his impressive record of socioeconomic transformation, especially the introduction of the welfare state as part of the New Deal, endeared him to the people. How do Americans account for the 170-year delay to introduce presidential term limits? Were they under dictatorship during that long duration? If they want to be sincere, they acknowledge that it is the context of War that made it necessary for Roosevelt to stay and die in office. In other words, they concede that democracy, and even term limits, evolve within a country’s specific context, history, and competing priorities. Another of the other rare “democratic” countries with presidential systems, France, introduced term limits only in 2008. Clearly, there is no inherent sanctity in term limits. In fact, when questions are asked about the American Senate system where Joe Biden served for seven terms from 1972 to 2009, there are no satisfying answers. Senators and members of the lower houses are also prone to nepotism and corruption, and they are subject to capture by special interest groups that prevent them from serving the interests of those who elect them. If it were Africa, the story of Joe Biden would have been about his longevity in power from the early age of 29. However, Biden’s longevity as Senator of Delaware is accounted for by the fact that at no single time was his vote in the senate elections lower than 60 percent. In other words, he – like Roosevelt before him – remained popular with his electorate. Of course, to accuse Biden of being power hungry would be to disregard context and history. Therefore, term limits are a defeatist approach and simplistic way of escaping the major question of electoral justice. In a society where there is electoral justice (that is, a fair system where peoples’ votes count), an electoral commission that is constituted to ensure fairness, and where people can vote out a leader once they are fed up with him or her, one doesn’t have to bother with term limits. On the other hand, term limits can become a hindrance when people genuinely want to keep their leader in power because they still trust him or her to get the job done. In this instance, term limits stand in the way of the democratic wishes of society. In other words, where there is electoral justice, what people vote for is what counts, and how long leaders stay in power is irrelevant. Hence, our democratisation journey in Africa should focus on electoral justice, not term limits. Term limits as a one-size-fits-all approach to politics were introduced in Africa as part of an externally-inspired reform package, and are considered the most important sign of democratic performance. The media, civil society, and even the people, always closely follow every leader at the end of his/her official mandate, to see if they will or won’t go beyond the two-term constitutional limits. But term limits inherently carry two questionable assumptions. One, it is assumed that an African leader cannot, by himself, without any external constraint or pressure, relinquish power and hand it over to the next leader. This, of course, doesn’t stand scrutiny. 35


The second questionable assumption is that when leaders stay long in power, it is necessarily bad for a country, its population, and its institutions, despite the avalanche of evidence to the contrary. Most radical reforms and national transformations took place under visionary leaders, thanks to their longevity in power. In fact, to see radical transformation taking place in the span of one or two terms is exceptional. In many instances, term limits are merely an artificial, psychological comfort in the absence of accountability. For instance, the world is replete with examples of leaders who are elected by less than 50 percent of eligible voters, even 30 percent in the worst cases. This happens in the so-called established democracies in the West mainly because a significant part of the population has become too disillusioned with the status quo to bother casting their votes. Moreover, in political systems where one or two parties have dominated the political scene for decades, changing the heads of government without changing the logic of governance can only add to the disillusionment.  For instance, it makes little difference to vote for democrats or republicans if the vote has been stripped of its ability to bring about the change that the people want. It is cosmetic; it is indeed artificial comfort to believe that there has been change when it is only the faces of those at the helm that change, not the systems. Two-party system Similarly, efforts to export the two-party system where governance is reduced to a performance of musical chairs ought to be questioned. Politics in Africa, unlike in the West, does not reflect ideological divides. Therefore, it is wrong to try to draw similarities with the west. Because we have no competing value systems – the way liberals and conservatives are organised in America, France, Britain, etc, or the way the global north was divided between capitalists and socialists. In most cases in Africa, there are methodical issues; political parties are merely special purpose vehicles for competing elite groups.  That’s why we have mobility of politicians (pejoratively called turn coats by those they spun) from one party to another as opposed to the West where one person belongs to the party of their ancestor and passes it to their offspring. Clearly, on our continent, the divide is not ideological as such, which is a good thing. Africans should celebrate the fact that they don’t have fundamental ideological disagreements and shouldn’t seek to emulate others who are having intractable problems because of them. In Rwanda, for instance, the government has been telling people that they hold no ideological differences and that they shouldn’t confuse criminal discourse for acceptable political ideology. Perhaps, because our history doesn’t create that situation where, at some point, we had a feudal class – that constituted almost a political divide – dominating other sections of society, capitalism and scientific socialism remain alien concepts. In Africa, we had colonialism under which we all suffered and upon independence we were – and still are – struggling with our socioeconomic issues which affect us all, and over which we differ only in terms of how we approach solutions. Of course, that can cause frictions from one election to another, but those frictions don’t constitute radical ideological divides. Therefore, even the argument that there is no political opposition because, in some instances like Rwanda, people have agreed on the basics (the consensus model) and chosen to work together doesn’t hold. The point is, unlike in the West where people are forced into coalitions to gain numbers, in Africa, it is easier to form coalitions because our pursuits are the same. There are no fundamental disagreements. It follows that the current approach to democratisation in Africa is an intra-party (not multi-party) competition or contestation. When electoral justice is lacking, the contestation can turn violent and will most likely follow identity lines because there are no indigenous, organic and irreconcilable competing ideologies to organise around. Such issues cannot be resolved by term limits. Furthermore, it is disingenuous to characterise an African leader who is elected by 99 percent of 36


the population as authoritarian while brushing aside as mere imperfection of democracy a situation where a European leader is elected by members of his party that represent less than 0.5 percent of the country’s population. Surely, a rational person wouldn’t conclude that only one of these two approaches produces undemocratic outcomes. They operate in different contexts much in the same way that some African countries have evolved into a situation where term limits work for them. For others, term limits have turned into a game of musical chairs with little to show for the democratic outcomes of improving people’s lives. In all these cases, the lesson is simple: Africans shouldn’t uncritically emulate systems that have failed elsewhere, especially by looking for problems we don’t have in our societies, such as ideological divides. All successful societies have examined their contexts for democratic inspiration. For such alien systems to be replicated in our societies, we need to also import the problems they were designed to resolve. Yet, we are currently lucky not to have issues similar to those they are trying to find answers to, as they are ripping their societies apart. The lesson that the West should help Africa learn about democracy is that it emerges from and evolves within a particular context, as it did in the West’s own circumstances. This calls for a change in attitude; otherwise, we shouldn’t expect any real change. However, continuing to push democracy as practised in the West into Africa is like throwing good money into an obviously bad business. Martin K. Ngoga is the Speaker of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). ❧ ❧ ❧ The RPF and Moral Legitimacy Lonzen Rugira The RPF’s greatest achievement is that it stopped the genocide against the Tutsi amidst international indifference to the killing of over a million men, women and children. This was the moral basis of its claim for power in 1994. However, the RPF itself has never made that claim. It says that its legitimacy is derived from putting in place a competent and accountable state that is committed to the greater good. Its opponents do not address themselves to this source of legitimacy. Instead, they are convinced that to defeat the RPF, it is essential to demystify its greatest achievement in the eyes of the majority of Rwandans. Here’s why. Having stopped the genocide against the Tutsi in the context of international indifference, the RPF could assert its moral right to preventing the occurrence of another genocide. The general indifference made it difficult to convince the RPF and Rwandans that they could rely on anyone but themselves to ensure that there could be no recurrence. As a result, the RPF has made sectarianism as a basis for political organisation a no-go area in Rwanda. Sectarianism was the ground on which the road to genocide was laid. If the consultations that informed the framing of the post-genocide constitution are an37


ything to go by, the vast majority of Rwandans agree with the RPF that this would be a dangerous path to take. This can also be seen in the pressure against government to “do something” whenever would-be politicians or political activists take to sectarianism-laced political discourse as some do on YouTube. Here is a predicament, however. Given that stopping the genocide is the RPF’s moral centre of gravity, those who seek to remove it from power know that this is what they must destroy precisely because they cannot make an equally potent counter claim in their pursuit of political power. If you can’t outcompete the RPF on the moral plane, you are left with only one option: destroying the ground on which it stands. The double genocide conspiracy aims to do just that. It is a classic case of trying to trade places. The claim that there were two genocides aims to create a moral equivalence between the RPF -and perpetrators of the genocide against the Tutsi. It is supposed to culminate in the claim that given both sides killed, neither can claim any moral pedestal. Further, it seeks to free the genocidaires and their supporters, among them relatives, from the burden of shame they carry ever since the mass atrocity they seek to disown or dissociate themselves from. As the RPF appeals to the offspring of genocide perpetrators to dissociate themselves from the crimes of their parents, those who seek to demystify the RPF make the opposite appeal, calling on them to justify the actions of their parents and to even defend their “honour.” Ambiguity around the facts of the genocide against the Tutsi and its outright denial are in effect used as tools to hold the relatives and children of genocide perpetrators hostage. In such a context, those who are eager to establish the facts constitute the biggest threat to this movement. This was evident when a young man, Innocent Habumugisha, recently testified that he had been lied to by his parents and others about what really transpired in 1994. In his own estiPhoto from The NewTimes Senator Marie Rose Mureshyankwano urging Rwandans to bring clarity to genocide 38


mation, taking the time to inform himself freed him from captivity. He is not alone. Before that, Senator Marie Rose Mureshyankwano had repeatedly given her personal testimony that brought clarity to the issue of the genocide. So did Nelly Mukazayire who testified at the United Nations, distancing herself from the actions of her mother who is serving life in prison for genocide crimes. As expected, those who would rather distort the story treated them as traitors to the “ethnic cause”. The result were attacks of all kinds on social media. Apparently, they had been bought off by the RPF. And then there is Victoire Ingabire. While the RPF insists that her prosecution and conviction to a jail term were linked to the nature of her crimes and the ideological divide they reflect, which presents Rwandans with an existential threat that makes confrontation unavoidable, Ingabire insists that her Hutuness, and by extension that of millions of other Rwandans, is the real issue. Ambiguity around the facts of the genocide serves one more purpose. It is used in a bid to prove that the RPF is no better than the government it overthrew, a regime that had ethnicity as the moral basis for its claim to power. In other words, the ultimate goal of demystifying the RPF’s main achievement is to reintroduce ethnicity as a legitimate platform for pursuing political power in Rwanda. This is the terrain that the ethnicity entrepreneurs who would demystify the RPF are most comfortable with. They see it as a sure route through which to acquire power. Going by their reasoning, once the moral foundation of politics in Rwanda is reduced to ethnicity, the RPF’s claims to legitimacy can only be assessed on ethnic grounds; thereby making it legitimate, only to Tutsis. They see it as a smart way to reintroduce ethnic politics through the backdoor, which is necessary given the front door has been shut by law and kept locked by the aspirations of all right-thinking Rwandans who have taken lessons from our tragic history. As we head towards the 2024 elections, the conscience of the nation continues to revolve around the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Those who saved people have a special standing because of their display of moral courage. They include the RPA soldiers and ordinary citizens who despite the danger they faced, actively put their own lives on the line so that others may live. They represent the value system Rwandans cherish as they deepen their cohesion around shared values. The best way to counter these divisive narratives that seek to undermine the gains of the last 27 years, is to reaffirm the facts around the genocide and the values shared by those who defeated the genocidal forces. Keeping Rwandans united around these shared values requires of every Rwandan of goodwill to amplify the courageous voices that reject ambiguity. This endeavour ought to transcend the potential political benefits the RPF would reap since, as argued before, genocide ideology is society’s underbelly regardless of which party is in power. When they seek to demystify the RPF, its detractors mean not only to erase these fountains of courage either literally through violence, or figuratively by drowning them out, but also, and most importantly, to erase the memory of the people we lost while also setting the ground for a recurrence. Since those committed to confrontational western political models are here to stay, and if constructive criticism is what they aim for, then Rwanda needs an opposition that innovates around a complementary moral gravity of its own without feeling the need to destroy the one upon which the RPF stands. Otherwise, no responsible and conscientious Rwandan, let alone the RPF (or even its political partners who together with it constitute Rwanda’s post-genocide political landscape), would countenance allowing such a discourse to pollute the air in our society. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Lonzen Rugira is a Rwandan independent researcher and former academic. 39


Magufuli Did Stumble While Running But Never Slowed Down or Stopped Eric Mwakibete Of all the presidents of Tanzania, no other has divided public opinion as the late Dr John Pombe Magufuli. Simply put, when it comes to Magufuli, there is no middle ground as far as commentators are concerned: he was either one of the greatest presidents this country ever had or the worst. I contend that a nuanced analysis of his presidency might reveal the main reason behind his actions: he was a man trying to catch up with lost time. On the matter of foreign policy, for instance, his harshest critics argue that he weakened the country’s regional and international standing. They say that he was a president of infrastructures who knew little or nothing else. In the same vein, others have pointed to his domestic political career as one of the reasons why his foreign policy was disastrous: while in government as a minister for two decades, he never handled any foreign affairs-related matters nor was he ever a member of any parliamentary committee, which would have exposed him to foreign policy issues. Statistics of declining foreign direct investments are often cited as proof of how things got worse under his watch. However, like most aspects of his time in office, it is impossible to understand Magufuli’s handling of foreign policy without an understanding of the state of the country he inherited from his two immediate predecessors – their handling of foreign policy and how that was reflected on the domestic scene, especially with Photo from Flickr 40


regard to three key areas: foreign travels, foreign investments, and regional security. In 1997, Tanzania, like many other African countries, adopted the so-called “economic diplomacy.” In doing so, Tanzania departed from what was then termed “liberation diplomacy,” which had been in place since independence. In this new foreign policy era, the debatable assumption was that political liberation had been achieved on the continent; and that it was then time to focus on the economic front. Magufuli’s ban on foreign travels Notwithstanding the controversy as to what the term “economic diplomacy” entails, one of its salient features in many African countries is the requirement for leaders, including presidents, prime ministers, ministers, parliamentarians and other senior government officials, to frequently travel abroad to “brand” their countries to wealthier countries and powerful economic actors. These travels are justified by governments as necessary to enhance the image of African countries and change the negative perceptions about Africa’s economic environment abroad. They are also considered necessary because they help connect domestic businesspeople with their global counterparts who might have otherwise not met without the intervention of these leaders. Part of this global engagement requires African leaders to take on some global initiatives or be part of various global foundations/ groups/economic blocs to increase their countries’ “international stature.” Former President Benjamin Mkapa excelled on this front. Similarly, his immediate successor in office, Jakaya Kikwete, excelled on foreign travels to the extent that some in the region labelled him “a globe trotter.” However, and this is the issue where Magufuli’s stance was justified, the frequent foreign travels of Mkapa and Kikwete yielded little positive impact on the domestic front. In his first speech as president, while inaugurating the eleventh parliament in Dodoma in November 2015, Magufuli offered some numbers about the price tag of these foreign trips while mentioning some of the state institutions which had the most numbers of foreign travellers. Between 2013 and 2015, a total of Tsh 356.324/- billion (approximately 168 million USD at the time) was used for foreign trips with the lion’s share going to airplane tickets and allowances for travelling officials. Consequently, he banned “unnecessary” foreign trips. For his troubles, he was labelled a “populist,” which is a misleading, useless term in providing any meaningful insight into his decision, and by extension his time in office. The general public applauded his decision, which was only problematic to the elite and those who had benefited from frequent foreign travels. Critics even pointed to his heart condition as the real reason behind the fact that he was the least foreign travelling president compared to his predecessors. However, while such personal circumstances may have impeded his ability to travel, this criticism fails to provide the general context that prompted him to cut government expenditures related to foreign trips for all public servants, including himself. From Magufuli’s perspective, public resources which could have been used for more impactful projects had been lost for far too long. Foreign Direct Investments The most contentious and controversial aspect of Magufuli’s governance in the era of “economic diplomacy” revolved around his attitude towards foreign direct investments (FDIs). Prior to his electoral victory, questions about the country’s sovereignty and the secrecy that surrounded the contracts the government had signed with mining companies had fuelled public anger. As part of the reforms by former President Mkapa to attract foreign investors in the country, many public parastatals were privatized and the mining sector saw one of the biggest increases in FDI. Laws and policies were made or amended to increase the country’s “competitiveness” in attracting these investments. However, in some of the regions where giant mining companies were given land for their activities, the processes were chaotic and confrontational. The relationship between these companies and the communities around their investments was either very tense or outright bad. 41


During Kikwete’s inaugural speech as president to parliament in December 2005, he promised that the government would not embark on any new mining investments without involving the parliament. The political environment was such that the controversies caused by FDIs launched the political careers of many leading opposition politicians like Tundu Lissu and Zitto Kabwe. There was little to no link between the economic growth shown in government reports and the economic realities of people whose regions had benefitted from these investments. Government’s own statistics showed that some of the areas with large mining activities were among the poorest in the country. In regions like Mara, the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), either lost constituencies or fought hard to retain them because of the disparity between the communities’ level of livelihoods and the huge mining investments around them. To Magufuli, this was personal. He hailed from one of the regions with huge gold deposits. In his inaugural parliamentary speech in November 2015, he said he wanted to see “economic diplomacy” answering domestic challenges like employment, infrastructures, markets for agricultural products, etc. Even before he launched his bid for the presidency, he was seen in a 2014 video speaking candidly with friends in his constituency about what he would do if he gained power. Countless times when in power, he repeated that the country had been cheated too much for far too long. He succeeded in renegotiating some of the controversial terms of the mining industry, giving the government more control and introducing new laws. One can debate the merits of the means through which he achieved these outcomes or the amount of money the country received which was nowhere near what he had promised, but there is no disputing that he was heard by the powerful mining companies which had played by a different set of rules for more than two decades. They had the upper hand, but he tilted the scales. Regional security Magufuli is not one of the former rebel commanders who dominate the politics of the region. While he appreciated the role Tanzania played in the liberation struggles in many countries, he was never personally involved nor was he an activist in his youth days as a member of the CCM. In many ways, the era of liberation struggles passed him by. Consequently, this was the single area of foreign policy where his “weakness” served him well. For instance, the fact that he had no direct or indirect historical relations with armed protagonists in the Great Lakes allowed him to sidestep some of the glaring mistakes of his immediate predecessor, such as suggesting talks between Rwanda and the remnants of the genocidal regime hiding in the forests of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Instead, he adopted an economic approach in dealing with neighbours, choosing to prioritize infrastructural projects to ease trade. Though he lacked the finesse of some of his predecessors, he eased security tensions and suspicions which had characterized Tanzania’s involvement in some of her neighbours’ politics. He knew how to dance without stepping on any toes, at least not publicly. The late Magufuli did things his way, which is why his critics see him as an erratic man. What is certain is that the idea of a country that is potentially rich in natural resources but economically poor never sat well with him, even more so the idea of a country on its knees going around the world with a begging bowl. At one time, while launching a week of industries and business for SADC countries, he paraphrased Mwalimu Nyerere who once said that while others are walking, we should run. Magufuli thought that Tanzania had been walking for far too long, so it was about time it ran. He did stumble while running but never stopped or slowed down. Indeed, his actions and policies were an attempt to compensate for Tanzania’s lost time. ❧ ❧ ❧ Erick Mwakibete is a Tanzanian commentator based in Dar es Salaam. 42


ANC No Longer Assured of Victory in South Africa Emmanuel Matambo In some quarters, the ANC has become so unpopular that associating with it might be costly for some political players On 1 November 2021, South Africa held its local government elections. For the last few years, the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s ruling party since 1994, has been taking the brunt of frustration for corruption, persistent poverty and a raft of other challenges, such as unemployment and social inequalities. Despite these troubles, the party has always been confident of victory at the polls. In fact, the ANC had become so complacent and entitled to electoral victory that some of its leaders have asserted that the party will rule South Africa until the return of Jesus Christ. However, the current voting patterns, voter turnout, and frustrations with the political system and leaders demonstrate that the ruling party can no longer take victory for granted. Those who think that the ANC will rule forever might want to look at the 2019 General Elections and the 2021 municipal elections as a reality check. Even before one talks about the results and how participants fared, the dwindling turnout of voters is a troubling reality. In the 2016 municipal elections, voter turnout was 57.94%, which reduced to 45.71% in the 2021 elections. A number of reasons could be adduced for this. In 2021, one might be tempted to attribute this low turnout to how COVID-19 has affected people’s lives and movement. In South Africa’s case, however, this argument does not currently go far because movement is no longer restricted during the day. A more fundamental reason, one that indicts the South African Photo from Flickr/ANC 43


political system, is that voters have begun to feel indifference towards elections in South Africa. Frustrated citizens, who faithfully vote but whose daily challenges and needs remain unaddressed, choose to either change their voting patterns or withhold their votes by boycotting elections. In extreme cases, this might lead to a general hostility towards electoral politics and the democratic processes that they entail. The responsibility to remedy this resides with those in power and the parties that oppose them. Those in power bear the responsibility of visibly improving the lot of those whose votes they seek to court. The opposition, on the other hand, has to persuade prospective voters that they are better alternatives and deserve to be placed in authority. The ANC, as the party in government, naturally incurs the primary responsibility for voter apathy and lack of participation. Another major talking point about the 2021 municipal elections is the performance of the two dominant parties, the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA). In the 2016 elections, the ANC and DA got 53.91% and 26% respectively. In 2021, the ANC reduced its tally to 46.04% and the DA to 21.83%. Again, several issues, some selfinflicted, are responsible for these declines. The ANC has been in power for 27 years – the entire gamut of South Africa’s postapartheid era. While it has made strides in providing amenities such as housing, sanitation, education and employment opportunities, it has also been deficient in substantially transforming or changing a socio-economic structure that is simply impregnable for previously disadvantaged South Africans. This translates into the persistent economic exclusion of black South Africans. It’s worth noting that the ANC had well-intentioned initiatives such as Affirmative Action and the Reconstruction and Development Programme to remedy the situation. However, these initiatives were infected by tokenism and incompetence, thereby benefitting a few ‘connected’ people while leaving the poor in their fringe position. Worse still, factors such as recent cases of corruption and factional wrangles have further eroded the party’s integrity. As I write this, the party’s Secretary-General, Ace Magashule, is under suspension and is in court facing allegations of corruption. Furthermore, the short imprisonment of former president Jacob Zuma in July 2021, which led to protests in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces, further divided the party. All these factors, happening in an election year, were bound to have a telling impact on the performance of the ANC. From ANC’s woes, one would expect that the DA, as the main opposition, would benefit. Voter percentages show that this has not been the case. The DA has suffered its own mortal blows. It has failed to shake off the belief that it is a racist party. In light of the gains that have been made by smaller parties (such as the Economic Freedom Fighters, Inkatha Freedom Party and the Freedom Front Plus) and a noticeable maiden performance by ActionSA, many hope that, in subsequent elections, the incorrigibility on the part of the dominant parties will be penalized. For the ANC, the last two municipal elections (2016 and 2021) point to a rot that is gnawing at the party. Apart from issues of service delivery which are keenly felt by many South Africans, the party also has to do a comprehensive in-house cleaning. Moreover, the ANC will also have to gird itself for difficult discussions with those they might seek coalitions with. This is so because, in some quarters, the ANC has become so unpopular that associating with it might be costly for some political players. Finally, young people, especially with no tangible memory of apartheid, will demand that their circumstances be improved, regardless of who is in power. Consequently, the ANC can no longer be complacent that it will rule in perpetuity. The fact that it played a seminal role in bringing about the end of apartheid and thus securing suffrage for black South Africans does not entitle it to unthinking endorsement. Indications are that the ANC might not rule until the Second Coming, after all. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Emmanuel Matambo is a Senior Researcher at the University of Johannesburg’s Centre for Africa-China Studies. 44


Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and Patricia Espinosa, Executive Secretary United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, greet Felix Tshisekedi, President of DR Congo, at COP26 World Leaders Summit The UN Climate Summit, held last November in Glasgow, Scotland, claimed to “bring together governments from around the world to agree coordinated action to tackle climate change.” And yet, like many of its predecessors ended with barely any concrete agreement in the stickiest of the issues: cuts to emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). As a result, countries will meet next year to pledge cuts to emissions of CO2. Africa has always got a raw deal from most COP 26: This Time, Africa Must Not Accept Being Bullied Bernard Sabiti of these climate summits. The summits tend to put the continent under undue pressure to ‘help’ the world fight climate change by turning to green energy. However, it is unfair to ask African countries to turn to expensive sources of ‘green’ energy when they barely have used any energy at all, dirty or not, at a time when most regions of the continent are barely beginning their own industrial revolution that western nations went through 200 years ago. On the one hand, rich countries account for only 12% of the world population but are responsible for half of all the CO2 emissions over the past 170 years, according to the New York Times. The United States has, over this period, emitted the most carbon dioxide, totalling a quarter of all emissions. The Developed World’s ferocious industrialization craze, greed and reckless capitalism have set our beautiful planet onto a journey to becoming a hot stove. Yet, the consequences of that greed have It is unfair to ask African countries to turn to expensive sources of ‘green’ energy when they barely have used any energy at all. 45


been more devastating to poor countries that have very little to do with it. A warming planet has created deadly heatwaves, drought, famine, etc – natural disasters that normally hit the poorer world the hardest. On the other hand, most of Africa is currently still way back on the development trajectory that the fumes that come from her still emerging industrialization and resource exploitation are too low; they barely register on the global carbon emissions Richter scale. The continent accounts for only 2–3 per cent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industrial sources, and, according to the World Resources Institute, Africa’s per capita rate of emissions of carbon dioxide in the year 2000 was 0.8 metric tons per person, compared with a global figure of 3.9 tons per person. In fact, even the little being emitted in Africa is largely by predatory (western and Chinese) incursion on the continent, whereby all profits of this exploitation are repatriated, leaving Africans with almost nothing. For instance, the value of Illicit Financial Flows – IFFs – out of Africa by large global corporations is estimated by the UN to be at nearly $100bn annually. Despite all of the above, the dynamics you get when looking at the worth that is given to the concerns of those other ‘governments from around the world’ besides the world’s biggest polluters are shocking. It’s as if our concerns have no bearing in policy considerations. As long as the situation remains unchanged, Africa should not be bullied into signing historically unfair, frivolous agreements that keep the continent in a subservient climate change position to meet the interests of the supposedly richer countries. African countries worked hard to harmonise their positions in Glasgow, but the problem is not just in the present; it is also in the past. Simply put, rich countries, which made their wealth by burning the planet, must pay their fair share first. At the same summit ten years ago, these countries promised to help Africa and other developing regions deal with the devastating effects of climate change by contributing billions of dollars annually towards climate change adaptation. As is their wont, many of these countries haven’t fulfilled these promises. Secondly, African countries should leverage all possible sources of affordable energy to facilitate their development journey, even if they have to make some mistakes in so doing. This means exploring affordable, albeit somewhat environmentally harmful, sources of energy to get to a level where we can even begin crawling manufacturing-wise because, right now, we aren’t even at the stage of moving, let alone taking off into the manufacturing stratosphere. At this moment, Africa’s share of global trade is currently only at 2%. It is difficult to significantly increase this by using solar energy to manufacture products. The international climate governance ecosystem cannot follow the dictatorial and unfair format of the UN Security Council where a handful of countries force their will on the rest of the world; or the unfair trade negotiation practices of the World Trade Organization, or the predatory lending of the World Bank and the IMF. When it comes to climate, an issue upon which our very lives and those of our children depend, we must, for once, put our foot down. Most importantly, Africans must change the terms of interaction. The current format, which does not prioritize the concerns of the global south, should not remain the main platform for policy formulation with regard to the fight against climate change. Africa, through its regional and continental bodies, has to find the needed financial resources to fund climate change mitigation programmes in case the so-called rich countries fail to do their part as they have done in the past. In 2019, the Trump administration pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement, complaining that it asks America too much, yet China is currently the bigger polluter.  Africans, on the other hand, have signed agreements devoid of the proper mechanisms to ensure that either rich countries would meet their financial obligations or Africans are able to move forward even without the compliance of the rich countries with international treaties. The consequences on our people have been dire. COP 26 should have been different. ❧ ❧ ❧ 46


Human Rights Watch Should Know that Victims’ Rights Are Human Rights Alphonse Muleefu The September [2021] conviction and 25-year sentence of critic and political opponent Paul Rusesabagina on charges including murder and membership in a terrorist group after a flawed trial was emblematic of the government’s overreach and the manipulation of the justice. This is a statement in the Human Rights Watch’s summary of 2021 events in Rwanda. The use of “emblematic” suggests that, in the view of Human Rights Watch (HRW), the case of Paul Rusesabagina in relation to other alleged abuses is the most serious human rights violation representing Rwanda’s unfairness. If this HRW meant this literally, then it is very easy to defend Rwanda’s human rights record, and here is why. There are three indisputable facts about Paul Rusesabagina’s case: first, that between 2018 and 2019, 9 civilians were mercilessly murdered, and people’s property destroyed by the National Liberation Front (FLN, French acronym); second, that Paul Rusesabagina is one of the leaders and founders of the FLN, a fact he freely and openly acknowledged in court; and third, that it is on record that Rusesabagina openly called people to join the group. Keeping these three indubitable facts in mind, justice is – and should be – about balancing conflicting interests, and in this case, it is about balancing the rights of the suspects, those of the government to meet its constitutional obligation of providing security to the people, and those of the victims to receive justice. An objective analysis should not dismiss or ignore these competing rights. Human Rights Watch has betrayed its professed mandate. Photo from Flickr 47


These are rights in their true sense; they are universal, inherent to human dignity, and are legally protected in Rwanda. Simply put, all three branches of government have a constitutional obligation to protect and enforce them. The 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power is clear on victims’ right to access justice and fair treatment, and it encourages states to establish and strengthen mechanisms that allow victims to obtain justice. According to the Rwandan Criminal Procedure Code, a victim has a right to civil damages, and, under its provisions on private prosecution, a victim has a right to have the offender(s) punished. Therefore, if we understand injustice as doing something wrong against someone, certainly an argument that skews the facts to exclude the victims from the analysis is unjust. It is even more unjust and worrisome that, in this case, a supposedly human rights organization is clearly sidestepping the victims’ justice, which shows that they are up to no good. The Rwandan government cannot participate in an international conspiracy that denies its citizens their rights to receive civil damages and have offenders punished. However, HRW’s never-ending hostility towards the Rwandan government simply dismisses victims’ rights and considers the rights of only one of the 21 co-accused in the FLN trial as worthy of their protection. Ironically, HRW’s advocacy, which stubbornly denounces the method of the arrest of Rusesabagina, would not stand to scrutiny in the very western “democracies” upon which the organization rely to pressure Rwanda into releasing him. These governments have, for instance, repeatedly argued that victims’ rights to justice and citizens’ rights to protection against recurrence justify more extreme methods than mere luring. In this regard, the remarks made by former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on December 5, 2005, speak for themselves, as shown below. “Rendition is a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism. Its use is not unique to the United States, or to the current administration. Last year, then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet recalled that our earlier counterterrorism successes included “the rendition of many dozens of terrorists prior to September 11, 2001. Ramzi Youssef masterminded the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and plotted to blow up airlines over the Pacific Ocean, killing a Japanese airline passenger in a test of one of his bombs. Once tracked down, a rendition brought him to the United States, where he now serves a life sentence. One of history’s most infamous terrorists, best known as “Carlos the Jackal,” had participated in murders in Europe and the Middle East. He was finally captured in Sudan in 1994. A rendition by the French government brought him to justice in France, where he is now imprisoned. Indeed, the European Commission of Human Rights rejected Carlos’ claim that his rendition from Sudan was unlawful,” Condoleezza Rice said.  “Renditions take terrorists out of action, and save lives,” Rice added, making no secret of the US government’s intention to continue using rendition as a foreign policy tool. Therefore, HRW’s advocacy for Rusesabagina would make sense to observers if and only if they disregard the three aforementioned undisputable facts and deny Rwandan victims and citizens the same kind of inalienable rights to justice, human dignity and protection that western citizens enjoy. The fact that European courts, the European Commission of Human Rights and US courts have repeatedly dismissed the objections raised by suspected terrorists who were brought before them through abduction and rendition only proves that in any functioning country, the three branches of government act in a concerted manner to protect these rights for their own citizens. They do this regardless of the methods used in bringing elusive suspects to courts. People around the world generally support this stance because the crime of terrorism is deemed too despicable and its threat to national interests too high when balanced with the rights of suspected terrorists. This confirms, in such instances, that the rights of the victims should 48


not be ignored while considering those of the accused. The HRW, as an activist organization, is free to oppose both national and international practices, but we cannot allow it to manipulate international public opinion by claiming that Rwanda acted abnormally. Therefore, we can only hold HRW credible when it is applying the right reasoning to correct facts based on the same standards applied in dealing with all governments, whether western or African. It is worth noting that there is an ongoing appeal process. The prosecution, civil parties, and some co-accused appealed against the decision of the High Court Chamber for International Crimes. Generally, one may argue that there is nothing interesting to discuss about this appeal since the law allows all those that appealed to do so. However, the issue that needs some reflection is whether the Public Prosecution needed to appeal. In other words, since the prosecution had obtained convictions for all the accused persons, was it necessary for it to engage more public resources in this case. In response, I would like to highlight some plausible ideas a prosecution may have put into consideration before filing for the appeal. It is important to recall that the prosecution has a mandate of impartiality and service to the law. In order to achieve this mandate, two considerations may come into play. First is the fact that the prosecution has a duty to ensure that those responsible for serious crimes are given proportional sentences. This goes well together with the obligation to prevent crimes through punishment. The prosecution may have seen this as an opportunity for deterrence, a warning to potential future perpetrators. Second is the fact that the court of appeal is believed to be more competent with more experienced judges capable of providing a more nuanced interpretation and sounder judgement. It is also worth stressing that the suspect that forfeits their right to participate in the court proceeding, as Rusesabagina did, should understand that they are undermining the court’s ability to access the truth and administer justice. The law is clear on the fact that the trial should proceed. The criminal procedure was never intended to create a situation where justice can be hijacked through stubborn dilatory tactics. Neither should HRW’s constant bullying undermine its precepts. This is exactly what we expect from an independent judicial system, as one American lawyer noted, ‘”judicial independence” embodies the concept that a judge decides cases fairly, impartially, and according to the facts and law, not according to whim, prejudice, or fear, the dictates of the legislature or executive, or the latest opinion poll.’ The prosecution serves best its mandate of impartiality and service to the law when those responsible are given appropriate punishments based on correct charges using the correct interpretation of laws, including respecting victims’ rights. Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, has betrayed its professed mandate. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr Alphonse Muleefu is a Rwandan academic. 49


BRD-Renewable Energy Fund “CANA UHENDUKIWE” Will Change Beneficiaries’ Livelihoods Through Affordable Solar Home Systems For every contribution of 15,000 RWF (US $15), BRD will top up the remaining 100,000 RW (US $ 100) necessary to purchase and install a home solar system for a family. BRD calls upon everyone who can to join this initiative that will light up and transform the livelihoods of at least 10,000 families. The issue of access to electricity continues to be a challenge in Africa. In Rwanda for instance, as per the latest data provided in October 2021, the cumulative connectivity rate is 67.1% of households. Among these, 48.6% are connected to the national grid and 18.5% get electricity through off-grid systems (mainly solar). However, through the elaboration of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies (EDPRS II), the Government of Rwanda has shown its commitment to ensuring universal access to electricity by 2024, with off-grid solutions contributing up to 48%, while on-grid solutions will account for 52% of national electrification. To meet this target, the Government of Rwanda channelled funds through the Renewable Energy Fund (REF), also known as CANA UHENDUKIWE, managed by the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD) in order to accelerate efforts aimed at universal electrification. These efforts will subsequently pave the way for beneficiaries’ economic growth. BRD’s interventions have been designed to address key constraints in the sector such as high start-up costs, among which electricity costs constitute a challenge, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Through this initiative, Rwandan households and SMEs will be connected to off-grid electricity through solar systems. In this process, the use of electricity generated by a clean source of energy will replace the use of diesel, kerosene, dry cell batteries, as well as other alternative fuels. How does one apply for the loan? To get a ‘CANA UHENDUKIWE’ loan, one must have an account in Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCO), a Commercial Bank, or a microfinance institution; or work with a solar company from where they apply and are vetted in order to get the solar home system on credit. There are currently 46 SACCOs, four commercial banks (Bank of Kigali, Bank of Africa, I&M Bank, and Access Bank), and over 6 solar companies (BBoxx, Ignite, Mobisol, NOTS, StarTimes, and Solektra), all working under the CANA UHENDUKIWE brand. With CANA UHENDUKIWE, an applicant chooses a specific loan product and gets solar home systems installed with no delays. The #CanaChallenge The #canachallenge is a community-based initiative launched by BRD on December 16th 2021 on different social media platforms. The campaign encourages all Individuals and Organizations to make voluntary contributions to “Light up a Rwandan Family” that cannot access affordable electricity.


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