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250 782520302 [email protected] PanAfricanRevie CONTRIBUTORS Jonathan Said Lionel Manzi Ndayisaba Gateka Poorva Karkare Copy Editor Dr Kingsley Ugwuanyi Layout Nizigiyimana Hassan Umande 30 Food security Decolonizing Africa’s taste buds for food security and sustainable agriculture - Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu The over six decades of dumping excess agricultural production of processed wheat flour and others in Africa had decimated the taste buds and health of the region | Page 53 55

I t is an incontestable fact that the world is undergoing major geo-strategic shifts. One of the interesting aspects of these shifts has been the anxiety that is faced by the major global players, which validates the saying that when the big neighbour sneezes, everyone is likely to catch a cold. Africa’s predisposition has been to stay as far away as possible, lest it catches a cold. However, there is only so much that this approach can achieve. In this competition of geo-strategy, the world is being redefined, which means that Africa itself is being redefined. In other words, it’s a radically significant process about which Africa cannot afford to stay indifferent. Europe’s – and to a lesser extent America’s – anxiety has a lot to do with the reordering of the world. It is a world in which the West is used to being on top of the food chain and from the higher rung it lectures others on what the rules and values are or should be, and how to play by them. Therefore, it is not surprising that Practical pan-africanism secures Africa’s dignity Lonzen Rugira 04 The Practice of Pan Africanism

in the process of redefining the world - the rules and values that govern it - Europe has been very aggressive. It is as if it fears that it could become the next Africa and find itself at the bottom of the food chain. Why is this a problem for Europe? Well, Europe understands that it has had an overwhelming influence in defining the image of Africa, especially over the past half-century; it knows full well the role it has played in misrepresenting Africans – as a hopeless people without agency; a people whose life chances are left to western benevolence. This was evident in the media coverage of the coronavirus pandemic, as Europe battled with one of its worst health crises in decades. Even as the death toll worsened in its own backyard, Europe seemed to be preoccupied with the “mystery” of “Why aren’t Africans dying?” It was incomprehensible that Africans could perform better than Europeans in containing the effects of the pandemic. All kinds of “analysis”, including the advantage of poverty (a headline the BBC was forced to retract), were used to explain Africa(ns)’ reluctance to conform to the image Europe had shaped for them and confirm Europe’s predictions of high death rates in Africa. Meanwhile, while African institutions had money, they couldn’t find vaccines to buy because western governments had hoarded them beyond what they needed for their people. Again, the western media narrative had to weaponize benevolence by showcasing the donation of vaccines that were near expiration or those that had already expired. So, in the present context of the war in Ukraine, and ensuing food and energy crises, Europe understands that its vulnerability invites others to define it just as it has done for Africa. Similarly, it understands that the ability to define others is a weapon to strip them of their dignity. It is, therefore, not surprising that Europe is the most nervous in the ongoing process to reshape the world, as it fights to prevent itself from becoming another ‘Africa’. Those who are nervous are susceptible to becoming aggressive. So has Europe. This time again, western coverage of the war in Ukraine is repeatedly predicting the worst for Africa, not Europe where the war is taking place. War is in Europe but the victims are in Africa. The images of the catastrophic consequences of the war are the “Starving” and “Hungry” Africans. Despite the greater effects of the war on Europe, famine-fearing Africans dominate western media coverage. In the media war opposing the West and Russia around the food crisis in Europe, Europeans claimed that Putin was not allowing food to leave Ukraine while Putin claimed that sanctions and mined passages were the reason the food remained in storage. So, Africa’s top leaders, Macky Sall and Moussa Faki, were mobilized to pressure Putin who, according to the western media narrative, was threatening Africans with hunger. Russia was starving Africa. Sall apparently told Putin that Africa was “at the mercy” of the war in Ukraine – in other words, at Putin’s mercy. While, in fact, Europeans wanted to beg Putin for food, they couldn’t imagine sacrificing their dignity in the process. How could self-respecting people line up to beg Putin for food, they must have asked themselves. At any rate, the sides reached an agreement, and shortly after, western media reported with a sigh of relief that, finally, the ships had lined up to “load up wheat for hungry Africa.” Yet, it was soon revealed that the wheat was distributed in Europe. Clearly, Africa had just been used to preserve the dignity of Europe from appearing to beg for food. The fact that Macky Sall and Mousa Faki could find themselves in a situation where they were used as pawns didn’t sit well with self-respecting Africans. Why was it important for Europeans to preserve their dignity but not Africans? It was a sense of déjà vu where African actors play an active role in the misrepresentation of their continent. But most importantly, one where Europe still finds that it is in its (geo-)strategic interest to strip Africans of dignity, especially 05

when it feels vulnerable. Indeed, the changing nature of the global geostrategic environment and the dangers it presents for European leaders suggest that Europe is likely to double down on this attitude. Practical Pan-Africanism Since the end of the cold war, an effective multilateral system had restored a degree of confidence in the West and allowed its ideals to rule the roost. It wasn’t vulnerable and, therefore, had no reason to be anxious. However, the relative decline of the West vis a vis the rising powers in the East and Russia’s insistence that it is a major power to reckon with have brought new realities. The strategic question for Africa is how she can exist in a fast-evolving world order that is keen on stripping the dignity of the indifferent. Clearly, the first place for Africa to assert itself is to resist attempts by those who insist on defining it. Those who are losing their sense of self cannot be in a position to define others. However, since western benevolence is a tool that assaults African agency, then it is essential that Africans identify some of the main challenges they face and mobilize material and intellectual resources to address them. For instance, it should be problematic that a continent of one billion people living on some of the most fertile and virgin lands find themselves in a situation of begging for food from anyone. However, it is reassuring that a number of initiatives have been established as anchors of African dignity. The creation of the African Center for Disease Control (CDC) is one of such initiatives. In the same vein, African institutions have responded to the refusal to access covid vaccines by establishing pharmacological manufacturing capabilities in South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, and Senegal. In November last year, the African Medicines Agency (AMA) came into force. Clearly, Africans have realized that the most pressing issue is not the cheapness of life-saving drugs but rather access to them, not to mention the safety and reliability of supply chains. There remain challenges related to technology, training of specialized personnel and investments in research, but the journey has begun. In a similar light, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement was established to ease intra-Africa trade and different institutions such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) will facilitate intra-Africa trade without relying on the dollar. If Africans have learned anything from the current confrontation between the major global players and the subsequent removal of Russia from the swift financial system, then it ought to be evident that 1) our banks need to transact with each other without any intermediaries outside the continent and 2) trade within the continent should not rely on foreign currencies. The African Peace Fund is yet another initiative that seeks to bring the resolution of conflicts in Africa under the agency of Africans. It is embarrassing that Mali and other countries in West Africa had to rely upon their former colonizer to help them deal with the terrorist threats in the Sahel region. SADC’s and Rwanda’s timely and remarkably successful interventions in Mozambique show that there is an alternative that puts into practice the ethos of African unity and solidarity. For long, Pan-Africanism was said to be rhetorical. However, these initiatives of practical Pan-Africanism suggest that it is an ideology that can secure the dignity of Africans. The goal is to set up more of such initiatives that address the key challenges facing ordinary Africans so that every aspect of the security of Africans is secured. The fact that initiatives for food security and Pan-African media have not been established suggests that there is still much work to do. But the train has left the station and those who seek to project their anxiety onto Africans will have to find other tricks. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr. Lonzen Rugira is a Rwandan independent researcher and former academic. 06 Practical Pan Africanism

Financing global peace and security: A paradigm shift needed Donald Kaberuka A famous economist, Maynard Keynes, once said that the biggest problem in the process of change is not ‘adopting new ideas’ but ‘abandoning old ones’. Financing global peace and security is one of the most recent challenges of our time. Those who have the means lack the will, and those with the will are short of resources. Examples abound. In Mozambique, Rwanda has been providing a global public good since 2021. However, Rwanda has to rely on its limited national means. The UN and similar bodies on the other hand have resources but are not able to respond due to a whole range of constraints. This creates quite a dilemma. As the nature of war and conflicts across the globe has changed dramatically over the last 30 years, the need for fresh thinking on financing mechanisms has become more critical. Conflicts are now largely within rather than between states. In Africa alone, terrorist insurgencies are wreaking havoc in large swathes of the continent, from the Sahel, Mozambique, and the Horn to parts of the Great Lakes region. Despite asymmetric capacities, several African countries and regions can and have offer(ed) solutions with significant positive outcomes, but they lack financial means. Since World War II, the ruling doctrine has assumed that the responsibility for responding to insecurity and other threats to world peace rests on the United Nations and that the instrument for carrying out this objective should be UN Peacekeeping. The question now is whether the UN or even any other organization alone is capable of keeping peace in the world. Over the years there is the recognition, even from the UN itself, that the answer is ‘no’. There is now a general agreement that the UN’s peacekeeping model and doctrine are outdated and no longer fit for the purpose. 07 Security

To begin with, it is very costly, ineffective and sometimes ends up becoming a part of the problem. Since the early 1990s, there have been several attempts to reform the peacekeeping doctrine and its financing. Some progress was made. However, this has been incremental, and timid, reflecting inertia and ‘real politik’ among big powers. Attempts to significantly reform the financing have been particularly challenging. This should not be surprising. The existing global peace and security architecture has been in place for the past 70 years. Initially, it was in a way successful in cases such as the Indo-Pakistan crisis, or Cyprus. But these were very different types of conflicts. The framework in force at the time rested on four assumptions. The first assumption was that there was peace to keep. The second was that the intervention would be at the invitation of a host sovereign state or states. The third was that the peacekeepers would be neutral and use minimal force, except in self-defence. Finally, it was an unwritten rule that the big powers would not participate in peacekeeping. Needless to say, the ruling doctrine was that all the financing needed would come from UN-accessed contributions. Over time and as the nature of the conflicts evolved, it became clear that almost all these assumptions were no longer relevant. In the case of Rwanda in 1994, those UN forces who were supposed to protect the people were not only toothless, but many decided even to flee or were withdrawn by their home governments at a time when they were most needed. In Somalia, it was a case of a failed state, which gave rise to a whole range of non-state actors, remnants of the state, or just terrorist groups. It is obvious that force was needed to protect those in danger and restore some level of stability pending political solutions. There was no established authority to invite the peacekeepers because the Somali state had failed. So, the UN could not act. It was the AU, and a number of neighbouring states that moved in through AMISOM, with all the well-known challenges and complications. Finally in recent years, contrary to the unwritten rules, the big powers are increasingly becoming involved in peace enforcement in various forms, including through unilateral interventions. The above landscape has complicated matters for regional organizations such as the AU. Typically, when the UN Security Council authorizes and mandates a peacekeeping mission, it can take up to a year to get the logistics in place, secure the commitment of troop-contributing countries (TCC), and mobilise the civilian and police components. During this waiting time, the humanitarian toll gets worse, as was the case in Darfur and the Central African Republic. At such a moment, the urge, the need, and the pressure to send in first responders become very high, which typically comes from the region or its environs. In such circumstances, the AU has often had no choice but to intervene, but it often lacks the wherewithal to do so, at least as much it might want. The organization then, as in the case of Somalia, has to appeal to partners such as the EU for support. In the case of AMISOM, this support was indeed provided by the EU. The UN and some bilateral parties, too, made contributions. However, the real problem was that it was all ad hoc support and purely voluntary. The same happened in the early stages of the interventions in Mali and CAR. While awaiting outside financial support, the AU was obliged to draw down on its limited reserves. Within a few months, AU’s financial means got exhausted, forcing it to very quickly and prematurely hand over the responsibility to bilateral parties or the UN itself. Since the early 1990s, different UN Secretaries-General have been aware of this conundrum and commissioned several reviews. I refer to the Brahimi report, the HIPPO report, or the Prodi report. All of these reports recommended the urgent need to re-model UN’s peacekeeping operations, recognize the changing landscape, and acknowledge the key role of regional organizations. However, these reports all fell short in indicating where financing should come from. 08

At the moment of writing this piece, the Sahel is an existential challenge. Even West African Coastal countries are now affected. It is in that recognition that the UN Secretary-General and his AU counterpart approached the former President of Niger Mahamadou Issoufou to lead a High-Level Advisory Panel to reflect on the lessons from the Sahel, which could be relevant (mutatis mutandis) to other parts of Africa. There is no doubt these are complex issues from political, security, socio- and geopolitical perspectives. However, whichever new approach is adopted, financing should be at the heart of it; at its core should be how to access UN ‘peacekeeping’ resources. So, I return to Maynard Keynes: it is time to figure out what it would take to “abandon old ideas” and “embrace new ones”. Clearly, a new financing model is needed. For a new model to succeed, it must address three important elements. One, it must ensure that peacekeepers actually have means and are capacitated to protect those facing imminent danger. Depending on the nature of the crisis, all options should be on the table. Regional organizations which are able to act as immediate first responders must be financially enabled to get into the theatre that needs stabilization, while longer-term solutions are envisioned or planned. Two, if there are individual unilateral initiatives that have broad acceptance and are able to provide solutions, the same should apply; they should access financing. Three, once the peacekeepers are deployed, and succeed in doing the job there must be adequate thinking as to how to sustain their operations and avoid premature abandonment or unworkable ad hoc solutions. The question of how to access UN financial resources has to be addressed in that context. In general, what I have heard from those constituencies who are reluctant or sceptical are three sets of arguments: 1. That regional organizations such as the AU do not yet have the financial governance robust enough to meet fiduciary and accountability standards of the UN and the P5. Therefore, there will have to be a lot of “asks” and “ringfencing” before the AU or an individual country can assess UN contributions. 2. That there is a risk of such interventions falling short in the aspects related to compliance with international humanitarian law. 3. That some have raised the issue of burden sharing; in other words, that any regional body like the AU accessing UN resources should pay its share. Here is the issue though. The observation that the AU (or similar organizations) does not have accountability or fiduciary standards applies to the UN too. Most international organisations (chief of which is the UN) need financial governance. That is why the AU has been working hard to reform its finances. The same applies to matters of humanitarian law. If we all agree that these are important matters, they can be addressed in the context of UN/AU dialogue, and there are signs that such a conversation is underway. This is especially relevant because the UN has faced similar challenges in several of its missions. With regard to burden sharing, this is an issue which needs careful thought. AU members are also UN members. Asking them to pay would be “double dipping”. In cases such as Somalia, the EU was helping out with AMISOM financial costs, because the Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) were already bearing quite a heavy burden. The case of MINUSMA in Mali is the same. In this case, the countries in the region had to set up a structure called G5 Sahel because they were concerned about premature transitions and sustainability. However, G5 Sahel is underfunded, underequipped, dependent on a few individual countries, or volatile and politically complex bilateral support. In the case of the Lake Chad Region, it is actually the affected countries (Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun and Niger) that have borne the largest burden – with some limited external support. In Mozambique, where terrorist groups 09

had overrun large swathes of the country, it is Rwanda and SADC that had to carry the burden. So, the correct analysis is that individual countries and regional blocs which have intervened do actually carry a large burden for what is a global problem. In places like Mozambique, the question of sustainability must sooner or later be addressed, including the return of the IDPs and the reform of the security sectors. Friends such as Rwanda have demonstrated efficient, effective first responder capabilities and are still doing so. However, they are incurring a huge cost to their national budgets and yet they are providing a regional and global public good. It is not sustainable. A lasting solution is now more urgent than ever. To return to the question: why can’t the UN, with its considerable resources, often ineffectively wasted elsewhere, not pay for such missions? The three concerns articulated above which emanate from the UN P5 have not yet been overcome. The current leadership of both UN and AU are doing their best to make it happen. It may take time to overcome the inertia, geopolitical calculus and asymmetrical state interests. We are in that space where everyone agrees that conditions are ripe for a different approach and a new financing architecture, and yet actions in that direction are particularly slow, if any. At the global level, the issue is not necessarily a lack of money. In recent times, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), when at full capacity, has spent up to eight billion (8bn) from accessed contributions. In DRC alone, they reportedly spent 1.6 billion per annum. In most other crisis theatres, it is said to cost between ½ to 1 billion dollars per year. These are quite astonishing sums. AU peace facility In recognition of this fact of “realpolitik”, AU member states decided to re-activate a Peace and Security Fund which was instituted in 1993, but which has never been fully functional. The objective of the Fund was to enable the AU to have the minimal resources needed to at least quickly respond to any crisis, pending durable solutions. It is not the intent that the African Union Peace Fund, now endowed with 300 million USD, does fund peacekeeping. Where there is no peace to keep, peacekeeping operations are a very costly solution. This facility cannot replace UN financing. First of all, 300 million USD is a drop in the ocean. And secondly, it is not right, nor even fair, that AU members, who are full members of the UN should ‘double dip’ to fulfil a role the UN should fund, let alone the fact that the burden they already bear is quite onerous. The idea at the moment is that this facility could enable countries, with first responder capabilities, such as Rwanda (as demonstrated in the case of Mozambique) to move in quickly, pending the availability of global resources. Upstream mediation and prevention are also another “good fit” function for the Fund which, at the moment, is largely dependent on donors. ECOWAS, over the years, has demonstrated real upstream capabilities. In the Gambia, for example, the organization prevented a potential crisis through proactive diplomatic initiatives. But the organization has to meet the costs itself. The AU peace facility normally should indeed be deployed to capacitate such preventive diplomacy to avoid a wider crisis breaking out. It is efficient; it is cost-effective. A review of such activities by the AU in the last decade shows that on average, the astronomical cost is about 60 million USD per year. Compared to peacekeeping, this shows the effectiveness of well-funded preventions. One should of course not be naïve to believe that all conflicts can respond to prevention or mediation. In the current landscape, vast resources will always be needed for stabilization or peace enforcement missions. Hence, it is time to explore new approaches. As this moves forward, it is important to learn from what works on the ground, not what is “correct political speak” in diplomatic circuits. 10

The capacity of the state At the moment, many of these peacekeeping missions are in Africa (with a few exceptions). There are many reasons for this: both external and internal. Crucially, while external causes must always be factored in, the outbreak of major conflicts like the ones we now face in some parts of Africa and indeed the larger Middle East are due to the failure of these states to function effectively. This suggests that initiatives to strengthen the ability of the state to fully assume its regalian functions, of which providing security is primordial, have to be part of the solution. In many countries in Africa, such as those in the Sahel, some states are unable to provide basic necessities to their security structures due to governance and financial challenges. International organizations such as the IMF need to appreciate the need to boost defence spending. In the past years, international organizations may unwittingly have complicated matters by putting maximum limits on defence spending, sometimes as low as 1.5% of the GDP. This needs to change. Restoring state authority is a necessary condition to capacitate investments and economic growth. Otherwise, non-state actors, local and foreign, will fill the void and exploit underlying socioeconomic grievances. Resources spent on building domestic capacity should be seen in that context. Needless to say, this must be accompanied by security sector reforms, sound governance and a fight against corruption. Final reflections For Africa, and indeed everywhere in the world, security cannot be solely defined and addressed simply by military means. A strong security sector is the guarantor, the enabler, and the foundation upon which a successful state is built, but sound governance, service delivery, addressing broader socio-economic issues is what creates stable and cohesive societies. That is why, as part of this financing conundrum, African countries must secure means to address the economic, social, and environmental challenges, while dealing with external shocks such as a pandemic. As we all deal with these longterm challenges, the ability to achieve inclusive economic growth is the ultimate bulwark for lasting security. In Africa, there 11

is another key aspect of financing peace and security – how to ensure African countries with limited fiscal space can mobilize international capital. At the moment, economies are shrinking due to external shocks such as Covid-19 or war in Eastern Europe. The ability to access capital markets is constrained by debt sustainability. And yet, the needs are immense and increasingly evolving. This is a much wider issue of the reform of the international financial architecture, not the subject of this paper, which we shall return to later. The problem described in this paper is not an easy one. It calls for bold thinking, innovations and re-engineering solidarity – there is much to do: (i) rebuilding capacities of the states to ensure they perform their regalian responsibilities; this implies rebuilding, reinforcing, and reforming security sectors in many countries; (ii) addressing socio-economic issues that constitute sources of tensions, and which create room for opportunist local and foreign non-state actors; (iii) financially empowering regional organizations especially the AU and/or even individual countries with the capacity and willingness to provide the global public good that is peace and security for all; and (iv) mobilizing international capital to enable countries to respond to shocks, whether these are from financial markets, pandemics or conflicts. The current turmoil in Eastern Europe has impacted energy and food markets, payment systems and global supply chains, deepening poverty in the Global South given their limited shock absorbers The African Union and its RECs, with all their imperfections, will have to play a bigger role. Diplomatic efforts by the AU to access UN resources must be beefed up. We must strive to narrow down differences among UN constituencies. The AU too has its work cut out for it: to be in shape for the new challenges. The cost of inaction will be much more consequential than the cost of getting something done. Years of stability, of steady economic gains, are put at risk across Africa. The issue is not that the world lacks financial resources. It is rather a case of inertia, lack of will and zero-sum calculus. Time is of the essence for the needed paradigm shift, and that time is now. Sometimes it takes less time to do the right thing than the years we have spent explaining why it could not be done. Dr. Donald Kaberuka is the High Representative for the AU Peace Fund. ❧ ❧ ❧ 12

UN's failing peacekeeping model should take inspiration from intra-Africa bilateral deployments Michael Rubin The recent outbreak of conflict in eastern DRC between the government and the M23 rebellion has brought back to attention the ineffectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The UN’s peacekeeping model in Africa is broken but Rwanda’s bilateral deployments provide a better alternative from which the UN should adopt. In 1994, UN peacekeepers in Rwanda stood aside as génocidaires unleashed a brutal and preplanned anti-Tutsi genocide. Although the UN subsequently apologized to Rwanda for its cowardice and bureaucratic deflection, it was insincere: how else would one explain the promotion and subsequent re-election to the office of the secretary-general of the then head of peacekeeping Kofi Annan? That Annan was complicit in a million deaths and suffered no career consequence remains a stain on the organization. When it came to Rwanda, it would not be the UN’s last shame. As the Rwandan Patriotic Front triumphed and ended the genocide, many génocidaires fled the country. Herein lies UN’s second mistake: rather than segregate and disarm those culpable in perhaps the worst atrocities of the late 20th century, the UN allowed the génocidaires to take refuge in UN camps just across the border in DRC. This means, for the past quarter of a century, the UN in the DRC has effectively been complicit in enabling génocidaires to hold refugees hostage while indoctrinating a new generation into racist, eliminationist hatred. While terrorist regimes have administered other refugee 13

camps—the Khmer Rouge ran camps in Thailand after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, for example—they did so without UN collaboration. In the DRC camps, however, the UN clearly collaborated with génocidaires. In effect, the UN repeated the mistakes it made in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and Gaza. In both the DRC and Palestinian cases, UN’s willingness to deny or ignore terrorists hiding in the midst of refugees perpetuated conflict and destabilized governments. UN officials benefit(ed) from continued conflict with lucrative jobs, while wasting billions of dollars in donor money. The five most expensive UN peacekeeping missions today are in Africa. For the fiscal year 2022, the budgets for the missions in Mali, South Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic each topped US$1 billion, whereas the UN presence in Somalia added another half billion dollars. While UN missions in both the DRC and the Central African Republic missions have gone through name changes and bureaucratic reorganizations, they are almost a quarter of a century old. The UN Mission in South Sudan is more than a decade old, while the one in Mali is now approaching its first decade. In the case of the Central African Republic and South Sudan, UN peacekeeping expenses are equivalent to between a quarter to half the country’s gross domestic product, according to International Monetary Fund data. If the definition of insanity is to repeat the same actions but expect different results each time, then UN peacekeeping in Africa’s most persistent trouble spots has been insane. When I worked first in Tajikistan and then in Iraqi Kurdistan, I learned firsthand from aid and relief workers that when they are deployed to war zones, they adjust to local society, but, ironically, when the UN enters a country, it expects local society to adjust to its practices and procedures. Such bureaucratic arrogance and inflexibility contribute to UN’s persistent failure in countries like Mali, the Central African Republic, and the DRC. Another factor that compounds UN’s failure in its peacekeeping missions in Africa is moral equivalence. In the DRC, for example, the UN is unable to differentiate between génocidaires and others who seek to defend themselves from the génocidaires. In both the Central African Republic and Mali, the UN might recognize each country’s government, but it prioritizes observation and monitoring over action. The kneejerk reaction of the UN leadership in New York is to negotiate compromise and build a big tent. Not only does this incentivize terrorists to win through diplomatic concession what they cannot achieve at the ballot box but it also protects and extends terror campaigns and, essentially, doubles down on the ineffectiveness, if not complicity, that allowed the anti-Tutsi genocide 28 years ago. Even though UN’s top officials themselves privately acknowledge their organization’s imperviousness to creative thinking, the stakes in Africa are too great to defer to UN sclerosis. Rapid state failure makes the status quo untenable. Here, the UN might consider the effectiveness of Rwanda’s approach as a pillar of much-needed peacekeeping reform. Just before the Christmas of 2020, rebels loyal to François Bozizé, a former president of the Central African Republic, marched on the streets of the capital. This incident caused civilians to panic and flared both ethnic and sectarian tensions across the country. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra called UN headquarters for help, but the global body was unresponsive. While the Rwandan contingent made it clear that it would protect itself (and other national peacekeeping contingents redeployed to move closer to the Rwandans for their own protection), the UN Secretary-General did not greenlight any substantive action to hold the rebels at bay. In effect, it was a repeat of UN’s traditional actions in the days immediately prior to the anti-Tutsi genocide. Touadéra also called Paris and Washington but received no response. President Paul Kagame, however, responded. So long as Touadéra would allow Rwandan forces to take and fortify the airport in order to ensure secure logistics, the Rwanda Defense Force would deploy and protect key infrastructure, including the presidential palace. Within 48 14

hours of that phone call, Rwandans were on the frontlines, and Bangui was saved. While the UN continues to observe events in the Central African Republic at a cost of US$135,000 per hour, Rwandan bilateral forces continue to secure infrastructure, capture terrorists and give the country space to recover from decades of instability. The Rwandan success is evident in Bangui, where Muslims and Christians again mix, and once deserted markets are bustling again. Events in Mozambique showed that the effectiveness of bilateral deployments was the rule rather than the exception. Successive governments in Maputo ignored the northern Cabo Delgado province. The Mozambican army, meanwhile, neglected civil affairs. Not only did soldiers not speak the local Makhuwa or Makonde languages, but they also could not speak Swahili. Because local villagers and townsmen did not trust Mozambican forces and feared the army would interpret forewarning with complicity, the eruption of the Islamic State insurgency in March 2020 blindsided President Filipe Nyusi. He initially sought to contract Russia’s Wagner Group, but they failed in the face of the same challenges as the Mozambican Army, and so Nyusi instead turned to both the Rwanda Defense Force and, separately, a multilateral Southern African Development Community (SADC) force. The Rwandans proved most effective, both because of the unity of command and because of the willingness to fight. Because, like the UN elsewhere, SADC was more interested in showing its flag than in joining the fight, Rwanda has increased its area of operations and recorded a great deal of success. As in Central Africa, it took just days for Rwanda to secure key infrastructure and just weeks to secure road and population centres in order to allow displaced populations to return. The mentorship between Rwandan Police and their Mozambican counterparts has put local security on a sounder footing. Certainly, the crisis is not over. Maputo’s lack of capacity continues to impede the fight against Islamist militancy. But the turn to bilateral deployments with Rwanda has stabilized Cabo Delgado far quicker and at a lower cost than the years of multi-million-dollar United Nations peacekeeping missions. This is the major reason why Mali, now in its second decade of persistent insurgency, has inquired about the possibility of supplementing, if not supplanting, UN operations with a bilateral force. When US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken travelled to the region to address the tension between the DRC and Rwanda, he should have recognized that the problem is not simply between Kigali and Kinshasa, but that the problem is New York: Decades of UN mismanagement perpetuated a conflict they could have avoided if UN peacekeepers had disarmed génocidaires and not enabled them to transform their camps into terrorist safe havens. Diplomats might pontificate about M23 from their compounds 1,600 kilometres away in Kinshasa, but the truth is that Congolese Tutsi need no outside incentive to avoid their own slaughter. UN’s Force Intervention Brigade has some utility, 15

especially as Ansar al-Sunna and myriad other terrorists seek to carve out more safe havens. But there is evidence from experience in other countries that a more dedicated bilateral force might help the eastern DRC become an economic engine for the entire country rather than its bleeding ulcer. For too long, the United Nations and the international donor community have treated peacekeeping as a jobs programme and a mechanism to virtue signal rather than to make peace. The cost of this deception is great, costing billions of dollars and thousands of lives annually as UN negligence perpetuates conflicts that wellpaid, business class-flying UN diplomats promise to resolve. Africans should say that enough is enough. If peace is indeed UN’s goal, then it is time for the global body to study what works and recognize that 75 years after its first peacekeeping missions, they should be open and sincere enough to adopt innovative and pragmatic approaches to peacekeeping. If they seek to replicate what works, the Rwandan deployments in the Central African Republic and Mozambique would be a good place to start. The UN might revert to a fundraising role to identify and subsidize those forces who can do what UN-recognized governments in conflict zones request in order to end persistent insurgency and terrorist safe havens, as well as to enable military and intelligence capacity building. Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official. He is a US citizen Taming conflicts in the DRC: Prioritise regional efforts Frederick Golooba-Mutebi Starting by diagnosing the causes of conflict rather than immediately imagining a solution based on standard templates, would provide a firm foundation for arriving at fitting strategies for ending the perennial upheavals and bloodletting and the misery they cause and perpetuate US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has been to the Great Lakes region, said what he came to say, made the demands he wanted to make, gave the lectures he wanted to give about the sort of behaviour the US expects from our leaders and governments, emphasised the importance of American values (not ours) and left for home.  In Rwanda and the DRC, he outlined those principles which he and his government would like to see applied to addressing the challenge of rebel groups M23 and FDLR and related insecurity in the Kivu region. The principles, outlined as if to squabbling youngsters, are that neither the Government of Rwanda nor that of the DRC should provide support to rebel groups, and that both groups should disarm. He offered no guidance on how either should be pursued and achieved. He was not inter- ❧ ❧ ❧ 16

ested in weighing one rebel group against the other or comparing them. What mattered to him and presumably his government is that both are armed groups and that both are causing the suffering of many people. He, therefore, had no interest in examining the root causes of the crisis. And, of course, for whatever reason, the other 128 or so rebel groups were of no interest. They did not feature in his speech. This is the second time that M23, founded in April 2012, takes up arms against the DRC government. Unlike the FDLR with its genocidal intentions and its terrorising of civilians, especially Tutsi communities in the DRC, for which the US government has officially designated it as a terrorist group, M23 does not seek the extermination of any population group in Congo. Also, analysts agree for the most part that ordinarily it does not count among rebel groups which are known for committing atrocities against local communities. The first time it took up arms, much effort was spent by outsiders, among them the Americans, to ‘find a solution’ to the crisis. Then as now, their ‘solution’ was simple: accusing Rwanda of supporting the insurgents and the Rwandan army of fighting alongside them, and then lean on Rwanda to cease its alleged support. The US and other Western actors, applauded by the Government of the DRC at the time, Western NGOs and sections of Western academia, believed that diplomatic pressure on Rwanda would in the end lead to the collapse of M23 and, de facto, the end of ‘the problem’. Presumably, they believed that even the grievances that drove the rebellion then and even before would simply disappear. They did not. Eventually, however, M23 came under military pressure from a UN intervention force on the one hand and political pressure from Rwanda and Uganda on the other, to cease fighting. Among the DRC’s immediate neighbours, only Rwanda and Uganda have come out openly to urge the DRC government to address the grievances driving the M23 insurgency. This political pressure came with promises that the DRC government would be pressed to address their grievance. The current crisis proves that neither pressure on 17

Rwanda, nor the use of force and scattering of M23, nor even the DRC government’s decision to renege on the promises made to M23, achieved long-term peace. It would seem, however, that Western governments drew important lessons from this, and that the lessons explain their more cautious approach this time round. The assertive posturing of the US has not been loudly embraced or supported by any other Western power. Arguably the biggest mistake they made was when they chose to focus exclusively on M23 while ignoring FDLR, the very generator of the insecurity that forced entire Tutsi communities out of the DRC into Rwanda as refugees. As long as the FDLR continued to pursue their genocidal agenda inside Congo and to threaten Rwanda’s security, as long as MONUSCO continued to turn a blind eye to its activities while pretending to keep the peace, as long as the Congolese army or elements of it continued to fraternise with FDLR, it was a matter of time before war would flare up again. It might not be M23 rising up again. It could as well have been another insurgent group. However, the actors would remain the same: the children of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese who have been driven out of their country because they are Tutsi or associated with Rwanda and therefore labelled by some Congolese as ‘Rwandans’. One expects that this lesson too has been learnt, and that it explains why there have so far been no calls for another Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to use force to suppress the rebellion. Although at the time it was touted as having routed M23, the FIB had minimal contact with the insurgents before they dispersed in order to wait out the political solution they had been promised, or to fight another day. Listening to Anthony Blinken argue that the insurgents should not be weighed against each other, one gets the feeling that there is as yet no appetite for getting to the root of the crisis. These details tend to become necessary after fighting escalates and more lives are lost. The idea that all the insurgents should be treated uniformly or even-handedly is another exercise in futility. M23 and FDLR are different, driven by radically different agendas. Approaches to removing them from the scene must not avoid examining what each one of them is out to achieve, and whether its ambitions are realistic, feasible, and justified. One consequence of foreign actors wading into this crisis with ready-made solutions or with approaches to conflict resolution that de facto seek to portray the image of even handedness, is that it opens up space for the DRC government to make excuses for its own failures and to seek to hold outsiders, Rwanda especially, responsible for the insecurity and instability in the Kivu region. This, however, does not provide clarity regarding who is responsible for insecurity and instability elsewhere, and what should be done about it. Since M23 rose up again recently, the DRC army, the FARDC, has been most successful at showing its incompetence, incoherence, internal mismanagement, and abject lack of discipline. These have combined to render it ineffectual as a fighting force. The cry “it is Rwanda that is attacking us”, readily believed by many local and foreign commentators, begs the question: what is the DRC army, one of the largest in Africa, doing to defend the country’s territorial integrity, whether against foreign or internal insurgents, or supposed aggression by Rwanda. By listening to the DRC government’s excuses and amplifying them, its sympathisers and supporters are contributing to condemning the country to eternal conflict and instability. That some Congolese have taken to anti-Tutsi incitement and, in some cases, killing and cannibalisation of those whom they have killed, and that they do this with impunity, only serves to guarantee that war will remain part of the DRC geographical landscape for years to come. The other mistake made has always been to allow MONUSCO to get away not only with turning a blind eye to the activities of FDLR, but also to the group’s fraternisation with elements of the FARDC in the Kivus. There are credible reports that, whenever pressed by the Government of Rwanda on these issues, MONUSCO has usually invoked the presence of women and children 18

in FDLR camps for not attacking them, disarming the insurgents, and arresting them. This dilly-dallying has had only one effect: it has allowed the FDLR to carry on with its activities which ultimately lie at the root of the recurring tensions between the DRC, a country which MONUSCO ought to pacify, and Rwanda which would be served well by that pacification if it happened, for it would remove the one DRC-based threat to its national security. Continued obsession with M23 by external actors and their focus on pressing Rwanda to help the DRC government to defeat it distracts attention from the real cause of insecurity in the Kivu region. Anthony Blinken’s visit, therefore, hasn’t moved the region even an inch closer to the solution. We are yet again able to see that reaching out to foreign, non-regional actors to provide solutions to protracted conflicts only opens the way for them to lecture and offer answers – such as peace-keeping missions and mediation – that are costly in financial terms, take ultimate responsibility out of the hands of the affected governments, lack context and worsen the situation. There is only one way of sorting out the situation: get the countries that generate insurgents, that therefore have a major stake in the DRC’s stability and internal security, to sit down together and come up with a collective approach. Additionally, outsiders farther afield, such as the US and its usual allies, should refrain from getting involved in the search for a solution until they have been asked for help by the protagonists. A smart way to proceed would be to prioritise efforts to diagnose the immediate and underlying causes of conflicts that involve the major rebel groups before venturing to prescribe a cure. This direct engagement with, rather than avoidance of, the drivers of conflict, offers great opportunities. First, it promises to highlight the pivotal role of Ugandan, Burundian and Rwandan insurgents, the DRC’s predatory military, and long-festering grievances in the DRC especially, in provoking local communities into taking up arms to fill the vacuum left by the at best dysfunctional, at worst absent, government. These are important issues the Tshisekedi government, and those who seek to beef up its military capacity or to neutralise M23 as a priority, conveniently disregard. Starting by diagnosing the causes of conflict rather than immediately imagining a solution based on standard templates, would provide a firm foundation for arriving at fitting strategies for ending the perennial upheavals and bloodletting and the misery – hunger, poverty, ignorance, ill-health – they cause and perpetuate. If prioritised, it will, in the end, give real meaning to the usually rather hollow and easy-to-deploy slogan “African solutions to Africa’s problems”. Dr. Frederick Golooba-Mutebi is a Ugandan-Rwandan independent researcher and former academic. ❧ ❧ ❧ 19

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Mozambique and DRC conflicts: The powderkeg of elite appeasement Lionel Manzi I had the opportunity to visit Mocimboa and Palma, the two districts of Cabo Delgado where Rwandan Security Forces (RSF) operate. I have been reflecting on this experience. Looking at the warm and cordial relationship between Mozambique and Rwanda on the one hand and at the currently strained relations between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda on the other, a curious observer would not fail to note the stark difference in the perception of Rwanda as either a peace builder or a trouble maker in Africa. On my part, I have come to the conclusion that these contradictory perceptions cannot both be true. Something has got to give. Instead, they are the reflection or an expression of the standoff between the aspirations for the unity of the African peoples and the interests of an ideologically corrupt African bourgeoisie mimicking the colonially inherited divide-andrule tactics that have held back our continent. Whichever of these aspirations prevails depends on the leadership qualities and, to be precise, the political courage (or lack thereof) of the authorities in place – in other words, the moral purpose for power. The prophecy In the Wretched of the Earth, the famous pan-African intellectual, Frantz Fanon, provided an insightful take on the pitfalls of national conscientiousness with regard to African Unity. “The people of Africa have only recently come to know them21

selves. They have decided, in the name of the whole continent, to weigh in strongly against the colonial regime. Now the nationalist bourgeoisies, who in region after region hasten to make their own fortunes and to set up a national system of exploitation, do their utmost to put obstacles in the path of this ‘Utopia’. The national bourgeoisies, who are quite clear as to what their objectives are, have decided to bar the way to that unity, to that coordinated effort on the part of two hundred and fifty million men to triumph over stupidity, hunger and inhumanity at one and the same time.” Fanon was ahead of his time. He understood that internal forces would prompt weak African leaders to act against the interests of their own people and further delay our progress as a continent. Taking his observation to its logical conclusion, he affirmed, “This is why we must understand that African unity can only be achieved through the upward thrust of the people, and under the leadership of the people, that is to say, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie.” Sixty years after the publication of Fanon’s book, his words remain an indictment of those among African leaders who have failed to give meaning to their privilege by displaying the one quality that was assumed to come with the territory – leadership. The challenges There are some similarities in the challenges faced by President Filipe Nyusi of Mozambique and President Tshisekedi of the DRC. Firstly, they both inherited corrupt security apparatuses and people’s mistrust of the authorities, which is due to the shortcomings of previous administrations. Secondly, they also have to deal with traumatized populations subjected to violence by both the armed groups and the security services, an uninspired and destructive political opposition whose sole raison d’être is to oppose any government’s decision regardless of its merits, and foreign-founded civil society groups who are echo chambers of western divisive narratives. Finally but crucially, on the political front, both presidents pledged to bring peace back to their respective countries, and their success or failure in this regard could be the decisive factor in their respective bids for reelection. What differentiates the two, however, is how they deal with these challenges and the related pressure from internal forces on their respective administrations. Nyusi’s political courage President Nyusi decided to do the herculean task of meeting people’s expectations. To achieve this, he had to take decisions that were unpopular among elite circles in Maputo but were welcomed by the neglected population of Cabo Delgado. He decided to bet on Rwanda’s help to tackle the security challenge in his country despite the antagonism of the different groups in the opposition and civil society who constitute the most vocal components of the Mozambican bourgeoisie. With about 3000 Mozambicans dead and 800, 000 internally displaced at the time and even before Rwandan forces could establish firm control of their areas of operation, this bourgeoisie – which spoke from the safety of the Mozambican capital, Maputo, and was happily platformed by western media – was mainly demanding “an exit strategy for Rwandan troops”. That the residents of Mocimboa da Praia, one of the most severely affected districts of the Cabo Delgado Province in Northern Mozambique, were relieved by the presence of Rwandan forces was of no concern to these elite groups which seemed to have an agenda at odds with protecting Mozambicans. Last September, I had the opportunity to visit Mocimboa and Palma, the two districts of Cabo Delgado where Rwandan Security Forces (RSF) operate. I was not surprised to find out that the love affair between RSF and the residents of the two districts continues unabated and undisturbed by the noise from the bourgeoisie, which has lost momentum and relevance. The abuses predicted by human rights activists when the Rwandan deployment was announced never materialised. Instead, Ismael, one resident of Palma whom I met at the local 22

market had a spontaneous smile on his face when I asked him about the state of this relationship. “They respect us,” he explained laconically, adding, “Armed people don’t usually pay when they come to the market. The Rwandans are different. They respect our goods and they protect us.” This sentiment was echoed in Mocimboa da Prai, where one of the residents told the journalists that were interrogating him on the same topic: “If the Rwandans leave, we will leave with them.” And as a matter of fact, the people of the two districts are voting with their feet in their support for Rwanda’s intervention, as 60 thousand of the 800, 000 internally displaced have already returned to their homes. At the same time, the RSF accompanied by Mozambican security forces and leaders have introduced practices – community work, sports activities and medical interventions – that have proved their effectiveness back home in strengthening ties and building trust within and among communities as Mozambican authorities rush to restore basic services, involving the reopening of schools and hospitals among other things. Nyusi understands the need to win back the hearts of the Swahili-speaking populations of Cabo Delgado who had come to believe they were not a priority for the elite class in Maputo or even considered as citizens of the country. As a result, he has won the support of the ruling party, FRELIMO, for a third consecutive term, a remarkable feat on its own considering that the party had not publicly expressed support for his decision to involve Rwanda. He intends to sustain and build on this momentum by conducting a reform of the security sector and by building capacity in the government forces with Rwanda’s help. Already, Nyusi’s approach – which consists in prioritizing the needs of ordinary Mozambicans over the views of the bourgeoise – has paid off on the political front. The same cannot be said of his counterpart in Kinshasa. Tshisekedi’s approach of elite appeasement At the dawn of his reign, Tshisekedi sought to mark his difference with the political establishment in Kinshasa by affirming the need to cooperate with neighbours, including Rwanda, to address the security quagmire caused by the disastrous decisions of previous Congolese administrations to support genocidal groups operating in eastern DRC and their inability to improve the lives of Congolese people. Predictably, the growing ties between the DRC and Rwanda attracted the wrath of the usual suspects – the very bourgeoisie that Frantz Fanon warned us against – who portrayed Tshisekedi as a puppet of Rwanda. At the time, however, Tshisekedi, surfing on the political capital inherited from his father, seemed determined to improve relations between the two countries and avoid the populist and divisive discourse that had stood in the way of good neighbourliness for too long. “We have wasted so many years being antagonistic towards each other, living in tension and in a war situation, but also sharing hatred, now that’s enough,” Tshisekedi said in June 2021 after the signing of three agreements of bilateral cooperation with his 23

Rwandan counterpart, President Kagame. But as time passed by and as the elections period approached, his determination faded away as the pressure from the Congolese bourgeoisie increased. Externalizing the blame for his administration’s failure to deliver on his early promises appeared the best way to appease these elite groups in order to stave off the prospect of an impending electoral defeat. This appeasement approach has had consequences on the security front as it put an end to the unofficial talks between the DRC government and the M23, a selfdefence group for the Rwandaphone populations which, against all evidence, the bourgeoisie in Kinshasa insist on describing as a Rwandan armed group. The M23’s subsequent decision to renew fighting to pressure Kinshasa into implementing the 23 March 2009 peace agreement was sufficient pretext for the government to walk back on all treaties of cooperation with Rwanda. The nationalist bourgeoisie had won and the Congolese people were left to fend for themselves as insecurity grew, with thousands fleeing their homes once again. Today, as ever, hatred against Rwandophone communities in Congo and anti-Rwanda rhetoric in international forums are the two main characteristics of this political drive, which is supposed to culminate in Tshisekedi’s reelection for a second term. For the DRC president, these tactics feeding on hatred and ignorance which appeased the elite were undoubtedly the easiest path to take compared to the more difficult task of actually meeting people’s expectations. Sadly, when the dust settles, ordinary Congolese in the East will realize that nothing has fundamentally changed in the way the bourgeoisie in Kinshasa relate to their aspirations for peace – its indifference and its rejection of Congolese Rwandophones’ right to protection. In hindsight, Fanon’s words have never rung truer: “African unity can only be achieved in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie”. The moral compass There are obvious differences in the two approaches: where Nyusi recognized the need to ensure the right to the security of Swahilispeaking populations, Tshisekedi 24

de facto stripped Rwandophone Congolese communities of this right by labelling the M23 a terrorist movement and tolerating hate speech against them. Where Nyusi pursued a strategic longterm imperative, his DRC counterpart pursued a tactical one with a short-term objective. Ultimately, where the former took an audacious political risk against the national bourgeoisie by securing the lives of the people, the latter chose appeasement as a means of securing electoral victory. Even if a regional military intervention appears unlikely, Fanon’s words should serve as the moral compass for African leaders devising ways to solve the Congolese conundrum, as there are notable differences with the situation in Mozambique. Indeed, the fundamentalists in Cabo Delgado have imposed a reign of terror, provoked the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, burned down houses, administration offices, schools and hospitals, and destroyed energy infrastructure. Their professed objective is to establish sharia law against the wishes of the people, on their graves if need be. Even as these terrorists exploited real grievances related to governance failure to attract recruits, it has been impossible to find rational actors among them to put an end to their violence through nonmilitary means. The DRC is different and more complex. Groups such as the M23 would cease to exist if Rwandophone Congolese were treated as citizens in their own country and if the DRC government committed to fulfilling existing peace agreements and its mandate to protect its populations from violent genocidal groups. In other words, there is a possibility to resolve some of the violence through peaceful means. But this can only be possible if the people, not the bourgeoisie, are at the centre of leaders’ discussions and preoccupations. Lionel Manzi is a Burundian freelance writer. ❧ ❧ ❧ Walking the talk on Africa’s health security Bakani M. Ncube Africa is a rich and diverse continent made of 55 countries with a combined population of nearly 1.3 billion. However, the continent faces challenges related to access to medicine, and the establishment of the African Medicines Agency (AMA), which will become the continental regulatory agency, is a response to these challenges. It is an open secret that African countries import over 70% of medicines, vaccines and other products. Additionally, less than 1% of all vaccines used in Africa are locally produced. This threatens the continent’s health security, makes the region over dependent on foreign supplies and, thus, considerably vulnerable. Worst still, 42% of all reports of substandard and falsified (SF) medical products are from Africa and it is estimated that up to 70% of medicines in some African countries are in that category. As a result, each year, more than 100,000 children in Africa die because of poor quality antimalarials, and 79,000 - 116,000 more children die from pneumonia for the same reason. Effective regulation of markets is therefore crucial. 25

In cases where medical products are quality-assured, safe and efficacious, there are delays in getting them onto the market and into the hands of African patients due to the lack of an efficient regulatory ecosystem. These delays can be anywhere between four to seven years whereas high-income countries register new products in six to twelve months. As a result, Africans only have access to a handful of medical products/ health technologies and they must also pay higher prices for them due to shortages and lack of competitive alternatives as the pharmaceutical market remains dominated by non-African operators. To address these and other challenges such as the high vaccine development costs, market fragmentation and the lack of a skilled workforce, Africa needs a robust regulatory framework that creates conditions for a strong local pharmaceutical production sector, assures the quality of medical products manufactured and distributed on the continent, boosts public and industry confidence in the healthcare system, and contributes to economic growth and job creation. This is where the AMA comes into play. Adopted in 2019 by African Heads of States and Governments, the AMA is being established through a treaty which came into force on 5 November 2021. It is expected that the continental regulatory agency will benefit many starting with patients, but also regulators, the pharmaceutical industry and healthcare systems in Africa. Currently, 19 Countries have ratified and deposited the ratification instruments, 3 have ratified but not deposited, 9 have signed but not ratified the treaty, and 24 countries have not signed yet. Fortunately, the AMA treaty is still open to African countries for signature and ratification. The goal is to have all 55 countries ratifying as it will enable the continent to speak with one voice on regulatory matters. Enhancing advocacy within certain countries that have low political buy-in is therefore crucial as it could accelerate the implementation of regional or continental decisions. 26

reduce the duplication of work and streamline regulatory processes. It is worth noting that the AMA will not replace national regulatory authorities or the sub-regional regulatory authorities that regional blocs will establish. Instead, the AMA will offer regulatory guidance on problematic issues which lack technical capacity and expertise at the national or regional level and provide recommendations that AU Member States can use as a starting point for their regulatory decision making. National regulatory authorities will still assess the majority of medical products, have their regulatory decision-making roles and put in place market controls for their respective territories. Furthermore, the AMA will provide a platform for coordinating and strengthening ongoing medicines regulatory harmonisation initiatives in Africa, and it intends to optimally use the continent’s scarce resources by pooling capacities and expertise, as well as strengthening the regulatory networks that exist. Ultimately, it is hoped that the enhanced regulatory environment that the AMA creates will improve access to quality-assured medical products on the continent. Next Steps and Key Considerations On 16 July 2022, the AU Executive Council which met in Lusaka, Zambia announced that Rwanda had been selected to host the continental regulator. In addition, Rwanda is set to host the African Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation, an initiative of the African Development Bank (AfDB) that is anticipated to boost Africa’s access to technology in medicine and vaccine manufacture. Following the decision on the hosting of the AMA, the AU must now select the Agency’s Board, appoint the Director General, and establish rules for the AMA. It is also important that the continent builds on the efforts of the African Medicines Regulatory Harmonisation (AMRH) initiative which is proposed to serve as the foundation for the establishment of the continental regulator. Moreover, there is a need to move from donor funding to financial sustainability and to obtain the required regulatory infrastructure and a competent workforce. Furthermore, there is a need to foster an environment that is conducive for innovation and for the (bio) pharmaceutical industry, and to bring together African regulators and the regulated industry. Last but not least, sourcing finances to fund human resource costs, infrastructure and operational costs is an important consideration. There is still much work to do, but the continent is on the move. Africa’s health security requires the participation of all. ❧ ❧ ❧ Bakani M. Ncube is a Zimbabwean pharmacist. Health The value proposition of the african medicines agency The AMA will be a technical agency of the African Union (AU) that is legally mandated by its member states. Its vision is to ensure that all Africans have access to safe, quality-assured, efficacious and affordable medical products that meet recognised standards. The Agency also aims to coordinate national and sub-regional medicines regulatory systems, conduct regulatory oversight of selected medical products including traditional medicines, and promote cooperation, harmonisation and the mutual recognition of regulatory decisions within the continent. The AMA is expected to expedite approvals for medical products that meet the African population’s health needs, especially for conditions that affect the continent disproportionately, while also fostering the competitiveness of medicines and vaccines that are locally manufactured. The agency will improve regulatory standards by providing advice on how to develop the local pharmaceutical industry in line with the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa (PMPA) and the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) in support of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Additionally, the AMA will work in collaboration with African countries’ regulatory authorities and provide technical guidance, 27

From aid to health technology transfer Ndayisaba Gateka The recent agreements between African countries and their European counterparts in the healthcare sector could open up a new era for North-South relations. They focus on sharing knowledge instead of sustaining the vicious cycle of dead aid that places Africans at the mercy of capitalist machinations and predatory practices. This is significant in as far as it offers an opportunity for structural transformation in the sector across Africa and improved health outcomes. Since the late 1950s, the transfer of money and goods, ostensibly to help struggling African countries, has been a key feature of North-South relations. Obviously, that transfer was not free; it was given as debt even though for some unknown reason, the debt has been called “aid”. This debt was spread out throughout decades, and it couldn’t possibly be paid back because Africa had failed to acquire the necessary technologies and technical know-how to climb the ladder of the value chain in industrial production and generate sufficient income. Thus, the burden of the debt became unbearable and almost three decades later, in the 1980s, the global north, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pressured African governments into paying back their debt or, at least, reducing their debt intake. This famous process was termed the “structural adjustment programmes” (SAPs). These programmes forced African governments to significantly reduce budgets for vital organs of societies, namely education, healthcare and infrastructure in order to save money and service their debt, thereby rendering public investment in socially productive projects almost non-existent. In other words, with the inevitability of SPAs, Africa found itself in a zugzwang: the obligation of conforming to the actions that undoubtedly work against their interests. In retrospect, the failure of NorthSouth collaborations was due to one major flaw: transferring goods and money in lieu of transferring knowledge. Even from the western capitalist perspective underpinning such collaborations, it is clear that money solely used to cover expenses, consumption and for purchasing finished products, does not generate income. The borrowers in such relationships can neither repay the debt nor 28

invest in income generating projects to wean themselves from dependency on debt. This leads to a parasitic relationship where the lenders build and consolidate their wealth at the expense of the borrowers. Clearly, therefore, debt (termed aid) is a trap from the perspective of recipient countries. Long-standing problems require new solutions Serious African leaders are no longer asking for aid, as a result. They are insisting that the only way to improve North-South relations was to start with cancelling the debt, ending the aid paradigm, and instituting a new win-win collaboration paradigm. They are essentially channeling the famous speech of Thomas Sankara, “A United front against the debt,” in the 1987 African Union general meeting, which is just one of the numerous examples of African heads of state who had understood the devastating effect of aid to Africa. Accordingly, there have been encouraging steps from African countries that have shown interest in introducing a new collaboration era. Indeed, the recent global pandemic crisis has opened new opportunities for partnerships that, when looked at closely, have a new focus. Senegal, Rwanda and South Africa have recently signed a ground-breaking agreement with BioNTech, a global pharmaceutical firm, to install manufacturing plants in these countries. The biggest plant called Madiba (Manufacturing in Africa for Disease Immunization and Building Autonomy) will be built in Senegal. The plan is to produce up to 300 million vaccines per year. This production capacity will come to bridge Africa’s vaccine gap that keeps the continent totally dependent on imports. In Rwanda, just like in Senegal, the benefits will range from job creation to training of local staff to engage in laboratory services, quality insurance, production, storage and distribution processes. The Rwandan plant will also serve as a research facility for tuberculosis and malaria vaccines. This kind of transfer of knowledge in an industry that is economically productive is crucial in modern collaborations. It is worth mentioning that the BioNTech plant in Rwanda will partner with Izuba, a local company, to provide renewable energy in its production process. Kenya has also entered the vaccine manufacturing arena by signing a memorandum of understanding with the US-based pharmaceutical firm, Moderna, to establish its first mRNA manufacturing facility in the East African country. While these endeavours are encouraging, innovation and research projects should not solely rely on cooperation with foreign entities if the aim is to ensure Africa’s health security. Countries like Japan have shown the way by importing human resources where needed in a bid to improve their command of modern technologies and chart their own path to the kind of economic development that is aligned with their socio-economic and geographical realities. We should also not forget that the most difficult part of vaccine manufacturing lies in the regulation systems for drug approval, and Africa will indeed benefit greatly from being involved in all these processes. Generally speaking, the technology bit will push us to improve our management capacity. Already, Africa is placing its various continental bodies at the centre of its healthcare infrastructure. For instance, Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa (PMPA) by the African Union Development Agency is tasked with reducing the unsustainable reliance on foreign imports of medical products. Its objectives are to ensure access, quality and affordability of medical essential products and to secure economic benefits for the continent through sustainability, competitiveness and self-sufficiency in pharmaceutical products. The good news is that the focus now is on technology transfer and technical know-how. If African initiatives are successful, the continent will surely cease to be a passive subject on the receiving end of dead aid. ❧ ❧ ❧ Ndayisaba Gateka is a Burundian independent analyst on religion and its impact on culture in Africa. He works in the healthcare sector 29

One of the challenges Pan-Africanism has faced is translating its ethos of solidarity and African unity into practical actions that would advance to cause of the continent’s quest for integration. A crucial question in this regard has been how to deal with the hindrances to our economic development, most of which stem from the artificial, colonially inherited barriers that keep us divided and unable to work collectively in advancing our shared interests. The creation of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) is one of such initiatives that aim to respond to this question. Pan-African Review recently had a chat with the CEO of PAPSS, Mike Ogbalu, an engineer by training who worked in financial services and technology with banks, but now working in payment systems. PAR: We have read about PAPSS quite a lot. We like to hear you talk about PAPSS. How did such an idea start and how did it grow to the level of the institution that it has now become? Please, take us through the journey until where we are right now. Mike Ogbalu: Thanks. I think going through the journey, we will have Why PAPSS is a game changer for intraAfrican trade to go way back because some of our forebears, some of the founding fathers of the key Pan-African institutions, actually envisaged that at some point we will need an infrastructure that will drive payments. So from when Afrexim Bank was being conceived, they enshrined in their establishing agreements that Afrexim Bank is empowered to put in place a Pan-African payment infrastructure that will support intra-Africa trade. So, the journey started quite a while back. But then, if you look at the continent, you are looking at 54, 55 countries to territories, and each of these countries has defined how they will trade. They have set rules for trading amongst themselves. They have an acceptable legal tender, money, that is acceptable in their markets, and therefore they are able to trade. Now, the continent has realized that it has 1.3 billion individuals, but all these individuals are in small entities and as such it doesn’t have the power to be able to negotiate as a collective. The continent decided that we are going to put the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which has been signed and ratified by a significant number of African countries and it came into force of course when the twenty-seventh country ratified. Now, having come into place it has set Pan African Review [PAR] Interview with Mike Ogbalu, CEO of Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) 30

standards that will guide trade on a Pan-African basis. Of course, trading without dealing with payments doesn’t work. So, working with AfCFTA, Afrexim Bank and the AU, PAPSS was conceived. One of the benefits of this payment system is that goods and services can be paid for in local currencies. For instance, I can use Egyptian pounds to pay for goods and services, say, in Kenya, and the seller will receive the payment in Kenyan shillings. Also, those transactions can be instant, meaning the transactions will not depend on banking relationships or restrictions between countries. Now, once we are able to deal with the subject of payments, it will have an accelerating effect on trade because, today, people spend 3, 4, 5, or 6 days trying to confirm payments. When payments can actually happen instantly, leaving businesspeople more time to focus on their business. That is what PAPSS is trying to do. You will find that innovation can actually be unleashed on the continent. People developing all manner of solutions around payments will no longer see one million people in their own countries as their market; they will begin to see 1.3 billion Africans as their potential market. Moreover, payment will not need to travel from the African continent to somewhere like New York or the UK before coming back. Over 80% of our trade payments today on the continent have to travel somewhere outside of the continent before coming back. Of course, that results in overpriced service and these are all losses to the continent. PAR: Who would you call the primary target audience for PAPSS? Mike Ogbalu: Fantastic! Actually, PAPPS should support every African who does business across the many borders that divide us. For example, what we built is an ecosystem that comprises an instant payment system that has the ability to clear and settle transactions in local currencies. Then, we built in some operations, some system support, a dispute management mechanism, and some governance mechanisms that will ensure that this system continues to operate within strict governance. Because it is a financial market infrastructure, its governance is very critical. Now, the first set of people that we will be connected to this core system is the central banks. We will connect with different central banks. Today we have connected six central banks in West Africa, which is where we started our pilots and these are Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea.. So, the first beneficiaries are the central banks who are now able to connect and are now able to settle transactions on behalf of their country. The second set of participants that we will go after are commercial banks. Remember that when people want to do transactions, they don’t go to their central banks; they walk into their commercial banks or their commercial banks extend services to them using channels such as mobile and internet banking, ATMs, points of sale devices, and so on. Today, we are connecting 15 of the largest banks on the continent onto this infrastructure, but of course, we need more commercial banks to join. After that, there are other smaller payment service providers, mobile money providers, and even stock exchanges that would require to open up their markets to other countries so that there will be a free flow of capital. Those ones also can be layered on top of these participants. Then on top of that, we are hoping that different people will begin to create solutions around remittances, around invoicing, around escrow services and so on and so forth, which will sit on top participants that we have already onboarded. Eventually, it should touch the lives of all Africans, whether you are a shoemaker sitting somewhere in Aba in Nigeria and worrying about selling shoes to someone, say, in Sudan, and how that person would pay. So, PAPSS is going to be answering those questions. A local rice producer somewhere in The Gambia, a rubber producer somewhere in Malawi, begins to see now that he has a market that is able to pay him for whatever he is producing. PAR: It’s a trickle-down kind of effect because you have the primary beneficiaries who are supposed to serve Africans at the end of the day. This begs a question about the general financial literacy of our people. For instance, someone who lives in Kenya and wants to buy a RwandAir flight ticket from Nairobi can only get the price in USD and in Kenyan 31

shillings. That person may wonder which currency to use to make sure they don’t get to pay a lot of money. Aren’t these some of the tips we should get, the kind of information we should have? At least know that there are platforms which are supposed to help us get the most out of the transactions we make. What do you think about that? Mike Ogbalu: It’s interesting that you mentioned the airline example. We can spend the whole day talking about so many useful cases that can be applied to the PAPSS platform. Now, the biggest challenge that the airlines have in each of the countries where they operate is actually how to get their money out. For example, while Kenya Airways sells tickets in Nigerian naira in Nigeria, they would be happy to have the money in Kenyan shillings because that is the company’s home currency. And Kenya Airways shouldn’t worry about how to get its money in Kenyan shillings because PAPSS is going to deliver the money in Kenyan shillings. In the countries where we are present, they don’t need to worry about how to source foreign currencies to be able to do that transaction. You shouldn’t even worry about the sourcing of foreign currencies to be able to do that transaction, you should just pay in the currency that you have which is your local currency. If you are in Kenya, pay in Kenyan shillings and it will ease stress for the consumers, as well as the airlines and the central banks who now will no longer be looking for foreign currencies to support those transactions when transactions can happen in their individual local currencies. PAPSS is actually a game-changer. People talk about a lack of silver bullets, and I see PAPSS as the silver bullet even if there are a lot of other things that need to change or that need to improve on our continent before we see the value. Still, it’s a game-changer because it will spur change in a whole lot of different areas. PAPSS is actually designed to help these payment companies to offer you service in a way that you don’t have to stress about how your value will convert from naira to dollar, dollar to this or that. We want to significantly lower any dependency on foreign or third-party currencies. PAR: Normally, as you mentioned before, our trade payments today on the continent have to travel somewhere outside of the continent before coming back. Naturally, we would assume that this meant some profit for the institutions in some countries. If that is true, some of their revenues from African countries will significantly reduce. Do you see any political pushback against PAPSS? Mike Ogbalu: I try not to dabble in politics. What I know is that the continent needs to be liberated. The continent needs to take steps to engender its own prosperity. Again, if you look at it from an efficiency point of view, the current systems are not efficient. A lot of African banks have been struggling with meeting compliance requirements that were not even designed for the African continent. The expectations are actually designed more to suit the American continent and the European continent rather than to suit us. So, there are so many areas where we are disadvantaged. For us, Africans, we shouldn’t be looking at what other people would think. We should focus on what is good for us. Again, the whole world is integrated. There is still room for us to collaborate with the rest of the world, but it has to be first of all with the consideration that we will do what is best for Africa. And when we have done what is best for Africa, then we can still go to the table and agree on ways to collaborate with the rest of our brothers and sisters outside of the continent. PAR: What kind of structure do you have in place to make sure that what you want to achieve can be achieved? Mike Ogbalu: Well, I think when we were designing PAPSS, we set a few of what we call design principles. Let me share just three out of many of these design principles. One was that it must be founded on a very solid legal basis. The second one is that it must enjoy the endorsement of key African institutions. And the third one is that there needs to be significant support for settlement finality to always take place on these transactions. Now, I have already spoken about a solid legal basis in the sense that these countries who are already members of Afrexim Bank had enshrined it in the establishing agreement of Afrexim Bank. They have signed and ratified; it is a treaty among countries. 32

Now for the second part, we have the support of African leaders. At the Extraordinary Assembly of Heads of State in 2019, they formally gave their endorsement to PAPSS and more or less mandated Afrexim Bank, working with the AfCTA Secretariat, to make sure that this is fast-tracked and put in place. They recommitted themselves to PAPSS in December 2020 when they met again. And, in the last 35th AU Ordinary Assembly in Addis-Ababa, they once again more or less mandated all central banks to join PAPSS. Now, there are very few times when you find Africans speaking in so much unison to say, “Look! This is what we want. This is good for our continent.” I think once Africans realize that our own prosperity as a people is tied to how well we work together on some of these initiatives that we drive as a continent, then, the better for the continent. I think that as far as the central banks and the governments of Africa are working together, there is nothing anybody can do about it. We are acting in our own self-interest. Obviously, we have significant support from the critical institutions on the continent and, as far as we continue to enjoy this support, we will certainly succeed at putting this structure in place. There is also significant support from Afrexim Bank, which has approved 500 million dollars to support settlement finality. When we scale to the whole of Africa, that value goes up to three billion dollars. So that kind of support is difficult to come across and it can only come from a serious conviction that this is what is important for the continent. PAR: What is the big vision, in the event that PAPSS is working at the optimum capacity? What should we be able to see? Mike Ogbalu: What you would see is a prosperous continent that trades more with itself than it currently does. Today, Africa trades 85% with the rest of the world and only between 15% and 18% with itself. We expect that, within the next five years, we should be heading towards 30%, This would significantly reduce trade with the rest of the world. We also expect to see a strengthening of African currencies because we will no longer be dependent on global third-party currencies. The demand for or the hunger for them continues to strengthen those currencies while weakening ours. We expect to see more businesses thriving in multiple countries. We expect to see more tech companies and financial services providers operating in many different countries because the burden of how transactions are settled has been lifted. We want to see a strengthened financial system that now has developed more capacity to support businesses in multiple jurisdictions. We want to begin to see even that small trader who before now never thought of selling his wares anywhere outside of his home borders begin to see how markets are opened up for him in multiple countries. We expect that PAPSS will actually begin to engender prosperity. Individuals, businesses, and governments don’t eat money. Nobody puts money on the plate and starts eating. They consume goods and services. And the only way goods and services are consumed is by the trigger of payments. It is only when you pay that trade happens. So, the fact of it is that we will begin to see economies of each and every country in Africa begin to get a significant boost and begin to see (a significant increase in) value, which it didn’t have before now, all because PAPSS has taken root. PAR: Thank you so much, Mike. This is such a beautiful and well-articulated story. But also, we really note how important PAPSS is for all Africans. Thank you for your time and when we need you again, I hope you will have a few minutes to come back and tell us how far you have gone with PAPSS. Mike Ogbalu: Thank you very much for having me. It is always an honour to discuss PAPSS, to discuss our continent. Really, our continent can be transformed, and I am hoping that we will join the voices that will help us to bring as many efficient people as possible on board to transform Africa. Once again, thank you. ❧ ❧ ❧ 33

When trading under the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) officially began on the first of January last year, it signalled the dawn of a new era for intra-Africa trade. At the time, AfCFTA was the world’s largest trade area. Africa’s milestone agreement was hailed as a game changer that would create a continent-wide single market that adds up to $70 billion to trade between African countries and would potentially move 50 million people out of extreme poverty. A year and a half later, AfCFTA seems to be trudging along its runway struggling for momentum. The buzz that propelled it into popular consciousness when it went into effect in May 2019 after the Gambia ratified seems to be fading. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the agreement does not seem to be well understood by some of the most crucial interest groups: “African businesses do not have a clear understanding of the AfCFTA mechanisms of operation and market opportunities at the continental level”, wrote representatives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in a Brookings Institution article this month. It sounds ominous that a pan-African operation that has taken a decade to bring to life remains rather vague to businesses. Africa’s trade ministers and envoys appear to have put in several hours convincing one another of the benefits of free trade without doing enough to engage those who will do the actual trading. This kind of policy rollout misstep has, unfortunately, been common on the continent, supporting the argument by some policy analysts that African countries tend to lack in planning before implementation. Second, the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, or PAPSS, which is supposed to facilitate intra-African trade, has not yet got the buy-in of all 54 signatory countries (Eritrea is not expected to join the party anytime soon). Is Africa’s historic free trade agreement stuck or sailing? Alexander Onukwue 34

PAPPS is designed as Africa’s centralized payment and settlement system, connecting central banks, commercial banks and other financial institutions for seamless, real-time payments, especially for trade. Exerting financial independence, Africans will transact and settle payments in African currencies within minutes courtesy of PAPPS. However, only 8 central banks, mostly in English-speaking West Africa, are part of the network. An effort is ongoing to persuade all central banks, including the vital Central Bank of West African States in charge of the West African CFA franc in 8 countries, to join by the end of 2024. Of the 763 or so commercial banks in Africa, only 28 are currently plugged into PAPPS. The rest are expected to join by 2025 or so. It is worth noting that while technology innovators in the private sector have founded payments processing companies (such as Paystack, Flutterwave, MFS Africa, Zeepay, and Yoco) to solve the fragmentation of financial transactions across Africa, PAPSS is the most significant effort by a bilateral African body to integrate payments within the continent. Indeed, PAPSS incorporates the work already done by these financial technology companies. Backed by the AU (through the Africa Import Export Bank), its unique promise is that payment settlements between businesses in different African countries would no longer be expensive and time-consuming due to the cost of needing correspondent banks outside Africa and dealing in currencies like the US dollar. Third, it took time for AfCFTA to finalise the terms under which goods will be eligible for preferential treatment based on the nationality of those goods. These terms are called the rules of origin in international trade jargon. Because the original agreement establishing the AfCFTA did not specify the criteria and conditions for these rules of origin, it was left up for debate in subsequent meetings. The first version of the rules of origin manual was published in July this year. Among other things, it is intended to “enable Customs officers and other stakeholders involved in the clearance of Goods to understand the mechanisms of according preferential tariff treatment to goods traded in the AfCFTA.” AfCFTA intends to eliminate tariffs for 90% of goods produced within Africa but that would only be a wish if member countries have no clear sense of whether or not their goods are exempt. Best practice requires the rules to be “simple, practical, and business-friendly to enable African businesses to optimize the trade gains” while leading to “a transformation process that generates value through intellectual property gains and/or new jobs,” as the UNECA experts describe it. This is an essential high standard required for a consequential agreement meant to affect the lives of 1.3 billion people. Africa’s industrious entrepreneurs finally have a real chance to resume the exchange of goods and services more easily after being hampered for decades by the adverse effects of colonialist partitions. To be sure, the incomprehension on the part of the business community has not ground the AfCFTA to a halt. In this regard, Wamkele Mene, the AfCFTA Secretary-General, has increased engagement with businesses lately, having met CEOs of South African companies this month in a push for “the start of commercially meaningful trade”. Most importantly, with the rules of origin now in place, a pilot trading scheme under AfCFTA rules commenced in July, which involves Rwanda, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, and Tanzania. Known as the ‘guided trade’ initiative, these countries are expected to test the trade agreement’s documents and the reformed custom procedures with actual shipments of goods until September 2022. A successful pilot would be the biggest assurance yet that AfCFTA will work. Hopefully, when African heads of state and government meet in late November in Niamey, Niger for an extraordinary summit on the AfCFTA, that will be their big announcement. ❧ ❧ ❧ Alexander Onukwue is a Nigerian journalist. 35

The Status of the African Continental Free Trade Area - The dawn of a new era Francis Mangeni, Andrew Mold quently in Africa the recovery has been complicated by rising levels of debt, increased climatic challenges, and uncertainty over the general direction of global economic policy.3 Although there is some evidence that intra-African trade was quite resilient to the associated economic downturn4 , the timetable for the implementation of the AfCFTA did inevitably suffer some setbacks. That said, reflecting the strong degree of political support behind the agreement, the AfCFTA still managed to make progress on many fronts. A big step forward in 2020 was the establishment of the AfCFTA Permanent Secretariat in Accra. Wamkele Mene – the former Chief Negotiator for South Africa - was elected its first Secretary General in February 2020. The AfCFTA Permanent Secretariat is playing a vital role not only in concluding the negotiations, but also in its effective implementation. Although it has still not reached its full compleResilience and Trade” https://www.wto. org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr21_e/00_ wtr21_e.pdf 3 World Bank (2022) Global Economic Prospects, 2022, available at https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/37224 4 United Nations/TradeMark East Africa/African Economic Research Consortium (2021), “Waving or Drowning? The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on East African Trade. Addis Ababa.  https://hdl.handle.net/10855/43923” ment of staff (250 staff when all recruitment has been finalised), and the effective implementation of the agreement is ultimately the responsibility of national governments, experience shows that successful regional secretariats can significantly facilitate and support member states.5 A key milestone was reached in July 2022, when the Facilitated and Guided Trade Initiative, which aims to kickstart trading under the AfCFTA, was launched. Reflecting the diversified nature of the opportunities of the larger continental market, participating State Parties will showcase their consignments and products - Rwanda (to export coffees and teas), Egypt (air conditioner parts and processed foods), Kenya (teas, Exide batteries, avocados),6 Cameroon (teas and dried fruits), Ghana (ceramic tiles and palm kernel oil). Tunisia, Tanzania and Mauritius are expected to process some consignments soon. The Initiative aims to test and prove that 5 Echandi, Roberto; Maliszewska, Maryla; Steenbergen, Victor. 2022. Making the Most of the African Continental Free Trade Area : Leveraging Trade and Foreign Direct Investment to Boost Growth and Reduce Poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ handle/10986/37623 6 According to media reports, Kenya’s first consignment of Kenyan Exide batteries worth USD 77,000 were released on 23rd September in Tema Port, Ghana, in a historic ceremony that marked Kenya’s first exports under the AfCFTA. A lot has changed since the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) at the African Union Summit, held in Kigali in March 2018. Initially, 44 AU member states signed up to the agreement, but that soon rose to 54 – a remarkable show of consensus for an agreement that encompasses the largest number of member states of any regional bloc in the world. By signing up to the AfCFTA, the African continent really has been moving in a different direction to much of the rest of the world, which has become increasingly sceptical of the power of international trade agreements to contribute to global development and economic wellbeing.1 Officially, the implementation phase of the AfCFTA started in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, on the 1st January 2021. However, this was obviously not the most propitious moment for implementing such a major initiative – global trade in goods and services contracted by 9.6 percent in 20202 , and subse1 It should be recalled that 2018 was just two years after both the ‘Brexit referendum’ (when the United Kingdom chose to exit the European Union) and when the avowedly trade sceptical Trump administration in the United States was voted into power. 2 World Trade Organization (WTO), (2021), “World Trade Report 2021 – Economic 36

Trade the AfCFTA system works, and to inspire trading under the AfCFTA across the continent. The commencement of trading was possible because the enabling regime is in force. The agreement officially entered force on 30 May 2019, about a year after the consecration of the AfCFTA at the Kigali AU Summit. Of the 54 signatories to the agreement, there are now 43 ratifications – the process of formally approving the agreement through national parliaments and constitutional assemblies. For these member states, it means that they can now enter directly into the operational phase of the agreement. Oversight institutions are also already in place – the Council of Ministers, Senior Trade Officials Committee, and Committees of Experts on goods and services, as well as the dispute settlement body. Trade and customs documents have been designed and are ready for use, especially the AfCFTA certificate of origin, on the basis of which preferential treatment is accorded. At the national level, coordination committees have been established to facilitate trade. Tariff and Services Schedules for phasing out trade restrictions are also in place. Thus far, 88 percent of product lines have agreed rules of origin – the ‘passports’ for goods that allow them to qualify for the AfCFTA tariff reductions (i.e. all except mainly textiles and clothing and automobiles).7 In 7 Of these outstanding rules of origin, around 10 percent are for textiles and clothing alone. From a developmental perspective, services too, much progress has been made, with 48 countries having made their initial offers of liberalisation in the five-priority sectors designated in the agreement. Of those initial offers, 15 have now been verified by the Secretariat, approved by the Ministers and will constitute the initial core of the single African market for trade in services. 20 more are expected to be approved by the Ministers. Being a modern and comprehensive agreement, digital tools have been established to address non-tariff barriers,8 provide market intelligence (the Africa Trade Observatory)9 , and facilitate cross-border payment (the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System).10 Negotiations on the protocols on competition and investment are practically finalised, and these protocols will be adopted in November 2022. Negotiations on the protocols for digital trade and women and youth in trade are currently at the design stage. One area less talked about in the media, but of fundamental importance for the effectiveness of the whole agreement is the Protocol the textile and clothing sector has always been of strategic importance for developing countries. Efforts are currently being made to resolve the differences between member states in terms of the technical details pertaining to these rules, and hopefully the issue will be resolved by the end of 2022. 8 https://tradebarriers.africa and https://www. tradebarriers.org 9 https://ato.africa/en 10 https://au-afcfta.org/operationalinstruments/papss/ on the Free Movement of Persons. 11 Here the level of support from member states is less pronounced, with just 33 countries signing up to the agreement and only four countries having ratified it.12 This is a shame, because the implementation of this protocol offers the prospects of enormous benefits to the general public, in terms of easing the ability to travel between and work in different African countries. Free movement is often considered as the ‘handmaiden’ through which greater trade and investment opportunities materialise, and it would also represent a great boon for young people, who tend to be the most mobile among the African population13, and yet who often struggle to find gainful employment in their countries of origin. Given the manifest skills shortages that the business sector often complains about in many African countries, implementation of this part of the agreement needs to be prioritised. Moreover, the Protocol has taken into account practically all security, immigration, health and other public policy concerns, and should be signed, ratified and implemented, but misconceptions persist. The EAC and ECOWAS, as 11 Hirsch, Alan (2022), “How Africa can promote the continental free movement of people”, available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ africaatlse/2022/01/14/how-african-unioncan-promote-continental-free-movement-ofpeople-migration-protocol/ 12 The four countries that have ratified the protocol are Rwanda, Niger, Sao Tome & Principe and Mali. 13 African migrants have the youngest age profile of anywhere in the world. Within Africa, migrants in East Africa are the youngest with a median age of just 27.0. See African Union (2022) “African Integration Report: Putting Free Movement of Persons at the Centre of Continental Integration.” 37

well as a number of other countries on an autonomous basis, such as Mauritius and Seychelles, have all demonstrated the significant economic benefits from liberalising the movement of persons. Other critical success factors will include the scaling up of Foreign Direct Investment (particularly by African-owned firms), deeper private sector ownership of the agreement, greater awareness creation and more market information. Also, supranational institutions in areas such as competition and investment will be helpful, along the lines of those in regional economic communities, such as COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, UEMOA on competition policy, dispute settlement, finance and trade facilitation. Of course, implementation challenges that have plagued regional economic integration efforts in the past will have to be monitored closely - such as inadequate resources (both human and financial) and infrastructure, including issues such as the lack of flight interconnectivity and unreliable energy supplies. Among the services sectors, transport, energy, communication, banking, insurance, health, education, distribution, and professional services will all be important facilitators to greater intra-African trade in agricultural and, above all, industrial products. Fortunately, political will remains strong. Together with the creation of a large continental market, the increased predictability due to its rules-based nature, and the associated policy reforms, the agreement implicitly carries a generous value proposition. The momentum is there, and external partners should recognise that the time for the AfCFTA has come, and support it, rather than frustrate it. There needs to be realism, of course, and the agreement will take some time to implement – but over the course of this decade and the next, the AfCFTA will put the continent’s economy on a stronger footing, and with it, accelerate the process of social economic transformation that is already underway. All is set, and Africa is open for business. Francis Mangeni is Coordinator of Regional Advisors to the Secretary General of the AfCFTA Secretariat and former Director General of Trade of COMESA. Dr Andrew Mold is Chief, Regional Integration and AfCFTA Cluster, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Regional Office for Eastern Africa, Kigali, Rwanda. Mangeni and Mold are the authors of a forthcoming book entitled “Borderless Africa – A Sceptics Guide to the Continental Free Trade Area”, to be published by Hurst, London, in February 2022. ❧ ❧ ❧ 38

AU must protect Africa’s strategic sectors from unfair competition if AfCFTA is to live up to its promise Lionel Manzi The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) promises incalculable socio-economic opportunities and benefits for Africans. However, the prospect of removing trade barriers for made-in-Africa products within this newly created single market has raised concerns among some member states of the African Union (AU), mainly regarding how the economic competition between the states will be organized. While such concerns are worthy of consideration, the protection of Africa’s free trade area against unfair competition or predation from outside the union deserves even more attention. The reasons as to why this aspect is critical should be obvious. It is imperative for Africa to avoid repeating at the continental level the mistakes made at the national levels during the imposition of the structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s. At the time, African states yielded to the pressure from western governments and financial institutions and agreed to substantially or fully withdraw from strategic sectors of the economy under the guise of liberalization, thereby reducing financial support to or shutting down state-owned enterprises. Needless to say, these West-inspired policies had negative effects on African economies. For one thing, the privatisation to which African states agreed was undertaken in a way that reduced the participation of Africans in the economic development of their countries. Indeed, not only did the foreign investors that were – still are - favoured in this process outcompete African investors in terms of the opportunity to raise capital to begin with, but they were also granted economic incentives (land leases, lower taxes, monopoly rights, grants and preferential loans, etc.) that their African counterparts could only dream of in their own countries. In such a context, the requirement of removing subsidies to stateowned enterprises and opening up African economies to competition actually led to subsidizing foreign-owned corporations instead. This wasn’t – and still isn’t – fair competition at all. For another, privatisation in this case meant that: 1) African natural resources and economic means of production were relinquished to the control of foreign investors; 2) African countries were denied revenue through tax exemptions and tax evasion; and 3) Africa’s economies were denied the multiplier effect they would have enjoyed if the revenue accrued by investors were reinvested on the continent instead of being repatriated. These issues were compounded by the failure of African states to create enough job opportunities for Africa’s youth, with the argument that foreign direct investment leads to job creation increasingly becoming a myth. Indeed, the problem of unemployment in Africa is directly traceable to the collapse of industrialisation, which is directly linked to the shift to privatisation and foreign direct investment instead of investing in the growth of domestic entrepreneurship. Obviously, the collapse of state parastatals did not lead to the growth of Africa’s private sector and the creation of jobs as envisaged; African leaders rather gave away Africa’s resources to external players, with almost nothing to show for it. Clearly, if today’s leaders are serious about reaping the benefits the AfCFTA promises, these self-sabotaging practices must be reconsidered. Moreover, the non-participation of the state in critical sectors of 39

the economy meant that African economies could not benefit from research and innovation supported by state financial muscles. Instead, Africans were deceived into thinking that the private sector should lead research and innovation efforts - an idea that does not stand up to scrutiny when one looks closely at how things are done in most developed countries. As underscored by Mariana Mazuchato in her book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, “Every major technological change in recent years traces most of its funding back to the state”. As an example of this, Mazuchato notes that “The National Institutes of Health have spent almost a trillion dollars since their founding on the research that created both the pharmaceutical and the biotech sectors–with venture capitalists only entering biotech once the red carpet was laid down in the 1980s.” Mazuchato’s observation can also be made for communication and software technologies which are dominated by US private corporations working on the foundation laid by trillions of dollars of public funds spent on research by the Department of Defense (DoD). In the same vein, smaller enterprises and startups are, from time to time, invited to participate in innovative projects funded by the DoD. In fact, such is the grip on this sector - and at the global level - of US-based corporations, which has resulted in mounting calls for the EU to create a few publicly supported large corporations for greater scientific and technological opportunities to challenge the US’s dominance. The irony here is that while African states are ordered, by way of multilateral agency conditionalities, to withdraw from the economy and stop subsidizing their enterprises in the name of liberalisation, developed countries are doing the opposite in all economic sectors that are deemed strategic in the life of their nations. Hence, unless Africa does the same for its own strategic sectors that member states of the AU ought to collectively protect, support and fund, the single market that we aim to create will be dominated by foreign corporations. This situation will again suffocate African infant industries and businesses, while these foreign corporations would, as ever, repatriate their benefits home – capital flight. What then are Africa’s strategic economic sectors? One can think of three main categories, namely telecommunications and transport, food and agriculture, energy and natural resources. The Covid-19 pandemic has forced Africa to face the reality of its own vulnerability with regard to the manufacturing (or lack thereof) of medical equipment, drugs and vaccines. It is hoped that the Russia-Ukraine war is another eye-opening experience that will awaken African leaders to our other vulnerabilities – the dangers hanging on the continent should the powers that be in the global order become openly hostile and decide for some reason to exert pressure on Africa. This is not a remote possibility. Food and energy are vital to the survival of any nation, let alone a continent of 1.3 billion people, and so are communications and transport. Already, the current global food crisis has been weaponised to pressure Africa into taking sides in the conflict, and while Europeans have quietly lifted bans on Russian coal, African countries who intended to buy Russian oil are threatened with sanctions by the US. On telecommunication infrastructure, for instance, in March 2022, one could note with concern Ukraine’s request to ICANN (the internet governing body) to shut down Russian internet domains. Although this request was not granted, it raises questions as to what would happen if Africa was the target of such technological warfare tactics. The fact being that Africa is ill-equipped to deal with such threats to our security, whether individually or collectively as countries. The same can be said about our transport networks. For maritime trade, Africa still relies on foreign-owned companies for its exportation and importation with no African country among the top 35 ship-owning nations as of 2017. As for air transport, despite the presence of multiple national air carriers, Africa has still not attained full coverage as some connections between African countries require going through Europe 40

or the Middle East before coming back to Africa. The transport and telecommunications conundrum has to be addressed as a priority if Africans are to fully take advantage of their single market. One way to address these challenges is for African countries to collectively support African enterprises that have demonstrated expertise and potential for strong growth in their domain and, through consolidation, turn them into stronger entities able to compete with the world’s best. There are precedents for such endeavours. The Airbus-Boeing 17 years dispute between the EU and the US provides a case in point on how state support for strategic sectors is paramount if African companies are to grow and compete on the global stage. It is worth noting how Airbus was registered as a European rather than a French national corporation and how it benefited from EU collective support in the form of subsidies, something that can be replicated for Africa’s best companies in strategic sectors. In a similar fashion, the current economic war led by the US against the Chinese Huawei in the race for 5G technologies is another example of how states protect their own industries against external competition, even under false pretences. In fact, even in the area of agriculture and food production, we ought to keep in mind that the EU, China and the US (three major economic entities) all subsidise their farmers, making it impossible for African farmers to compete with their cheap agricultural products. All of this is to say that it would defy logic if the Africa Union did not protect our single market and the economies of its members like other economic entities do for their people and member states. What’s good for the goose ought to be good for the gander. However, for the African Union to be effective, African states ought to have a comprehensive approach to security and diplomacy that are coherent with the defence of their shared interests, at least on these matters of strategic importance. The stakes are high. Failure to protect our single market and our economies will mean that Africa’s single airspace will be dominated by foreign air carriers; our single market will be flooded by foreign agricultural products dumped on our shores by foreign-owned ships; our access to critical information (even internet itself) and our ability to communicate will depend on the whims of a company based in the US, etc…the list of impending catastrophes could go on and on. If this isn’t scary, I don’t know what is. In other words, a comprehensive approach to African security and diplomacy is needed if any of the important initiatives such as AfCFTA are to transform the continent and its people. ❧ ❧ ❧ 41

Gambling”, “bets” and “deals” are not the usual argot of a development economist, especially not a UK bureaucrat. And yet they are at the core of the argument in Stefan Dercon’s recent book: Gambling on Development. We don’t intend to review it here as others have done so elsewhere (the FT’s David Pilling, LSE’s Duncan Green, Stephen Williams in African Business, CGD’s Ranil Dissanayake or Simon Maxwell). We focus on how his thinking applies to African economic integration, and what someone like Wamkele Mene, the Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and his partners, might use from it. The book arguments The main argument of the book is that growth and development occur where a development bargain has been struck, defined as “a commitment by those with the power to shape politics, the economy, and society, to striving for growth and development.” To paraphrase, development bargains emerge when the political and economic elites decide to gamble their political and economic power on promoting and implementing policies in pursuit of wider development rather than narrow self-interest or through predatory rent-seeking behaviour. If the bet succeeds, the economic pie grows and everybody wins. If it fails, they risk losing power. That means that elites need to be willing to take the gamble. But it is not easy to predict what conditions will lead them to do so, and it is especially difficult to ensure that gambles pay off. As Dercon says, “understanding why the rhetoric was followed by action in some places and not in others is at the centre of understanding how development works”. While Dercon focuses on national economies, it is even more interesting to analyse whether this concept could be useful at a regional and continental level. How might AfCFTA secretary general Mene or other regional policymakers use the concept of ‘regional development bargains’ to make the AfCFTA and its benefits a reality? The following three areas are worth exploring: regional industrialisation; regional trade and transport corridors; and the role of external partners such as the EU in supporting these. Regional industrialisation bargains Recent evidence suggests that intra-African trade has a higher share of manufactures than non-African trade and that the past trend of deindustrialisation since African independence may have slowly been reversed. That seems to bode well for the AfCFTA ambition of promoting regional value chains (RVCs), while the low starting point lends weight to the argument that inWamkele Mene and the AfCFTA roulette Poorva Karkare, Bruce Byiers 42

dustrial policy will be key to AfCFTA success. However, even at a national level, industrial policy success depends on the kinds of elite bargains that Dercon refers to. Actor and interests must align to address a whole host of “internal coordination and management issues that are essential for achieving competitiveness”. At a regional level, the complexity rises further, helping explain why past regional industrialisation strategies have often struggled to move from policy to practice. For instance, although the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) initially sought to become a customs union, the process stalled due to concerns among members that their industrial sectors were ill-prepared to further open up trade. This led them to adopt a regional industrialisation strategy to boost production, with a stated ambition of promoting RVCs. Other regions have done the same but all with similar outcomes: competition among states trumps cooperation between them, as seen in the regular ‘trade wars’ within the different regional customs unions in East and West Africa. That would suggest there needs to be a ‘regional development bargain’ to promote private sector development, investment and job creation, not just within states but also between states. That requires a joint commitment among multiple heads of state “to shape politics, the economy, and society” in the name of regional growth and development through trade and investment. But is that possible? In a recent speech, Secretary General Mene mentioned the possible need for a new continental industrial policy. This new policy would replace or build on the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) initiative, which was endorsed by African heads of state in 2008, but has also struggled to gain traction. It could be that the new focus on continental trade and RVCs merits a renewed strategy to promote investment and coordination in key sectors. Analyses, such as those conducted by UNCTAD and ITC, suggest that RVCs could indeed emerge in certain important sectors like pharmaceuticals, agro-processing and automobiles. Here, Secretary General Mene, the AfCFTA state parties and their international partners will need to identify not only the economic viability of promoting intra-African RVCs, as current studies do, but also where an RVC ‘development bargain’ already exists or is emerging and can thus be supported. Regional corridor bargains The AfCFTA Secretariat has chosen to work on the Abidjan Lagos Corridor in West Africa. Back to Dercon: is there a development bargain between the corridor states and indeed the regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)? Evidence from the Nigerian border closure with Benin, partly related to smuggling but also to industrial protection, suggests there is quite some distance to go at that particular border. A corridor approach may offer a way to support trade in a bottom-up, more manageable way, focusing on barriers and specific areas for reform. But they may also require a ‘development bargain’ at different levels of intervention – at the borders themselves, along corridor routes, between high-level politicians, and arguably with the wider regional economic community. Recent work on the Dakar-Bamako corridor shows that despite high-level political interest and commitment to promoting corridor transport even in 2011, ten years later, strikes were still taking place to complain about the lack of progress in removing the same barriers. Here, the ‘bargain’, if there was one, broke down at the administrative level, where bureaucratic and other economic interests were able to block corridor reforms – ‘profitable inefficiency’ if you will. That said, past work on the Beira and Nacala corridors, connecting Malawi to the Mozambican coast, illustrates that even within one country, one corridor (Beira) can have something of a development bargain around it, while another (Nacala) is the surrounded by rent-seeking. 43

That suggests that a development bargain could emerge on the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor if the right actors are involved and incentives can align around the need for smoother cross-border conditions. External supporting bets The AfCFTA is very much an African agenda, driven by African actors. To his credit, Secretary General Mene has been steering a difficult path between accepting external financial support while keeping a firm grip on the direction of his dossier. Nonetheless, there is a place for external support as agreements with the UK and other international partners attest. The challenge here, à la Dercon, is that aid should only be used where it somehow supports a development bargain, or helps one to emerge. How will assistance change the odds of success? Will it strengthen those with a focus on growth and development or will it give ammunition to those keen to capture more rents? The EU is currently programming its funding to support economic integration in Africa through the regional communities, the AfCFTA and a series of corridors. Even if framed as the ‘EU Global Gateway’, it is also framed as supporting the AfCFTA and integration more broadly. Yet it is not clear to what extent they are able to take account of the ideas discussed here. They too must understand contexts and the key actors engaged to identify where their aid can support or help development bargains emerge around industrialisation, trade and corridors – indeed attention to the first may need to precede the latter – and given the regional focus, where these are happening between and within countries and regions. Some development actors are arguably already somewhat in the betting game. Organisations such as the multi-donor funded Trademark East Africa have worked with and through regional politics for many years in East Africa, while in West Africa and the Great Lakes trade facilitation programmes also seek to support trade and traders with an eye to working within the local, national and regional politics. While not easy and requiring a degree of flexibility and adaptability in programming and implementation, an approach that looks for and works with regional and cross-border political-economic ‘bargains’ is surely a signal of ‘aid effectiveness’. Altering the odds? If indeed development is best seen as a gamble, Secretary General Mene has been given a lot of chips, and people are queuing up to give him more. He, his staff and their regional colleagues will therefore need a clear idea of what games are being played on the different tables. There is a lot of existing knowledge about where power relations lie, and how state-business relations shape sector development in different countries. But bringing these to the fore can be tricky unless done so in a more neutral, analytical way. At the same time, there is a whole range of African and other researchers and think tanks following the AfCFTA processes at all levels, including the related politics. Their analyses might be drawn on to inform and facilitate the process of AfCFTA implementation and external support – to alter the odds of success, so to speak. Though that in itself may be a gamble... The irony of it all is that the AfCFTA is a bargain by definition – the result of explicit negotiations between states. Even if and when those negotiations are complete, there will still be a lot of betting and gambling to do to get it implemented, before eventually translating it into tangible development. ❧ ❧ ❧ Poorva Karkare is a Policy Officer at European Centre for Development Policy Management Dr. Bruce Byiers is a development economist with a DPhil from the University of Sussex. He leads the ECDPM Programme on African Economic Integration 44

I n October 2022, the Secretary General of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, His Excellency Wamkele Mene, spoke with the global affairs think tank Overseas Development Institute and indicated the four main challenges holding back intra-African trade: market fragmentation, small-sized economies, lack of industrial capacity, and the continued exportation of primary commodities to traditional markets in the Global North. When one dissects these challenges, it becomes clear that the most important policy governments in Africa need to get right is industrial policy, not trade policy. It’s important to be clear that industrial policy does not mean manufacturing policy. The scope of industrial policy includes industries such as tourism, agriculture, mining and IT-based services, as well as the coordination of key enabler sectors like energy, finance and telecoms. It is the policy to develop the productive capacity of a country by supporting the private sector to produce and export value-added goods, rather than primary ones. Industrial policy is the most important of all economic policies because it is the only one that can bring coherence across the many disparate set of economic policies that governments have. It is also the only economic policy that deliberately targets the restructuring of the entire economy toward inclusive growth. Monetary, trade and fiscal policies cannot play this leadership and coordination function. Monetary policy, for example, is about money supply and demand, inflation management and exchange rate management. It doesn’t deliberately target the non-monetary economy: the capability of a country to make goods, provide services, create jobs and raise household incomes. Trade policy also doesn’t deliberately target the capacity of a country to make goods and to provide services. It focuses on improving the ability of countries to exchange goods and services with others by ensuring the flow of goods across borders. Whether or not the trade involves imports or exports, primary commodities or value-added goods is not its core concern. For this reason, while trade policy in Africa over the past three decades has been generally good at opening up markets and reducing cross-border barriers, it has not succeeded in addressing the challenges of small economies and market fragmentation that H. E. Mene mentioned. This is because sector development and trade facilitation are two different things. In fact, trade has facilitated value-added imports and primary exports, when what is needed much more is primary imports and value-added exports. Moreover, despite existing trade facilitation efforts, markets in Africa have not been able to defragment half as much as they need to and the main business vested interests have remained largely insular and cautious of the AfCFTA. Similarly, fiscal policy cannot bring the coherence needed around productive capacity – even though on paper one might argue that it could through the government’s budget-setting process. Fiscal policy is chiefly concerned with fiscal stability, like monetary policy is concerned with monetary stability. The emphasis ends up being on debt management and keeping the governments’ lights switched on while trying to mobilise as much short-term tax revenue as possible. This is because most fiscal years in most African countries are budget crisis years. Over the past decades, efforts have been made to scale up medium-term plans for the budget following public financial The key to AfCF TA success is industrial policy, not trade policy Jonathan Said 45

management best practices. But this approach hasn’t really delivered strategic and structural shifts in many of the economies of the continent because fiscal policy alone cannot guide economies towards actually growing firm and industry capability without industrial policy. This is much the same reason why the chief financial officer of a business is a different role from the chief executive officer and the chief strategy and product officer. Financial sustainability and developing one’s capacity to produce and sell products are two different concepts, despite being related. Industrial policy can bring coherence to all the above policies as well as to energy policy, land policy, transport policy, digital policy, education policy, and so on by giving a clear ‘real’ economy benchmark that they can all be anchored to. It does this in two ways. First, it allows for proper, constructive dialogue and collaboration with those that actually develop a country’s productive capacity - the private sector – on what holds them back from expanding and investing. Second, it channels that feedback from the private sector into the mammoth and multi-headed organisation that is the government, giving government leaders the ability to identify practical solutions to specific bottlenecks and to actually follow up on the solutions. So if an industry that has the potential to export value-added products to other African countries is facing market access bottlenecks, electricity bottlenecks, a skills gap and poor internet connectivity, industrial policy plays a ‘clearing house’ role to signal to trade facilitation stakeholders, electricity stakeholders, TVET stakeholders and digital stakeholders – all of whom are disparate groups of organisations and people in the government as well as non-government actors, with their own separate priorities, views, constraints and issues - that they need to respond and do their best to address the bottlenecks. And it can provide internal accountability and enforcement, using the executive powers of the Head of State, to ensure follow up by those stakeholders. With proper structures for support to these stakeholders, this allows for policy coherence around specific problems, investments and industries that government leaders – who we must recall are politicians - can rally and organise around. This last point is critical. In his remarks at the Overseas Development Institute, H. E. Mene also alluded to another critical ingredient for AfCFTA’s success: the direct involvement of the heads of state. For decades now, the African value-adding private sector has been clear that the most important condition it needs is policy coherence from governments, so it can plan accordingly and not face too many curve balls that disrupt their plans. If fiscal policy, electricity policy, land policy, TVET policy and so on are going in different directions, then the value-adding private sector significantly under-invests. Only heads of state and those directly empowered by them can coordinate the disparate ministries and agencies of government that shape such policies. But for the last four decades at least, heads of state in Africa have not been provided with the key policy tool to coordinate these various policies. We have mistakenly thought that monetary, fiscal and trade policies could do this – but they have each shown they cannot. So for AfCFTA to meet its ambition, it’s time to unlock the transformative power of industrial policy so heads of state can coordinate governments and let the value-adding private sector and inclusive markets do their job and accelerate intra-African trade and the continent’s industrialisation and economic transformation. ❧ ❧ ❧ Jonathan Said is an economic development specialist and manager born in Malta, with 18 years of experience. He works with governments and African international organisations to accelerate economic transformation and job creation. 46

From illicit financial flows to wealth creation for Africans: Some strategic concepts Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu Aid or development assistance to Africa pales in comparison to the amount of money siphoned out of the region by foreign corporations. These illegal movements of capital have thrived for many years as a result of the flawed belief by African governments that there is no other alternative to the extraction and processing of their natural resources outside of a dependence on the more technologically advanced countries. However, the penetration of the internet across Africa presents a strategic opportunity for African governments to redirect their gaze from the so-called technologically advanced countries to building technologically savvy Africans. The internet has finally loosened the centuries-old grip of the West on technological knowledge, and liberalized learning for all interested persons. African countries will have to adopt approaches that empower small-scale, citizen-based direct participation in the extraction and processing of natural resources. According to a September 2020 study released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Africa suffers a loss of around US$88.56 billion in illegal capital flight every year. This amount is comparable to 3.7% of the continent’s gross domestic product. According to the research, between 2000 and 2015, a total of $836 billion worth of illicitly obtained funds were covertly funneled out of Africa. Now compare this with Africa’s total foreign debt in 2018, which stood at $770 billion, and make the conclusions yourself. Corporate robbery often takes the form of illegal movements of money from one country to another, and may involve revenues from illegal activities, tax avoidance, abusive profitshifting, and trade mis-invoicing, among others. Africa is especially vulnerable to these illegal capital flights for many reasons. The continent’s major trade, which remains the export of raw, primary commodities and natural resources (such as cocoa, coffee, tea, crude oil, and mineral deposits, including gold, bauxite, tantalum, tin, gold, and others) exposes it to the vagaries of multinationals. In many African countries, trade data demonstrates that exporters routinely under-invoice their goods, which results in persistently under-reported overseas shipments. In Ivory Coast, for example, which is the leading cocoa producer in the world, partnerships between the domestic elite and foreign firms are characterised by rentseeking, where the former looked the other way for the latter to advance their corrupt interests. In the case of South Africa, mining corporations have been involved in significant capital flight and tax fraud by under-invoicing their shipments. In Angola, capital flight has ensured that the presence of a now much depleted and rapidly diminishing crude oil reserve has only enriched the country’s ruling class and foreign transnational corporations, while the majority of Angolans profit little to nothing. These examples are evidence that foreign corporations and governments are complicit in capital flight, cutting across many nationalities: China, the United States, European countries, South American countries, etc. In some cases, under-invoicing occurs with the explicit approval of corrupt government agents; yet in many cases, these transnational corporations are able to singlehandedly engage in actions that cheat African countries of billions of dollars in revenue. Outside of corrupt Africans and multinational corporations, 47

capital flight is also fuelled by a complex web of global enablers, including bankers, accountants, lawyers, and politicians. These parties facilitate the outflow of undeclared profits and shipments from Africa, but they also make it possible for such to be hidden in offshore secret jurisdictions. Education will be fundamental in combating capital fight in Africa. Many Africans still associate their governments and territories with the colonial administration; so conniving with foreigners to dupe their own governments are conducted along that thinking pattern. The idea of building statehood as the personal responsibility of every citizen remains alien in the minds of many formerly colonized Africans. Citizen enlightenment at the level of formal, nonformal, and informal education is crucial to transforming this colonial mindset. Citizens must see themselves as gatekeepers, whether they work for the government, run a business, or deal with multinational corporations that do business in their area. Another important point is that the explosion of information technology has rendered the idea that large-scale multinationals are indispensable when it comes to technological advancement almost redundant in many sectors of operation across Africa. African governments will have to find ways to disengage with as many multinationals as possible while supporting small-scale mining and natural resource prospecting by citizens. In an internet age, where it is becoming easier by the day to establish and coordinate a widespread supply market, this task can be achieved quite easily. Gone are the days when the only route to becoming a manufacturing or processing giant was through the establishment of huge processing factories by governments, wealthy individuals, or multinationals. African governments must now set up structures to make it easier for citizens to establish small-scale mining and natural resource processing units, with the government acting more as a coordinating body. African governments can set the pace in subverting the established routes to becoming an industrial giant by “scaling out” (involving the masses) rather than “scaling up” (investing in massive technology and structures). The emphasis will be on building a citizen base devoted to national advancement, willing to work hard in their chosen fields of endeavour and pay taxes. Africa’s greatest assets are its citizens. These citizens must be empowered en masse to take charge of the continent’s natural resources. African countries will have to toe uncharted pathways to keep the bulk of the continent’s wealth in the hands of its people. Training a crop of citizens with a nation-building mindset is the first step to establishing Africa as a manufacturing giant. This will be followed by or undertaken together with looking away from large-scale extraction and manufacturing enterprises and focusing on encouraging citizens to venture into research and development on basic manufacturing and production mechanisms. With rapidly increasing internet access and penetration across the region, the time has come for a paradigm shift for Africa as far as natural resource management and processing are concerned. The focus shouldn’t be on traditions and practices brought over from other continents and run on imperialist ethos. Instead, the focus should be on what will help a larger number of Africans use the continent’s natural resources to build stronger and more prosperous communities. ❧ ❧ ❧ Dr. Chika Ezeanya Esiobu is a Nigerian writer and academic. 48

Africa states must open up the airspace for the benefit of the African people Joachim Buwembo The 6th Aviation Africa Summit and Exhibition held in Kigali on September 12 came as a reminder of a sad reality: Africa remains fragmented in 55 airspaces and this has greatly harmed the average African who cannot enjoy the social, cultural, intellectual and economic benefits of travelling easily to and visiting other parts of the continent. There is no justification for this state of affairs. While Africa’s 1.22 billion people make up about 15 percent of the world’s population, Africans constitute less than 1 percent of global air traffic. This would certainly change if governments enacted and implemented policies to unify our airspace. And what is more important, the cost of flying within our purportedly integrated regions would get drastically cheaper, boosting economic growth and human development. In the East African Community, the freedoms and opportunities of 300 million citizens would get a dramatic boost. Picture this: If two airports are only a couple of a hundred kilometres apart but located on different sides of a border between two neighbouring East African countries, a flight between them costs four or more times as much as a flight between two airports with the same distance apart if they are situated within the boundaries of a single territory. The difference is caused by the two being under different jurisdictions both on ground and in the air. To illustrate it more clearly, even if the different airlines decided to charge a passenger nothing, the journey would still cost over one hundred dollars because of different charges imposed by East African states should their citizens fly within our so-called economic union but 49

across borders. For instance, the company that gives you a free ticket would still have to factor in charges levied by the civil aviation authorities of the two countries between which you are flying, and currently these come to about a hundred dollars in total. And it is the poorest of East Africa’s poor who foot these charges because the policymakers usually have their tickets paid for by the taxpayers, while the businessmen and women pass of their expenses to the consumers of their products and services. Why is it that people in Africa can communicate using phones and the internet at the same speed as those in Europe and America, travel on the road as fast as those in Europe and America, but cannot fly within their continent like Europeans fly around Europe and Americans fly across America? Africans did not invent the internet and road vehicles but use them. They have demand for them and make it worthwhile for entrepreneurs to invest in availing them. But when it comes to aviation services, why do African governments appear to work tooth and nail to block their citizens from flying? Whenever you try to inquire into the cause of the aviation vacuum over Africa, one town name always comes up: Yamoussoukro. This is the Ivorian city where in 1988 a process to rescue and grow African aviation was initiated and the Yamoussoukro Declaration was issued. In 1999, the declaration was upgraded to a decision, at another meeting of transport ministers. The objectives of the declaration and decision revolve around the quest for a full liberalization of the African air transport industry. This involves opening the skies over Africa for Africans by creating a unified airspace. Later in 2013, the continental leaders who marking half a century of the AU and its precursor the Organizaton of African Unity, strengthened the Yamoussoukro deal by endorsing the creation of the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM) to operationalize the opening up of the African sky. Then came the anticlimax – it was given a timeline of being attained in 2063!   Now, when you ask the nearest knowledgeable person why governments in Africa cannot ratify the single airspace, the most likely answer you will get is ‘prestige and pride of having national carriers which would get outcompeted and die if the airspaces were opened up or unified. If you ask a politician, they will probably claim that the airline is necessary to market the country and attract tourists. As if traveling to a country on its national carrier is a significant factor for someone to make the decision to come for a tour! So, the AU, through the implementing agency for the Yamoussoukro accord, has drawn up a transition that can only be attained in 2063. How many AU policy makers/ influencers will still be alive in 2063?  Let us pray for them to be around to enjoy the fruit of their visionary decision making. Some changes may even have taken place regarding the boundaries and number of states constituting Africa by that time.  Both the International Air Travel Association (IATA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) wish the Yamoussoukro declarations and decisions to take off. They even provide research and data support for the SAATM process to progress. One of the IATA and ICAO’s desires is to improve safety and reduce accidents. As we should all know, safety is the number one consideration of the aviation industry. In East Africa, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) will be opening for a new season in a month or so, following the election of new members in the different member state parliaments. Can at least one of the 63 members move a motion for the fast tracking of unifying the East Africa’s airspace? We need to know from the debate that would ensue if there are any stronger reasons than “national prestige” and “national pride” that makes it impossible to open East Africa’s airspace in three months. And we don’t want the option of waiting until AU’s single airspace comes alive in 2063. Time is of the essence! ❧ ❧ ❧ Joachim Buwembo is Ugandan social and political commentator 50