STARSHELL WINTER 2023 | ISSUE 97

NAVAL ASSOCIATION OF CANADA

An In t er view w it h VAdm Topsh ee Su bm ar in e Ops - A Pr im er Th e RCN: Fleet by t h e Nu m ber s Ch in ese Ar ct ic Resear ch An Un der -Ice Capabilit y f or t h e RCN?

Starshell ISSN-1191-1166 OFFICERS OF THE CORPORATION PRESIDENT: Bruce Belliveau VICE PRESIDENT AND NAVAL AFFAIRS: Tim Addison TREASURER: David Colbourne EX. DIRECTOR: Kevin Goheen COMMITTEE CHAIRS NOMINATING COMMITTEE: Mike Hoare NAC ENDOWMENT FUND COMMITTEE: John Anderson NATIONAL AWARDS SELECTION COMMITTEE: Bruce Belliveau MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE: King Wan FINANCE AND INVESTMENT COMMITTEE: vacant NATIONAL APPOINTMENTS NATIONAL ARCHIVIST: Richard Gimblett CHAIR, HISTORY AND HERITAGE: Alec Douglas EDITOR, STARSHELL: Adam Lajeunesse EDITORIAL BOARD: Ian Parker, Howard Smith, Tim Addison, Norm Jolin EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SECRETARY/COMMUNICATIONS: David Soule 1613-837-40261 [email protected] STARSHELL magazine is published three times per year (with occasional special editions) by the Naval Association of Canada (NAC). The editor is solely responsible for the selection of material. Contributions are encouraged and should be sent direct to the editor at [email protected]. The opinions expressed in this publication are deemed to be exclusively those of the author(s) and are not necessarily shared by the Naval Association of Canada, the Royal Canadian Navy, or the Department of National Defence. If copyright is specified for any item, permission to copy must first be obtained through the editor, otherwise material may be copied without permission provided appropriate attribution is given to both the author(s) and STARSHELL. DISTRIBUTION and SUBSCRIPTIONS STARSHELL is circulated electronically via email and displayed as a flipbook accessed through the NAC website.

Cover Image: Members of the embarked Air Detachment onboard HMCS FREDERICTON conduct fueling operations with the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter during Operation REASSURANCE (Photo: Cpl Noe Marchon, CAF)

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HMCS FREDERICTON pduring Exercise DYNAMIC MANTA with NATO naval units in the Mediterranean (Photo: Cpl Noe Marchan, CAF)

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St ar sh ell Nu m ber 97 (Win t er 2023) Table of Con t en t s

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Fr om t h e Ops Room Tim Addison

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An In t er view w it h VAdm An gu s Topsh ee

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Th e Br idge Layou t f or t h e CSC

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Can adian Su bm ar in e Oper at ion s Norman Jolin

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A Can adian Ar ct ic Un der w at er Capabilit y Tim Choi and Chris Spedding

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Ops Updat e

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RCN M en t or sh ip Pr ogr am Amber Comisso

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RCN Fleet by t h e Nu m ber s Tim Addison

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Ch in ese M ar in e Scien t if ic Resear ch in t h e Ar ct ic Adam Lajeunesse & Suzanne Lalonde

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Let t er s t o t h e Edit or

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Fr om t h e Br an ch es

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Th e Last Post

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HMCS FREDERICTON deck operations with an SH-101 helicopter from ITS MARGOTTINI during Operation REASSURANCE (Photo: Cpl Noé Marchon, CAF)

From Ops Room Tim Addison, Naval Affair s Fellow NAC Members, It?s my pleasure to introduce the Winter 2023 edition of STARSHELL. Looking back at an old copy that I discovered in a bookcase recently, STARSHELL has come a long way. That 10-page black and white edition which rolled off the press in 2002 contains names many will remember, including the Editor George Moore, Russell Moore the National President, and Duncan Mathieson the Executive Director of what was then NOAC. As a sidebar, In my youth I baby-sat Dunc?s children when we lived in Virginia Beach. I remember doing command board preps with Russ when he was CO of Provider and I assisted George a few years back when we started to expand STARSHELL to include BOA Dinner sponsors? ads. That Summer Edition (Volume VII, Number 19) contains an article written by the national fund-raising Chairman of the day, Andy Irwin, whose wife Elaine contacted me recently about attending the Battle of the Atlantic Gala Dinner in Ottawa on 3 May. Sadly, Andy passed away in 2017. Elaine is planning to attend this year?s Dinner with Fraser McKee, someone who?s name we all recognize as a major contributor to STARSHELL over the years. Fast forward to today, you may have noticed on the Marquee of this edition that we have introduced an ?Editorial Board? as part of the team that helps with the production of our flagship publication. The Board?s objective is to produce a professional publication with a focus on what has long been our mission: to educate the Canadian public on their Navy and what it needs if it is to continue to contribute effectively into the future to Canada?s security, prosperity and other interests, not only in home waters, but around the world. The intent is to

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include articles related to Naval Affairs, including the on-going discussions about the past, present, and future of the RCN, while preserving the flavour of what member?s expect: a publication with some news of what?s happening at the national level, within branches across the country, and with individual members. In other words, ?A little light on what?s going on.? You may ask, why are we so intent on this focus of Naval Affairs? You may be aware, recently the Government of Canada initiated a ?Defence Policy Update?, in response to the upheaval in eastern Europe with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and the sabre rattling in the Indo-Pacific by the PRC and North Korea. These events are causing parliamentarians to ask questions about our navy and its capabilities, and more specifically why we need replacements for the current fleet of twelve Halifax class frigates, twelve Coastal Defence Vessels and four Victoria class submarines. This week as a volunteer with the Navy League of Canada, I participated in discussions with some of those parliamentarians. There were questions about the cost of the Canadian Surface Combatant program, its value to the Canadian economy, why we?re building it in Canada (or not in the case of submarines), and nuclear versus diesel powered submarines. There is still a degree of maritime blindness but the sense that I got was that defence capabilities, particularly naval capabilities are more important now than in the past 50 years. You may have also noticed STARSHELL?s transition in terms of increased advertising content. This quite simply is a function of survivability. Employing a professional editor, a second writer to produce content for the

website, a coordinator who manages much of the day-to-day activities at the national level and covering the salary of a paid Executive Director costs real money. Times have changed. We aren't blessed with the mainly volunteer team that we enjoyed in the past and bringing in revenue from sponsors ads covers some of these costs. That said, we are looking seriously at how to reduce costs. Regarding the Defence Policy Update (DPU), the Naval Association will contribute to the discussion and hopefully influence the outcome, if we are prepared and have something of value to contribute. With that in mind, our Editor with the assistance of the Editorial Board will review all articles published in STARSHELL and on our national website over the last few years and consider them for submission to government (with authors' permission of course) as part of the DPU process.

Keep in touch with the NAC If you are receiving NAC News, but are not a member, please consider joining. Or, keep in touch through social media. Join the NAC navalassoc.ca/branches/ View our newest Naval Affairs work navalassoc.ca/naval-affairs Archived weekly NAC new links navalassoc.ca/naval-affairs/nac-news/ Follow us on Twitter @navalassn Should you wish to donate or leave a memorial visit: NAC Endowment Fund NAC reference to assist veterans and/or seniors is located at Veteran's Comer

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The feature of this edition is the interview conducted a few weeks ago with Commander RCN, Vice­ Admiral Topshee. You will observe that the Admiral was very forthright in his responses, and we covered a lot of the waterfront. This edition also includes a commentary by Norm Jolin on submarines and an article on the history of how the RCN fleet has diminished in size over the years, written by the undersigned. We also have an article on the RCN's mentorship program, which shows promise to involve NAC members in the future. Our Editor Adam Lajeunesse has prepared an interesting paper looking at the background of China's Arctic maritime research, a topical issue following the recent CAF announcement that it had pulled a PRC buoy out of the Arctic waters. Tim Choi also provides an in-depth analysis of submarine requirements for Arctic operations, something that is on many minds these days as the RCN considers how a new class of submarines can enhance Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic. To sum up, I encourage all members to contribute to the ongoing discussion on Naval Affairs. We will be glad to publish your thoughts and opinions in STARSHELL provided that they are relatively coherent and accurate in terms of the content. They will also be considered for submission as NAC's contribution to the DPU. Our Editor Adam Lajeunesse can even assist with generating a final draft. And of course, we all enjoy the sea stories, even the odd tall one. One other change in terms of content, I hope to once again feature "Schober's Quiz" in our next edition, which you will recall was a staple in STARSHELL for many years. George is a family friend who I recently heard from, thanks to email. We will start with some of George's old quizzes and gradually introduce some new brain teasers. Standby for the fust quiz. That reminds me, I owe George a reply. Yours aye, Tim

An In t er view w it h Vice-Adm ir al An gu s Topsh ee, Com m an der of t h e Royal Can adian Navy

The NAC is very grateful to VAdm Topshee for taking the time to speak with us about the state of the Navy, its most pressing challenges, and the road ahead. This interview took place on March 20th and is published here in an edited and abbreviated form.

Dr. Adam L aj eunesse Good Afternoon sir, thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. To start, could you give us a bit of background on yourself, particularly your education and how that has influenced your thinking regarding Canada's place in the world as a maritime nation and as a middle power. VAdm Angus Topshee I want to start by beginning by acknowledging that I'm joining you today from the traditional territories, the Algonquin Anishinabe Nation. Interestingly, since you asked about my career, the reason that I came to really appreciate the challenges that we face is because of my time in command of HMCS Algonquin. I was sent to sort of meet with the First Nations for whom the ship was named, and I very quickly learned the complexity of so much of what we do.

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Picking up on your question about my background, I've always believed that learning is a lifelong process, that I learn from every interaction and from every opportunity. I've been blessed in my career from a number of different things. The highlight of my career will always be that time in command of HMCS Algonquin. But, from an educational point of view, during my four years at RMC I had the opportunity to spend six months at the Australian Defense Force Academy and learn that where you live in the world really does change your perspective. These two nations are virtually identical, and I was shocked by the number of differences that we continue to see today, exemplified by the different strategic choices our governments are making.

I also did a Master's degree in Scotland, University of Aberdeen, and learned a lot that confirmed my lifelong interest in strategic studies, history and politics, and a belief as well that all of that can only be understood with a strong background in economics and human incentives. Then, I did staff college. I was at the Naval War College and the National Security Program in Toronto. And probably the number one thing that the Navy did to keep my interest and engagement following my command of Algonquin was sending me to Afghanistan for a year, working with the NATO training mission there to help run the Afghan National Police Training General Command, and really work on the operational aspects of building a police force for Afghan security. That year showed that there is life after command in the Navy. I felt as though my contributions were valuable. Then, I was made a base commander, which taught me that there is far more to the navy than just the ships that go to sea, and that there is a huge infrastructure that supports the institution. So, all of those things were fantastic experiences. Dr. Adam L aj eunesse Given Canada's deteriorating relations with Russia and growing great power competition with China, the CAF?s operational commitments are increasing across the board, yet recruitment and retention are significant challenges. Can you tell us what the RCN is doing to address its shortfalls in personnel? VAdm Angus Topshee It's a pretty significant challenge. Right now, we're about 1,500 people short in the regular force, and about the same in the reserve. That's a significant level of missing horsepower in terms of staff Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 7

capacity and operational effect. And then there?s the personnel and civilian personnel side as well. We'd love to hire more people into the fleet, so what we are doing is making sure that, on the civilian side, we take action to spend our full allotment of civilian salaries every year, and that we expedite the hiring process to the degree possible, so that we're never the reason why hiring a slow. That's challenging, as with any bureaucratic process. The first challenge is, on the retention side. The best way to get a sailor who's got 15 years of experience is keep the sailor with 14 years of experience. So, we're really making sure that we're doing everything we can to prove to our sailors that they are the essential element of our business, that this is a worthwhile profession, that we take care of them, that we pay them properly, that we set up their families and everything else. There are some challenges on that front, to be honest; I think we do we need a pay raise. Our junior sailors are also feeling the impacts of inflation. I think we need desperately to revitalize and and modernize the post living differential that we pay for the cost of living. Halifax and Victoria are two of the highest cost of living places in Canada and we're asking sailors to come from across Canada and go to two of the top five most expensive places in Canada to live and bring their families. That's tough, so we need to fix that, and we're working to address that. Retention is a big piece of it, and part of that is culture, so we?re making sure that we really do create a culture that is inclusive, that is welcoming, that allows every sailor to reach their full potential within the organization. The final piece is recruiting. We have not hit our

target number of recruits since 2012. So, we're launching a new program called the Naval Experience Program that is going to be a targeted enrollment program designed around expedited entry. The goal is that 80% of applicants will be enrolled within 21 days. Those applicants will join the Navy, do eight weeks of basic military qualification training, then four weeks of naval environmental training. Then, after that, they're going to be fully qualified as a general duty sailor. They'll spend the next eight months or so on a coast learning the full range of navy jobs, including some sea time and ideally a foreign port or two. And, assuming that they're a good fit for us, then we'd offer them an employment within the Navy.

operate in the Arctic and assure Canadian sovereignty, to work with the whole of government effort to make sure that we address all aspects of sovereignty and security in the High North.

Dr. Adam L aj eunesse

The second part is the balance between NATO and the Indo-Pacific, and it really is a challenging balance for Canada. We've had a number of discussions around the Armed Forces Council about that. The way I've come to conceive of it is that, for us, for Canada, NATO is really more of a land theater. That doesn't mean that there isn't a role for the Navy and the Air Force, but in terms of the preponderance of Canadian effort, and who is the supporting commander, it's going to be the Canadian Army - as you will see through the Enhanced Forward Presence operation in Latvia.

Canada's facing something unprecedented in our history. We're looking at two great power competitors, now on opposite sides of the world, and the Navy is having to strike a balance. How is the RCN addressing the government's desire to maintain its commitments to NATO, while at the same time increasing its persistent presence in the Asia Pacific region?

Right now, going beyond the battlegroup, and how do we create, a meaningful, real commitment from Canada that that provides a measurable difference to that environment? We are still on the hook for up to five frigates in support of NATO response initiatives, but that doesn't mean that those five frigates would all necessarily be assigned to the North Atlantic.

VAdm Angus Topshee

In the fall, you're going to see us deploy two MCDVs to Europe because the extensive mining in the Black Sea around the Ukraine War has show the value of that mine-hunting capability. MCDVs are actually a great platform for doing that given the technology that we use these days, so we're going to renew that deployment that was very successful last year with Kingston and Summerside. We also have every intention of deploying HMCS Windsor in support of that, providing subsurface deterrence intelligence morning.

I think for the first time in our history in Canada, we actually have to take seriously the threats in all three of our oceans. We've always talked about being a three-ocean nation and having a navy that can operate in all three. But as you pointed out, right now, we're being asked to do all three simultaneously, and that's a difficult balancing job. The first good news is that, for the first time, since the 1950s, when we had HMCS Labrador within the Navy before it was transferred to the Coast Guard, we've actually got ships purpose built to Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 8

How are we meeting the Indo-Pacific commitment? The simple answer is that we are taking the second frigate, that used to go to NATO, to the Indo-Pacific. We're still deploying the four frigates a year, it's just that instead of two to NATO and two to the Indo-Pacific, it's one to NATO and three to Indo-Pacific. Simply, we view the Indo-Pacific as more of maritime theater, and this is the more appropriate weight of effort for the CAF.

Shipbuilding Strategy was a deliberate decision to build a shipbuilding capability in Canada and we deliberately built the program such that the non combatant ships were built before the Canadian Surface Combat, all around building that expertise. And so, one of the challenges of shipbuilding is that it's incredibly complex and difficult. So, in building the AOPS, there are elements that did not go the way we had anticipated. Some of those have already been resolved.

Dr. Adam L aj eunesse You mentioned the Arctic Admiral. The new AOPS are still developing their concept of operation to determine what precisely they will be doing. Do we have a clearer idea of those tasks? Separately, these ships have been experiencing mechanical issues, can you give us an update on that? VAdm Angus Topshee We have deliberately created the AOPS as a littoral ship that's got the connectors to be able to deliver effect on shore through its landing craft and other connectors. All of that is designed around going up North, Understanding the environment, first and foremost, building maritime domain awareness. Building a sense of the recognized maritime picture and engaging with the communities as well. What are the threats and challenges that we see to Canadian security and sovereignty in the High North? Fundamentally, the AOPS provides the ability of the Canadian government to operate in the region and protect Canadian interests across a broad spectrum of potential threats.

The major issues right now are the main diesel generators and, somewhere in the process of designing and operating that system, something has not gone right, in the sense that we are delivering corrosion into the engines, and, therefore, having trouble keeping them running. So, when I describe it as a design issue, I mean design in its holistic sense, not just the physical design, but also the maintenance and training regimens that go around that as well. We're working through that challenge, making sure that we have reliable and fully operational systems. We'll wrap up in, in time for the summer and our goal is to deploy both Harry DeWolf and Margaret Brooke up into the High North. Dr. Adam L aj eunesse That?s great news about the summer deployments. Another of the big future questions is, of course, the Canadian Submarine Replacement Program. The replacement of the Victoria class has been hinted at by the government by DND, but there aren't any firm decisions yet. Can you give us an update on the status of submarine replacement? VAdm Angus Topshee

As far as the maintenance challenges, the National

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The government has been clear that they want Canada to have to maintain a submarine capability. Our assessment is that we require a force of at least eight and, ideally 12, submarines to do so.

that it pursue a military off the shelf procurement. For this, there are a number of countries and companies that build submarines that will meet Canadian needs. Dr. Adam L aj eunesse

We've twice looked at nuclear submarines in our history and there is tremendous cost and challenge to that, as Australia is demonstrating right now. And, even if we decided on the need to go after nuclear submarines right now, we would still need to buy a replacement class to bridge the gap. So, no matter what we do the next acquisition for submarines for the Canadian Navy will be diesel submarines, whether it is a bridge to something else, or as the solution. Our view is that that's going to have to be a military off the shelf procurement. We've got a recent report that explores submarine building around the world. The South Koreans, for instance, developed a really robust submarine building industry. It took them 37 years to get to where they are now. And so, would it be possible to do that in Canada? Absolutely. But we're talking about a multigenerational commitment by the Government of Canada. And, importantly, the Koreans operate a lot of submarines, and so we would be looking at building far more than 12 submarines for Canada if we wanted to go down that path. So, if the decision was to build a domestic submarine building capability, we're still going to have to start as the Koreans did with military off the shelf procurement and then gradually repatriate the ability to build submarines back in Canada. That being said, I don't think that, given the size of force that we're talking about, in terms of value for money, it makes any sense to develop that capacity. So, we are recommending to government Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 10

For surface combatants, we seem to be aiming for a fleet of 15 based on the number of frigates and destroyers that we have and have recently retired. Is that an appropriate number? Is there a rationale behind the fleet design beyond simply replacing what we had before? VAdm Angus Topshee For that, we looked at a series of different vignettes of security challenges. Then, we looked at elements and concurrency: what are reasonable projections for maintenance and operational availability. The number 15 is where we landed based on whether we can we meet the fleet?s requirements 70% of the time. So, in other words, if we demand more of the crews, then we can get up closer to an 80 to 85% availability rate within a class of 15. How many ships should Canada have? Ideally, to take that risk as close to zero as possible, that number is above 20, but 15 is a reasonable compromise for assuring that I can put my hand on my heart and say, you will have the necessary number of Canadian combatants available when required. And, that I can guarantee a level of availability and the ability to surge to meet requirements. If the requirement is to sustain a lasting effort, then it gets more challenging over time, but we can certainly manage for the first year or two, depending on how we manage our personnel requirements.

There's other questions about why are we building a single class, and other design questions around the CSCs. For us, the only choice that makes sense is not to tie hands by saying, OK, well, I've only got four or five air defense destroyers, that complicates deployments. Let's make every ship capable of being a frontline vessel capable of operating anywhere in the world. And so, my vision of the CSC is quite simple: we are going to build a traditional destroyer. A ship that is fit for the frontline of battle in any theater in the world, capable of holding its own. It does not need to go with something else to defend it. It can defend itself. And, like all destroyer forces have been throughout their history, you want real combat power. Then, you aggregate them together to maximize the impact of the weapons and systems that those ships bring to bear. Dr. Adam L aj eunesse As we, we wait for the ships to come online the Halifax-class is showing its age. Are you confident that our current frigates are going to be able to continue in service functionally until the CSC are in commission? VAdm Angus Topshee I remember listening to a former commander the Air Force talk about whether is it safe to operate the Sea King helicopter, and the answer was: we will never operate an unsafe helicopter. So, yes, it's always going to be safe to operate those. The Navy will always make sure that the Halifax-class remains safe to operate. No matter what, and we're investing heavily in the maintenance to do so. In fact, we're working on advancing a plan for the entire class and costing to fully to sustain the Halifax-class through to the 2040s because we

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know that even though the first of the Canadian Surface Combatants will be delivered early in 2030, it will take us time to be the point where we can deploy those ships. And those Halifax-class refits are now lasting as much as two years because we want to make sure we take the time to refurbish all of the components of the ship's hull and systems to make sure it can continue to operate. So effectively, half of our frigate force right now is in long term maintenance. Dr. Adam L aj eunesse I am sure on occasion you get a chance to interact with the Minister of National Defence about all of these issues and programs. I know that, often it?s important to distill some of the complexity down to key points. How does your elevator speech go when you get the opportunity for a discussion with her? VAdm Angus Topshee In those conversations I always lay out three principles, three priorities. The first is an elevator pitch around people. We're desperately short of people, any help that we can get on the retention front, in terms of making sure that we're getting movement through Treasury Board, on a pay raise, and on a solution for post living differential which, by the way, we're hoping, will happen very, very shortly. On the CSCs, I talk about ships that can go anywhere, do anything for Canada, and that guarantees our security at home and abroad and divides that response capability for Canada. And 15 is the minimum number in order to make sure of having what we need when we need it.

And then for submarines, it's very simple. There is no other platform that operates with the same degree of stealth, persistence and lethality. A submarine is the arbiter of last resort in every naval combat. And so, if you really want to guarantee Canadian security in our waters and defend Canadian interests at all, we need submarines. And it's our job to tell you what the best way to get there is so the government can achieve that requirement. Dr . Adam L aj eunesse A bit off topic, but can you speak to why the RCN is looking for a new march to replace Heart of Oak? VAdm Angus Topshee The bottom line on that song goes back to my whole message about people and creating a culture. Heart of Oak is a great song, it's one of the few songs, to which I know all the words, and can actually, generally sing along to, because I am not musically inclined. It will always have a special place, in my heart, but it is the March of the Royal Navy and the deeds of Nelson don't resonate today. It's past due time for us to have a March that we can be proud of. And, more broadly than that, we're opening it up to Canadian society writ large. We've already had a singer and an admiral get together to come up with a proposal for a song that was quite interesting. I think it's past due time for the Royal Canadian Navy to have a March that is unique, specific to the Royal Canadian Navy, that speaks to who we are and that every sailor can see themselves in, and as much as I love Heart of Oak, that's not the case with that song. It's not ours. Dr. Adam L aj eunesse Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 12

A very general question to wrap up. What keeps you up at night? VAdm Angus Topshee If we don't make sure that, that we stabilize the personnel situation so that at the end of the year the Navy is at least as large next year as it is this year, and on a clear path to growth, then it doesn't matter what ships or submarines we acquire. So, we need to make sure that we've got people front and center of everything we do. The unfortunate reality is that we have squandered a lot of our credibility in the Department of National Defense on a variety of different fronts. And so, when we put out a big shiny sort of announcement, nobody believes it until they see it tangibly and meaningfully on the ground and affecting their lives. And so, for me, a lot is about delivering on the promises that have been made in ways that are meaningful and tangible to sailors. And I think we're actually having success there. That's where most of my focus is. The rest of it, as you say, is seizing the moment in terms of the procurement, and making sure we finish the job on the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship. That we deliver the Joint Support Ships as quickly as we possibly can. And, of course the Canadian Surface Combatants. How will I measure success? By the end of three years, we'll have got a contract in place for the first three Canadian Surface Combatants, and cut steel on the first of those. And we will have a clear path forward to a viable achievable plan to replace the Victoria-class early in the 2030s - an actual path that will deliver in time.

The Shape of Things to Come The Bridge Layout for the CSC put on Display

From: The Lookout, CFB Esquimalt By definition "the future" is something that will never arrive. It is a term that evokes a sense of abstraction and of fantastical things that exist primarily in our imagination. And so it must have seemed to senior naval leadership as they used the term "future fleet" during the first decade of the current millennium, when discussing the eventual and inevitable replacement to the Iroquois-class destroyers and the current workhorse of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) - the Halifax-class frigates. Its only natural. With a planning horizon in excess of 25 years, none of those who initiated the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) programme could have reasonably expected to be in uniform to see those vessels enter service. And so it remained for the majority of RCN personnel. As the years have passed CSC has continued to be a distant and abstract idea. Until recently, when a select group of sailors and officers stepped foot on the bridge of Canadian Type 26 frigate (albeit a full-scale replica) for the first time. "You could sense the excitement amongst the participants," observed organizer LCdr David Canning. "For most it was the first time they encountered anything tangible connected to the CSC design process. Their eagerness to serve aboard this fast-approaching class of warship was evident." LCdr Canning is the Deputy Project Director for CSC and normally works in the offices of Director Naval Major Crown Projects (DNMCP) in Ottawa. He oversaw the bridge design validation exercise, which was a collaborative effort involving DND managers, RCN personnel and Defence Industry representatives. The event ran from March 6th to 10th within the Starshell (Fall 2022) I Page 13

Nixon Building gymnasium at Work Point. The weeklong agenda began with information sessions and ended with a short visits programme. The bulk of the effort entailed running naval personnel through a range of notional evolutions and operational scenarios as they "crewed" a purpose-built, full-scale bridge mock-up. "The first thing people commented on is the scale of the thing," said LCdr Canning in reference to a bridge area delineated by large ribbons of brown parcel paper denoting bulkheads and bridge wings. Measuring ten percent longer, a quarter again as wide and at almost double the displacement, the CSC will be significantly larger than our current warships. Although nobody was fooled into believing the were on an actual warship, the mock up accurately represented the CSC dimensions and included a wide range of displays and instruments ranging from the familiar (compass repeaters, helm and throttle station) to the new (electronic chart table) or improved (reconfigurable digital overhead displays and bridge wing selectable navigation displays). There were even two easily recognizable bright red action alarms. "The sailors seemed very enthusiastic to be participating," observed LCdr Canning. "I think they all understood how the validation process is essential to assuring we get things right and that this was their opportunity to influence the design of a vessel we are building to meet the demands of naval operations for the coming decades." Real-time feedback from the sailors was noted and compiled alongside staff observations and miscellaneous recorded data. All collected information will be analysed and serve to inform future project design decisions.

Sailors discuss features of the proposed CSC bridge design. (Foreground left to right) S3 Dennis Hutten, MS William Beck, and S1 Elliot Dunbar. During the week of March 6th, 2023, LCdr David Canning, CSC Project Director (DNMCP) led a Bridge Design Validation exercise at the Nixon Building, Work Point. Supported by a team of DND managers, CAF personnel and Defence Industry representatives, the exercise allowed MARPAC sailors to provide feedback as they conducted a range of operational scenarios on a full-scale bridge mock-up.

?The ultimate objective is to ensure the CSC?s bridge configuration incorporates the best technology available from Canadian Defence Industry and its layout is optimized to support the operational success of our sailors well into the future,? stressed LCdr Canning. The CSC vessels will be constructed at Irving Shipyards, Halifax, NS. The initial keel is expected to be laid in the next two years with the first-of-class ship entering service early in the next decade. Although navigators calculate distance in nautical miles, most sailors measure it in time. The bridge design validation exercise was a reminder to all present, not only is CSC making steady headway ? it is getting closer than we realized. Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 14

A Timeline 2011 - Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) articulated in National Shipbuilding Strategy 2015 - Irving Shipbuilding Inc. announced as prime contractor. 2016 ? Request for Proposal (RFP) submitted to prequalified industries. 2019 ? Government of Canada announces Lockheed Martin Canada as design team for winning bid based on the BAE Systems Type 26 Global Combat Ship.

HMCS WINDSOR and HMCS TORONTO on Exercise CUTLASS FURY 21 (Photo: Mona Ghiz, MARLANT Public Affairs, CAF)

Can adian Su bm ar in e Oper at ion s - A Pr im er Capt(N) [Ret?d] Norman Jolin

Canada, for over sixty years, has operated a balanced navy, capable of performing a wide array of defence and security tasks. Understanding the essence of that ?balance? is important. It means having the capability to control or influence maritime operations in three distinct domains: above, on, and below the sea. This then translates into at least three distinct platform types, namely aircraft, surface ships and submarines. Canada has historically operated a capability in all three domains, but of the three it is the submarine capability that is the most difficult to justify to the public, as their operations are necessarily highly classified. This paper will attempt to explain what submarines do, from a Canadian standpoint, in an unclassified forum, by avoiding details of specific operations or missions.

What type of submar ines are there? Today most navies operate submarines, normally suited to the specific requirements of the parent Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 15

nation that is usually defined by geography and affordability. Canada is no exception. Typically, submarines are differentiated by two factors ? primary mission and propulsion type. To this I mean: M issions: Attack submarines (SS for Ship Submerged) with a primary role of hunting others ships and submarines (SS K for hunter-killer) and submarines with a deterrence role such as ballistic missile firing submarines (SS B for ballistic missile) which remain constantly ready to fire their missiles at strategic targets. Propulsion type: There are conventional submarines with a diesel-electric propulsion system (SS), which may be augmented by non-nuclear air independent power, and then there are nuclear-powered submarines (SS N for nuclear). The formidable expense associated with the support and operation of nuclear-powered submarines restricts the number of nations that operate these vessels. As of 2023 there

are only six nations that operate nuclear-powered submarines, with Australia recently announcing its intention join this group.1 Canada has continuously operated conventionally powered attack submarines (SSK) since 1961, of which the Victoria-class is currently in-service.

What do they do? The evolution of the modern submarine was impacted by the momentous events of the 20th century, notably two world wars and the Cold War, the latter defined the modern submarine. When envisioning submarines most people automatically picture commerce warfare on merchant shipping in the first half of the twentieth century ? for Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy this was the Battle of the Atlantic. But it was the evolution of the modern submarine, firstly with the German Type XXI Elektroboot at the end of the Second World War, a fast conventional submarine that was designed to stay submerged for extended periods and, ultimately the American nuclear attack submarine, USS Nautilus, which introduced nuclear power a decade later. These designs significantly complicated the ability of anti-submarine forces to detect and defeat a modern submarine, causing disproportionate efforts to counter a submarine threat. Finally, the marrying of missile technology to submarines, be it ballistic or cruise missiles, shifted submarine warfare from an anti-shipping role to that of antisubmarine warfare (ASW), as the submarine now threatened the homeland with nuclear annihilation. The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 illustrated this point in utmost clarity as the world faced nuclear war. Fundamentally, unlike surface ships, modern submarines can offer governments options that they may not necessarily wish to be made public ? that is why submarine operations are highly

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classified. If one was to liken it to a local police force, the police are reticent to discuss any details of undercover or covert operations, yet the public is aware the capability exists in their city or region. Therefore, without discussing sensitive missions or capabilities, it is important to understand what modern submarines do and the fact they are much more than the submersible torpedo boat of yesteryear.

What capabilities does a submar ine br ing to the table? First and foremost, a submarine brings stealth to a balanced fleet. A submarine can go into areas and covertly collect information, be it with optical, electronic and acoustic sensors or the covert insertion and recovery of special forces. Importantly a submarine can be on station for weeks, totally unsupported, with a highly trained crew that can respond to mission changes as events transpire. This is a warfare capability unique to submarines. Anti-submar ine war fare: The biggest threat to North American remains the missile firing submarine, be it hypersonic cruise missiles or ballistic missiles

targeting cities and infrastructure. The best counter to this threat is to destroy the missile firing submarine before it can launch its missiles. This is easier said than done, as it requires a complex multi-faceted capability than can detect and trail opposition submarines, over days and weeks, whilst remaining undetected and, when required, engage them before they can launch. Different submarines bring different capabilities to the fight as larger nuclear powered attack submarines excel in deep water with unlimited endurance to trail a transiting submarine. Whereas conventional hunter-killer submarines are particularly adept at working closer inshore and in geographic ?choke points? where opposition submarines must pass through and thereby risk detection ? ambush tactics if you like. Suppor t to special forces: While all submarines are capable of embarking special forces (SOF), some types of submarines are simply better suited. Modern nuclear-powered submarines tend to be quite large and, as there are exceptions, they prefer deeper water, to support SOF from a distance. Conventional submarines tend to be smaller and more used to working in shallow water or at periscope depth for

prolonged periods, making them a much better vehicle for tight and congested spaces.

How far and how fast can a moder n submar ine go? Modern submarines are fitted with one of two fundamentally different power generation systems which dictate their range, speed and submerged endurance. Nuclear power which allows for virtually unlimited submerged operations, as the reactor generates mega-watts of power that lasts the length of the reactor?s core life ? which is measured in years. The latest nuclear-powered submarines have reactor cores that will last the entire service life of the submarine (25-30 years). Most nuclear submarines can exceed a speed of 25 knots submerged indefinitely, the power generated by the reactor also allows for the operation of energy intensive combat systems as well as atmosphere regeneration ? the making of oxygen. The only limit to a nuclear submarine?s range and endurance is the amount of food carried onboard. While this power generation system is ideal for submarine operations, it is also exceedingly expensive, demanding a sophisticated supporting nuclear infrastructure. It is for this reason alone that few nations own and operate nuclear powered submarines. Conventional diesel-electric power is the system used by the overwhelming majority of submarines operating in the world. This is a straightforward legacy system, whereby diesel generators are run to create electricity that is stored in large batteries. At sea, a conventional submarine will charge its batteries from a snorkel or ?snort? system whilst dived, where an induction mast is raised to bring air into the submarine and an exhaust mast allows for the expulsion of engine exhaust. The submerged endurance of the submarine is dictated by how much battery power is available before its needs to be recharged. This is a variable that can be misconstrued, particularly when addressing the following questions:

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Speed: While many conventional submarines can exceed 20 knots submerged speed, the amount of time at high speed is measured in minutes and is dependent on the state of the charge of the battery at the time. Most submarines use lead-acid batteries which have proven to be reliable in wartime submarine operations, however when charging they cannot exceed about 80% of a full charge without generating hydrogen gas which is highly explosive ? an operation that, understandably, should not be conducted when snorting. Increasingly, lithium-ion batteries are being experimented with in submarines by some nations. While this technology has the potential to dramatically increase power storage, it is not a panacea and there are risks associated with these batteries. Notably the increased potential for thermal runaway causing a catastrophic fire while dived. That said, this technology is evolving, and future submarine can expect to enjoy greater power storage, which will be needed as fitted systems demand more and more power (see below). Submer ged endur ance: The most important question here is how long a submarine can remain

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submerged before it needs to come up to periscope depth to snort to recharge its batteries ? the answer is: it depends. A patrolling submarine operating at slow speeds can go without a battery charge for days and, in this mode, it is really only the state of the atmosphere (breathable air) that drives when to snort. However, should the submarine be transiting to or from a patrol area it will necessarily be at a higher speed that will require more frequent snorting. Moreover, it is important to note that the battery provides power to everything onboard, not just the main propulsion motor. Modern combat systems (sonars, radios, fire control equipment) consume greater and greater amounts of power. There is also the ?hotel load? of the galley, freshwater generation, freezers, heaters, air conditioning, etc that all draw power from the battery. The latter will also reflect usage driven by the operating area conditions, such as warm tropical waters versus cold ice-edge waters. Range: Simply put, the range of the submarine is dictated by the amount of fuel that it is able to carry. Long range demands large fuel tanks for the diesel generators and fitted AIP systems (see AIP below).

factors which are driven by how and where the submarine operates. Of the current non-nuclear AIP systems (nuclear power being the ultimate AIP), fuel cells and external combustion engines are the most popular. Both systems require Liquid Oxygen (LOX) to be stored in tanks, with a modern submarine being able to carry an average of two-three weeks supply. Again, if the submarine is operating close to supporting infrastructure (ports) this can be a significant contributing factor, however, if long transits and extended patrols are envisioned, it quickly becomes a limiting factor. Finally, AIP systems are not designed to offer a high-speed capability similar to that of that nuclear propulsion, what they do is charge the battery when operating at slower speeds thereby reducing the frequency the submarine needs to snort. High speeds mean high battery discharge rates, which in turn generates excessive heat, which precludes charging the battery when going at high speed.

What weapons does a moder n submar ine car r y?

This necessarily drives the size of the submarine, as the bigger the submarine, the more power is needed to be generated to drive it through the water. As submarines operate independently and away from dedicated support facilities, they must carry all the fuel they will need for the mission. If the projected operating areas are close to port facilities, then excessive range is not a factor ? this is seen in smaller European submarine designs which reflect operating areas in the Baltic, North and Mediterranean seas with close access to resupply. Whereas nations such as Canada and Australia by necessity have to transit and operate at great distances from supporting infrastructure and therefore demand a much larger displacement submarine. Non-nuclear air independent power (AI P): This is a perceived panacea of having all the benefits of a nuclear submarine without the cost. While modern AIP systems do allow for charging the battery without having to snort, they are limited by a number of

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The weapon load out can vary with the mission but as a constant almost every submarine in the world carries heavyweight torpedoes that are launched from similar sized torpedo tubes, which are 533mm in diameter (21 inch) and about seven meters long. That is why all submarine launched torpedoes in the world look to be about the same size, regardless of manufacturer. Modern heavyweight torpedoes are very sophisticated weapons that are specifically designed to acquire and chase a deep-diving submarine and destroy it - they are not really designed for an anti-shipping role, which they can do if required. Moreover, these same torpedo tubes can fire encapsulated missiles, such as Harpoon (anti-shipping) and Tomahawk (land attack) or, if fitted, the missiles can be fired from separate vertical launch missile tubes, all while the submarine remains submerged. Finally, submarines can carry anti-shipping mines, which they can covertly lay off an enemy coast in time of conflict. In the end, the actual weapon load is determined by the assigned mission and the resulting space available within the weapon stowage compartment of the submarine.

So how does this all wor k? The conduct of submarine operations, in some ways, is more akin to operating aircraft than surface ships and is more than the sum of the hulls in a nation?s inventory. There are a number of factors at play that are worth discussing. Number s: There is an expectation that warships are like the family car ? I can drive it whenever I want as long as I fill up the gas tank and do the required routine maintenance, they are always available. That is not necessarily true. Ships require dedicated and routine maintenance support and the reality is that to have one submarine ?out? full time, requires a fleet of at least four in each geographic area.2 While one will be in deep long-term maintenance and one at sea, the others may be in varying states of availability. In Canada, with two major naval bases separated by thousands of kilometres, to have a submarine always available on each coast would require a submarine fleet of at least eight submarines. Canada currently operates four Victoria-class submarines based on the two coasts, offering some insight into the oft-mentioned unavailability of this class of submarine. People: Notwithstanding the ability of the supporting infrastructure to maintain a submarine ready for operations, the defining issue remains the generation of trained submarine crews. While crew size in a submarine is much smaller than that of a frigate, typically about one-quarter of the size, the crew composition is made-up of individuals with different skill sets and qualifications, of which all must be in the right positions for the safe and efficient operation of the submarine. A typical submarine crew will have specialist technicians that operate and maintain the

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power generation system, different technicians that maintain the combat systems alongside specialist operators for these combat and communication systems with officers that represent both warfare and engineering expertise. All these people must have the requisite training necessary for their unique job specifications in the submarine, training that represents formal schoolhouse courses, at sea ?on the job? consolidation training and a final certification process, both as an individual and as a team. Crew generation is a complicated process and many studies have determined the minimal optimal fleet size, in each geographic area, is six submarines to allow for a critical mass of key personnel with the requisite qualification level. Canada has never achieved this and, accordingly, has always faced submarine crewing issues that could potentially impact submarine availability. Tr aining: This is more than individuals having the necessary qualifications, as a submarine crew must function as a team. There are various types of team training that uses shore-based simulators, alongside total ship training that follows and eventually at sea training under the supervision of an independent set of sea-trainers to assess whether the submarine is ready to conduct operations. Depending on where the submarine is in its?s operational cycle, between deep maintenance periods, this process can take from a few days to many weeks to complete.

Oper ations To best describe what a Canadian submarine does, the following narrative will walk the reader through the process to deploy a submarine on a typical submarine mission, with a broad-brush illustration of the factors that go into a successful deployment.

The Beginning: Whether the submarine is in build or long-term maintenance the process is roughly similar. Once the maintenance authority has completed the contracted work there will be a trials period where systems are checked, and any arisings are documented. Much like building a house with a contractor, the final inspection will always find arisings that the contractor will commit to their rectification at a later date. These are agreed to, as long as they do not impact the ability to safely conduct training and operations, and the submarine is then passed to the Navy for post-refit employment. At the same time a complete crew has been put together reflecting all the positions required to be filled, with the requisite personal qualifications both in their respective occupations, but also the basic submarine qualification which is a standard that all submariners must achieve to be awarded their ?dolphins? - the submarine qualification badge. While submarines will always carry some personnel undergoing basic submarine qualification training, for submarine safety the numbers of unqualified personnel must be closely monitored.

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Tr aining: Typically, the submarine will then conduct intensive safety training in shore-based simulators, as well as in the submarine itself whilst alongside the jetty, to bring the crew together as team to be able to conduct post refit sea trials and system checks such as noise ranging. The sea trials period will include a series of dives under the supervision of an escorting ship, culminating with the submarine diving to its maximum diving depth. At the end of this period, that can take weeks, the submarine will then enter a defect rectification period to address outstanding maintenance arisings and defects found during trials. This is not abnormal; submarines are complicated vessels and there will always be defects that need rectification. The submarine then conducts a lengthy working-up period, where crew training, as a team, goes through a graduated process, supervised and assessed by an independent team of experienced submariners, that typically takes many weeks. The process includes a safety phase where the crew is exercised in increasingly challenging defect and simulated action

damage scenarios which include firefighting, flooding and casualty drills. The next phase is an operational phase whereby the submarine is tasked with typical missions including submarine versus submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, minelaying, embarking and deploying special forces and conducting intelligence gathering including photo reconnaissance underneath a warship. The final phase is weapon certification where the submarine deploys to an instrumented underwater 3D range and fires a number of torpedoes which are tracked on the range to assess crew and system proficiency. All of this is in a pass/fail environment where there are regular debriefs after each evolution and an assessment of whether the performance was considered to be satisfactory or not. Failure to achieve a satisfactory standard usually results in personnel changes and the necessity to re-do certain aspects of the at sea training programme, which in turn can delay the availability of the submarine for operations. Be there no doubt, work-ups can be quite stressful and are not fun, but they generate the necessary team confidence to be able to handle any mission the submarine will be tasked with, as the programme is designed to test everyone onboard, particularly those in leadership roles. The M ission: Once the submarine is certified ready for operations, it will then undergo a short alongside period to rectify any defects that have arisen, as well as conduct mission planning, routine maintenance and pre-deployment storing. The latter is important as all the food, stores and spare parts necessary to operate independently have to be calculated, ordered, acquired and correctly stored onboard. For food this is necessarily last minute (to reduce spoilage) and the freezer (similar to a large chest freezer) is stored according to the menu plan developed for the entire deployment ? you literally eat your way down to the bottom of the freezer. The submarine is fully fuelled and moves to the ammunition jetty to load weapons, which in Canadian submarines is mainly the embarkation of heavyweight torpedoes. Finally, there are the inevitable unforseen personnel changes (for last minute medical & compassionate reasons) that challenge the fleet staff in finding specifically qualified personnel at the last minute to deploy. Tr ansit: Depending on the assigned mission there

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will be some form of transit phase to move into the area of operations. This is a very important period as it allows the submarine captain to bring any new members of the team together and set the tone for the mission. Typically, the submarine will sail from its base port and dive once clear of the harbour and it will likely stay submerged until it surfaces to enter its next port, which can be many weeks away. It is during this transit period that the captain enforces strict submarine routines to ensure the crew is always working at peak efficiency and the submarine remains undetected. Daily exercises of the attack teams and firefighting and damage control exercises continue as the submarine settles into a routine built around the watch rotation. The routine is very important to a crew, as there are very few non-watch standers onboard a submarine, meaning that time on watch must all be carefully coordinated. Watches are designed around mealtimes to keep a semblance of normality, with most of the crew in two watches (six hours on and six hours off) where meals, departmental work, training, recreation and sleep are all conducted during their off-watch time. The watches are structured so that the submarine can conduct routine operations and defend itself with just the personnel on watch ? only going to Action or Emergency Stations for evolutions that require the entire ship?s company to be engaged. Routine evolutions such as coming to pericope depth and snorting, to charge the batteries and change out the atmosphere, are coordinated with other necessary activities including fixing the position of the submarine (GPS signals do not work underwater) and copying the communication broadcast. These two latter points are noteworthy, as the submarine is under the control of a shore based Submarine Operating Authority that coordinates underwater movement in a way similar to an air traffic controller with aircraft. To prevent mutual interference with other submarines, each submarine is given a moving haven (known as a ?box?) of specific dimensions that travels along at a predetermined speed of advance to its patrol area which is usually determined by geographic coordinates - it is very important that the submarine stay within its box as it conducts the transit. Any changes or updates to mission instructions are sent by low frequency radio signals that can be copied when

submerged at shallow depths. The submarine does not transmit an acknowledgment (unless directed to), rather each serial numbered message is repeated on successive ?broadcasts? every so many hours. After a number of repetitions, it is assumed the submarine has received it and is acting accordingly. Patrol: As the submarine nears its patrol area, transit speed is reduced to quietly ease into the patrol area. What the submarine does on patrol will be dictated by the geographical area, weather and specific mission objectives. Any intelligence as to potential threats or targets of interest are signalled to the submarine by the shore authorities. Typically, the submarine will be conducting long-range acoustic searches using passive (listening) sonars ? active sonars are rarely used as their transmission will alert a potential enemy and risk counter detection. When operating at periscope depth the submarine will also have optics and passive electronic support measures (ESM) that can detect and classify radar signals. Should the submarine detect a contact of interest it will classify it and endeavour to record its signature as well as its movements by trailing it without being detected. If this contact is of specific interest, or in times of tension a potential aggressor, the submarine will break contact and return to periscope depth to report it by radio. As a submarine can acoustically cover a very large area with fitted sonar equipment and is on station for many weeks, patrol routine can become tedious. That is why on each watch there are a number of sensor operators that change over amongst themselves during the watch, to avoid potentially miss a fleeting contact that is operating quietly or being masked by difficult acoustic conditions in the water column. Notwithstanding the efforts of the best trained operators, there are occasions when new equipment or tactics are exhibited by an adversary that are not immediately recognized. This is why during the watch meticulous records are kept for post-mission analysis by shore-based organisations with greater analytical capability. This all appears relatively straight forward but is complicated in practice by the acoustic conditions in the area the submarine is operating, which can vary causing sound to be refracted and dramatically reduce

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detection ranges - layering due to changes in water temperature being a well-known phenomenon. Moreover, when operating close to shore and in shallow waters, of which conventional submarines routinely do, changes in salinity from freshwater runoff can dramatically impact precise depth keeping when working at periscope depth. There is also the challenge of navigating in poorly charted waters, with unknown underwater currents, often complicated by a congested acoustic environment when having to operate near fishing fleets. At the end of the patrol the submarine will conduct a submerged transit to its next operation or port. Often a submarine can be tasked to conduct training support to friendly forces on the return transit. This may include participation in a multi-national exercise or operations with allied forces in support of specific objectives. For example, because the US Navy only operates nuclear-powered submarines, the Americans are always interested in honing their counter-SSK skills, as the majority of submarines in service throughout the world are conventionally powered.

Conclusion Submarines offer nations a unique capability that cannot be replicated by other platforms, and they are necessarily a key part of balanced maritime forces that include aviation and surface assets. Canada has continuously operated a conventional diesel-electric submarine capability for over sixty years and is looking to replace the current Victoria-class submarines under the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. As part of any procurement process it is necessary to justify the need to maintain a certain capability, however, given the secretive nature of submarine operations, it is hard to explain this requirement in an open forum. Moreover, any discussion must also address misconceptions and the realities of fleet availability and how it actually comes together - there is a reason it takes this much time and effort. In using an analogy of a police force, that fact is that security organizations have certain key capabilities and, to effectively conduct their operations, some are legitimately classified for reasons of national security. Simply put, to openly discuss details of recent

submarine operations can give a potential adversary an advantage as to an insight into capability and limitations, as well as potentially those of key allies. All that said, it is important for the nation to understand what their submarines do, even though specific details cannot be published. Operating submarines is complicated, in that it is not simple but ultimately do-able, and complex as it is hard to control all the factors that go into the maintenance and operation of an effective submarine capability. Canadian submarines have, and continue to, conduct sovereignty patrols, intelligence collection to maintain maritime domain awareness, in conjunction with our allies, as well as warfare training against

ships and submarines and support to special forces. They are an absolute critical part of a Canada?s maritime security forces and their contribution, while secretive, is disproportional to their small size.

Notes 1

United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and India 2

This why both the British and French have four SSBNs each for their national nuclear deterrence force. This is the minimum number required to ensure one submarine is on a deterrence patrol at all times.

Capt(N) [Ret?d] Norman Jolin served 37 years in the Royal Canadian Navy with the majority of his career at sea in both ships and submarines, culminating in the command of HMCS Montre?al. He was a member of the Directing Staff at the Canadian Forces College and later the Branch Head for Exercises at NATO?s Strategic Transformation Command in Norfolk Virginia. Subsequently he served as the Naval Adviser to the UK and Defence Attache? to Denmark and his final service appointment was as a member of NATO?s International Military Staff in Brussels Belgium. On retiring from naval service, he set up a private consulting firm and, in 2017, he joined CFN Consultants as the associate specializing in support to acquisition projects for the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard.

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Con sider at ion s an d Opt ion s f or a Can adian Ar ct ic Un der w at er Capabilit y 1 Tim ot h y Ch oi, Ph D an d Ch r is Speddin g

USS Connecticut surfaces through the ice as it participates in Ice Exercise (ICEX) 2018 (Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel Hinton/Released, USN)

On July 14, 2021, the Canadian Press revealed that Canada has stood up the initial stages of a program to replace the current Victoria class submarines. Dubbed only as the ?Canadian Patrol Submarine Project? (CPSP), its scope is limited to analyzing future needs and options for replacing the current underwater fleet.2 It does not aim to propose a single path forward, nor does it commit the government to any actual path. Thus, a range of options exists to date. Little is known publicly about the priorities of the office in terms of submarine objectives, cost ceilings, and technological risk acceptance. However, interviews with relevant officials, including multiple Commanders of the Canadian Submarine Force, indicate a clear desire to ?include the Arctic? as part of the options analysis.3 With such a priority, there are only a limited number of options that would be feasible. These options would have to emphasize at least one of the following considerations: power density, autonomy, and/or size. How much of these is required will depend on the exact operational postures envisioned.

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Consider ations In terms of power density, the challenges of diesel-electric propulsion are well-known. In summary, the need to regularly surface to recharge the batteries by running the diesel engines dramatically limits how long and where in the Arctic the submarine can operate. While large polynyas like the Pikialasorsuaq (North Water Polynya) between Greenland and Ellesmere Island offer year-round thin ice or ice-free areas that are relatively predictable, such areas are limited in numbers and would drastically constrain where and when a submarine can operate to ensure air access for recharging, communications, or emergencies. This would put the SSK at a significant disadvantage should it be expected to monitor all areas where a potential nuclear-powered submarine intruder may be operating. SSNs, with no need to surface for regular operations, can roam relatively freely in the Canadian Arctic depending on the purposes of their mission. For a Canadian submarine replacement to freely

operate under the ice, it would require a means of propulsion that does not depend upon regular access to the air. Whether this is nuclear power, advanced air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems, or very high-capacity batteries like lithium ion is something the program office will have to detail. Each of these propulsion systems have their advantages and disadvantages. Nuclear is incredibly expensive to acquire and maintain with accordingly high political, personnel, and temporal costs. AIP systems vary in their exact means of converting secondary fuel sources into usable power, but they all suffer from the need to carry that secondary fuel, which occupies space that may be better used for more energy-dense fuels like diesel. AIP?s ability to extend a submarine?s underwater endurance is also dramatically affected by the rate at which the fuel is exhausted, which is dependent upon the speeds and power consumption demanded at the time of use. Such limitations are rarely discussed or specified by AIP systems manufacturers when they claim certain endurance periods. Finally, high-capacity batteries like lithium ion remain relatively untested. Only a small number of submarines have been built to date with them, mainly in Japan. There remain concerns over the relative ease with which they can catch on fire in comparison to traditional lead-acid batteries, though submarine battery manufacturers are actively working on such concerns. There is also the option to combine these technologies. An AIP system that recharges lithium-ion batteries might, for example, match the functional endurance that an SSN can achieve (though not the latter?s speed and power) given the need for even SSNs to replenish consumables like food. For instance, today?s AIP systems recharging traditional lead-acid batteries are publicized as capable of underwater durations on the order of three weeks.4 Lithium ion batteries have the potential to increase power storage by up to four times that of lead-acid counterparts.5 If sufficient AIP fuel is available, then theoretically an AIP lithium-ion boat could have sufficient underwater endurance to last twelve weeks. Alternatively, replacing the space currently used by AIP equipment with more lithium ion batteries recharged through snorkelling may result in similar endurance.

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But if the cost of building new submarines with cutting-edge propulsion systems that would be sufficient for under-ice operations proves prohibitive, one alternative is to leverage uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) that can be deployed either from land or from cheaper conventional SSKs. Although their smaller sizes would almost certainly result in inferior sensors and weapons compared to a crewed submarine, the lack of personnel allows them to be used in more risky situations than their crewed counterparts. While this benefit is obvious in a general sense against military threats, this becomes even more desirable when environmental threats of heavy sea ice are thrown into the equation. Without the need to ensure the crew?s survival by carrying sufficient power to reach predictable surfacing areas, a UUV can be used with greater risk thresholds. In the event of power loss, it may even be retrievable at later dates. This can allow them to be sent ahead of a carrier submarine into and under heavy sea ice for long periods. Although these UUVs will be smaller than their crewed counterparts, the lack of crew spaces provides more internal volume for batteries or fuel, and the associated reduction in cross section allows for stiffer, lighter hull forms. Indeed, existing Extra Large UUVs like the US Navy?s Orca can already operate without replenishment for months on end. However, it is uncertain Whether Canadian geography and infrastructure could support the deployment of such large UUVs for Arctic operations. For instance, the distance from Canada?s Atlantic naval base in Halifax to the refueling station of Nanisivik on the eastern entrance of the Northwest Passages is the same as crossing the Atlantic to Great Britain. An XLUUV would almost certainly need to refuel/recharge in the Canadian Arctic before proceeding under ice for patrols throughout the NWP or the central Arctic Ocean. However, it is doubtful that any independent UUV, even an XL variant, would be able to breach the ice-covered surface during Arctic winters ? which is when an under-ice capability is most necessary. More will be discussed regarding the requirements for surfacing in ice later. One major challenge regarding UUVs of all sizes is their ability to communicate with shore-based,

submarine-based, or ship-based personnel. While this challenge is notable in ice-free waters, at least such oceans allow an UUV to surface or deploy communication buoys whenever and wherever required. In ice-covered waters, this is not an option. Sea ice prevents UUVs from surfacing, while communications buoys can be torn off due to icebergs (and cannot themselves surface through ice). This means Arctic UUVs must rely on either communication techniques that are effective underwater or employ very high levels of autonomy. Currently, underwater communications experience extreme trade-offs between distance, bandwidth, and antenna size. The density of water makes it difficult for high-bandwidth radio signals to penetrate a long distance, while acoustic means of long-distance communications tend to have low bandwidth. Very large antennas can overcome these problems to some extent, but they are so large that they need land-based facilities and cannot be fitted onto ocean-going platforms. Newer technologies like lasers can deliver video-quality bandwidth, but are limited to only around 100 meters in distance.6 There are ways to get around this problem within Canadian waters, though they each comes with challenges. Foremost amongst these are underwater stations that the UUV can dock at to download their data and update their instructions. These stations, in turn, can be connected by cable to land-based antennas that enable direct higher bandwidth satellite or radio communications. However, such an approach has to deal with at least two additional problems: first, the stations need to have their own power source and second, underwater stations can be damaged by sea ice and icebergs scraping along the seafloor. The first of these problems can be resolved without too much trouble, as the Canadian Coast Guard already conducts annual refueling operations for uncrewed aids to navigation in the Canadian Arctic.7 The second issue is more problematic given the effects of climate change on decreased predictability of sea ice behavior in the Canadian Arctic. Collapsing glaciers would, for instance, result in large, deep icebergs with enough draft and erratic shapes to drag along both the seafloor and slopes where one may place underwater stations. This would require frequent and expensive replacements or repairs when the stations and their

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cables are damaged. The other solution, which also applies to ice-free oceans, is to increase the autonomy of UUVs. Such autonomy would be intended to reduce the need to send data back to human operators who would decide on updated instructions. In the event the UUVs were to employ more advanced or complicated propulsion technologies, the autonomy would also have to take into account controlling those complex systems without human intervention. Above all, however, is the need to decide on whether these UUVs will have a lethal capability, which results in a level of autonomy that puts the decision of life and death into its robotic hands. Ultimately, a decision to develop an uncrewed under-ice capability for the RCN that emulates the entire range of capabilities possessed by crewed submarines would have to involve a very high-level political decision on whether uncrewed vehicles can decide for themselves on whether to take human lives. Finally, there is the issue of size. While size dictates range, endurance, weapons capacity, sensor capabilities, and crew comfort in ice-free waters, it has an additional impact in ice-covered waters: the ability to ?punch? up and through sea ice. Contrary to some popular notions that nuclear power is required to generate sufficient force to push up and through the ice, the main determinant of a submarine?s ability to surface through ice is its mass and reserve buoyancy. The larger a submarine and the more buoyant it can be, the more upward force it can generate when rising up against sea ice. Submarines surface through ice not by sailing quickly and ramming it, but by gently resting against the underside of the ice and blowing its ballast.8 Thus, the method of propulsion plays little to no role in a submarine?s ability to surface through ice. Rather it is whether the submarine has sufficient mass and buoyancy to split the ice above it as it rises. All of this means that if an Arctic underwater vehicle, whether crewed or uncrewed, wishes to have access to the air, it would have to be fairly large. In the 1980s, the 4,700-ton British Trafalgar class SSN was deemed large enough to surface through the 3 metres of ice that was considered likely in the Canadian Arctic. Whether a Canadian submersible vehicle in the Arctic

HMS Trafalgar (Photo: Wikipedia) requires access to the air depends on its expected missions. Intelligence collection, whether through optical or electronic means, would certainly require some ability to raise sensors and masts above the surface. The launching of cruise missiles or aerial drones would be another mission that requires through-ice surface capability. While the Victorias do not currently have a cruise missile capability, if Canada adopts a ?deterrence by punishment? posture as part of NORAD modernization, that would certainly justify an RCN submarine cruise missile capability to hold at risk other Arctic actors? surface or land assets. These two missions potentially apply regardless of whether the submarine is crewed or uncrewed. If it is crewed, however, then there is the additional need to ensure the submarine can surface through ice in order to evacuate injured crew members or abandon the boat in the case of extreme emergency. All of this is in addition to any potential need to surface in order to recharge the boat?s batteries should the vessel be built with such a propulsion arrangement.

Over all Opt ion s Acknowledging the above need to emphasize at least power, autonomy, or size, the following high-level paths are available for the RCN in its efforts to replace the Victoria-class. The nuclear-powered options will not be discussed due to its high political, financial, and human resource requirements. Instead, SSK and UUV options will be explored. A conventionally-powered crewed submarine (SSK) has generally been viewed as the more realistic option

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even though it remains quite challenging from a procurement perspective. Canada has only succeeded once in taking a SSK procurement from conception to new construction and delivery, with the ordering of the Oberon class during the 1960s. Previous and subsequent acquisition efforts have relied on second-hand submarines from the United States and United Kingdom, which meant Canada had to make the best out of vessels that were not designed or built to meet Canadian requirements. Although the National Shipbuilding Strategy has enshrined a ?build-in-Canada? policy for several major federal shipbuilding projects, submarines are not yet included in that strategy. Thus, while Canadian politicians and shipyards will likely press for a domestic submarine construction approach, there remains the possibility that a foreign shipyard may end up being the builder. This is particularly likely given the full schedules of the three main Canadian shipyards during the 2030s timeframe in which the submarines will have to be built. This makes exploring the possibility of a foreign-built SSK of vital importance. The paths for this are unclear given Canada?s relatively unique requirement combining non-nuclear propulsion with long-endurance, which results in a submarine that is larger than most current SSKs. Although most Western submarine builders have offered larger long-range versions of their current in-production submarines, such as Saab?s A-26 derivatives and France?s Shortfin Barracuda, these have yet to be built and are not designed to operate in Arctic waters. An ?off the shelf? option therefore does not exist, and significant modifications such as ice-strengthening would have to be made with attendant design and

engineering costs. Still, leveraging in-service large-displacement SSKs would at least minimize risk, and such options are so far available in the forms of the South Korean KSS-III (3600 tons), Japanese Taigei/29SS (3000 tons), and the Spanish S-80 Plus (3000-3400 tons).9 Each of these are notable for different things: the KSS-III is one of the few operational SSKs designed to carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the Taigei incorporates lithium-ion batteries in place of traditional lead-acid batteries, and the S-80 Plus is the largest European SSK.10 While a SLBM capability may seem incredulous to most Canadians, the SLBM tubes could be either converted for cruise missiles or have their weight and space margins reutilized for other features like ice strengthening, endurance, uncrewed underwater vehicles, and improved habitability. Meanwhile, Japan?s pioneering work on incorporating lithium-ion batteries on submarines will provide much-needed real-world test results regarding their continued viability, ensuring Canada will have sufficient data to assess whether the technology is mature enough for use. Whether any of these submarines are large enough to meet the buoyancy requirements for surfacing through Canada?s Arctic sea ice is uncertain, though history provides a hint. Putting aside for the moment the highly variable thicknesses and hardnesses of sea ice by year and location, it was determined back in the 1980s that 3 metres of sea ice was a likely presence in the Canadian Arctic and that any Canadian SSN should be able to surface through that amount. Today, 3-3.5m sea ice thickness represents the upper limit of what is likely to occur in and

around the Canadian Arctic and therefore remains a reasonable goal.11 Two competing designs were offered for the Canadian 1980s SSN project: the 2400t French Rubis/Amethyst class SSN and the British Trafalgar class at 4730 tons. Although displacement is not a direct indicator of buoyancy, they do apparently serve as a decent proxy. Assessments at the time did not expect the French boat to have sufficient buoyancy to surface through 3 metres of ice, though the French tested scale models with an ?icepick? added to the sail that could enable such surfacing. The Trafalgar was assessed to have no issues with that amount of ice. Ultimately, DND changed their ice thickness requirement to only 1 meter in order to allow the French option to remain in the running.12 From this, we can reasonably expect that the three aforementioned large SSKs may have sufficient buoyancy to surface through at least 1 metre, and possibly 2 metres, of sea ice. Whether this is sufficient for operations in the central Arctic Ocean would depend on the time of year and the extent of climate change impacts. While strengthening will have to be made to the submarine?s various appendages like planes and propeller, at the very least the fundamental size requirement would appear to be available. An additional question regarding an SSK option for its Arctic sea ice is its submerged endurance. While the current Victorias are known to operate along the edges of the sea ice, tracking and potentially prosecuting Russian nuclear-powered submarines in the central Arctic Ocean sea ice will require submarines with much greater operational and reserve endurance. A hypothetical underwater patrol

French Rubis/Amethyst class SSN (Photo: Wikipedia)

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beginning in southern Baffin Bay, through the Nares Strait, loitering some 800 kilometres in the Central Arctic Ocean, down through the western EEZ of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, and eastwards through McClure Strait and Parry Channel back to Baffin Bay would be a distance of roughly 7,000 kilometres. More direct routes are possible to reduce the distance and time required underwater, though they would sacrifice surveillance coverage. At an average speed of 6 knots or 11.1 km/h, a submarine would require roughly 26 days of underwater endurance. This could be stretched during slower loitering speeds for passive sensing in the patrol area. Advertised estimates of current SSKs equipped with the latest Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) technologies fall just short of this, with Spain?s S-80 rated for 21 days at 4 knots, and South Korea?s KSS-III Batch II at ?more than 20 days? at unspecified speeds.13 Clearly, even with the relatively minimalist patrol outlined above (it does not include reserves for emergencies or higher speeds necessary for intercepting enemy submarines, for example), the latest SSK power technologies are insufficient to meet Canada?s Arctic underwater needs. Still, the differences are small enough that it is conceivable that improvements over the next decade may prove sufficient, especially if a larger hull is acquired to fit more batteries and/or AIP fuel. Regardless of how much improved future AIP and battery technology become, an under ice SSK would still be limited in its tactical posture to that similar to the Oberon class off the North Atlantic during the end of the Cold War. They were capable of only listening and tracking transiting Soviet SSBNs rather than being able to catch up and maintain interception positions. This may or may not be satisfactory to Canadian politicians and the RCN. Th e Cr ew ed-Un cr ew ed Team in g Opt ion Canada can also leverage developments in uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUVs) technology to enhance the capabilities of an SSK option. An armed UUV-only solution is unlikely to be feasible given the size and buoyancy requirements required to surface

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through sea ice in order to communicate with shore via satellite or radio. By the time one develops a UUV of such size, one may as well buy a crewed submarine. A fully autonomous system with authorization to employ lethal force without human intervention, obviating the need to be large enough to surface through ice for communications, is highly unlikely to be approved by the Canadian government and the public. Thus, a more feasible option is to employ smaller UUVs alongside crewed submarines, whether nuclear or conventionally powered.

Canadian Theseus drone, an early example of a domestic UUV (Photo: Wikipedia)

UUVs would enhance the capabilities of SSKs more so than they would SSNs. This is due to the aforementioned challenges with developing an SSK that could sail reliably under vast expanses of sea ice. By leveraging UUVs, an SSK could conceivably remain at the edge of the sea ice or under polynyas while UUVs sail ahead to survey the areas around them under thicker sea ice. This reduces the risk to the crew of the SSK in the event of an emergency surfacing and extends the time the submarine can spend deployed in the Arctic by allowing it to run its diesel engines and recharge its batteries. In the event a UUV detects an enemy submarine, the SSK can theoretically follow up and have the personnel on board authorise any necessary violent responses. Such

a UUV may be carried internally in the SSK, externally like swimmer delivery vehicles, or sail for the entire duration of the deployment entirely separate from the submarine hull. Each of these options allows for different sizes of UUV, with the larger ones being able to sail farther into the ice pack ahead of the SSK. However, while this concept of operations may seem an attractive solution to the problem of putting a non-nuclear presence under Arctic ice, it also comes with at least one major issue: that of communications. While deploying a UUV with an accompanying SSK obviates the need for the UUV to surface and communicate with land personnel, it does need to communicate with the SSK either continuously or occasionally. Either of these modes would restrict how far away from the SSK the UUV can operate. Continuous communications would almost certainly require a wired method due to the many fjords, straits, and variable oceanographic conditions that are prevalent in Canada?s Arctic. These conditions obstruct or degrade wireless methods like acoustic and laser, the latter of which has especially short ranges on the order of around 100 metres. The length of the wire would provide a hard limit to the UUV?s range, as well as be susceptible to obstruction or damage caused by ?ice jungles? (ice that have been compressed downwards into the water like stalactites in a cave) or icebergs.14 Meanwhile, intermittent communications could see the UUV ranging farther away from the SSK to collect data before returning to the SSK to deposit its information. While this allows the UUV to operate with greater freedom, it dramatically delays the response time of the SSK due to the need for the UUV to return. This is especially problematic given SSKs? slow speeds to ensure sufficient under-ice power reserves and the much higher speeds of the likely nuclear-powered quarry. The UUV could reduce the time it takes for its data to be transferred to the SSK by docking with seabed stations, but these stations would be vulnerable to deep-drafted icebergs and their cables connecting them to the shore for communications would also be susceptible to damage by sea ice.

Con clu sion The desire for Arctic under-ice capability has long been in the Canadian defence imagination, but it is likely to become even more vital in the coming years. With China?s growing naval prowess pulling American and British naval resources to the Indo-Pacific region, there may be a decreasing capacity for those traditional Arctic undersea powers to track and shadow Russian submarines under the ice. Canada may well be expected to take on that task. Canada has no easy option as it attempts to find its unicorn: a non-nuclear-powered crewed submarine that is large enough to have the underwater endurance and buoyancy needed to surface through ice. Rough comparisons with Canada?s previous attempt to acquire SSNs suggest that there are a small number of SSKs on the market today that may approach the size necessary, providing a suitable basis for ?Canadianization?. The technological advancements in battery and AIP options in the coming years should make a large Arctic SSK even more plausible. However, Canada?s previous attempts at acquiring new SSKs also ran into challenges, and this latest iteration is unlikely to be easy either. With Canada?s three current major shipyards already busy with work through to the 2040s, Canada will likely have little choice but to buy the new vessels from foreign yards. This drastically reduces the political incentive to maintain the program across multiple governments, with the risk of cancellation made ever greater due to the long timelines that are likely.

Not es 1

This article is adapted from a longer report entitled ?Canadian Submarine Recapitalization in the Context of Climate Change? produced for the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) which was funded by the Department of National Defence?s MINDS program, available HERE. 2 Lee Berthiaume,

?Navy kicks off long-anticipated push to replace Canada's beleaguered submarine fleet,? CBC News, July 14, 2021.

Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 31

3 Terri

Pavelich, ?Victoria-Class Modernization: The Way Forward,? Vanguard, October 4, 2022, Victoria-class Submarines Against Current and Evolving Threats,? Vanguard Canada, December 6, 2021.

2021; ? ? ? ? , ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? 22? ? ? ? ? ? ,?Yahoo Japan, March 9, 2022; Méndez, ?Power Estimates for an Arctic AIP Submarine for Canada,? 24. 10

4

Kate Tringham, ?First Spanish S-80 Plus submarine starts sea trials,? Janes, May 31, 2022.

H I Sutton, ?The First S-80-Plus Class Submarine Will Launch New Era For Spanish Navy,? Naval News, April 22, 2021.

5 José Cañadas Méndez,

11 Martin Stendel,

?Power Estimates for an Arctic AIP Submarine for Canada,? Canadian Naval Review 16, no. 2: 24-26.

?Sea Ice Thickness and Volume,? Polar Portal: Monitoring Ice and Climate in the Arctic, March 10, 2023, http://polarportal.dk/en/sea-ice-and-icebergs/sea-ice-thickness

6

Naval Sea Systems Command, ?Compact, Efficient 2-Band Underwater Optical Communications System,? NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command, January 14, 2021, https://www.navysbir.com/n21_A/N21A-T006.htm.

12

Julie H. Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service (Toronto: Dundurn, 2014), 350-352. 13

7

CCG, ?Canadian Coast Guard Begins 2021 Arctic Season,? Government of Canada, June 22, 2021.

Tringham, ?First Spanish S-80 Plus submarine starts sea trials?; Daehan Lee, ?South Korea?s KSS-III Batch 2 Submarine To Feature Both AIP And Li-Ion Batteries,? Naval News, June 18, 2021,

8

See Adam Lajeunesse and Timothy Choi, ?Here there be dragons? Chinese submarine options in the Arctic,? Journal of Strategic Studies 45, no. 6-7: 1044-1070.

14 Lajeunesse and Choi,

?Here There be Dragons??

9

Gabriel Dominguez & Dae Young Kim, ?DSME contracted to build South Korean navy's second KSS-III ?Batch II' submarine,? Janes September 10,

Dr. Timothy Choi is a member of the Canadian Naval Review?s Editorial Board and a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. His Ph.D. from the University of Calgary examined the influence of the Exclusive Economic Zone on Norwegian, Danish, and Canadian naval forces. He has been a consultant with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), during which he conducted research that contributed to this article. Chr is Spedding is a Policy Fellow and the Manager of the Technological Risk Programme at BASIC. His doctoral research focuses on nuclear systems in space.

USS Connecticut (SSN 22), USS Hartford (SSN 768), and HMS Trenchant (S-91) surface through the ice during the multinational maritime (Fall 2022) Circle. | Page(Photo: 32 Ice Starshell Exercise in the Arctic Chief Mass Communication Specialist Darryl I. Wood/Released, USN)

OPS Update Every month the RCN produces a handy ?Ops Update? to keep the public informed of the Navy?s major deployments and other significant events. This section is a quick summary of the most important ship news. Stay up to date with Your Navy Today by subscribing to receive these updates directly. To subscribe email: [email protected]

This December, HMCS Vancouver and Winnipeg completed their six-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific Region and returned to Esquimalt, B.C. The deployment saw both ships take part in Rim of the Pacific 2022, after which, both continued westward and joined Operation (Op) Projection, enhancing interoperability, cooperation, and relationships with our allies. Vancouver also supported Op Neon, Canada?s contribution to multinational efforts to monitor sanctions imposed on North Korea by the United Nations Security Council. While on Neon, the ship?s operations and bridge teams tracked thousands of potential vessels of interest. HMCS Winnipeg, meanwhile, continued to operate in Southeast Asia under Op Projection, conducting forward naval presence operations and cooperative deployments, and participating in international naval exercises with partner nations. While in Asia, the two warships participated in seven international exercises, including Keen Sword, which focused on anti-submarine warfare and included 36,000 personnel from the U.S. and Japan. HMCS Montréal also returned to its home port of Halifax after having sailed in the North Atlantic with HMCS MONTREAL patrol the Mediterranean Sea on Operation SEA GUARDIAN (Photo: Corporal Braden Trudeau, CAF)

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the U.S. Navy?s 2nd Fleet and the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group. During its time with the Carrier Strike Group, Montréal participated in Exercise Silent Wolverine, providing an opportunity for the RCN to maintain operational readiness and practice integrating with NATO allies. As part of Operation Projection West Africa, sailors from HMCS Glace Bay and Moncton built ties with the Navy of Sierra Leone and 20 other nations during Exercise Obangame Express. The exercise focused on building the skills needed to counter piracy, terrorism, and smuggling operations in the region.

HMCS Fredericton deployed on Operation Reassurance this January and joined Standing NATO Maritime Group Two. On February 13, HMCS Edmonton headed south to conduct Operation Caribbe in the Eastern Pacific, supporting U.S.-led enhanced counter-narcotics operations. On 26 March 2023 DND announced that HMCS Montréal departed for the Indo-Pacific region. During its deployment, Montréal will be supported by Naval Replenishment Unit M/V Asterix. Two other Canadian frigates are set to deploy to the region on later dates. In addition to Operation PROJECTION, HMCS Montréal will also participate in Operation NEON, Canada?s contribution to multinational efforts to monitor sanctions imposed on North Korea by the United Nations Security Council.

US Naval Ship SUPPLY (centre) conducts a replenishment at sea with HMCS MONTREAL (bottom), and USS GONZALEZ (top), in the Mediterranean Sea during Operation REASSURANCE (Photo: Corporal Braden Trudeau, CAF)

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RCN M entor ship Progr am Building Strength from Within Commander Amber Comisso, CD ? Director ate of Naval Per sonnel 2 On 26 May 2022, the RCN hosted the inaugural session of the RCN Mentorship Program. The program was developed after conducting a needs assessment, which clearly articulated a growing desire for mentorship at all levels of the RCN. The program?s guiding principles are ambitious: to provide personal and professional growth opportunities; to support the development and preparation of sailors and Officers for future challenges; to foster engagement; to encourage diversity of thought; and to improve knowledge transfer in a more formal setting. While program creators? CPO1 Tara White and Cdr Dennis Witzke? hoped to develop a program that included development opportunities across the spectrum, from presentation to one-on-one mentorship, they committed to launching a monthly online MS Teams

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session with the belief that it was better to start with something than continue to have nothing. The need was there; and no one wanted to wait for a perfect solution to launch a program that was so necessary. The Covid-19 pandemic spurred the integration of additional tools that facilitated delivery of a formal program, through MS Teams, to a wide and diverse audience. And, in keeping with the intent to encourage and support the program, facilitators deliberately chose to host these sessions during the workday to both mark Command endorsement and to ensure people, across the country, could join. The fir st session focused on ?Why M entor ship? Why are we doing this and what is in it for you?? The mentorship program delivery continued through the summer of 2022 with advertised group sessions

occurring each month. There was so much interest in the program that, at one point, the public servant participants almost outnumbered sailors. The program was purposefully open to everyone; while it was created to respond to the needs of sailors, participation was not restricted in any way so that there could be diversity of perspective and dissenting voices to spur honest, frank debate and real learning. The sessions are by design interactive in nature, with the presenter speaking on a focused topic and then fielding questions from the audience and/or in the chat function of MS Teams. Since that first session, a broad range of topics has been discussed based on feedback from attendees; topics have included: Networking & Work-Life Balance (July 2022); Culture (Aug 2022); Mentor-Protégé vs Coaching (Sept 2022); Emotional Intelligence EQi and Leadership (Oct 2022). Each session is hosted by Subject Matter Experts in the subject field. One of the bonuses of the virtual format is that all sessions were recorded and have been uploaded to the RCN Mentorship Program SharePoint site for ease of access. Upcoming sessions will include Physiological Safety, Moral Injuries and Trauma (April & May 2023) and Community, Sports and building Relationships through Mentorship (July 2023). Additionally, some focused sessions have been planned which include: Sub-Lieutenant's Q& A Leadership Session with the Chiefs (June 2023), building off the success of the MarTech session that was run this month. In time, the program will evolve to include group, small group, and one on one mentoring but, for now, it remains a monthly MS Teams session that is focused on subjects that are selected by the membership. RCN M entor ship progr am consider s explor ing collabor ation with NAC Ottawa Br anch. A few months ago, members of the NAC Executive connected with organizers of the RCN Mentorship Program to explore a connection between these two organizations.

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The Naval Association of Canada explores implementing a mentor ship progr am of its own. In the fall of 2022, NAC Ottawa considered how a mentorship program could provide an important added value to its membership as well as attract new members to the association. It was noted that given the recruitment and retention challenges the RCN was experiencing, a NAC mentorship program could additionally provide support to RCN personnel. The NAC Ottawa board believe the deep naval experience and network connections of its members is a valuable asset and could play a pivotal role when aligned to the RCN?s mentoring program. For example, the NAC Ottawa mentoring program could provide insight to RCN members at various points in their Naval careers or when transitioning to the private sector. NAC Ottawa will be looking for volunteers within its membership to participate in its mentorship program in the coming future. Please stay tuned for an upcoming announcement on the formation of this program. From an RCN perspective, there is interest in having members of the NAC participate in upcoming mentorship sessions and continuing collaboration and info sharing on the topic of mentorship itself. Organizers of the RCN Mentorship Program are looking forward to watching the program build and grow to meet the needs of our Navy in this ever-challenging environment of personnel shortages, platform challenges, and culture change. After all, as JFK said, ?leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.?

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Th e RCN Fleet by t h e Nu m ber s How w e got t o w h er e w e ar e t oday Tim Addison , NAC Dir ect or Naval Af f air s Any student of Canadian naval history will know that at the end of the Second World War, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) consisted of a fleet which numbered just shy of 400 vessels and slightly under 100,000 personnel, which was a significant increase over the 13 ships and 3,500 sailors in service on the eve of the war in 1939.1 Today Canada?s navy consists of 12 frigates, 12 maritime coastal defence vessels (MCDV), three Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPV)2 and four diesel electric submarines, supported by a leased replenishment vessel. Given the propensity for various dictators and bad state actors to wage war from time to time, as was amply demonstrated in the last century and again more recently in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, should we as Canadians be comfortable with as navy of such diminished size? Conversely, given the advances in technology and the ability of the warships

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of today to be more multi-purpose than at any time in the past, is it possible that a fleet of say, fifteen major combatants3 can carry out the various missions and tasks expected of it by today?s Government and indeed our allies, that required a significantly larger fleet in the past? This article will explore how the size of the RCN fleet has declined in size over 75 years to a point where today it is only just meeting government expectations through use of minor war vessels and has little to no excess capacity.4 In a follow-up article to be featured in the next STARSHELL we will examine the current requirement in terms of ship and submarine numbers to meet Canada?s needs for maritime defence and security and make a meaningful contribution to global security in an increasingly volatile world. The post Second World War years were indeed a

period of downsizing and restructuring in the RCN. While the post war economy of the country underwent a transformation and the automobile became king, Canada?s naval shipbuilding industry was boarded up across the country as large and small yards who had built many of the vessels in what was the fifth largest naval fleet in the world5 were shuttered or went back to commercial work. In terms of numbers Joseph Schull listed 326 principal ships as composing the RCN fleet at war?s end in 1945 in his account of the RCN in the Second World War, Far Distant Ships.6 As the human component of the RCN was demobilized post war, and there was no emerging new threat to the world?s peace and security, it was obvious that there was no need for a fleet of that size.7 As such, the navy rapidly shrank in the late 1940s, with a number of ships being returned to the British Royal Navy (RN), converted to commercial service, sold to other navies, or in many cases relegated to the scrapyards, with some exceptions.8 A number of River class frigates were stripped and turned into makeshift breakwaters for small coastal towns in British Columbia (photo of the Kelsey Bay hulls circa 1965). The majority of the Town class destroyers, that were originally First World War vintage US Navy vessels and joined the ranks of the RCN during the war, were scrapped in Sydney, NS, or used for training purposes and then scrapped. As discussed below, the Tribal class and the V class destroyers built mid-war served on in the fleet of the 1950s and into

the early 1960s. Some of the late war build frigates were subsequently converted to Prestonian class Ocean Escorts and some served into the 1960s. Admittedly many of the smaller vessels that saw service in World War II (corvettes, minesweepers and patrol craft) were designed and built in great haste and with little survivability expected beyond first contact with the enemy. Many of the corvettes (the name was coined by Churchill at the beginning of the war, as he didn?t like ?patrol vessel, whaler type?) also met their fates in the scrapyards of Sydney, NS, while a few were sold off or refurbished and employed as whale catchers.9 The Second World War minesweepers met with the same fate in the 1940s, 50s and early 60s. One could surmise that the post war era was one where the RCN actually had too many ships, given the abruptness of the war?s end and the lack of operational tasks. The main activities of the RCN through the 1950s and 60s as the older ships were paid off and the first of the St. Laurent class destroyer escorts (DDEs) were delivered, were oriented towards maintaining and improving the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills that had been developed by the end of the Battle of the Atlantic, as the realities of the Cold War began to settle in. NATO had been stood up in 1949 in response to the rise of communism and the Soviet Union?s expansionism. As a result, western allies? naval forces began to conduct major exercises to maintain their warfighting skills. With the exception of HMCS Magnificent?s involvement as a troop carrier in response to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, Canada?s naval forces were engaged in primarily training and secondarily as tools of diplomacy. Ships like HMCS Ontario undertook round the world training cruises10 and the RCN regularly visited US and European ports and exercised with allied navies. In terms of fleet structure and capabilities, the best perspective of the Canadian Fleet is provided by an examination of the situation at the

Kelsey Bay

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time of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis as related recently (October 2022), by the Directorate of History and Heritage?s Senior Naval Historian, Michael Whitby. Whitby writes that RAdm Kenneth Dyer, Commander MARLANT, also known as the Canadian Atlantic Sub-area at the time, had at his disposal ?a mix of forces both new and old, cutting-edge and obsolescent.? To summarize Whitby?s description of naval surface and subsurface forces on the east coast, they consisted of the following: -

-

-

-

-

The modern light fleet carrier HMCS Bonaventure. The Fifth Canadian Escort Squadron (CANCORTRON 5) comprised of Restigouche-class destroyer escorts (DDE), Dyer?s ?most effective unit?. Commissioned over the previous four years, the Restigouches represented the latest in ASW capability and were led by aggressive commanders with well-trained ships companies. Two other destroyer groups ? CANCORTRONs 1 and 3 ? which ?included destroyers of Second World War vintage.? The Prestonian class frigates of CANCORTRONs 7 and 9 which ?were also Second World War era ships, but they had been extensively modified from the main deck up during the 1950s. Lacking the speed and sensor fit of the destroyers, they were nonetheless useful ships that could fulfill more limited roles.? The Bay-class minesweepers of MINRON 1, new ships that were useful for patrolling inshore waters. Two Royal Navy Amphion-class conventional submarines of the Sixth Submarine Squadron. HMS Alderney and Astute mainly fulfilled a training function as ?clockwork mice? for the fleet but they had recently been modernized into valuable anti-submarine platforms. Although RN submarines, they had a mix of British and Canadian

-

sailors and were under Rear-Admiral Dyer?s operational control. HMCS Cape Scott ? a maintenance vessel which also saw limited service during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Naval surface and sub-surface assets on the west coast in October 1962 were far less in number that the east coast fleet. At the time, Pacific Command consisted of: -

-

Six St Laurent class destroyer escorts in CANCORTRON 2, Seven Prestonian class frigates in CANCORTRON 4, Four Bay-class minesweepers. The RCN?s sole submarine, HMCS Grilse, which was used only as an ASW training platform. HMCS Cape Breton, which was already relegated to an alongside maintenance facility role.11

Thus, in terms of numbers and deployable capabilities, the combined resources of the east and west coast fleets in 1962 consisted of an aircraft carrier, 14 DDE destroyer escorts, 10 Second World War vintage Tribal class destroyers, 18 Prestonian

HMCS Prestonian (Photo:Wikipedia)

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HMCS Protecteur (Photo:Wikipedia)

class frigates and 10 minesweepers. Finally, there were the two maintenance ships, Cape Scott and Cape Breton for a total of 55 surface warships. Additionally, the RCN was operating three diesel powered submarines (SSK), two of which were on loan from the UK. In terms of availability during the Cuban Crisis, it is interesting to note that during the crisis, twenty-nine of thirty-eight of Atlantic Command?s ships and submarines, or seventy-six per cent, ?were ready and available for action?. On the west coast, the availability was twelve of eighteen, or two-thirds of the fleet.12-13 The Cuban Missile Crisis was somewhat of a revelation. While the overall assessment within Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa was that the RCN had acquitted itself well, there were some serious concerns about shortcomings in the fleet. Success at ASW was limited as there had been very few, if any, positive detections of Soviet submarines known to have been involved in the operations. The wartime vintage destroyers and frigates had limited capabilities in an ASW environment and were becoming more and more of a challenge to maintain and operate. The lack of logistics support for ships at sea, including an alongside replenishment capability was also a major concern. HMC Ships Cape Scott and Cape Breton were ill-suited as replenishment ships and were soon retired from sea going service after the Cuban Crisis to become alongside Fleet Maintenance Facilities.

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However, the Defence White Paper, tabled by Minister Hellyer in Parliament in 1964, and culminating in the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act in February 1968, began the slippery slope of what earlier had been downsizing to meet the need, to downsizing to meet the budget. The 1971 Defence White Paper, ?Defence in the 70s?, was a precursor to further retreat by successive governments away from maintaining meaningful naval capabilities. Meanwhile rapid technological development including the move from analog to digital systems and post-war ship replacement programs, progressed around the globe. Thus, the period of 1963-1975 in the Canadian Navy was a period of change and growth in capabilities in some respects, while the overall number of surface ship hulls saw decline. In 1963 HMCS Provider, the first of three replenishment vessels commonly known as AORs, was commissioned into the RCN.14 It was a period of innovation with the invention of the ?BearTrap? helicopter haul down system and conversion of seven St. Laurent class DDEs to helicopter carrying destroyer escorts and experimentation with the Fast Hydrofoil Escort HMCS Bras D?or, in commission from 1968 to 1972. Four of the seven Restigouche DDEs were converted to Improved Restigouche Escort (IRE) class in the 1964-to-1972-time frame. The remaining wartime vintage destroyers and frigates were decommissioned and with the exception of HMCS Haida, were

scrapped. Concurrently the number of ?steamers?15 increased with the delivery of the six ships of the Mackenzie and the Annapolis classes. The replacement cycle concluded with the introduction of the four new Iroquois class DDH 280 destroyers in the early 1970s. By 1975 the Navy was a relatively modern force of sufficient size for the tasks at hand, which continued to be focused primarily on the Cold War ASW mission. The ASW capabilities of the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure, which had been retired in 1970 amid much protest over an expensive refit, had been replaced by the conversion of the St. Laurents to carry

HMCS Athabaska (Photo:Wikipedia)

large Sea King ASW helicopters. The IREs had also undergone significant ASW upgrades. The government of the day had determined that Canada needed 30 surface combatants in war, 26 in peace but would only pay for 24 as that was what the existing infrastructure would support. Thus this fleet of twenty-four DDH/IRE/DDEs was deemed to be adequate for the needs of the navy and met NATOs requirements for commitment of forces in the event of war with the Soviet Union. However, while the USN and the Soviets continued to

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build significant armadas of well armed vessels and other navies kept pace, overall post 1972 the RCN started to see a decline in numbers and capabilities. The lack of budgetary increases in Canada, (in some cases there were cuts, particularly in the 1990s) combined with increased operating costs and maintenance requirements resulted in reductions in the numbers of Canadian ships. On the east coast HMCS St. Laurent was paid-off 16 and other St. Laurents were deactivated, in some cases due to crew shortages. Similarly in Esquimalt HMC Ships Chaudiere, Columbia and St. Croix, who did not undergo conversion to IRE due to budget cuts, were relegated to the ?Black Squadron? (Category ?C? reserve) in 1974.17 In essence the ships were only kept from being scrapped by the need to meet Canada?s commitments to NATO, at least on paper. Thus by 1975, the RCN surface fleet consisted of three operational squadrons of sixteen DDH/IRE, one training squadron of four Mackenzie class DDEs and three Provider/Protecteur AORs. Additionally, six former minesweepers renamed as Patrol Frigate Light (PFL), and later renamed as Patrol Boats (PB) were employed as training ships and the Naval Reserve operated five Gate Vessels, known as the ?Porte Boats.?18 In 1978, a plan to execute a Destroyer Life Extension program (DELEX) for the 16 older DDE/IRE/DDH was announced.19 In the case of the St. Laurent class DDH, given their advanced age and physical state, what the DELEX refits achieved was to keep these ships seaworthy and add some modest technology improvements. While ships? sensors and communications were improved, the weapons systems across the fleet were less than adequate in that they had no realistic air defence capability. Through the 1980s operational ships on both coasts were engaged in training, combat

readiness and occasional operations, either as single ships or in squadrons. The 1987 Defence White Paper took a serious look at defence requirements ?to protect our shores, our waters and our airspace.?20 This document introduced a glimmer of hope that Canadian governments recognized the importance of a strong capable, globally deployable navy, as the White Paper recognized the ?bowwave? of deferred equipment acquisition since the 1960s.21 In terms of naval capabilities, the Paper envisioned a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear powered submarines (SSN) to support the need to defend the Arctic waters as well as the Atlantic and the Pacific. However, with communism crumbling and the fall of the Berlin Wall imminent, the 1987 defence policy became shelfware and the idea of SSNs in Maritime Command went up in smoke. Shortly thereafter the collapse of the Soviet Union signalled the end of the Cold War and removed the perceived threat to the west. This outcome had a serious impact on numbers in the surface fleet, in that on paper the fleet of twenty surface combatants in being quickly became a fleet of eighteen, consisting of the twelve new Halifax Class Canadian Patrol Frigates (CPF), the two relatively new DDH, HMC Ships Annapolis and Nipigon22 and the four Iroquois class destroyer.23 The four destroyer escort hulls put into reserve status in 1974 and eventually disposed in the 1980s would not be replaced. Later that decade the older DDH and DDEs began to be taken out of service and their crews assigned to the new CPFs as they were delivered by St John Shipbuilding and Marine Industries and MIL Davie Shipbuilding in Lauzon, QC. This era was referred to by many in the RCN as the first iteration of ?the bathtub years? when ship availability was at its lowest. At the time of the First Gulf War in 1991 only the IRE and Iroquois Class ships were deemed suitable for operations in a theatre of war and only after Harpoon missile and Vulcan-Phalanx close in weapon systems destined for the soon to be built CPF were essentially bolted on to the ships identified for deployment. The Canadian Task Group24 of one DDH 280, one Improved Restigouche Class escort, and one AOR,

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became the response approved by the government of the day for deployment to the Persian Gulf. Three years later the Task Group concept25 appeared in the 1994 White Paper, which stated a requirement for Maritime Command to have the capacity to generate two naval Task Groups, one on each coast, with up to four combatants (submarines, frigates or destroyers) and a support ship. This concept became naval doctrine, embedded in the first version of ?LeadMark?.26 Squadrons were renamed as Maritime Operations Groups and ships were tasked and deployed either as single ship task units, or multi-ship (usually a DDH 280, one or two IRE/DDH and an AOR). Notwithstanding the long-winded attempts to gain approval for an AOR replacement program,27 Provider was paid off in 1998 with no replacement, leaving the RCN with two operational AORs, removing the flexibility that Provider had provided.28 The final cuts to the number of available major surface vessels in the RCN came about as a result of further budget cuts, personnel reductions and quite literally ?rust-out? and ?burn out? of the Iroquois class and the Protecteur class AORs. Despite being the most recently upgraded of the four Iroquois class destroyers through the Tribal Update and Modernization Program (TRUMP), in 1995 HMCS Huron was decommissioned in 2000 and eventually sunk as a target in May 2007. The personnel establishment that was Huron?s crew was quickly subsumed into the rest of an already depleted Canadian Armed Forces and the naval component was reduced to 15 surface combatants. Later in the 1990s concerns were raised about the seaworthiness of the remaining Iroquois class DDH, which had been renamed as DDGs following the TRUMP refits. Over 2014 to 2017, Iroquois and Athabaskan experienced engineering failures and corrosion problems to a point where they were laid-up and then turned over to Crown Assets Disposal to be scrapped, with their crews being reassigned throughout the east coast fleet. Although Algonquin was planned to remain in service until 2019, after a collision with Protecteur in 2013 and with significant cost for repairs looming, that plan was reconsidered. She was paid-off in 2015 and sold for scrap. Damage

to Protecteur as a result of the collision with Algonquin was not significant and she continued operations until 2014, when she experienced a major engine room fire while enroute Hawaii. She returned to Esquimalt under tow and was decommissioned in May 2015. While Preserver ?s fate was less ignominious, she did suffer from significant electrical problems and corrosion and was taken out of service in 2016. Like many other Canadian warships, she made her final voyage to Sydney, NS where she was scrapped in 2017.

not designed for operations in threat environments.

As such, today the RCN operates as a fleet of 12 Halifax class frigates, 12 Kingston class MCDV of which only six are fully operational, and four Victoria Class submarines, supported by a leased AOR, the M/V Asterix. As we know, new capabilities are coming online with the delivery of the six Harry DeWolf Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels, two Joint Support Ships and eventually fifteen Canadian Surface Combatants and a new submarine capability. This past Sunday, (26 March 2023) we witnessed the two ship Task Group of HMCS Montréal and the M.V Asterix depart Halifax bound for operations in the Indo-Pacific. This will be one of four FFH deployments planned for the year.29 In the next STARSHELL Naval Affairs will examine in detail what size of fleet is required to maintain the Task Group concept of up to four combatants and a support ship to meet Canada?s needs for maritime defence and security.30

8

Notes

14 Ibid,

1

These are approximate numbers, often quoted, but hard to confirm.

5

World War ? Willmott, H.P. et al.; Dorling Kindersley Limited, London, 2004, Page 168 6

Joseph Schull, Far Distant Ships, Stoddart Publishing Co, p 426. 7

The Naval Association intends to address the post-war personnel/HR aspects of the RCN in a paper to be published later in 2023. For example, the frigate HMCS Stormont was purchased by commercial interests, resold and converted to a luxury yacht for Aristotle Onassis. 9

Ken Macpherson, John Burgess: The ships of Canada?s Naval Forces 1910-1981. p 68. 10

The author has in his possession a track chart of HMCS Ontario?s 1955 round the world cruise. 11

Michael Whitby, ?Exceptional Circumstances? Canada?s Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis October-November 1962, Produced by: Canadian Armed Forces, Directory of History and Heritage, 2022, p 12-13, 60. 12

Ibid, page 86.

13

The difference in numbers between the total count of 55 ships and Whitby?s tally of 56 is unexplainable. page 81. Provider was authorized in 1958 and laid down in 1961. Subsequently Protecteur and Preserver were delivered in the early 1970s. 15 ?Steamers? was a descriptor

2

Three additional AOPV are being built in Halifax under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

for the older destroyer escorts referencing their steam driven propulsion system as compared to the DDH 280 destroyers which were powered with gas turbine engines.

3

The Canadian Surface Combatant program is planned to deliver 15 ships to replace the 12 Halifax Class frigates and the 3 of the Iroquois Class destroyers. 4

RCN assigned tasks in 2023 include frigate deployments to Europe in support of NATO commitments and to the Indo-Pacific. The surveillance task off the coast of Haiti will be carried out by Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels, which were Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 44

16 17

Macpherson, Burgess, page 164.

Many will remember the dismal sight in the late 1970s of St. Laurent alongside in Halifax, and Chaudiere and Columbia berthed on the west side of Esquimalt Harbour, in mothballs so to speak. In late 1974 St. Croix was transferred back to the east coast and became an alongside harbour training ship.

18

Named after the Gates in Quebec City.

19

Macpherson, Burgess, page 170.

?Leadmark: The Navy?s Strategy for 2020? was promulgated in June 2001. 27

20

The 1987 White Paper is here

21

Ibid.

22

Annapolis and Nipigon were commissioned in 1964, based on the converted St. Laurent Class (DDH) design.

The first iteration, known as Afloat Logistics Support Capability or ALSC was under discussion in the early 1990s, finally went to Request for Proposals as the Joint Support Ship Project in 2004, but failed when the two bids received were deemed to be non-compliant because they exceeded the fixed price contract offered by Canada. 28

23

At one point what was known as Ship Replacement Program (SRP) set the RCN?s requirement at 18 surface ships to be delivered in three flights; however SRP III was cancelled.

Another indication of the challenges faced by the RCN at that time, Provider?s establishment (personnel billets) was used to offset the personnel bill for the acquisition of the VICTORIA class submarines. 29

24

Task Groups originated with the US Navy in the Pacific theatre during World War Two. Post 1960?s the RCN had always been organized in squadrons for administrative purposes, but typically deployed in Task Groups under the command of a squadron commander, the commanding officer of the AOR in company, or the senior ship?s commanding officer. 25

In the early 1990s the term Task Group was introduced into White Paper discussions in NDHQ to justify the navy?s desire to maintain the surface fleet at 16 combatants, as the government of the day favoured land forces to support peacekeeping operations. The number 16 was recognized as insufficient, and as such was not by choice, but was considered the best solution in a worst case scenario.

See Commander RCN interview elsewhere in this edition of STARSHELL. 30

The generally accepted military force generation calculation suggests that to generate one high readiness unit for operations, it is necessary to have three other units in various stages of preparing for operations, returning from operations and one unit resting/undergoing refit/overhaul. Theoretically speaking, that construct would require the RCN to have a fleet in the order of 16 combatants (including submarines) and four AORs on each coast to have the capacity to generate one Task Group from each coast to meet one hundred percent of the government?s requirements.

26

LeadMark and its follow-ons are the RCN?s unclassified doctrinal publication, the first of which

Tim Addison retired from the Canadian Forces, as it was then known, in 2006 in the rank of Commander. Much of his naval career was spent in sea going postings, or in NDHQ in J3 Plans (Maritime) and later in the Maritime Staff in the Directorate of Maritime Operations, Plans and Readiness.

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Xue Long (Photo: Wikipedia)

Ch in ese M ar in e Scien t if ic Resear ch in t h e Ar ct ic Th e Hist or y an d Legal Fr am ew or k Adam Lajeu n esse, Ph D & Su zan n e Lalon de, Ph D

Oh Bu oy In late February 2022, the Department of National Defence (DND) made the startling announcement that it had ? according to the Globe and Mail ? ?found and retrieved Chinese monitoring buoys in the Arctic.?1 The buoys were spotted by the Canadian Armed Forces as part of Operation Limpid, a continuing effort to provide early detection of threats to Canada?s security. The precise nature and purpose of these devices remain classified, but the very fact that

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Chinese hardware was appearing in the region gave credence to existing fears that Beijing?s presence in the Arctic was destined to lead to competition. DND added to these concerns by noting as well that it was ?fully aware of recent efforts by China to conduct surveillance operations in Canadian airspace and maritime approaches utilizing dual-purpose 2 [civilian/military] technologies.? Given China?s global challenge to the rules-based international order, and its particularly corrosive

behavior closer to home, it is only natural that such a find in the Arctic would be tied into that global competitive framework. Yet, this turn of the events in the Arctic remains far more ambiguous, and far less sudden, than its presentation by the media suggests. In fact, China has been operating its expanding icebreaker fleet in the region since 1999 and, over the twelve Arctic expeditions since then, has routinely deployed and tested an increasingly sophisticated array of buoys, autonomous vehicles, surface gliders, and other technology. What?s more, these exercises have not been secret (even if their full extent may have been). In the wake of Canada?s discovery of the Chinese buoy, and to provide the needed legal and historical context to the issue, this article offers a brief overview of China?s marine scientific work in the Arctic, looking at the tools it has been developing, the laws governing these activities, and where that leaves Canada.

China?s Arctic Oper ations The deployment of Chinese technology into the Arctic Ocean, and surrounding seas is nothing fundamentally new.3 Working in ice-covered waters requires a unique set of technologies and skills and China?s scientists have been developing them for well over a decade. As early as 2008, the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) began deploying what it described as ?underwater robots,? which were designed to help predict sea ice changes.4 Four years later, the icebreaker Xue Long [Snow Dragon] advertised its success in deploying buoys in the region for the first time, to observe air-sea interactions in the Norwegian Sea.5 By 2018, that program of work had expanded considerably. That year, as part of the country?s ninth Arctic expedition, Xue Long deployed an ?unmanned ice station? on an Arctic floe.6 The PRIC also boasted of its success in testing underwater gliders, spindle anchors observation platforms, as well as sediment traps.7 As part of a large scientific program, including five ice stations and 43 different buoys, the Chinese icebreaker trialed submersible devices able to ?record the temperature, salinity, current speed and flow data? of the ocean.8 It also tested the submersible ?Haiyan? underwater glider in the Bering Sea. This is an autonomous vehicle ?used to monitor the deep-sea environment in vast areas? with temperature, salt, Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 48

depth, and dissolved oxygen sensors.9 This glider was actually left in the region during the Arctic expedition and was only scheduled to be retrieved on the return leg, after travelling autonomously for more than 1,111 kilometers.10 This system was deployed again the following year to observe hydrographic and biochemical data in the Bering Sea.11 In 2020, three of these devices were deployed simultaneously. This glider system is not Arctic specific technology, having been deployed globally by the Chinese, including 550 days of continuous operation in the East Indian Ocean in 2019. Clearly, Beijing is working to adapt and test its existing systems in an ice-infested environment ? and with some success. Just how threatening these experiments really are remains debatable. Unmanned vehicles are widely used by other Arctic states in the region and have legitimate scientific capabilities. Still, the military applications are also obvious. Because these gliders have no propulsion systems (maintaining momentum by relying on small changes in buoyancy) the acoustic signature is extremely low, making them ideally suited to undersea warfare.12 The mapping of the region?s seafloor, salinity levels, and water temperature are also all perfectly legitimate scientific pursuits. Indeed, this work is framed in English and Chinese language discussions as legitimate civilian environmental research, designed to better understand the Arctic region and a changing global climate.13 Still, this is also the prerequisite work to understanding submarine operations in the Arctic waters, mirroring studies undertaken by the US and Canada in the 1950s and 1960s for that purpose. In their detailed analysis, Bryan Millard and Whitney Lackenbauer highlight the ?rigorous discipline? that the PRIC showed in its messaging, keeping in line with Beijing?s broader Arctic narrative centered on science and diplomacy. However, the icebreakers? operations and chosen routes strongly suggest that there is more to these expeditions than pure science.14

Tr acing Chinese Oper ations There has been a clear geographical focus in Chinese Arctic expeditions since 1999. For the most part, these activities have been concentrated within the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas. Over the years,

they have consistently pushed further north, attempting to make high latitude records and gain the national prestige of reaching the North Pole (90°N). Xue Long 2?s summer 2021 voyage north of Russia?s New Siberian Islands and Severnaya Zemlya, across the North Pole, and then through the Greenland Sea (which separates Greenland from Svalbard), is a case in point.15 The fifth expedition in 2012 and the eighth in 2017 represent notable exceptions to China?s concentrated activity. Both of these expeditions circumnavigated the Arctic, but with different return routes, with the ship returning via the Transpolar Route in 2012 and through the Northwest Passage in 2017. The official report of the fifth expedition emphasized how it set various new records, representing the first Chinese scientific expedition to transit the Arctic Ocean as an ?Arctic seaway? and thus opening a ?new chapter in China?s maritime history? and ?laying a material foundation? for ?China?s Arctic sea-related assessment work.?16 The report on the 2017 expedition is more sparse, but highlights ?crossing the

Arctic Central Channel and the Northwest Passage for the first time,? detailing how ?the regional scope and content of China?s Arctic marine environmental operational surveys have made positive contributions to building China?s Arctic operational survey system, Arctic environmental assessment and resource utilization, and Arctic frontier scientific research.?17 Noting that the ship deviated from its original plan to spend more time in the central Arctic Ocean, Chinese news agency CGTN tied the voyage to China?s desire ?to play a bigger role in Arctic development.?18 Given China?s well-understood global search for natural resources to fuel its industrial development, there is a widespread assumption that these operations are an attempt to develop those future resources. While resource exploration is not the explicit objective of Chinese icebreaker operations, it is a persistent secondary task. Surveying research topics coming out of Chinese polar maritime research agencies, reveals two overarching themes used to frame this research: the first is the interaction of polar oceans, atmosphere, glaciers, biology, earth and

CHINARE Arctic Expedition Routes, 1999-2018. Source: Polar Research Institute of China

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Xue Long

considered ?marine data collection,? and are therefore not considered ?marine scientific research? under the updated policy.

geophysics; and the second is the use of polar resources. The routes taken by the Xue Long certainly indicate an interest in deep seabed mining and highlight certain key areas. Every Chinese Arctic Expedition (save the fifth) placed considerable emphasis on surveying and studying the continental shelf north of Alaska. In particular, the focus has been on the Chukchi Plateau and Northwind Ridge. These areas are thought to be particularly mineral rich. In 2019, Chinese investigations included ?the formation mechanism of polymetallic nodules,? which primarily consist of iron oxyhydroxides and manganese oxides, onto which strategic metals such as nickel, cobalt, copper, titanium, and rare earth elements attach.19 In 2020, Xue Long conducted core sampling on Northwind Basin at a depth of 1,870 meters.20 This work took place on the US continental shelf, though was not in violation of existing US regulations concerning maritime scientific research at the time. It did however cause sufficient concern that the Trump administration changed US policy to require US permission for future core sampling.21 Under US law, marine scientific research only includes ?those activities undertaken in the ocean to expand knowledge of the marine environment and its processes.? Hydrographic surveys ? including those for military purposes ? and resource exploration, which China?s research fleet is known for, are instead Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 50

Despite having the lions? share of the Arctic coast, Russia has rarely seen Chinese operations on its continental shelf, including beyond 200 nautical miles. In 2020, however, that changed. That year, China announced the inaugural research program for Xue Long 2?s maiden Arctic voyage, which centred on a survey of Gakkel Ridge. This area of seafloor is suspected of containing massive sulfides, rich in copper, zinc, and other minerals and there. The Chinese project, focused on such a strategic sector directly abutting Russia?s continental shelf, prompted an official Russian reaction. Following the announcement of Xue Long 2?s route, Russia submitted an Addendum to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2021, which incorporated the Gakkel Ridge area into its extended continental shelf claim. A Canadian government representative working on the continental shelf file highlighted this shift as a clear reaction to China?s activities and presence there.22

L egal Consider ations China?s marine scientific research in the Arctic has certainly expanded in recent years, both in the technologies being tested and in the geographic scope of the work. While the precise nature of that research, and its dual use potential remains hazy, we can still analyse the important legal considerations that arise. Are these operations permissible, or has China been violating Arctic States? sovereign rights and/or jurisdiction? How are China?s rights to conduct research balanced against the Arctic state?s legitimate and broad security concerns? The Introduction to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) refers to a ?ubiquitous concept? that

pervades the Convention ? the ?balance of rights and duties.?23 In his introductory remarks as President of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, Tommy Koh refers to this important achievement, specifically as it relates to Part XIII of the Convention: ?The Convention contains new rules on marine scientific research which strike an equitable balance between the interests of research States and the interests of the coastal States in whose economic zones or continental shelves the research is to be carried out.?24

(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living;

At the heart of those interests are the sovereign rights which Articles 56 and 77 afford coastal States over the natural resources of the EEZ and continental shelf. It is noteworthy that the official Introduction to the Convention refers to the protection of these coastal States? rights as the essential underpinning of the new marine scientific research regime: ?The Convention also includes provisions to ? encourage the conduct of marine scientific research. The inclusion of such provisions was dependent on the establishment of adequate safeguards for the holders of the rights concerned? [italics added].25

(d) contains information communicated pursuant to article 248 regarding the nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching State or competent international organization has outstanding obligations to the coastal State from a prior research project [italics added].

The equitable balance celebrated by Koh is referred to in the first provision of Part XIII of UNCLOS: ?All States ? and competent international organizations have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the rights and duties of other States as provided for in this Convention? (Article 238) [italics added]. Article 240 then lists ?general principles? that apply to the conduct of MSR and stipulates at paragraph (a) that it ?shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes.?26 The actual mechanics of the compromise are set out in Article 246, which provides in paragraph 3 that coastal States ?shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent for marine scientific research projects in their EEZ or on their continental shelf ... To this end, coastal States shall establish rules and procedures for ensuring that such consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably.?27 Paragraph 5 of Article 246 adds that coastal States ?may in their discretion withhold their consent? if the proposed project in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of the coastal State:

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(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment; (c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations and structures;

Paragraph 6 of Article 246 adds another layer of direct relevance for the Arctic coastal States. ?Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, coastal States may not exercise their discretion to withhold consent under subparagraph (a) of that paragraph in respect of marine scientific research projects to be undertaken in accordance with the provision of this Part on the continental shelf, beyond 200 nautical miles ? outside those specific areas which coastal States may at any time publicly designate as areas in which exploitation or detailed exploratory operations focused on those areas are occurring or will occur within a reasonable period of time. Coastal States shall give reasonable notice of the designation of such areas, as well as any modifications thereto, but shall not be obliged to give details of the operations therein [italics added].? Thus, a coastal State has different arguments at its disposal to refuse its consent to an MSR project by other States or organizations in its EEZ or on its continental shelf. Within 200 nm from its baselines, the coastal State can claim that the proposed project is of ?direct significance? for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living? in its EEZ and/or on its continental shelf (Article 246(5)(a)). The criterion is simply that the project is of ?direct significance?; the coastal State does not need to allege that significant harm or damage would or could result. And in exercising its

discretion to refuse the project on this ground, it cannot be challenged through the binding dispute resolution mechanisms under Part XV of the LOSC.28 Beyond 200 nm, the coastal State need only designate specific areas and assert that ?exploitation? or ?detailed exploratory operations? in those areas will occur ?within a reasonable period? to invoke Article 246(5)(a) and withhold its consent on the basis that the foreign project is of ?direct significance? for those operations. The coastal State is not obliged to give details of those ?exploitation or detailed exploratory operations.? Furthermore, it can be anticipated that the ?within a reasonable period? constraint will be interpreted more generously given the difficulties of conducting any operation beyond 200 nm in the Arctic Ocean. Subparagraph (b) and (c) also provide the coastal State with clear reasons to refuse its consent ? where Xue Long 2 (Photo given to author)

the foreign project involves drilling or the use of installations and structures. The reference in subparagraph (b) to consent being withheld because the project involves the ?introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment? could be interpreted very broadly by a coastal State, particularly the word ?harmful.? Paragraphs (b) and (c) are not caught by the special rules in paragraph 6 for areas beyond 200 nm and the compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms. Article 246(5)(d) might offer the widest discretion of all. As noted above, a coastal State may withhold its consent if it considers that the description provided by the researching State contains inaccurate information regarding the nature and objectives of the project. Thus, a coastal State which considers that all of the objectives of a project have not been fully disclosed could assert that the information provided is ?inaccurate? and on this basis, withhold its consent. Furthermore, this justification for withholding consent is not caught by the special rules in paragraph 6 of Article 246 for areas of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Once again, this exercise of discretion could not be subjected to compulsory dispute settlement. Even where consent is granted, a foreign State or entity has the duty to comply with a number of important obligations. Article 248 not only demands that the researching State provide the coastal State with a ?full? description of the nature and objectives of the project (paragraph (a)) but also, ?the method and means to be used, including name, tonnage, type and class of vessels and a description of scientific equipment? (paragraph (b)) [italics added]. The researching State must also ensure the right of the coastal State, if it so desires, to participate in the project, provide the coastal State with preliminary report as well as final results and conclusions and provide access to all data and samples (see the full list of obligations in Article 249).

Canadian Options China?s Arctic operations over the past twenty years have certainly expanded and may now be exploring dual-use military/civilian technology. That is not to say that China is about to expand its naval operations Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 52

into the Arctic; the strategic rationale for threatening North American from the region is questionable at best.29 However, within the context of a growing, global great power competition, any Chinese military research must be viewed as potentially problematic.

Notes

From a Canadian perspective, the presence of Chinese hardware in our waters also raises political and security questions. Observers should, however, be cautious on this point given how little is publicly known about what DND fished out of Canadian waters. China (like other states) has spent years deploying buoys into the Arctic waters and what Canada found may have been a civilian buoy drifting in from international waters. This would be very different from an anchored buoy within Canadian territorial waters, or within the EEZ. Canada?s reaction to this incident, and to China?s future research will rest on what we found, and what our security agencies think these Arctic expeditions are seeking to accomplish.

2 Ibid.

Part XIII of UNCLOS was intended to promote marine scientific research and the dissemination of information. Within this system, however, Coastal States retain significant control over that research in their EEZ and continental shelfs, given the discretion afforded to them by Article 246. Withholding Canadian consent is possible but would likely spark a broader political controversy and invite economic and diplomatic retaliation. It might also provoke a reciprocal denial of Canadian or other Western research projects in the Chinese EEZ, or on its continental shelf. Still, this may be a fight worth picking if it is deemed necessary to limit Beijing?s dual purpose research (if that approach can be demonstrated). If nothing else, this form of legal pushback would, shine a light on Chinese misbehaviour (again, if that misbehaviour can be demonstrated) and push back on Beijing?s persistent narrative that its role in the Arctic is a cooperative ?win-win?venture.

1 Steven Chase,

?Canadian military found Chinese monitoring buoys in the Arctic,? Globe and Mail (February 21, 2023).

3

For a more detailed overview see: Bryan J.R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ?Trojan Dragons: Normalizing China?s Presence in the Arctic,? CGAI Paper (June 2021). 4

??? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? [?Underwater Robots? Go to the Arctic for Scientific Expeditions to Conduct under-Ice Process Observations], ? ? ? ? ? [ChinaNews], July 5, 2010. 5 ??

? ?? ??? ???? ? ?????? ? ?? ? [The Chinese Arctic Scientific Research Team Deploys the First Large Polar Ocean Observation Buoy], ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? [The Central People?s Government of the People?s Republic of China], August 5, 2012. 6

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? [The Xuelong Returns from Breaking Ice], ? ? ? [Xinhua], September 27, 2018. 7

Retrieved from: China begins 9th Arctic expedition to help build ?Polar Silk Road?. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1111706.shtml 8

Retrieved from: 69? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . 69 days! China's ninth Arctic scientific research successfully completed." https://m.gmw.cn/baijia/2018-10/14/31699019.html 9

?? ????? ????? ??? ? ?????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , [China?s Tenth Arctic Scientific Research: China's First Underwater Glider in the Arctic Waters Group Network Observation], https://www.sohu.com/a/344517633_726570 10

Chinese sources were not clear if it actually was recovered. Retrieved from: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Domestic underwater glider used for the first time in the Arctic scientific research. 11 Retrieved from:

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?? ????? ????? ??

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? China's tenth Arctic scientific research: China's first underwater glider in the Arctic waters group network observation. https://www.sohu.com/a/344517633_726570 12

? ? ? ? ?2016? ? 19? ? ? ? ? ? [Ordinance Industry Science and Technology] (2016).

13

Adam Lajeunesse and Tim Choi, ?Here there be Dragons? Chinese Submarine Options in the Arctic,? Journal of Strategic Studies (July 2021). 14

Millard and Lackenbauer, 19.

15

CGTN, ?China's Xuelong 2 sets sail for new Arctic expedition,? CGTN (July 13, 2021).

25

Ibid, xxvii.

26 Although the requirement

that research be conducted for ?peaceful purposes? seems to suggest that research serving military objectives is prohibited, Article 240(a) repeats a formula found in other articles of the Convention, such as Article 88 which provides that the high seas ?shall be reserved for peaceful purposes?. According to Rothwell and Stevens, ?[r]ather than imposing a blanket ban on the use of the oceans for military purposes, the effect of these provisions is to apply the general prohibition on the use of force except in self-defence, or where authorised by the UN Security Council under its Chapter VII powers." D.R. Rothwell & T. Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 325.

16

?China?s 5th Arctic (Arctic Ocean) Scientific Expedition,? from Millard and Lackenbauer, 19.

27

?China?s 8th Arctic (Arctic Ocean) Scientific Expedition,? from Millard and Lackenbauer, 19.

Paragraph 4 of Article 246 specifically provides that ?normal circumstances? may exist ?in spite of the absence of diplomatic relations between the coastal State and the researching State?.

18

28 See Article 297(2)

17

Gong Zhe, ?Chinese ice breaker Xuelong crosses central Arctic during rim expedition,? CGTN, 18 August 2017, from Millard and Lackenbauer, 19. 19 "Xiangyanghong 01"

completed its first expedition in the Arctic waters China's 10th Arctic Expedition Team returned to Qingdao" (September 28, 2018), http://news.bandao.cn/a/286657.html

20

"China's polar icebreaker heading home from Arctic expedition," Xinhua (September 17, 2020). 21

US Federal Register, ?Revision to United States Marine Scientific Research Policy,? (September 18, 2020). 22

Commentary given to one of the authors.

23

United Nations, The Law of the Sea ? United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (New York: United Nations, 1983) p. xxv. 24

T.T.B. Koh, ?A Constitution of the Oceans? in ibid., at p. xxxiii. Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 54

of UNCLOS.

29

On this see: Adam Lajeunesse and Tim Choi, ?Here there be Dragons? Chinese Submarine Options in the Arctic,? Journal of Strategic Studies (July 2021).

Adam L aj eunesse is an Associate Professor in the Public Policy and Governance Program at StFX. Suzanne L alonde is Professor of International Law at the Université de Montréal. She is a specialist of the Law of the Sea, with an emphasis on the Arctic.

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E- transfers now accepted

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Let t er s t o t h e Edi t or A Qu ick Look at t h e 2022 M SC Con f er en ce Kevin M . Car lé

Day 1 Following Opening Remarks, Vice-Admiral Topshee, Commander RCN kicked off the program by facilitating the first panel discussion. His welcome remarks were fabulous. A great presentation! It was if he had a tele-prompter but, he didn't. He seemed to speak extemporaneously and maintaining eye contact with the audience throughout. Most impressive. Interesting in that he announced the future RCN warship deployment program in the Indo-Asia region including how east coast warships will participate and support a Canadian naval presence. Panel - Challenges to the Str ategic Commons A dynamic start to the proceedings. Topics included the "International Rules Based Order" and ?Climate Change? as they impact on much of the world. The nature and character of conflict has changed dramatically. Has globalization run its course? While there hasn't been a degradation of trade throughout the region it was suggested that perhaps a "re-wiring" may take place. China tends to be the trend setter however, its bullying demeanour and shaky trade relations with the USA, Canada and other nations suggest that relationships and global norms equated to greater security are now viewed by some nations as imposing restriction on national ambitions. It was acknowledged that the Arctic continues to be of great

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interest especially for North America, Europe, Russia and China. The Arctic presents huge cost challenges for any nation who desires to maintain a presence. Climate change along with more frequent natural

disasters with less recovery time between occurrences, the rise of sea levels (expected to be 1 meter by 2100) are all factors that maritime nations need to consider for future ships. Panel - Great Power Competition and The Spaces Between A most interesting presentation entitled ?Prospects and Implications of Sino-Russian Cooperation? provided an excellent snapshot as to the state of relations between these two nations. Given the current climate of tensions with both China and Russia and the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, it was interesting to learn that the Sino-Russian relationship remains complicated and not at all balanced. By this I mean, Russia needs China much more than China needs Russia. China dominates the Maritime sea lines of communication and trade. China is much more advanced in terms of information technology and data storage. Russia has abundant energy and is very advanced in terms of its ability to continue space exploration - something China lags. However, observers believe that this relationship is strengthening.

Day 2 A fascinating and thought provoking presentation by Dr. Sal Mercogliano entitled "Geopolitices, Security and the Shipping Industry" preceded the first panel of the day. In his presentation, Mercogliano stated that the biggest impact on global shipping has been COVID. It started with devastating effect in the cruise ship industry which had 24 million passengers suddenly reduced to some 7 million in 2020. He referred to a YouTube piece entitled "What is on with Maritime Shipping". There has been a huge growth in the shipping of bulk cargo including oil, grain and coal. LNG is the now primary and most desirable resource that is being shipped. Climate change has reduced water levels especially, in key river corridors which then reduces the flow of bulk cargo and adds to an already stressed ?supply chain? for many nations. China is establishing ports around the world and is

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also establishing new merchant shipping routes. It builds 40 % of the worlds merchant ships and has the second largest merchant navy in terms of sailors. Notwithstanding the situation with Ukraine, Russia continues to advance its maritime shipping activity where food, fertilizer and oil continue to be highly sought after. Panel - I nnovation to M eet M ar itime Challenges The second panel of the day - "Building the Fleets of Tomorrow", was Moderated by RAdm Christopher Robinson, Commander MARPAC. Presentations focused on : Canada's Shipbuilding Campaign; Naval Shipbuilding in Northeast Asia; Submarine Fleets in the Indo-Pacific; and then wrapped up with a very interesting presentation about South Korea's indigenous submarine program, the KSS-111 Program Group. The key players in the region are Korea (North and South), Japan, China, Russia, Canada and the United States. It is all about submarines! North Korea has a large fleet of submarines and is likely working towards or certainly would like to have SBN capability. The PRC is keen to improve its nuclear submarine building capability and looks to Russia in this regard. South Korea has developed AIP technology which is featured in their KSS-111 submarine. South Korea claims that this latest version has the highest level of stealth technology. Domestically designed and built, this submarine is the largest and quietest conventional submarine in the world. Canada has plans to replace its current fleet of submarines (TBC with Defence Policy Update) and whether this could be a contender remains to be seen. The recent defence agreement between Canada and South Korea regarding a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Defence Materials Cooperation between the ROK Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), may be a factor in this regard. And, of course the US maintains leading edge submarine technology. There is a trend throughout Indo-Asia to build larger boats with enhanced stealth features and improved combat systems. Growing regional tensions is the

driver for the growth of submarines as they are seen to be a kind of insurance. However, the entire region is facing shipbuilding challenges as there are fewer shipyards and the costs associated with shipbuilding are increasing. Summar y and Final Thoughts

signalled I believe, that the RCN is focussed on this important and complex region. Overall, the conference was very well organized. The variety of topics and range of experts really made for a great learning experience. It was an honour to attend.

The discussion at the beginning of the conference about maintaining the "world order" perhaps should be shifted to that of the "new world order." Certainly, it would appear from what we see these days, that world order at least as we all knew it, is no more. China continues its aggressive and expansionist goals. It is deepening its relationship with Russia which is in itself worrying especially with what we are witnessing in Ukraine. And then there is North Korea which continues to be dangerously unpredictable. Has Canada finally woken up to the importance of the Indo-Asia region? I would like to think so given Commander RCN's rather candid comments. However, the Euro-centric NATO lens continues to shape the way Canada and its armed forces conducts business. What will the long awaited Canadian Defence Policy update reveal? It's seems to be taking a ridiculous long time and one can't help but wonder if this government hopes that Canadians have forgotten their commitment to reveal a new policy. I commend the reader to view the video presentation by Lieutenant-Commander Ryan Bell, Executive Officer, HMCS HARRY DEWOLF. His topic "The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship: New Platform, New Operations" was an enthusiastic and passionate depiction of the ship's first deployment which circum-navigated North America. He discussed what capabilities and potential these new ships will bring to the RCN. In fact, I commend all of the presentations which have been recorded and are available on Youtube. The fact that Comd RCN, D/Comd RCN, the two coastal formation commanders, a large number of Canadian Defence Attaches/Advisors attended and remained throughout the three day conference

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Representatives from the Navy League of Canada (NLC), Naval Association of Canada (NAC) and Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Vancouver Island (VI) Branches attended the recent Maritime Security Challenges 2022 (MSC 22)- Pacific Seapower: Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific conference held in Victoria, BC from 14-16 November. The conference, attended by senior representatives from the RCN and allied navies, government and academic maritime security, marine industrial and environmental experts, along with a wide range of Indo-Pacific based interested parties, addressed the full scope of maritime security issues in the Indo Pacific region including challenges to freedom of navigation, the importance of regional maritime trade to the global economy and impacts of climate change. The MSC series of biennial conferences have been held since 2005 with the aim of providing a venue for discussion on issues of common concern, the exchange of shared experiences and potential solutions to the challenges presented to participating nations in the region. MSC 22 hosts included the RCN, Navy League of Canada and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Pictured (front to back) in the attached photo are: Captain (N) (Ret'd) Kevin Carlé (NAC VI). Rear Admiral RCN (Ret'd) Jennifer Bennett (NLC), Major (Ret'd) Scott Usborne (RUSI VI president) and Lieutenant Commander RCN (Ret'd) Paul Seguna (RUSI VI vice president)

Is t h e Navy Adequ at ely Equ ipped f or it s Pr im ar y M ission ? Roger Cyr The Royal Canadian Navy?s mission is to generate combat-capable, multipurpose maritime forces that support Canada?s participation in security operations anywhere in the world. Yet it is doubtful the navy could be capable of conducting its mission today given how it is equipped. The navy now operates 34 ships; they are 12 Halifax class frigates, 4 Victoria-class submarines, 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV), and 6 Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS). Three of these AOPS are now built and there are three more to come. Of the 34 surface combatants, 18 are not fitted with naval weapons and are certainly not combat-capable. So, Canada has 16 combat-capable ships to meet its mission requirements. As a comparison, the Chinese navy has some 500 combat-capable warships, and the US Navy assessed the number of combat-capable ships needed to meet its mission requirements to be 373. Now, what is Canada?s assessment of combat ships needed. One of the Navy?s most important missions is to provide armed sea-borne surveillance of Canada?s coasts, and to enforce Canadian sovereignty. How can these missions be carried out with ships that are unarmed? Why is the navy equipped with ships that could not respond to any type of military threat, or carry out force projection, since they have no armament? Operation Friction should be remembered. In 1991, three ships were sent to the Persian Gulf, HMCS Protecteur, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Terra Nova, as part of a multinational force. But, before the ships could sail for the Gulf, there was a mad rush

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with dockyard crews and contractors working around the clock to fit them with critical weapon systems. Given the world?s unstable situation today, the navy may not have the luxury of time in the future to fit its ships with weapons before they urgently need to deploy. Perhaps the way ahead for Canada is to have some functions now attributed to the navy, taken over by other government or private organizations. There are stark examples around the world where the private sector can manage assets and perform various functions much efficiently and more cheaply than government agencies. The USA contracted out its space travel, to a private enterprise with the goal of reducing space transportation costs. With the private sector this is turning out to be much more efficient. It also helped develop better than state-of-the-art technologies that would not have come to fruition otherwise. Private sector involvement is partially taking place in Canada. There is a contracted supply ship in service with the navy, the Asterix. The ship was delivered in December 2017, and she is leased to the navy with a merchant navy crew, complemented by naval personnel. This ship was built with provision for future installation of three Phalanx 20mm Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS). The 36-member civilian crew (including the captain) is responsible for all ship activities, whereas 114-member navy detachment onboard is responsible for communications and replenishment functions. The new replenishment ship, which entered service on time and on budget, has been performing brilliantly for the navy. During the late 19th century, Canadian officials proposed that Canadian vessels protecting fisheries could be turned into a naval organization. The proposals suggested that the civilian crews be given military training and that fisheries protection vessels be fitted with naval guns to act as a coastal defence force in wartime, thus relieving pressure on the overstretched navy. In 1904, the minister of Marine and Fisheries, Raymond Préfontaine, prepared the Naval Militia Bill, which provided for a permanent naval force of 800 personnel within the Department of Marine and Fisheries. They would be specially

trained crew members aboard government ships and serve as instructors for civilian seamen enrolled for part-time service on the model of the land militia. Nothing came of the bill after Préfontaine?s death in 1905. Perhaps this Naval Militia Bill should be resurrected. Given the shortage of personnel, it would make sense to phase out the MCDVs since they cannot truly contribute to the naval primary mission. The MCDVs are unarmed (except for two machine guns). They are non-war fighters and cannot be classified as warships, especially since they were built to commercial standards. They should be either transferred to other government agencies, such as fisheries, customs, coast guard, or simply fitted with combat systems. It should be remembered that the ships were initially fitted with a Bofors 40-millimeter gun. The Bofors guns were refurbished World War II models that had been previously used by the Canadian Army for air defence in Europe. They were removed in 2014, and now used as monuments in public places. In October 2006, the navy experimented with mounting a remote controlled heavy machine gun station, the OTO Melara 12.7 mm RCHMG, in place of the 40 mm Bofors cannon aboard Summerside. The Nanuk .50 calibre RCWS from Rheinmetall was also trialed as a replacement aboard HMCS Goose Bay in 2018. Perhaps these trials should be reviewed with the optic of installing these systems on the ships. As for the AOPS, only three have so far been built. The design for the remaining three should be modified to restore the original Norwegian weapon HMCS Halifax (Photo: Wikipedia)

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system suite of a 57mm naval gun and Simbad surface to air missiles. As Canada?s Arctic ice continues to recede, it is opening new maritime trade routes and other economic opportunities. The Northwest Passage is the sea route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, along the northern coast of North America via waterways through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Canada has great potential for economic growth and prosperity, but other players in the world may seek to infringe on this potential, hence the possibility of conflict over competing interests. The contested sovereignty claims over the waters may complicate future shipping through the region. Both Russia and China are now preparing to exploit the region by developing and building armed icebreakers. Other countries, including the USA, are also taking steps to ensure their access to the region for various reasons such as sea routes and untapped resources. The USA indicated its icebreaker capability must grow to counter Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic. Getting the capability and capacity to create an enduring presence in the Arctic, in the waters off Alaska are absolutely a priority. The USA and others have indicated that actual warships are better suited to this frigid environment and have the needed firepower in the event of hostilities. The 12 frigates and 4 submarines are the only ships that can be referred to as warships. Yet Canada is a nation that has coast on three oceans. Why do we not have a navy that can enforce Canada?s sovereignty over its territorial waters and be able to protect and

defend its shores. These ships are not enough to carry out this job, the navy needs more capable ships, fitted with up-to-date weapon systems. Perhaps there should be consideration given to have ships crewed by a mix of civilian and naval personnel. It is working well with the replenishment ship, so why not with a frigate-type ship. In summary, the MCDVs should be either transferred to other government agencies or be retrofitted with armament since they do not meet the mission requirements of the navy. The remaining three AOPS to be built should be redesigned to return the ship to its original configuration and fitted with naval weapon systems. The Asterix should be fitted with the three CIWS that is part of the project. For future ships, an industrial/naval approach should be adopted, as was done for the Asterix, to have ships crewed by a mix of civilian and naval personnel. There should be a transfer of some functions now performed by the navy to other organizations. This would help alleviate the navy?s personnel shortages and increase ship availability and capability. Canada would then have a navy that can deliver on its primary mission requirements. It should be remembered that in the event of naval warfare, it is the goal to destroy or disable the enemy's vessels, and unarmed ships have never impressed an enemy.

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Br odeu r Fam ily Dyn ast y Display Lau n ch es On lin e One Canadian family has the special distinction of having three successive generations hold positions of key significance to Canada?s Navy. That family is the Brodeurs, whose members ? Louis Philippe Brodeur; his son, Victor Gabriel Brodeur; and Victor Gabriel Brodeur?s son, Nigel Brodeur ? constitute a true Canadian naval dynasty. To celebrate the achievements and contribution of the Brodeurs to the Royal Canadian Navy and to Canada as a nation, the CFB Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum has launched an online exhibit on its website. The exhibit is titled ?The Brodeur Family ? An RCN Dynasty?, and is available HERE and HERE. The online display features a comprehensive gallery of personal photos from the Brodeurs? history - some never before seen outside family circles - as well as photos that document their professional and career firsts and achievements. The text was written for the museum by Dr. Richard Gimblett, the former Command Historian for the Royal Canadian Navy. In it, he captures the pivotal roles played by all three members of the Brodeur family in the development of a navy made in, and for, Canada. With their consecutive achievements spanning most of the first century of the Royal Canadian Navy, together the three generations of the Brodeurs have been highly important and influential. Each generation has had a part to play in the RCN?s inception, growth and direction: -

-

Louis Philippe Brodeur was Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier?s first Minister of the Naval Service, brought the RCN into being, and laid the groundwork for Canada?s organization of its own naval defence. his son, Victor Gabriel Brodeur, was in the

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-

very first cadre of naval cadets to join the service in 1909, served at sea and ashore through the two World wars, and rose to become the first franco-canadien to make flag rank; Victor-Gabriel Brodeur?s son Nigel served in the RCN throughout nearly the full duration of the Cold War, and was influential in setting up the Canadian Patrol Frigate project that remains the backbone of the present-day fleet.

?The Brodeur family is unique in the Canadian naval experience, in having three successive generations figuring at its very senior level,? said Dr. Gimblett. ?We are especially fortunate that Vice Admiral Nigel Brodeur had the foresight to save and make available the records essential to putting this exhibit together.? He added that he is grateful to have had the opportunity to work with the museum on a project that brings the Brodeur family into perspective, and to pay tribute to Nigel Brodeur, who has been an important mentor to him in his naval career and his subsequent career as an historian. The exhibit, which is available in French and English, is a first for CFB Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum. It was initiated by the Museum?s Exhibit Designer and webmaster Clare Sharpe, in response to the pandemic and the inability of potential visitors to access the museum in person. The museum?s website has long played an outreach role in bringing a wider online awareness of the history and heritage of the naval presence on Canada?s West Coast, and of the military on Southern Vancouver Island, Sharpe explains. ?But as was true for so many museums throughout the world, the pandemic brought into focus our need to make museum collections and records accessible in a way that was dynamic and informative, and based in a strong historical perspective.? The lively and engaging online exhibit was designed by Ardent West Creative principals Denis Eve and Olivia Hernandez, who also design and help maintain the museum website. To learn more about the history of the RCN, visit the CFB Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum, open Mon-Sun from 10 a.m-3:30 p.m., or discover the museum website.

Fr om t h e Br an ch es A Har bin ger of Spr in g 2023 an d t h e Cen t en n ial Tu lips Dedicat ed t o t h e RCNVR Fr om An t h on y Colu cci

The crew of HMCS Donnacona and local branch members were treated to a light buffet and beverages. The highlights of the Weepers were the gifting by NAC of a variety of tulip bulbs from the Canadian Tulip Festival named after Montreal-based Naval Reserve Unit, the recognition by the CO and Coxswain (Cdr Gareth Jarvis and CPO Isabelle Proulx) of HMCS Donnacona of the contributions by Donnacona Veteran, Klaus Kruhne and the congratulations to CPO (ret?d) Karin-Ann Goral by Montreal Branch President, Bob Boutilier, for her receiving the NAC Bronze Service Medal.

Recognition of Klaus Kruhne by HMCS Donnacona CO Cdr Gareth Jarvis and Coxswain CPO Isabelle Proulx) at Nov, 10 2022 Weepers

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Presentation of HMCS Donnacona Tulips to Manuel Pelletier of RCSCC Victory at Nov 10, 2022 Weepers

Last Post Compi l ed by Pat D.C. Barnhouse | Starshel l Obi tuari es Edi tor K i ndl y f orward al l obi tuari es to Pat at: 535 K enwood Avenue, Ottawa, ON K 2A 0L 7 or by emai l : pat.barnhouse@sympati co.ca

NAC M EM BERS L Cdr Har r y Dennis ABBOTT, CD* * , RCN(Ret?d) NAC-O, 93 in Ottawa 27/11/22. Jn?d in ?48 as OSLMS and qual EA (Electrical Technician-Air), Srv?d, inter alia, Stadacona, Shearwater, Magnificent and Naden. CFR?d as CMDO 13/04/63 thence Stadacona 08/63. Prom Lt 01/01/66, fll?d by CFHQ/NDHQ. Prom LCdr 01/07/71. Ret?d in ?85. Post retirement, active volunteer including Guide Dogs for the Blind. (Citizen)

A/L t William Rober t AL L AN, RCN(R) Calgary Br., 91 in Calgary 11/10/22. Jn?d Cataraqui as UNTD Cdt 07/03/51 and later redesig Ord Cdt. Prom A/Ord S/Lt 01/09/53 and tsf'd to York same date. Prom A/Lt 01/09/55 and tsf ?d to Donnacona 02/05/56. Rls?d in ?60. (WC)

VAdm Peter William CAI RNS, CM M , CD* * , RCN(Ret?d) NAC-O, 84 in Ottawa 18/02/23. Jn?d Venture as SSA Cdt 03/09/56, thence Cataraqui as RCN Cdt. Prom Mid 18/07/59 and A/S/Lt 01/09/59 fll?d by Sioux in ?60. Prom S/Lt 01/09/60 thence Chaudiere in ?62 and Gatineau in ?63. Prom Lt 16/10/63 fll?d by Niobe (RN S/M trg. fll?d by HMS Orpheus)) in ?65,Onondaga in ?67 and Rainbow (XO) in ?69. Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 65

Prom LCdr 01/01/70 thence 1st Cdn Sub Sqn in ?71, CDLS(L) (RN Perisher) in ?71 and Onondaga (i/c) in ?72. Prom Cdr 01/07/74 fll?d by Cdr 1st Cdn Sub Sqn in ?74, CDLS(W) (USN War College) in ?75, Fraser (i/c) in ?76, Margaree (i/c) in ?77, Assiniboine (i/c) in ?78 and Deputy Commandant CFFS(H) in ?78. Prom Capt 01/01/79 thence MARCOMHQ in ?79, Commandant CFMWS in ?79, Commander CANDESRON 5 in ?81 and NDHQ (DCPO) in ?83. Prom Cmdre 21/06/85 fll?d by NDHQ (DGPCO) in ?85. Prom RAdm 05/06/87 thence Deputy COS Ops SACLANT in ?87 and Cdr MARPAC in ?89. Prom VAdm 01/07/92 fll?d by Commander MARCOM in ?92. Ret?d in ?94. Post retirement head Canadian Shipbuilding Association. (Citizen, WM, Canada?s Admirals and Commodores)

Cmdre (Ret?d) Er ic James L EHRE, OM M , M SC, CD* * NSNAC, in Halifax 21/11/22. Jn?d as Cdt at CMR 09/67. Prom S/Lt 24/11/72 and Lt 24/11/75. Srv?d Restigouche, Yukon, Fraser and Annapolis. Prom lCdr 01/01/82 and Cdr 01/01/86, fll?d by Nipigon (i/c) 09/87 and Saguenay (i/c) 01/89. Prom Caot thence NDHQ (DMFD, D NATO Pol) and Commanding Officer CF Maritime Warfare Centre. Prom Cmdre 01/01 fll?d by Commander Canadian fleet Pacific 01/01. Ret?d 09/03. Prolific writer on naval policy and affairs. (DS)

L t(S) James Henr y L I TTL E, QC, RCN(R)

OTHERS

London Br., 87 in London 05/11/22. Jn?d Prevost as UNTD Cdt(S) 02/01/54. Prom S/Lt(S) 01/07/56, thence York 01/02/57 and prom Lt(S) 01/07/58. Rls?d in ?60. NOAC National President 1982-83. Bronze (?77) and Silver (?86) Medallions. (WC)

L t Ber nar d Wilfred Ar thur ABEL A, RCN(R)(Ret?d)

Cdr David NOWEL L , CD, RCN(Ret?d) NAC-O, 93 in Ottawa 03/10/22. Prior RN service (HMS Harrier). Canadian Government Meteorologist. Jn?d RCN as LCdr 05/01/60 thence Bonaventure 03/60, NSHQ 10/63 and FOAC 02/65. Prom Cdr 01/01/69; also srv?d SACLANT and CFHQ. Ret?d in ?73. (Citizen)

A/L t Peter Colin Gr aham RI CHARDS, RCN(R)(Ret?d) NOABC, 94 in Vancouver 08/08/22. Jn?d RCN as Mid at Royal Roads 29/08/45 and redesig RCN(R) Mid 03/05/47. Jn?d Discovery 07/47, prom A/S/Lt 03/07/48 and A/Lt 03/07/50. To Ret?d List in ?51. Practised law in Vancouver. Bronze (?72) and Silver (?86) Medallions. Past president NOABC. (RH)

L Cdr William James TAYL OR, CD* , RCN* Ret?d) NACVI, 96 in Sidney, BC 02/09/22. WWII naval service. Jn?d Malahat as UNTD OS(Officer Candidate), prom RCN(R) Mid 14/01/49, A/S/Lt same date, S/Lt same date and Lt 18/11/51. To Continuous Naval Duty 05/53 thence Beacon Hill. Tsf ?d to RCN(SSA) Fll?d by James Bay (XO) 05/54 and Cayuga 05/57. Accepted for Permanent commission with seniority 18/11/53 thence Naden 10/58, Recruiting Officer West 05/60 and Naden. Prom LCdr 18/11/61 fll?d by Joint NBCD Warfare School 06/65. Ret?d in ?73. (WC, RH)

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81 in Ottawa 06/02/23. Jn?d Donnacona as UNTD Cdt in ?60. Prom S/Lt 01/07/62 and Lt 01/07/64. Also srv?d Carleton. (WC)

L Cdr (P) Geor ge William BABBI TT, CD, RCN(Ret?d) 98 in Ottawa 20/10/22. WWII qual RCAF Sgt Plt thence in ?45 to RNVR as PO Plt and prom A/S/Lt(A) 01/09/45. Tsfd to RCNVR in ?45 as S/Lt (sen. 01/09/45) and prom RCN(R) Lt(P) 01/12/46. RCN(SSA) 14/04/47 and later RCN. Prom LCdr(P) 01/12/54. Srv?d RNVR HMS Seaborne, HMS Macaw RAF Tern Hill and RNAS Peplow. Srv?d RCN R) RNAS Rattray, 826 Sqn., Stadacona, Warrior,743 Sqn., and Uganda. Srv?d RCN RNAS St Merryn, RNAS Milltown, HMS Implacable, RNAS Culdrose, HMS Siskin, Magnificent, Shearwater, RCAF Trenton, RCAF Centralia and Bytown. Ret?d 01/04/69. (PB, Canada?s Naval Aviators, Citizen)

Cmdre(NR)(Ret?d) Rober t Nor man BAUGNI ET, OM M , CD* Former Member, 78 In Toronto 12/01/23. Jn?d Venture as Cdt 10/01/61 thence Royal Roads in ?62, fll?d by UNTD Cdt at Donnacona in ?64. Jn?d Carleton as LCdr in ?75 and CO in ?77. Prom Cdr in ?79 at York (XO). CO York from ?81 to ?85. Prom Capt in ?93. Prom Cmdre in ?95. Also srv?d SSO(N) to the Chief of Reserves, Commander Maritime Coastal Defence Seaway, the Chief of Reserves Council and the Naval Reserve Council. Ret?d in ?97. (WC)

CPO1 Ronald Henr y CAUDL E, CD* * , RCN(Ret?d) 87 in Colchester, NS 28/08/22. Jn?d as OS in ?55. Srv?d Shearwater, Bonaventure, Athabaskan, Iroquois, Ottawa, CFB Summerside and CFB Edmonton. Ret?d in ?88. (SR, Chronicle Herald)

A/S/Lt 01/05/59, S/Lt 01/05/60, Lt 16/02/62 and LCdr 01/07/71. Srv?d, inter alia, Naden, Chaudiere, Lanark, Athabaskan, Stadacona and Bras D?Or. Ret?d in ?84 from regular force, thence Reserve at Scotian with Gate Vessels and other training. Retired again in ?94. (WM)

S/L t(S) Alan Ross COL L I NS, RCN(R)(Ret?d)

L t David Ewar t HOWARD, RCNVR

91 in Edmonton 07/01/23. Jn?d Scotian as UNTD Cdt(S) 02/01/55 and prom S/Lt(S) 01/07/57. To Ret?d List in ?59. (WC)

Former Member, 104 in Toronto 21/01/23. Jn?d RCNVR in ?41 as Prob S/Lt, prom S/Lt 01/05/41 and Lt 01/05/42. Qual ?n?. Srv?d Stadacona, Cobalt, Morden, Somers Isles and Dundas (i/c). Rls?d in ?45. (FMcK)

L Cdr Davis Char les EDWARDS, CD* , RCN(Ret?d) Former Member, 97 in Kamloops, BC. Jn?d York as Prob S/Lt RCNVR in ?44, srv?d Cornwallis and rls?d in ?45. Jn?d York 04/46 as RCN (R) S/Lt (sen 27/04/45) and prom Lt 09/04/47. Tsf ?d to RCN as Lt (sen. 09/04/47) and prom LCdr 09/04/45. Srv?d Swansea, Stadacona, Naden, Ontario, Algonquin (XO), Niobe and CFHQ. Ret?d in ?71. (SR, Chronicle Herald)

L t Gor don Cyr il EDWARDS, CD* , RCN(Ret?d) 93 in Ottawa 29/12/22 .Korean vet. CFR?d as CMDO 15/04/65 and prom Lt 15/04/67. Srv?d, inter alia, in Stadacona and NDHQ. Ret?d in ?77. (Citizen)

A/S/L t L ouis B. GASCON, RCN(R)(Ret?d) 78 in Montreal 29/03/22. Jn?d Donnacona as UNTD Cdt in ?62 and prom A/S/Lt. 09?64. Thence to Ret?d List. (WC)

Cdr (NR(Ret?d) M ichael HODGSON, CD* * Former Member, 84 in Collingwood, ON 25/12/22. Jn?d RCN as Cdt at Royal Roads 01/09/56, prom

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L t Eugene Bever ley I RWI N, CD, RCN(Ret?d) 95 in Cole Harbour, NS 24/08/22. ATC specialist, CFR?d as CMDO 25/05/61 and prom Lt 01/01/65. Srv?d Warrior, Magnificent, Bonaventure, Shearwater and York. Ret?d in ?72. (SR, Chronicle Herald)

VAdmRet?d) Gregor y Evan JARVI S, CM M , CD* * 69 in Ottawa 13/11/22. Jn?d as Cdt in ?71 at UNB, prom S/Lt 01/05/75, Lt 01/05/78, LCdr 01/05/82, Cdr 01/06/86, Capt 01/07/90, Cmdre 01/07/94, RAdm in ?96 and VAdm 12/90. Srv?d CFB Edmonton, Athabaskan, Nipigon, CFCFC, CFB Halifax, MARCOM HQ, NDC (Course 47), secondment to Conference Board of Canada and several tours in NDHQ culminating as ADM (HR-Military). Ret?d in 2006. (HS)

A/L t John Peter JOL LY, RCN(R) 85 in Rothesay, NB 29/07/22. Jn?d as UNTD Cdt at Brunswicker 02/01/56. Prom A/S/Lt 01/05/58, S/Lt same date and A/Lt 01/07/60. Also srv?d Star and York. Rls?d in ?63. (WC)

Capt James Ter r ance Oliver JONES, CD* * , RCN(Ret?d)

Capt Duncan Stewar t M cNI CHOL , CD* * , RCN(Ret?d)

Former Member, 80 in Ottawa 28/09/22. Jn?d as a Cdt at Royal Roads 01/09/62 thence RMC 09/64. Prom S/Lt 01/05/66, Lt 01/05/68, LCdr 01/01/73, Cdr 01/01/80 and Capt 01/01/86. Srv?d, inter alia, Stadacona, Niagara (USN S/M Trg.), Niobe (RN Perisher), Ojibwa (i/c), Terra Nova (i/c), Attache Russia and Attache Turkey. Ret?d in 1990?s. (Citizen, DS)

Former Member, 92 in Ottawa 28/11/17. Jn?d Royal Roads as RCN Cdt 15/10/42, prom Mid 01/09/44, S/Lt(S) 01/02/46, Lt(S) 01/12/47, LCdr(S) 01/12/55, Cdr 01/01/66 and Capt 01/01/75. Srv?d RN (for Trg.), Scotian, Stadacona, Nootka, Iroquois (Korea), NSHQ, Naden, Niobe, NSD Hfx. and NDHQ. Ret?d in ?78. (Beechwood Cemetary)

L t William John M I L NE, RCN(R)(Ret?d) CPO1 Jor gen K rogsgaar d K NUDSEN, CD* * , RCN(Ret?d) 79 in Eastern Passage, NS 01/01/22. Jn?d as OS in ?60. Srv?d Cornwallis, Huron 1, Stadacona, Shearwater, Bonaventure, VS-880, Provider, Fraser, Annapolis, Huron2, Protecteur, Nipigon, Skeena, MAGHQ and CFB Cold Lake. Base Chief CFB Shearwater 1989 ? 92. Ret?d in ?94. (WM)

Sur g Cdr Br uce Roger M ARSHAL L , CD* , RCN(Ret?d) 78 in Ottawa 24/09/22. Jn?d RCN as Cdt at Donnacona (McGill), prom S/Lt 01/05/66 and qual ?E/AE?. Prom Lt 01/05/69, thence UofT for MD, prom Surg LCdr 01/01/80 and Surg Cdr 01/01/85. Ret?d in ?91. (Citizen)

L t I an Duncan (Goose) M cL ENNAN, CD* , RCN(Ret?d) 88 in Winnipeg 25/08/22. Jn?d as SSA Mid 15/10/52, prom A/S/Lt 16/11/64, S/Lt(O) same date and Lt(O) 21/06/56.. Qual O and later P. Srv?d Magnificent, Shearwater. RCAF Moose Jaw, CFHQ, CFB Rivers, CFB Winnipeg, CFB Portage, VS-880, HS-50, and HS-443. Ret?d in ?79. (PB, Canada?s Naval Aviators)

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90 in Burlington, ON 01/01/23. Jn?d Cataraqui as UNTD Cdt(E) 02/01/52 and later reclassified Cdt. Prom S/Lt 01/09/54 and Lt 01/09/56. Also srv?d Star, York and Tecumseh. To Ret?d List in ?59. (WC)

L Cdr (P) Rober t Thomas M URRAY, CD* , RCN(Ret?d) 94 in Arnprior, ON 01/11/22. Jn?d RCN(R) at Brunswicker as Mid 24/06/48 thence CND. Prom A/S/Lt 28/10/49, S/Lt same date and Lt 16/09/51. Srv?d Swansea, Haida, Huron, Magnificent, Stadacona and Shearwater. Thence SSA as Lt (sen. 16/09/51) and later RCN Lt(P) (sen 16/09/51). Prom LCdr(P)16/09/59. Srv?d RCAF Centralia, RCAF Portage (awarded wings), RNAS Culdrose, RNAS Eglington, HMS Illustrious, Shearwater, Magnificent, Labrador, Bonaventure, Provider, MARCOM, NDHQ, VS-880/881, HU-21 and HS-50. Ret?d 16/03/75. (PB, Canada?s Naval Aviators)

L Cdr (P) Edgar Alexander M YERS, CD* , RCN(Ret?d) 98 in Peterborough, ON 18/01/23. Jn?d RCAF as pilot trainee in ?43, tsf ?d to RNVR as A/S/Lt(A) in ?45, to RCNVR as S/Lt(Temp) in ?46 and RCN same year. Prom Lt(P) 27/04/46 and LCdr(P) 27/04/54. Srv?d Charlottetown, Antigonish, Stadacona, RCN Air Station Dartmouth, RNAS Lossiemouth, HMS

Implacable, Magnificent, Shearwater, RCAF Trenton, RCAF Centralia, Cataraqui (SO Air & VC-921), RCAF Rivers, CFHQ and Naden (VU-33[i/c] ). Also srv?d VT-40 and VS-880. (Citizen, Canada?s Naval Aviators)

03/09/59, prom S/Lt 01/05/63 and Lt 10/01/66. Qual P. Srv?d Jonquiere, Gatineau, RCAF Centralia, RCAF Rivers, Shearwater, Bonaventure, VU-32 and VS-880. Resigned 16/09/66. (e-Veritas, Canada?s Naval Aviators)

CPO Allen Scott ORR, CD* * , RCN(Ret?d)

Or d S/L t Peter Freder ick M acL ean SAEGERT, RCN(R)(Ret?d)

80 in Upper Sackville, NS 31/08/22. Jn?d in ?62 as OS in marine engineering branch. Srv?d, inter alia, Restigouche, Protecteur, Preserver, Mackenzie and Fraser (CERA). Ret?d in ?97. (SR, Chronicle Herald)

L Cdr Eden Anthony PAL A, CD* * , RCN(Ret?d) 88 in Lower Sackville, NS 25/10/22. P& RT specialist. CFR?d as CMDO 28/04/67, prom Lt 23/04/70 and LCdr 01/01/78. Ret?d in ?89.

83 in Newmarket, ON 11/06/21. Jn?d Cataraqui as UNTD Ord Cdt 02/01/56 and prom Ord S/Lt on transfer to Ret?d List. (WC)

S/L t(E) Her ber t James THORBURN, RCN(R)(Ret?d) 87 in Vernon, BC. Jn?d Discovery as UNTD Cdt(S) 02?01?54 and later tsf ?d to Cdt(E). Prom A/S/Lt(E) 01/07/56. Qual A/E. To Ret?d List as S/Lt(E) in ?60. (WC)

S/L t Donald John PATTON, RCN(R)(Ret?d) 79 in Toronto 02/12/22. Jn?d Brunswicker as UNTD Cdt in ?60, prom A/S/Lt 01/07/63 and S/Lt same date. Qual ?c?. Ret?d in late ?65. (WC)

S/L t(L ) William Ar thur TI L L ER, RCN(R)(Ret?d) 92 in Scottsdale, AZ 07/02/22. Jn?d York as UNTD Cdt)L) 25/01/49, prom A/S/Lt(L) 01/05/51 and S/Lt(L) same date. To Ret?d List in ?54. (WC)

L t(N)(Ret?d) Daniel Joseph PI RRI E, CD* * 73 in Truro, NS 14/10/22. Jn?d as an OS and later CFR?d as Lt. Srv?d various ships including Toronto and CPF build in St John?s. (WM)

L t August Elmer POK OTYL O, RCN 81 IN Victoria 25/08/22. Jn?d RCN as Cdt at RMC

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L t John Angus WYATT, RCNVR 104 in Ottawa 28/01/23. Jn?d RCNVR as Prob S/Lt at Ottawa Division in ?41. Prom S.Lt 11/05/42 and Lt 11/05/43. Qual ?n?. Srv?d Avalon, Arvida, Kings and LaHulloise. Rls?d in ?45. (Citizen)

Commodore (Cmdre) David Mazur, Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific and Sailor 2nd Class Sam Phillips (left) get lowered on the stage during a Surface Supplied Breathing Apparatus (SSBA) dive on Clearance Diver Course - 0017 off the Yard Dive Tender (YDT) 11 Boat in Maple Bay, British Starshell (Fall 2022) | Page 70 Columbia on 25 August 2022 (Photo: Sailor 1st Class Valerie LeClair, CAF)