ECONOMÍA DE LA REGULACIÓN Mario Bergara: [email protected] Jorge Polgar: [email protected]

Horas/Créditos: 40/8 Forma de evaluación: prueba escrita al final del curso PROGRAMA I – INTRODUCCIÓN II – ACERCA DEL CONCEPTO DE MONOPOLIO NATURAL II.1 – Algunas consideraciones previas II.2 – Subaditividad y monopolio natural III – REGULACIÓN DE PRECIOS III.1 – Primer y segundo óptimos III.2 – La regla de Ramsey III.3 – La regulación de la tasa de retorno III.4 – Mecanismos regulatorios alternativos III.4.1 – La regulación del retorno sobre el nivel del producto III.4.2 – La regulación del retorno sobre las ventas III.4.3 – La regulación del retorno sobre los costos III.5 – Discriminación de precios III.6 – La regulación de precios tope III.7 – El mecanismo de Vogelsang y Finsinger IV – REGULACIÓN Y SUBASTAS V – REGULACIÓN E INFORMACIÓN ASIMÉTRICA VI – REGULACIÓN CON MERCADOS ANÁLOGOS VII – MONOPOLIO NATURAL Y ACTIVIDADES COMPETITIVAS VIII – REGULACIÓN Y LEYES DE COMPETENCIA IX – LA DEMANDA POR REGULACIÓN X – EL MARCO INSTITUCIONAL Y EL PROCESO ECONÓMICO

X.1 – Conceptos básicos del análisis institucional X.2 – La economía de los costos de transacción XI – EL MARCO INSTITUCIONAL Y LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS XI.1 – El problema de la credibilidad III.2 – Referencias empíricas III.3 – Las instituciones y el régimen regulatorio XII – REGULACIÓN BANCARIA XII.1 – Introducción XII.2 – Especificidad de la firma bancaria XII.3 – Racionalidad económica de la regulación prudencial XII.4 – Instituciones, diseño e instrumentos de la regulación prudencial XII.4.1 – Diseño de la red de seguridad XII.4.2 – El seguro de depósitos XII.4.3 – El prestamista de última instancia XI I.5 – Crisis bancarias y regulación

REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRAFICAS

Textos: Alston, L., T. Eggertsson y D. North (1996): Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, M., S. Cowan, y J. Vickers (1994): Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience, MIT Press. (*) Bishop, M., J. Kay y C. Mayer (1995): The Regulatory Challenge, Oxford University Press. Gilbert, R. y E. Kahn (1996): International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation, Cambridge University Press. Laffont, J. y J. Tirole (1993): A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press. (*) Levy, B. y P. Spiller (1995): The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment, Cambridge University Press. (*) North, D. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press. (*) Saiegh, S. y M. Tommasi (1998): La nueva economía política: racionalidad e instituciones, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires. (*) Train, K. (1991): Optimal Regulation: The Economic Thoery of Natural Monopoly, MIT Press. (*) Vogel, D. (1986): National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States, Cornell University Press. Williamson, O. (1996): The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press. (*) Freixas, X. y J. Rochet (1997): “Economía Bancaria”, Bosch. (*) Dewatripoint, M. Y J. Tirole (1994) : “The Prudencial Regulation of Banks”, MIT.

(*) Recomendados

Artículos: Averch, H. y L. Johnson (1962): “Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint”, American Economic Review, Vol. 52. Baron, D. y D. Besanko (1984): “Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15.

Baron D. y R. Myerson (1982): “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs”, Econometrica, Vol. 50. Baumol, W. y D. Bradford (1970): “Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing”, American Economic Review, Vol. 60. Baumol, W. y A. Klevorick (1970): “Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, Vol. 1. Benston, G y G. Kaufman (1996): “The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation”, The Economic Journal, 106, 688-697. Bergara, M. (1998): “Network Access Pricing and Light-Handed Regulation: A Comparative Institutional Analysis”, Universidad de California, Berkeley, mimeo. Bergara, M. (1998): “Teoría económica de la regulación de monopolios naturales”, Universidad ORT-Uruguay, mimeo. Bergara, M. (1998): “La regulación de servicios públicos: una nota introductoria”, Departamento de Economía de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, mimeo. Bergara, M. (1999): “El marco institucional, el proceso económico y los servicios públicos”, Universidad ORT-Uruguay, mimeo. Bergara, M., W. Henisz, y P. Spiller (1998): “Political Institutions and Electric Utility Performance: a Cross-Nation Analysis”, California Management Review, Vol. 40. Bergara, M. y J.A. Licandro (2001): “Regulación Prudencial y Ciclos de Crédito: un Enfoque Macroeconómico”, Revista de Economía, BCU, vol. 8, nro.2 Bergara, M. y P. Spiller (1997): “The Introduction of Direct Access in New Zealand´s Electricity Market”, Utilities Policy, Vol. 6, Nro. 2. Bergara, M. y P. Spiller (1998): “Competition and Direct Access in New Zealand´s Electricity Market”, en Deregulation of Electric Utilities, editado por Georges Zaccour, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Bhattacharya, S, A. Boot y A. Thakor (1998): “The Economics of Banking Regulation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 30, nro. 4. Bhattacharya, S, y A. Thakor (1993): “Contemporary Banking Theory”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3, 2-50. Brennan, T. (1989): “Regulating by Capping Prices”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Nro. 1.

Demsetz, H. (1968): “Why Regulate Utilities”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 11. Diamond, D. y P. Dybvig (1986): “Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation”, Journal of Business, vol. 59, nro. 1. Faulhaber, G. (1975): “Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises”, American Economic Review, Vol. 65. Ferejohn, J. y C. Shipan (1990): “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 6. Gilbert, R. y M. Riordan (1995): “Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26. Goldberg, V. (1976): “Regulation and Administered Contracts”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, Vol. 7. Henisz, W. (1997): “The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment”, mimeo, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Henisz, W. (1998a): “Judging the Impact of Political Constraints on Economic Growth”, mimeo, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Henisz, W. y B. Zelner (1998): “The Institutional Determinants of Infrastructure Growth in Telecommunications: A Cross-national Study”, mimeo, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Laffont, J. y J. Tirole (1994): “Access Pricing and Competition”, European Economic Review, Vol. 38. Llewellyn, D. (1999): “The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation”, Financial Services Authority, Occasional Paper Series 1.

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Panzar, J. (1989): “Technological Determinants of Firm and Industry Structure”, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Edited by R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, Vol. 1. Peltzman, S. (1976): “Towards a More General Theory of Regulation”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 14. Polgar, J. (2004): “Crisis Bancarias y Regulación: Algunas Claves para el Nuevo Marco Regulatorio”, en Una Agenda de Reformas para el Sistema Financiero Uruguayo, G. Licandro y J.A. Licandro Editores. Salant, D. (1995): “Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, N° 3. Salant, D. y G. Woroch (1992): “Trigger Price Regulation”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 23. Santos, J. (2000): “Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature”, BIS Working Papers, nro. 90. Sappington, D. (1980): “Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, Vol. 11. Shapiro, C. y R. Willig (1990): “Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization”, in The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization, Suleiman and Waterbury Eds., Westview Press. Shleifer, A. (1985): “A Theory of Yardstick Competition”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 16. Spiller, P.T. (1990): “Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A MultiplePrincipals Agency Theory of Regulation, or ‘Let Them Be Bribed’”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33. Spiller, P. (1996): “A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law, or Regulatory Specificity?”, Southern California Law Review, Vol. 69. Stigler, G. (1971): “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, Vol. 2. Vaz, D. (1999): “Four Banking Crisis, Their Causes and Consequences”, Revista de Economía, BCU, vol 6, nro.1. Vickers, J. (1995): “Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62.

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Bibliografía Módulo XII Regulación bancaria

The Economics of Banking Regulation (Bhattacharya, Boot, Thakor: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking vol. 30, nro.4, 1998) The Rationale for Financial Regulation (Llewellyn: FSA, 1999) Financial Intermediation (Gorton, Winton: NBER WP 8928, 2002) The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation (Benston, Kaufman: The Economic Journal, 106, 688-697, 1996) Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A review of the literature ( Santos, BIS WP 90, 2000) Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation (Diamond, Dybvig: Journal of Business, vol. 59, nro.1, 1986) The role of capital in financial institutions (Berger, Herring, Szego: Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 1995)

An overall Perspective on Banking Regulation (Freixas, Santomero: FED Philadelphia, WP nro. 02-1, 2002). Economía Bancaria (Freixas, Rochet : Bosch, Capítulos 2, 7 y 9, 1997) Santos, J. (2000): “Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature”, BIS Working Papers, nro. 90.