The Challenge to an Argentine Merchant House in the Late 18th Century

By Ruprecht

Poensgen

INTRODUCTION

This article will discuss the impact of the crisis of 1790s on the commercial world of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. It will focus on the Anchorena family as representative members of an important economic and social sector of La Plata. The 1790s, throughout the Hispanic world, were part of a larger period of growing crises ( 1 7 8 9 1810), the crisis of the Spanish colonial system. Using the Anchorenas as a case study, this research attempts to show different aspects of this era in the most southern part of the Spanish Empire as well as the crisis' specific significance for a particular group of Buenos Aires' merchants. 1 The Anchorenas perceived the 1790s as an all-embracing crisis. The importance of the crisis in the late 18th century consisted in its total and irrevocable nature. „ The impact of the French Revolution lead to dramatic and decisive change for Spain and its empire. With the death of the most competent of the Spanish Bourbons, Charles III, began one of the most remarkable chapters of Spanish history, a chapter which would end in Napoleon's 1 This article is based on the author's unpublished master's thesis, "Die Krise des spanischen Kolonialsystems aus der Sicht der Anchorenas, 1 7 8 9 - 1810. Ein Bonarenser Handelshaus am Vorabend der argentinischen Unabhängigkeit", Universität zu Köln 1991. It is a revised version of a paper which was presented in April 1993 at the "The Eighth Annual Virginias-Carolinas Latin American Colonial History Seminar" in Charleston, South Carolina (USA). The author, actually working on his Ph. D. thesis, likes to express his thanks to Susan M. Socolow, Kristin Ruggiero and Eduardo Saguier for their remarks.

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occupation of Spain and the beginning of the Spanish-American revolutions. A decline in all aspects in the mother-country was reflected in the crisis of the Spanish colonial system. Under the reign of Charles IV and his prime minister Godoy, Spain no longer was able to maintain its role as an economic and political metropolis for its colonies. From 1793 up to 1808 Spain waged in changing alliances an almost permanent war with France (1793-1795; 1808-1813), Great Britain (1796-1802; 1804-1808), and Portugal (1801; 1807). The military conflicts sometimes affected Spain's territory, usually its coasts. Little by little the Spanish navy perished (St. Vicente 1797; Trafalgar 1805). Without doubt, Spain's participation in the European wars reflected its political weakness and its lasting dependence on France and England, both struggling for the predominance in the Old World. To be sure, the decline of Spanish political and military power also became manifest in the New World itself, as the losses of Santo Domingo (1795), Trinidad (1797), and Louisiana (1803) show. Spain's colonial crisis also meant deep economic confusion and difficulties within its empire. During wartimes, the enemy's navy, corsairs, and pirates separated and isolated the colonies' economy and communication from its mother-country. Mutual trade on both sides of the Atlantic was ruined. The so called free trade system (comercio libre), put into force in 1778 in La Plata, now was left without realistic foundation. Due to this fact, from 1791 the Spanish authorities reacted by opening La Plata's market to foreign merchants. At the turn of the century, another focus of economic troubles became evident: Upper Peru's silver mines faced intense production problems because of the decreased supply of Spanish mercury. As a result, the Viceroyalty's economic motor generated visible social tensions. The crisis of the Spanish colonial system was reflected in nearly all of its areas. In fact, the late 18th century saw a growing uncertainty toward traditional Hispanic political, social, and cultural notions. Attentive observers of their worlds in Spain and the Río de la Plata became alarmed by the state's and individual's changing attitudes and behavior. Indeed, longtime inherited political, cultural, moral and religious fundamental truths began to be questioned as a result of the advancing Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, revolutions in France and Haiti, and Spain's own decline. New ideological currents penetrated the Spanish Empire and the members of its upper stratum had to deal with them. Even if they could not escape the confrontation

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with a new ideological spirit, they did not all react in the same way. Some of the more progressive minded welcomed and enthusiastically embraced the new thinking. Other members of the upper class with a more conservative ideology and mentality, including the Anchorenas, considered the new ideas as dangerous and confusing. Because they observed behind Spain's general crisis a moral decline of European society, they stuck to their traditional convictions. This article focuses on a family whose name is well known in Argentine history and in the historiography of the Río de la Plata. If it is possible to link the Anchorenas to Argentine politics for several generations, they also can be considered a classic example of a familiy whose rise into the nineteenth-century landed oligarchy was based upon eighteenth-century immigration followed by a successful merchant career. Due to the "mythical character" of the Anchorenas many historians writing on Argentina frequently mention them. Nonetheless, little attention has been given to the fortune of the first generation of the Anchorenas in La Plata. 2 A rich documentation reflects both the formation of the family's original fortune and the crisis of the Spanish Empire in the Río de la Plata. The correspondence which Juan Esteban de Anchorena maintained with the commercial agents of his merchant house is a part of a large

1 The "myth" of the family is based first of all upon ils wealth which already at the end of the 18th century presented "algo de fabuloso", see Tulio Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra. Formación de una Elite Dirigente en la Argentina Criolla (2. ed., México 1979). Almost all biographers of the Anchorenas focused their studies on the Independence or post-Independence period; see the studies of Andrés M. Carretero, Los Anchorenas, Política y negocios en el siglo XIX (8. ed., Buenos Aires 1970); Julio Irazusta, Tomas Manuel de Anchorena o ¡a emancipación americana a la luz de la circunstancia histórica (2. ed., Buenos Aires 1962); Juan José Sebreli, La saga de los Anchorenas (3. ed.. Buenos Aires 1986) - it is a revision of his study Apogeo y ocaso de los Anchorena, first published in 1972. See also Jonathan C. Brown, A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776-1860 (Cambridge 1979); John Lynch, Argentine Dictator. Juan Manuel de Rosas, ¡829-1852 (Oxford 1981); David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987. Desde la colonización española hasta Alfonsin (Buenos Aires 1989), p. 81; and Nicolas Shumway, The invention of Argentina (Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford 1991), pp. 1 5 - 1 6 and pp. 2 5 - 2 6 . - Only Ibaguren's article "La rebelión de Tupac Amaru al través de las cartas de José de la Cuadra a Juan Esteban de Anchorena": Historia (Buenos Aires), XVI (1967), pp. 7 9 - 1 0 4 puts his main focus on the colonial era; See also Rose Marie Buechler's study on late colonial Potosí which she partly based on Anchorena's archive: Gobierno, minería y sociedad. Potosí y el "Renacimiento" Borbónico 1776-1810 (La Paz 1990), 2 vols.

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collection of documents 3 which covers a whole century of Argentine history. The first records which can be found, date from soon after the arrival of Juan Esteban de Anchorena at Buenos Aires in mid-eighteenth century. 4 Most of the existant letters were written to Juan Esteban de Anchorena by his agents and his oldest son, Juan José Cristóbal. As a result, the article will not only focus on the Anchorenas but as well on the merchants closely connected to their trading house. Another historical source integrated are the records of the consulado of Buenos Aires. 5 This paper concentrates on the primary sources. Juan Esteban de Anchorena, was descended from a Basque family. He was bom in Pamplona (February 1734) the third son of Domingo de Anchorena Elia and Juana Fermina de Zundueta. A few years later they moved together with their four children to the village of Berrotea in the valley of Baztán (Navarra). Juan Esteban passed his youth in Spain in rather humble conditions. He arrived in Buenos Aires in 1751.6 Anchorena shared his regional and social background with many young Spaniards who tried to make their fortune as merchants in Buenos Aires. Like other Spanish newcomers at La Plata, Juan Esteban de Anchorena possessed the talent, persistence, and luck to achieve an economic and social advancement within a relatively short time. He started his career as an employee in one of the existing porteño merchant houses, but by 1760 he already was traveling for his own business to Córdoba and Santa Fé. In the mid 1760s he worked as an comerciante minorista in trading activities with the merchant Miguel de Learte y Zegama of Cordoba, and in 1767 he registered as a pulpero in ' The so-called "Donación Carlos Ibarguren", Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter cited as AGN). Buenos Aires, Sala VII. 4 Although the existence of this documentation seems not t o . b e unknown, it has remained unpublished and was only in rare cases cited; see T. Halperin Donghi, Revolución y guerra, p. 42; and Enrique Williams Alzaga, Dos revoluciones, J" de Enero de 1809-25 de Mayo de I8J0 (Buenos Aires 1963), p. 54. Juan Carlos Garavaglia's essay about "El Río de la Plata en sus relaciones atlánticas; una balanza comercial (1779 - 1 7 8 4 ) " is also partly based on the correspondence of the Anchorenas; see Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Economía, sociedad, y regiones (Buenos Aires 1987), pp. 6 7 - 1 1 2 . 5 Archivo General de la Nación, (hereafter cited as AGN) Consulado de Buenos Aires, Acias - Documentos (Buenos Aires 1936-47), tomos I-IV. 6 Vicente Osvaldo Cútolo, Nuevo Diccionario Biográfico Argentino (1750-1930), I, pp. 160-161 (hereafter cited as NDBA). A letter of his sister shows that Anchorena left his parents' home in 1749; M.T. de Jesus y Anchorena to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina de Sena, Pamplona, 27.X.1786, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 5 ; The repeated statement of Anchorena's arrival at Buenos Aires in 1765, A. M. Carretero, Los Anchorenas, p. 10, J. C.Brown, A Socioeconomic History, p. 176, D.Rock, Argentina, p.81, is fiction.

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Buenos Aires. During the late sixties and early seventies he undertook several journeys to the interior (Salta, Jujuy) and Upper Peru (Potosí, Oruro, Chuquisaca), he extended his trade up to Lima and the Peruvian Pacific coast (Arica). His trade was based on domestic and European goods. By 1773 he had achieved an impressive fortune of 78.098 pesos. 7 Marriage often contributed to the increasing economic fortune of successful colonial merchants. In 1775 Anchorena married Romana Josefa López de Anaya y Gámiz de las Cuevas. Although Anchorena's bride contributed almost nothing to the couple's fortune, she probably belonged to one of the several impoverished, but nevertheless old and respected families of Buenos Aires. Even if Romana Josefa did not descend from an economical powerful family she helped her husband to consolidate his prestige by extending his social and economic network. Juan Esteban was 41 years, Romana Josefa was only 21. Only three of the couple's seven children survived infancy (Juan José Cristóbal, 1780; Tomás Manuel, 1783; Nicolás Mariano, 1785). From 1779 the family lived in their own house close to the "most successful" merchants in one of the most distinguished quarters of Buenos Aires. 8 Bureaucratic offices were disputed among merchants within the late colonial society. Juan Esteban de Anchorena held various local offices. Beginning 1776 he served as an alférez real of the milicias de caballería lugareñas and in 1781 he was promoted to its second in command. In 1785, as a consequence of his growing economic and social importance, the porteño merchants elected Anchorena to a group of 15 representatives who lobbied for a consulado. Desirous of improving his weakened health and engaging in business, Anchorena 7 See AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 1 ; AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 ; A G N , División Colonia, Sec. Gobierno, Tribunales, J X - 4 0 - 2 - 4 ; A G N , R-. 5 1775, Eufrasio Joseph Boyso, F. 3 0 3 306, and A. M. Carretero, Los Anchorena, p. 10. 8 V. Cútolo, NDBA, I, p. 160. According to Anchorena's capita!, the match was already decided in 1773. Because Anchorena was travelling to the "Reinos de Perú", he asked Cristóbal de Aguirre to make a marriage contract with Josefa Romana's mother; AGN, R. 5 1775, Eufrasio Joseph Boyso, F. 3 0 3 - 3 0 6 . Romana Josefa López de Anaya was bom in 1754; AGN, Padrón de Buenos Aires, 196. Following Sebreli, her maternal branch, the Gámiz de las Cuevas, had already immigrated to Buenos Aires in the sixteenth century, J. J. Sebreli, La saga, p. 52. At the end of the 18th century, the Anchorena family lived in the cuartel 3, manzana 42, which was adjacent to Buenos Aires's central square; see Susan Migden Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires. Family and Commerce (Cambridge 1978), pp. 7 2 - 7 3 . To Anchorena's new relatives belonged the families of Aguirre, Bosch, Ezcurra, Rodríguez, Rosas, and Saénz. As a result, Anchorena could establish closer personal connections to the families of Azcuénaga, Basavilbaso, Santa Coloma, and Ugarte. See J. J. Sebreli, La saga, p. 42.

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traveled to his native country in mid 1786, returning to the Rio de la Plata in early 1788, Although he had been exempted in 1787 from all offices within the town council, in 1789 the cabildo of Buenos Aires invested him with the office of the diputado del Ramo de Policía. When, in 1794, the consulado was finally established in Buenos Aires, Anchorena became its first consul. As such he served for three years, and then he represented Buenos Aires' trade as a regular member of the consulado until 1799. 9 Transatlantic links were emphasized by Buenos Aires' merchants. Already in the early 1770s Juan Esteban de Anchorena's commercial relations reached large parts of the most southern colonies of the Spanish Empire including Peru and Chile and also Spain. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century he traded with Cordoba, Tucumán, Salta, Jujuy, Charcas, Tarija, Potosí, Moxos, Oruro, Cochabamba, La Paz, Cádiz, Málaga, Valencia, La Coruña, Santander, and Madrid. Anchorena's commerce extended indirectly to France, England, the Hanseatic towns, and Spanish Central-America. From Spain he imported silverware, books and in particular all types of European (including Spanish) textiles. He exported American goods like hides, sugar, tobacco, and wool. At the same time he was engaged in the internal trade of yerba mate and Upper Peruvian textiles. 10 In the late 18th century, Juan Esteban de Anchorena based his operations on close commercial relations with about ten merchants within the New and Old World. Within the Viceroyalty he maintained the bulk of his trading activities with Francisco Antonio Diaz (Cordoba), Ramón Saravia (Salta), Manuel de la Quintana (Jujuy), Joaquín de Obregon Zevallos, and Juan Esteban de Ezcurra (both Potosí). His commerce with the metropolis was built with El Conde de las Cinco Torres, Agustín de Arrivillaga, Joseph Genesy (all Cádiz), Manuel José Pérez (La Coruña),

" See V. Cútolo, ΝDB A, p. 160; AGN, Consulado de Buenos Aires, 1, pp. 11-12; AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 ; 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 ; 7 - 4 - 2 - 5 ; 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 ; Archivo General de la Nación, Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Publicados bajo la dirección del Director del Archivo Genera] de la Nación Augusto S. Maillié, Serie III, tomo X, p. 254; Germán O. Tjarks, El Consulado de Buenos Aires y sus proyecciones en la historia del Rio de la Plata, Advertencia de Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois (Buenos Aires 1962), II, pp. 888 - 8 8 9 . In 1789 Anchorena was relieved From his military obligations, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 1-2. 10 See J. J. Sebreli, La saga, p. 42, and p. 65; A. M. Carretero, Los Anchorena, pp. 11 - 1 3 . With regard to the Upper Peruvian trade, see Enrique Tandeter et al., The Market of Potosí at the End of the Eighteenth Century (London 1987), pp. 11 - 1 2 .

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José Antonio de Arrangoiz (Santander), and Ramón Gómez (Madrid). Almost all of these merchants were important economic and social figures who also engaged in independent business affairs. They should not be regarded only as Anchorena's agents but also as his economic partners linked together by mutual commercial interests, although they never established a proper company. The location of their merchant houses reveals that Anchorena had founded his trade on two commercial networks. One covered a majority of Spain's important ports and its capital, while the second extended along the traditional silver route to Upper Peru. His correspondence shows as well that the merchants on both sides of the Atlantic maintained a constant communication among themselves. Juan José Cristobal de Anchorena, the oldest son of the family, was educated at the Real Colegio de San Carlos and probably received his commercial formation at his father's trading house. In 1798, at the age of eighteen, Juan José Cristobal left his native town to undertake his first trading work. He remained four years in Potosí where on behalf of his father he became involved in various commercial activities. Thus, Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena, who traveled to Spain as well in the early nineteenth century, shared the pattern of his career with the majority of the creole merchants of Buenos Aires." Because of the trade's longtime economic importance for Buenos Aires, its merchants like the Anchorenas had always played an essential role in porteño society. The wholesale merchants (comerciantes mayoristas) who traded goods over large distances between the Old and New World and within South America belonged, in a city with almost no titled-nobility, to the most distinguished social groups of the city. The growing size of the merchant group was one indication of La Plata's enormous economic dynamism during the eighteenth century. In 1736 Buenos Aires counted 20 comerciantes mayoristas, their number almost tripled by 1756; the size of the merchant group in 1778 reached 168. By 1798 the number of comerciantes mayoristas rose to 204. Thus during the first twenty years after the introduction of the comercio libre, for the first time during the eighteenth century, the commercial sector's expansion slowed. Moreover, a commercial almanac of Madrid in 1802, " AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 ; 7 - 4 - 1 - 6 ; See Susan Migden Socolow, "La burguesía comercial de Buenos Aires en el siglo XVIII": Enrique Florescano (ed.). Orígenes y desarrollo de la burguesía en América Latina, 1700-1955 (México/Caracas/Buenos Aires 1985), p. 504.

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estimates the size of the porteño merchant group at only 138. Even if one regards this number as probably too small, it certainly marks a downward trend for the end of the century and the following decade. In fact, the decrease of Buenos Aires' commercial sector was a true reflection of the crisis of the 1790s and its "high level of economical instability and insecurity".12 Historians frequently maintain that the merchants of Buenos Aires, including the Anchorenas and other high ranking comerciantes mayoristas, played a predominant role as intermediary traders involved in a "passive trade".13 To be sure, to some extent it is justified to describe the porteño merchant in geographical and economical terms as an intermediary trader linking the South-American and European markets. Many important merchants, including the Anchorenas, displayed a strong economic orientation toward Spain. But in no way the economic operations of the comerciantes mayoristas of Buenos Aires should be reduced to mere commission activities. Porteño merchants were endowed with their own capital which they invested in an independent trade. They worked on their own account and their own risk, they imported and exported, they had free access to the Spanish market, and even sometimes they were equipped with their own ships. 14

12 See S. M. Socolow, "La burguesía comercial", ρ, 501; Hugo R. Galmarini, "Comercio y burocracia colonial. A propósito de Tomás Antonio Romero. (Primera parte)": Investigaciones y Ensayos 28 (Buenos Aires, enero-junio de 1980), p.407; S. M. Socolow, Merchants, pp. 1 2 - 1 3 , and p. 67; José Torre Revello, La sociedad colonial. Páginas sobre la sociedad de Buenos Aires entre los siglos XVI y XIX (Buenos Aires 1970), pp. 106— 107. 15 "Se trata, en muchos casos, de meros consignatorios de casas españolas. Los Anchorena, Alzaga, Santa Coloma, Matheu, Larrea, que provienen del norte de España, reúnen una apreciable riqueza mediante el apacible oficio de intermediarios comerciales entre la Península y el Río de la Plata", Carlos S. Assadourian et. al., Argentina: De la conquista a la independencia (Buenos Aires 1986), p. 315. See also T. Halperín Donghi: Revolución y guerra, ρ, 42: "la mayor parte de los mercaderes porteños son consignatorios de casas españoles ( . . . ) . Pero aun quienes no se reducen a actuar como agentes de comerciantes peninsulares se limitan a unas operaciones sin misterio ni riesgo: basta hojear la correspondencia de Anchorena para advertir hasta qué punto su papel se limita al de un intermediario entre la península y el hinterland cada vez más amplio". 14 "The vast majority of porteño merchants were not factors or agents of Cádiz-based firms", S. M. Socolow, Merchants, p. 170. See also Wedovoy's study about the economic mentality of Buenos Aires' merchants: Manuel José de Lavardén, Nuevo aspecto del comercio en el Río de la Plata. Estudio preliminar por Enrique Wedovoy (Buenos Aires 1955).

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L. REVOLUTIONS AND WARS: THE 1790S IN EUROPE AND SPAIN

The correspondence of Anchorena and his agents is rich in comments on European politics, reflecting their view of the world, and their comments on far ranging political and economic events. 15

1.1 THE IMPACT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French Revolution shook the political and social foundations of the Old World. In particular Spain, characterized by a traditional, feudal, and cleric society and also ruled by Bourbons, was deeply shaken. France's changing social structure enforced by violence, its confrontation with the church, and finally the turbulent fall of its monarchy jeopardized the Family-Pact for the first time since 1733. From the start of the French Revolution, Anchorena was well informed by his agents in Spain. He already had foreseen the French events as Agustín de Arrivillaga acknowledged in a letter of August 1789. There, Arrivillaga reported the death of thousands of people in Paris commenting that nobody would know where everything "will end". Following the correspondence of Anchorena, one can hardly agree with Caillet-Bois' argument that Buenos Aires' "educated part of the population" embraced the beginning of the French Revolution. Juan Esteban de Anchorena shared the reaction of Ramón Gómez who was scandalized by the great number of thefts and violent death of noblemen: "The Lord may remedy this Kingdom which is found in such a deplorable state which is inexplicable". The stampede of clerics, the transformation of France into a-republic, the seizure and trial of the French monarch swamped the merchants' imagination. An enraged Conde de las Cinco Torres not only believed in the near "total ruin" of France but moreover he hoped for God's punishing lesson. A poem sent to Anchorena in October 1792 probably best demonstrates the scale of indignation among our merchants. Without doubt, for the monarchist and catholic minded Spanish traders the French Revolution was the

15 Observe for example Ramón Gómez' statemems about the outstanding military discipline of the Turks in their war against the Habsburg and, Russia; R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 12.VIII.I788, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 .

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work of devil. France, for seven decades Spain's ally and model for public reforms, had lost all. 16 The explosive political and social dimensions of the French events of 1789 clearly were perceived by Ramón Gómez. When Ireland experienced social disturbances in 1790, Gómez expected that other European countries, including Spain, would be struck by the "same illness". In fact, the fall out from the French Revolution extended, both in the Old and in the New World. In 1791, the Black slave population of the French-ruled Saint Domingue started a revolution which eventually led to Haitian independence. One echo of the lasting rebellions was heard in Anchorena's correspondence. For Gómez, the case was obvious: France's "illness" had proved "infectious". Moreover, the attraction of the revolutionary ideas was felt in Spain too. In 1798, Juan Esteban de Anchorena suspected the Catalans sympathized with republican ideas.17

1.2

S P A I N ' S WAR A G A I N S T T H E G O D L E S S F R A N C E

1793-1795

Spain's eventual military confrontation with the French Republic was at the beginning of the 1790s not in sight. In 1790, sustained armaments, the Nootka Bay incident, and traditional mistrust threatened somewhat 16 See Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois, Ensayo sobre el Río de la Plata y la Revolución Francesa (Buenos Aires 1929), p. 3 9 - 4 0 ; A. de Arrivillaga to J.E. de Anchorena, 4.VIII.1789, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.[VIII]. 1789, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 "En Francia hay muchas y grandes novedades: de sus resultas han ahorcado al Ministro de Hacienda y su hijo, con otros personajes de mucho carácter: han asolado la bastilla.. .son muchos los robos y desgracias que se experimentan, esperando ahorquen muchos, y entre él los algunos Principes de la sangre...". El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 2.VIII. 1791, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 : "Siguen las turbaciones de la Francia, y tenemos en nuestro Reino infinidad de eclesiásticos que han abandonado su patria, y ésta ya se ha declarado República, teniendo a su soberano aprisionado y formándole causa como a un hombre particular. Dios los alumbre, y los llame a sí", and El Conde de las Cinco Tones to J.E, de Anchorena, Cádiz, 24.X.1792, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 . For the poem, see "Appendix". 17 See R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 5.X.1790, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "La Irlanda se ha sublevado, y tiene puestos sobre las armas 50.000 hombres, quiere la libertad a imitación de la Francia.. .supongo que de esta misma enfermedad adolece la Inglaterra, y también la España". R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.XII.1791, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 "En el Guarico se han levantado los Negros contra sus amos quemándoles las casas, tierras de labor.. .lo cierto es que la Francia sigue con su enfermedad contagiosa..."; and J.E. de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 26.V11.I798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 2 - 6 .

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to reopen the door of war with Great Britain. As long as the political relations of the European powers remained in a state of flux and the Bourbons remained on the French throne, Anchorena s s agents failed to predict Spain's future political position. Moreover, shortly after the outbreak of the war between France and the Austrian-Prussian coalition in April 1792, at least Gómez' hopes rested on Spain's traditional ally. To be sure, Gómez did not sympathize with the revolutionists at all. But even if he was shocked by the brutal proceeding of the French troops in the Rhineland, he was more afraid of England's growing power which one day could "dictate the law to us". A few months later, while the coalition troops were threatening Paris, Gómez changed his mind. War against the godless France was well-deserved. The "sovereigns of Europe" had to react. One week after England, Spain, and other European states joined the coalition (February 1793), Anchorena's informant from the Spanish capital expected a "bloody war" for the whole continent. Europe aspired to "destroy the French nation". 18 The first news sent to Anchorena in early 1793 was characterized by the conviction that the great European coalition soon would overpower France. The murderers of the French King would be defeated by mid 1793. But expectations were based on a general misinterpretation of the reality. On the contrary, French troops invaded north-eastern Spain, including Anchorena's native region. The merchants became alarmed by the excessive costs of the war and increasingly nervous by the fierce defense of the French Republic. While the position of the coalition weakened, the merchants' aversion for France grew. In mid 1794, Gómez' last hope was God. 19

18 See El Conde de las Cinco Torres to Juan E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 1.VI. 1790, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 . R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 1I.VIII.I790, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . R. Gómez to J,E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 7.VL1792, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 1 - 2 : ".. .a los prisioneros de esta nación [Alemania] les ahorcaron los Franceses contra el derecho de gentes: La guerra presente será muy sangrienta... A nosotros nos importa que la Francia salga con lucimiento porque de otro modo los Ingleses nos darán la ley". R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 10.VIII.1792, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : ".. .siendo lo cierto no pueden mirar con indiferencia los soberanos de Europa semejante desorden, en fin no hay religión, y de aquí se infiere las consecuencias que se quieran..."; and R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8,11.1793, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . 19 See J.A. Saavedra y Carvajal to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 2.IV.1793, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "., .la plebe [francesa],. .se va desengañando desde que iniquamente mataron a su Rey en público cadalzo, todo el orbe entero tienen contra sí, les van sacudiendo bien y felizmente todas las potencias combinadas...". "Noticias", AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 8.VI.1794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1. R. Gómez to

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In the course of the war, the merchants realized that a victory for Spain and its allies over France was remote. While the coalition gradually disintegrated, Anchorena's agents were longing for peace. Moreover, complaining about England's actions, they were concerned about a new rising conflict with Spain's old enemy. Deeply impressed by the French fighting spirit, again they began to change sides. Nevertheless, the merchants welcomed the proclamation of Spain's peace with France with mixed feelings. 20

1.3 SPAIN AS A POOR WHIPPING-BOY; THE WAR AGAINST E N G L A N D

The merchants' political view of the French Republic was divided. On the one hand, France's bad image seemed to diminish in the same proportion as the relations between Madrid and Paris improved. Anchorena's agent and friend in Córdoba, Francisco Antonio Diaz, was disposed to perceive a positive political development within France and to forget the violent death of its Bourbon monarch. On the other hand, there still remained the disdain toward the revolutionist "bandits" and

J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VI.1794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "Las cosas de Europa se hallan en una situación la más funesta que se puede considerar [ . . . ] los picaros de los Franceses quieren corromper a todas las naciones e incomodarlas hasta lo sumo, pero Dios se ha de cansar de las iniquidades que cometen, hoy les ha de dar su castigo cuando estén más descuidados". 20 See El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 9.V.1795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 . F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 15.IX.1795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : " . . .siempre según veo las cosas, me parece lo mejor se haga efectuado la paz, o se efectúe cuanto antes, porque a lo largo tal vez quedaremos peor, como me persuade desde que los Franceses quitaron la vida a su legítimo señor por lo que son muchos, y han de pelear hasta el fin, a la desesperada, y más si como dicen tienen poco qué comer, que sólo Dios nuestro Señor los puede aniquilar". Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, 3.IV.1795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 : " . . .a nosotros nos conviene que ambos marinas [la francesa e inglesa] se arruinasen enteramente: Y vivimos con fundados recelos de que no ha de parar mucho tiempo sin que tengamos guerra con los Ingleses pues se están portando con los procedes más altaneros, y provocativos e indignos con nosotros". F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 7.XII.1795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : " . . .no hay duda que la paz siempre suena bien, pero el sentido de reconocimiento de República, que es lo que han querido después de tantas atrocidas, incomoda [...] pero lo que más me atormenta es la Religión, y más por lo inmediato, que de ésto no se habla nada, pero según los antecedentes a buen librar quedará para que cada uno siga la ley que quisiere, que será un dolor...".

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a deep mistrust of France's military expansionist intentions.21 Some days later, Spain and France signed the treaty of San Ildefonso (August 1796). A quick end to the European war was not foreseeable at all. As the merchants observed the depreciation of the bonds and joint naval manoeuvres with France, they anticipated Spain's new involvement against England. Nevertheless, the outbreak of Spain's war against England left Anchorena and his agents stunned. "Your prediction proved to be true that we would finally quarrel with the English", wrote Diaz to Juan Esteban de Anchorena in February 1797. Spain appeared as a poor whipping-boy financing the war of Europe's leading powers. In early 1798 Anchorena's agents feared the spreading of the European war to the Americas. In fact, after France had broken off its relations to the United States in 1797, both nations were on the verge of a war. In Potosí, Obregon Zevallos was alarmed about the possible involvement of Spanish America. Juan Esteban de Anchorena was scandalized. According to him, the main reason for the lasting war had to be sought in France's ambition to expand its revolution. "Hidden behind the war", he told his oldest son, "worse things might occur".22 During the late 1790s, the desire for a general European peace grew constantly among the merchants whose commercial activities as this article will show - were intensely affected by the war. This desire became so strong that they wished France's victory at any See F.A. Diaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 14.1.1796, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : " . . .por lo que hace a la Religión Católica en la Francia también veo algunos puntos de buena esperanza... Dios sobretodo". And F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 15.IX.1796, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : " . . . e n fin los franceses, el que murió, murió, y aunque queden destrozados pero van saliendo con la suya". France, following Gómez, would aspire to alliance with Spain tabreak up England's coalition and to "hacer la forzosa a Portugal... En fin, no sabemos en qué pararán estas misas, porque todo está malo, y anda muy revuelto"; R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VII1.1796, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . 22 See Conde de las Cinco Torres to Juan E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 2.VIII. 1796, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 . R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.X.1796, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : " . . .en fin, todo es miseria, y lamentos, y creo durer estos por largo tiempo". F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 14.11.1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 . Joaquín de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1V. 1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 2: " . . .España siempre pagará el pato, porque son muy grandes nuestros pecados, y la Francia será la que hará negocio". F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 15.VIII. 1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : "Los ingleses siempre me persuado se costen en la guerra con los españoles, y quiera Dios no nos visiten por a c á . . . " . J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1.1798, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 ; and J.E. de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 26.VII.1798, AGN, Vit, 7 - 4 - 2 - 6 .

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cost. Even if they detested the French revolutionist ideas, Napoleon now should vanquish Great Britain. But again, the merchants' hope proved to be unrealistic. In May 1799, Obregon Zevallos could only denounce the "sad situation" of Spain and Europe. The world had become incomprehensible, and the last hope left was again God. 23

1.4 MILITARY DISASTER A N D HUMILATION

For Spain and its colonies, the 1790s were a decade of military disaster and humilation which served as a prelude to the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the early nineteenth century. The war with revolutionary France became the first great public demonstration of Spain's weak military situation. Planned as a triumphal revenge of Louis XVI, the war turned into a bloody defense of Spanish territory. Among Anchorena's agents, the initial enthusiasm turned into disillusion and bewilderment. Like the northern parts of Catalonia, Navarra was greatly affected by the French invasion. Juan Esteban de Anchorena was told by his brother that French troops had entered the valley of Baztán. As a result of the war against France, one finds comments reflecting disillusionment and annoyance toward the Spanish army in Anchorena's correspondence. Spanish merchants and Anchorena's relatives in particular were indignant about their nation's regular troops. Some months after the war, Anchorena's sister complained bitterly of the generals' conduct: " . . .it became apparent that the French didn't want to enter but that our generals hoped for the invasion of the French, some of the Spanish Generals have acquired great prestige, [although] whereever they set foot they were defeated,.. .thus we are all pleased that these people have gone". The navy completed the negative picture of Spain's military power. The battle of St. Vicente in 1797 was only the beginning of the navy's ruin

23 See R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.XII.1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 ; and J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.V.1799, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 3 - 2 : ".. .quedo enterado de la triste situación en que se halla nuestra España y demás Reinos de Europa con la duración de la guerra, cuyos males parecen aquí inexplicables, tanto en lo espiritual como en lo temporal, y lo peor es, que no se divisa camino alguno para su cesación, Dios lo remedie todo, pues sólo su poder y misericordia infinita puede serenar tan grande tempestad".

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a decade later. Again, the merchants especially condemned the high ranking admirality.24 Spain's inability to fulfill its military role as a world power was realized by Juan Esteban de Anchorena and his agents. The crown's passivity shown toward English and Russian activities in 1789, the loss of Spanish-ruled Santo Domingo in 1795, and the British conquest of Trinidad in 1797 put into question the metropolis' ability to secure the integrity of its American colonies.25

2 . T H E COLLAPSE OF THE "COMERCIO LIBRE"

Europe's political crisis combined with the weakness of the Spanish military strongly affected the Hispanic Atlantic trade. For the majority of the porteño merchants including Anchorena, a successful domestic trade in the Río de la Plata depended on an intact and exclusive Hispanic overseas trade. Anchorena's economic advancement was founded on his trade with the mother-country, and in particular with Cádiz. Thus the economic implications of the European wars during the 1790s were felt by Anchorena and his agents on both sides of the Atlantic. The depression of the Atlantic trade meant at the same time a fundamental crisis of the Spanish trading system. The 1790s produced the collapse of the comercio libre. Because of an interrupted Hispanic trade, the crown legalized the slave trade in La Plata (comercio de negros, 1791), the trade with Brazil and the Caribbean Islands (comercio con colonias J4 . See F.A. Diaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 15.XI.1795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : ".. .veo que nuestros pobres vizcaynos han pagado bien el pato, de que aunque estoy tan lejos, me ha contristado bastante...". R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VI. 1794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . Juan Joseph de Anchorena io J.E. de Anchorena, Pamplona, 27.XI.1794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . R. Gómez to J.E. Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VI.I794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . M.T. de Jesus y Anchorena to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina de Sena de Pamplona, 25.XI.1795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . J. de Obregon Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VIII.1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 . See also the enclosed report to R. Gómez' letter to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.IV.1797: "El General Don Josef de Córdoba ha dado bien a costa de la nación una prueba completa de su incapacidad absoluta para mandar escuadras... Qué males no ha ocasionado a la nación él que quitó el mando de la escuadra del Mediterraneo al Exelentísimo Señor Mazarredo, y é¡ que tiene la culpa de que no la mande ahora? [Godoyj", Cádiz, 24.11.1797; AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 -1-2. 25

See R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.IV.1789, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 18.1.1796, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 4 4. R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VI.1797, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 .

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extranjeras, 1795), and the trade with those nations not at war with England (comercio de neutrales, 1797).26 As a result, non-Hispanic merchants and goods arrived in Buenos Aires in a direct and legal way by-passing Spain and a large part of the porteño commercial sector. Already during the late 1780s one can observe a depression of the overseas trade. In February 1789, El Conde de las Cinco Torres complained about the deteriorating situation of Cádiz' commerce. 27 In fact, taking a closer look at the volume of legal trade between the Río de la Plata and Cádiz, one can see a sharp decline in 1789/90 compared to 1784 and 1785. The large volume of the general Hispanic Atlantic trade during the two years following the peace-treaty of Versailles (1783) is not only explained by a pentup demand after the North-American war of Independence; it also shows a problematic pattern eventually repeated during the 1790s. The end of the North-American war of Independence, in which Spain had supported the former Anglo-American colonies against England, produced an "over-reaction" of the Spanish and SpanishAmerican markets. As a result, supply and demand, and stability were strongly affected. 28 Anchorena and his agents consequently faced abrupt fluctuations in prices, surfeited markets, a general shortage of capital, miscalculations, bad speculations, and bankruptcies on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, they deplored the strong foreign competition, the increasing use of credit, and the lack of its control.29

26 Real Cédula, 24.XI.I79I; Real Orden, 4.III.1795; Real Orden, 18.XI.1797, prohibited by Real Orden of 20.IV. 1799. Again legalized and prohibited in 1801. 27 "La infelicidad en que se halla ese comercio es bien notoria en este, y de élla se verifican aquí diarias resultas en repetidísimas quiebras, y éstas verificadas con tan mala fe que si no se toma providencia, habiendo algunos ejemplares, llegaría a perderse enteramente la confianza en este comercio", El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 3.11.1789, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 . 28 While we can observe a decrease of exports from the Río de la Plata to Cádiz from 87.708.995 reales de vellón in 1784 to 40.399.142 reales de vellón in 1790, and a decrease of imports from Cádiz to the Río de la Plata from 62.709.263 reales de vellón in 1785 to 27.591.934 reales de vellón in 1790, the value of exports and imports between Spanish America and Spain within the years 1783 and 1785 increased significantly (exports to Spain: 1783: 171.484.787 reales de vellón·, 1785: 1149.850.347 reales de vellón; imports from Spain: 1783: 136.750.290 reales de vellón; 1785: 457.675.683 reales de vellón), see John Fisher, Commercial Relations between Spain and Spanish America in the Era of Free Trade 1778-1796 (Liverpool 1985), p. 55, p. 118, and p. 45. 29 See Conde de las Cinco ToiTes to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 3.II.1789, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 : "., .sin duda todos atrasados en negociaciones a la América, comprando caro y vendiendo barato". Arangoiz, Pérez y Compañía to J.E. de Anchorena, 15.VIII.1788,

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To be sure, Anchorena's basic economic problems did not just rest on the consequences of a trading boom. They already were caused by the comercio libre of 1778. Indeed, it was the Spanish free trade system, or at least its reality in the late 1780s, which threatened the success of Anchorena's business activities. Anchorena's career was founded on the ability of a relatively small commercial sector to control the profits of the imported merchandise by controling its volume. At the end of the 1780s, the porteño merchants traditionally engaged in the trade with the mother-country had lost this kind of control. In mid 1789, Anchorena supported without doubt the statement of a large group of Buenos Aires ' merchants directed to Viceroy Loreto blaming the free trade system for the disastrous economic situation.30 Arguing for a quantitative limitation of the trade they sought to regain the former commercial stability and to restore their former monopolistic position.31 They tried to influence the King's representative at Buenos AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 5 : "...nosotros en esta nos vemos perplejos en nuestros negocios sin saber cómo acertar, aunque no sea sino es para costear el año, y asi no vemos senda por donde poder dirigirle que no sea segura la pérdida, y dudosa la ganancia...; . . .no tenemos nada de nuevo que observarle de altas y bajas de géneros en general ni en particular, pues continuamente los fabricantes extranjeros nos están metiendo por los ojos sus mercaderías". A. de Arrivillaga to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 4.VIIÍ.I789, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "...digo que la enfermedad es universal asi en toda la Europa como en la América, todo dimana de la mucha facilidad en los fiados". Since 1783 the credit volume of the commerce had been increased significantly, see Eduardo Saguier, "Las crisis de circulación y la lucha contra el monopolio comercial español en los orígenes de la revolución de independencia. El caso de Buenos Aires en el siglo XVIII": Revista Complutense de Historia de América, 19 (Madrid 1993), p. 164. 30 " . . .vemos arruinarse unas casas tras otras; profugar unos, quebrar otros, no pagar los más, malbaratarse los géneros, y últimamente irse debilitando el comercio en tales términos que si no se meditan y planifican con oportunidad los remedios, llegará a ser ruinosa a impulsos de la misma agradable abundancia y perspectiva que trae consigo el comercio libre", Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Documentos para la Historia Argentina, tomo Vil, Comercio de Indias, Consulado. Comercio de Negros y de Extranjeros (17911809) (Buenos Aires 1916), pp. 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 . 31 " . . .el único modo de mejorarla [la constitución del comercio] es que por ahora no se permitan embarcar para el consumo de ella más efectos de dos millones y medio de pesos cada año y que estos vengan en el numero de buques proporcionado a retornar la carga de frutos del país que, sobre poco más o menos vendrá a reducirse a doscientos mil cueros, y alguna lana y sebo [ . . . ] como su decadencia nace de la abundancia de efectos desproporcionada a los consumos sólo podrá cesar a beneficio de la limitación insinuada". Ibidem. - Without doubt, there was a long tradition of monopolistic strategies and arguments. See Fontana's remarks on the Mexican merchants: Antonio M. Bernal (Coord.) El "Comercio Libre" entre España y América (¡765-1824), Actas y comunicaciones del simposio de igual título organizado por ¡a Fundación Banco Exterior en el Puerto de Santa María, en diciembre de 1985, Presentación Josep Fontana, (Madrid 1987), p. 8.

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Aires in a time when Madrid was reconsidering its economic policy. But finally, the Spanish court decided to expand the comercio libre over all its American colonies. Anchorena's hope for a strong and efficient "remedy" of Madrid was frustated.32 "Europe's business in bad shape: no trade at all", this simple formula used by Ramón Gómez in early 1794 well describes Anchorena's frustration during a period of war. Any discussion about the free trade system had become useless. The economic reality was dictated by the consequences of Spanish involvement in the European conflicts. By capturing Spanish trading vessels, corsairs made a normal Hispanic commerce impossible. The merchants' indignation with the navy was founded to a great extent on its failure to protect the Spanish Atlantic trade. Moreover, soon Cádiz' commerce experienced periods of total breakdown. During Spain's war with England, the British navy imposed a blockade on the most important Spanish port several times. The same phenomenon was also felt in America.33 Statistics of the Hispanic Atlantic trade show between 1793 and 1795, that the value of goods exported from the Río de la Plata to Cádiz doubled compared to the years 1789/90. But the same development was not true for merchandise leaving Cádiz in the direction of La Plata. The value of goods entering Buenos Aires via Cádiz decreased by 50%. If one compares Cádiz' exports of the period 1793-1795 with its

32 "Nuestro Ministerio hasta ahora no ha resuelto nada sobre el remedio que intentaba poner a este descalabrado comercio nacional, y creemos que mientras se valgan de consultas el tiempo se irá pasando, y el enfermo irá adelante con su mal, mientras no se valgan del remedio casero, que con justo motivo piensa Vd. ser el más propio que es justicia eficaz, exigente castigo y premio, con celo del cumplimiento de cada uno, que con esto se remediaría lodo, pero contemplando no pueden ignorar esto mismo, nos hace conocer que hay algunos facultativos que más desean el mal que la salud del enfermo"; Arangoiz, Pérez y Compañía to J.E. de Anchorena, La Coruna, 15.VIII.1788, AGN, VII, 7-4-1-5. 33 See R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, spring 1794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8. VI. 1793, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 10.VIII.1793, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "Nuestra escuadra nada ha hecho, ni hará según veo, siendo fuerte desgracia, que no están concuidando en nuestras costas.. .para que nuestras embarcaciones no caigan en las garras de los ostinados Franceses". R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.VI, 1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 22.V. 1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 . J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.V1II.1798, AGN, VII, 7-4-3-2.

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exports of 1785, a decline of 80% will be noted.34 Anchorena, strongly dependent on the import of efectos de Castilla, was greatly effected. 35 To a certain degree, as it will be demonstrated later, his economic problems were self-made. Anchorena was unwilling to benefit from the growing export of La Plata's domestic products. The effects of Spain's war against Great Britain are shown by the revenues of the avería, a 0.5% duty imposed by the consulado of Buenos Aires on all goods legally entering or leaving La Plata. The revenues declined during the war with England to an annual average of only 21.700 pesos compared to 35.000 pesos from mid 1794 to mid 1796. 36 For Anchorena, perhaps the most troublesome economic aspect of the 1790s was the unpredictability of his business affairs. The sudden and rapid succession of war and peace, the continuing capture of Spanish trading vessels, and the repeated blockade of Cádiz created a general instability. It was a period when the spread of rumors could produce a fortune or a crash. It was a time when merchants needed a keen sense of smell. It was an era when the economy of the metropolis through its war expenses, its constant shortage of capital, its permanent emission of bonds (vales reales), and its consequent inflation seemed to be ruined. During the 1790s, Anchorena and his agents gradually lost confidence in the crown's economic policy. 37 34 Exports from Río de la Plata to Cádiz: 1785: 53.643.812 reales de vellón; 1790: 40.399.141 reales de vellón; 1795: 84.366.711 reales de vellón-, Imports from Cádiz to Río de la Plata: 1785: 6 2 7 0 9 . 2 6 3 reales de vellón; 1790: 27.591.934 reales de vellón; 1795: 13.631.503 reales de vellón; See J. Fisher, Commercial Relations, p. 55, and p. 118. 33 "Las reflexiones de Vm, en orden a la decadencia de nuestro comercio, y algunas otras que apunta son propias de un buen político que conoce las enfermedades de la Nación, y el remedio de curarlas aplicándolas el preservando contra las muchas causas que la devoran, pero que está convencido es inevitable por ser de tal naturaleza y tan general la enfermedad que se han hecho familiares los disparates más clásicos..."; J.A. de Arrangoiz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santander, 9.VIU.1793, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . 36 See G. O. Tjarks, El Consulado, I, p. 223. 37 See El Conde de las Cinco T o n e s to J.E. d e Anchorena, Cádiz, 3.IV.I795, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 : " . . .las circunstancias del día tienen a esta plaza en el estado más crítico que tal vez se ha visto desde su fundación: los efectos a unos precios exhorbitantes [ . . . ] todos los géneros ingleses un 30 % más caros que lo que estaban ahora dos meses; de suerte que no se comprende como tienen valor de comprar y hacen dependencias en la estación presente los hombres con objeto de remitir a las Américas, pues es preciso que en ellas esté todo más barato que en ésta". El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 1.VI. 1790 AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 . F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 10.V.I797AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : "Veo se publicó la guerra y que los enemigos ya habían hecho presas. Ignoro si se salvaría el barco [en] que fueron los

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Ruprecht Poensgen 3. T H E CRISIS OF THE INTERNAL TRADE

For the South-American wholesale merchants, the Atlantic trade with Spain was complemented by the internal trade of the Río de la Plata. The commerce with the efectos de Castilla could only be successful if they were sold in the viceroyalty's interior. The profits of the porteño merchants had been founded on their ability to control the volume of the imported merchandise and on its consequent stability. Due to their monopoly, the merchants of Buenos Aires attracted a considerable part of the capital circulating in the viceroyalty. Upper Peru with its mining center Potosí was of crucial importance. The trade of Anchorena and his agents was finally based upon their supply of silver. Furthermore, the trading system of Anchorena and a large sector of porteño merchants depended both on Spain's commercial primacy and on their access and control over the Upper Peruvian silver. 38 Generally speaking, the internal trade of the viceroyalty was stricken during the 1790s by problems similar to those facing the Atlantic trade. The commerce of the interior experienced, in the late 1780s and early 1790s, the consequences of the boom which had followed the contos reales de mi orden a La Corana, y me alegro no hubiese Vd. despachado nada de su cuenta como veterano en lo que maliciaba, y le salió cierto". Spain started to issue its vales reales in the 1780s; until the end of the century the crown's paper-money reached a nominal value of 1.759.639.500 reales de vellón·, see Emiliano Fernandez de Pinedo, "Coyuntura y política económicas": Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo et al.. Centralismo, ilustración y agonía del Antiguo Régimen (1715-1833), Historia de España, tomo Vil, Dirigida por Manuel Tuñon de Lara (2. ed. Barcelona 1984), p. 82. See El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 30.1.794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 ; El Conde de las Cinco Torres to Juan E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 30.XI.1799, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 ; R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, 8.X.1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 . "Noticias de principios de octubre de 1799", AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "La España está llena de miserias y sin dinero... toda ponderación es corta para pintar lo apurado que se halla este comercio, fábricas y todos...". El Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, 30.XI.1799, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 : . .todos son arbitrios en nuestra Corte imponiéndonos nuevos contribuciones: ahora ha salido una bastante crecida sobre criados, muías, caballos, y coches; y además se dice que está para salir el decreto para que de todos los caudales que vengan de América para particulares, tomará S.M. la mitad, y lo entregará en vales reales con que vea Vd. que buena era la cosa, y por lo que no conviene hacer venir por ahora los pesos que cada uno tiene en América, a más del riesgo de los enemigos". 3 " T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra, p. 49. - Without doubt the domestic products (efectos de la tierra) formed the bulk of Potosi's total trade. Yet, the trade with efectos de Castilla was of essential significance to the Upper Peruvian economy, In 1793, it was a group of 43 merchants who contributed about 50% to Market of Potosi's alcabala-revenues by the sale of imported merchandise; E. Tandeter, The Market of Potosí, pp. 6 - 8 ,

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North-American war of independence. As in the mother-country, the economic overreaction after 1783 led to surfeited markets, overstocked stores, and ruined retail traders. 39 The few transactions realized were made on the basis of credit. In May 1790, Juan Esteban de Anchorena commented on the difficult situation of the internal trade: If Europe does not realize the decline of the American trade, then "it must suffer because in America everything is piling up". Once they ran into financial problems, merchants were forced to sell goods below their value. At the same time, clients were unable to pay. According to letters received from Anchorena's agents in the interior, the disastrous situation did not improve. In April 1793, Salta's commerce was close to "total ruin", according to Saravia. A few months later, his description from Potosí was drawn in the same dark colors, To be sure, the crisis of the internal trade continued. 40 Evidently, the merchants could not perceive any change of the economic situation for the next years. After the end of the war with France (1795), a new wave of imported merchandise entered the Río de la Plata via Spain. 41 Again, stocks were oversupplied, prices decreased, and capital became scarce. From Potosí, a frustrated Obregon Zevallos reported the constant stagnation of the Upper Peruvian trade to Anchorena. According to another letter from Obregon Zevallos of January 1798, the crisis affected the entire region and its whole population. 42

39 See the example of Castrosanaz who was indebted with $ 12.000 pesos to Juan Antonio Lecica and Gaspar de Santa Coloma: ".. .el año de 85, año fatal y desgraciado para mi y para muchos que siguieron mi propia idea, pues nos comió nuestro dinero y los intereses que en esa nos confiaron, la fatal ruina del Péru... Sólo Vd. puede remediar, como lo creo, espero consiga de su protección no me desampare", J. de Castrosanaz to Juan E. de Anchorena, Tucumán, 10.V1II.1794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 4 . 40 See F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Córdoba, 3.XII.1789, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 4 1. J.E. de Anchorena to J.Ph, Rovillo, Buenos Aires, 20.V.1790, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 1. F.A. Díaz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santa Cathalina, 4.1.1791, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 1 : "En cuanto a comercio.. .no hay duda que el que tiene que vender casi es imposible el poderse escapar sin fiar alguna cosa [ . . . ] pues en el día por todas partes del reino está muy pobre como que jamás lo he visto y hemos llegado al punto que aun las mejores firmas no pueden pagar a tiempo". Saravia's letters to J.E. de Anchorena, Salta, 5.IV.I793, Potosí, 26.VII.1793, Potosí, 26.XII.1794, all AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 . 41 See "Avería de Buenos Aires y Montevideo, 1794-1804", G. O.Tjarks, El Consulado, I, 123. 42 See J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VI.I797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 — 3 - 2 : "Este comercio está en la mayor inacción, pues de fuera ninguno viene a comprar y los del pueblo totalmente se han retirado, con lo que los tenderos nada venden;

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During the 1790s, Anchorena and his agents no longer profited from the internal trade. They and their fellow merchants who were oriented toward Spain lost control of trade volume. Driven by their ambition to regain a limited, stable, and monopolistic trade, they started to look for a remedy. Thus they counted on the wars. They had learned that war would lead to the interruption of the Atlantic trade, choking off importation of European goods. As a result, an increasing demand and a growing volume of internal capital would revive business, strengthen the consumer's spending power, and decrease their overstock. Finally, they would recover their traditional profit margin and eventually restore their lucrative control over supply and demand. But these hopes soon proved to be unrealistic. Despite the "great revolution of Europe" and its long-lasting war, there was no shortage of goods. A letter of Obregón Zevallos reflects this hope within the merchant community before the outbreak of Spain's war with England in 1796. Nonetheless, Obregón Zevallos himself did not cherish many illusions believing that even if the war was to take place, there would be no greater demand. 43 Obregón Zevallos' letter explains why the merchants no longer expected to receive benefits from a European war. Even if the war reduced or interrupted trade with Spain, the viceroyalty was still swamped by European goods which had entered through Buenos Aires and the Pacific coast. Indeed, a growing number of foreign ships and an increasing volume of foreign merchandise had marked La Plata's commerce since the crown's liberalization of the trade system in 1791, 1795, and 1797. At the same time, English and North-American trading vessels supplied the South-American economy with European and "Chinese" goods by sailing to Arica, Arequipa, or any other place at the Pacific coast. As a matter of fact, the 1790s with its European wars, its collapse of the Hispanic Atlantic trade, and its commercial liberalization in the Río de la Plata had led to the ruin of Anchorena's internal trade and his traditional trading strategy. No wonder that Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena, since 1798 a direct observer of the Upper

y si alguno asoma a sus tiendas, le ofrecen más barato que les venden por mayor". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1,1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 . See J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 8.VI.I794, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 3 - 1 . Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.XII.1796, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 : "Aunque se verifique la guerra con los ingleses no han de tomar aquí estimación los efectos, por la mucha abundancia que hay y las continuas entradas por Arica y esa capital".

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Peruvian situation, agreed with his father's anger about the smuggling which constantly accompanied the Pacific trade.44 A study of Anchorena's correspondence underlines the impact of the European wars on Río de la Plata's internal trade. It demonstrates the merchants' miscalculations following the sudden succession of war and peace, and reveals furthermore that the mere rumor of peace or war was sufficent to hinder a normal commercial development. At the end of the century, the merchants again were positing their commercial activities upon the war factor. It was the "hope" of a lasting European conflict which led Ezcurra to engage in business. And it was the same thinking which nourished Obregón Zevallos' expectation to pull off a good deal with poor merchandise. But to be sure, oriented toward Spain's commercial exclusiveness within the international framework and dependant on their own trading monopoly within the Río de la Plata, the interruption of the Hispanic overseas trade could not help in the long run. Moreover, at the tum of the century another effect of Spain's crisis became evident: the decline of Potosi's silver mines. The lack of supply of Spanish mercury soon deepened Upper Peru's economic and social collapse. 45

·" See J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.V1.1800, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 . J.J.C. de Anchorena to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.1.1802, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 4 : "Esta ruina - como Vm. opinaba - la ha causado el contrabando, porque si este no se hubiera cometido, no hubiera habido la cantidad de efectos y dependencias que los está devozando, no hubieran habido decomisos que han perjudicado a los que tenían algunos fondos en manos ajenas, y perjudicaron a las negociaciones de Europa y han arruinado la América con la extracción de caudales". 45 See J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.11.1797, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 . J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.X.I797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 : "Aquí.. .todos creen inmediatas las pazes, y así el que tenía ánimo de comprar una capa, pasa con la que tiene, y se persuade comprarla más barata de los géneros de p a z . . . " . J.E. de Ezcurra to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.IX.1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 : " . . .parece que los enredos de Europa han de durar, esta esperanza me ha sujetado a pedir a ésa cosa de 10.000 pesos de efectos a suerte y ventura esperanzado en que antes que vengan las paces los he de concluir bien...". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J,E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.XII.1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 . J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1800, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 6 : "Este perjuicio acabó de arruinar al Péru, pues como Vd. sabe, no tiene esta villa otra subsistencia, ni entrada, que el trabajo del cerro, de modo, que en parando los ingenios se despoblará la villa, y se inundará más de ladrones, que apenas se podrá salir a la calle de día, pues, cuando ha llegado ya en otra ocasión a parar la rivera por cinco o seis semanas, por falta de agua, han sido muy graves los perjuicios que se experimentaron, ¿qué sería ahora con una parada, si Dios no lo remedia, sin término ni esperanza?".

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Ruprecht Puensgen 4 . T H E B R E A K D O W N O F THE HISPANIC TRADING SYSTEM

Studying the correspondence of Anchorena one notes a certain contradiction: Confronted on the one hand with an almost persistent lament about the commercial situation, on the other hand one nevertheless perceives that there always was considerable business going on. Indeed, the frequently deplored "total inaction" of La Plata's internal trade was a fact, especially for those merchants who, like Anchorena, had built up their fortune on the trade with the metropolis. As this article has shown, the 1790s experienced not only the depression of the Hispanic trade but furthermore the breakdown of its underlying trading system. Considering the comercio libre of 1778 as an attempt by the mother-country to reform its trade within the existing trading system, i.e., to open trade within its empire while conserving its monopolistic nature, the 1790s should be understood as a crucial turning point, changing the inherent structure of commerce in the Río de la Plata. Beginning with the liberalization of La Plata's trade during the 1790s, foreign merchants had begun to dominate the trade of the viceroyalty. From then on, the exclusivist nature of the Hispanic trade was never restored, a crucial factor in its ruin two decades later.4^ One may judge this transformation of La Plata's commerce at the end of the eighteenth century less as a structural change from monopolistic Hispanic trade to international free trade (or non-Hispanic monopolistic trade) but rather more as a restoration of La Plata's traditional commercial character, 47 Nonetheless, focusing on the second half of the eighteenth century, the period of La Plata's economic boom and Anchorena's and so many other merchants' careers, this research suggests the 1790s' importance as a turning point. The transformation of La Plata's commerce and its consequent economic and political tensions within Buenos Aires' merchant community can be seen through the debates of the consulado. In fact, the discussions of the consulado reveal a virtual division of the porteño merchants 46 Following Saguier, the crown's commercial liberation converted the external trade in the Río de la Plata in "un libre cambio casi internacional": "La lucha contra el monopolio se convirtió entonces, en los prolegómenos de la Revolución de Independencia, en lucha contra una amenaza puramente potencial...", E. Saguier, "La crisis de la circulación", p. 158. 47 See Zacarías Moutoukias, Contrabundo y control colonial en el siglo XVII. Buenos Aires, el Atlántico y el espacio peruano (Buenos Aires 1988), p. 20.

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The Spanish Colonial System in Crisis

into two factions disputing the control and nature of trade, and the future economic and political development of the Río de la Plata.48 The debates moreover underline the great weakness of Anchorena's commerce. To be sure, because of the interruption of the Hispanic trade and a growing export of domestic livestock products the liberalization of the trade corresponded to an economic need. But even if some merchants who represented the traditional Hispanic commercial sector accepted this necessity, they plainly hoped to restore the former trading system as soon as possible. 49 Still, Juan Esteban de Anchorena did not share the opinion of his colleagues. He frankly rejected any need to import European merchandise.50 He and his agents hoped the internal market would close because of the wars. He rejected every kind of non-Hispanic trade because he refused to engage in the new commercial opportunities. In 1793, Arrangoiz had urged Anchorena in vain to benefit from the export of hides.51 Like other merchants, Anchorena was neither willing nor prepared to change his traditional commercial attitudes. Instead, Anchorena felt threatened by the liberalized commerce and the growth of smuggling. Moreover, he and his agents were enraged

48 Belgrano, secretary of the consulado, was a spokeman for the progressive minded merchant group: "¡Ah!, Señores, es preciso confesar que el mal ha estado y está en nosotros mismos, y que los pudientes no han hecho más que el comercio de E u r o p a . . . sin atender otros ramos ni mirar que la tierra bien o mal empleada, el cultivo bien o mal dirigido deciden de la riqueza o la indigencia no sólo de los labradores, sino también en general en todas las clases de un estado en que el comercio y el bien real dependen esencialmente de las producciones de la tierra. Ya es preciso que despertemos de este letargo...", cit. por Ruben H. Zorrilla, Cambio social y población en el pensamiento de Mayo (1810-1830) (Buenos Aires 1978), p.64. 49 See for example the position of González de Volaños; AGN, Consulado, IH, pp. 293 -295. 50 " . . .las escaseses que se expresan padecen estas Provincias de efectos de Europa sin señarla sus especies no reconosco en el día haya falta en esta de algunos de absoluta necesidad [ . . . ] por el costo caro de algún genero que se venda ó exija si hay precision, no es carencia, y para la substentacion los de Lujo, en todo tiempo que no abunden suben sus precios, pues para la geme de poco caudal y servicio, no solamente no escasea la ropa de la tierra de colores (que ha bajado de precio en estos meses) Liensos razonables de algodon del Perú que han venido y vienen muchos miles de piezas del Valle de Catamarca, Paraguay y Misiones fuera de los que aqui se fabrican, sino que sobran para abrigar las gentes de trabajo", Ibidem. 51 J.A. de Arrangoiz to J.E. de Anchorena, Santander, 9.V1I1.1793, AGN, Vil, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "Aunque se haya retirado del comercio de cueros, debe Vra. recibirlo pues es el modo de que con menos trabajo saque muchas utilidades. Sin otro tráfico para España que el de cueros ( . . . ) con destino a este dicho puerto precisamente; se ha de hacer Vm. rico...".

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over the frequent cooperation between the viceroyalty's administration and his commercial adversaries.52 Some merchants of the Hispanic commercial sector like Anchorena did not simply deny the viceroyalty's need to import European merchandise through foreign merchants. Their central argument was based on their vision of a common link of economic interests within the Spanish Empire. Thus they spoke of an indissoluble "national" economic union and a total identification of interests between the viceroyalty and the mother-country. The liberalization of the export of hides, they argued, only could be considered as "an unreparable prejudice of the public funds, the national commerce, and the state in general". 53 Anchorena believed that a continuation of the unchanged comercio de negros would be "a universal detriment to the national commerce of all subjects in America and Europe". 54 In 1798, Anchorena became so alarmed by the consequences of the growing influence of the foreign merchants that he predicted a worst case scenario: a continuing direct trade with foreigners would not only ruin the Spanish trade but furthermore reduce Spain and America to poverty.55 To be sure, the advocates and beneficiaries of liberalization also claimed to represent the real interests of the Spanish crown and the viceroyalty. But in opposition to Anchorena they did not claim any direct link to other Hispanic merchants: "We are not the agents of the commerce of Cádiz, Lima, or Havana", proclaimed one merchant 52

See R. Gómez to J.E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.11.1793, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : . ,ηο sé como el ministerio no toma providencias capaces de contener el orgullo de (Tomás Antonio] Romero y otros para que no vayan a esos puertos embarcaciones con daño conocido a ese comercio". See also the remarks of Viceroy Avilés in Memorias de los Virreyes del Río de la Plata, Noticia preliminar por Sigfrido A. Radaelli (Buenos Aires 1945), p. 513; Sergio R. Villalobos, Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chite ¡700-1811 (Buenos Aires 1965), p. 84; and the comments of Tomás Antonio de Romero: "Esto de costear expediciones y arriesgar gruesos caudales es una empresa desconocido por a ahora a estos comerciantes. Son muchos los peligros y las quiebras que se temen en este género de comercio, no hay espíritu para disponer fondos ni tampoco para reunirse en sociedades y formar un capital competente"; AGN, Consulado, III, p. 393. " Ibidem, I, pp. 2 6 7 - 2 6 9 . 54 Ibidem, II, pp. 6 0 9 - 6 1 1 . 55 ".. .si se franquease á los extrangeros conducir de su cuenta Mercaderías de sus Provincias para comerciar en la América Española, y regresar á su voluntad los productos, no era solamente privar y arruinar el comercio de los Españoles (porque los mas de los generös de los nominados sin prohivicion son extrangeros) sino que se reduciría a los de estos Países a la constitución mas miserable, y desamparada dejando destruida la de los Reynos de Castilla...", Ibidem, III, pp. 2 9 3 - 2 9 6 .

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in 1797, denying those merchants oriented toward Spain the right to see themselves as the legitimate representatives of the national or domestic commerce. 56 Moreover, if Anchorena and his colleagues were not willing to sacrifice their particular concerns for the public interest, they would soon meet some other kind of resistance. 57 The debates of the consulado serve to show the high degree of division which existed within the merchant community of Buenos Aires during the 1790s. The debates demonstrate as well how extreme, distressful, and hopeless Anchorena's economic situation was. To be sure, Anchorena did not stand alone; he represented an entire group of merchants. The story of Anchorena's engagement in the consulado also includes something of a bitter irony. He had contributed to its establishment, he had served the city's merchant community as its first counsul, but he left the consulado in 1799 in anger and personal defeat. Leaving his office, his agents and friends congratulated him. A time of "intrigues", and "annoyances" finally was over. 58 It was not just Anchorena's personal defeat; it was the defeat of all merchants oriented toward the metropolis. A last comment with regard to Anchorena's trade: the correspondence indicates clearly that his agents in Upper Peru in spite of their complaints undertook profitable business. They managed to sell goods at 15 to 25 % over the purchase price. 59 Reducing this margin by 9 %, the value of the sales tax {alcabala), one still ends up with an

56

See the comments of Escalada; Ibidem. ".. .pues aunque haya uno o otro que por el establecimiento y conexion de sus giros en Cadiz, Lima, Habana &. tenga particular ínteres en sostenerlos [los atrasos] para fixar el monopolio.. .debe sacrificar al común ínteres el suyo particular; debe preferir á todo otro el País que lo abriga y que quisa le ha formado toda la fortuna, y si asi no lo hace debemos nosotros salirle al encuentro en bien gral. del estado y de nuestros propios hijos que en el día tendrían ya razón de acusarnos...", Ibidem, Ii, pp. 3 8 8 - 3 9 1 . 58 See R. Gómez to Juan E. de Anchorena, Madrid, 8.XII.I797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : "Me alegro salga Vm. bien del empleo que ha servido en ese consulado, en donde siempre habrá enrredos [ . . . ] de comercio, que a Vm. y a mí nos importan un bledo, cuídese mucho y haga por vivir que es lo que debe hacer un hombre rico y de talento como Vm.". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1799, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 . 59 Obregón Zevallos had realized in mid 1800 some $ 50.000 Pesos, see J. de Obregón Zevallos to J E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VI.I800, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 6 . See also J.E. de Ezcurra to Juan E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 8.VI.I794, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 . And Marcelino de la Vega to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 28.XII.1803, AGN, VII, 7 -4-3-4. 57

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average profit margin of 5 to 10 %. 60 If this profit margin compared to former times seems small, it nonetheless proves that there still were some deals to be made. In fact, this was exactly the conclusion that Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena arrived at observing the Upper Peruvian economy for some eighteen months. It is telling that the young Anchorena criticized the commercial strategy of the Obregón Zevallos and other more traditional merchants. Obregón Zevallos could have earned a great deal of money, argued Anchorena, if he had only been disposed to accept smaller profit margins. "But he is one of those", he continued in a letter to his father, "who aspire to at least 25% profit which for Peru is a very bad matter, because here the best way to trade consists in buying for 10 and selling for 12". Indeed, Upper Peru still could be a "paradise" even if it has become a "paradise without flowers" as Juan José Cristóbal wrote to his younger brother. 61 According to the younger Anchorena, the essential problem was the merchants' inability to adapt themselves to the new conditions.

5 . T H E LACK OF COMMUNICATION

The correspondence of Anchorena shows another phenomenon of the crisis at the late 18th century: the increasing difficulties of the merchants on both sides of the Atlantic in maintaining regular communication among themselves. Successful trade essentially depended on the merchants' ability to profit from favorable market conditions in Spain and the viceroyalty. But to engage in business through linking the markets at an optimal moment, they had to have exact information on the general situation and local trends. Anchorena and his agents in the Río de la Plata and in the mother-country needed to be prepared to react fast if economic and political events or developments made it necessary. Moreover, in a time of turbulent change, growing confusion, and spreading rumor, the merchants needed to be provided with dependable news. Thus both the head of the commercial house in Buenos Aires and 60

G. O. Tjarks, El Consulado, I, p. 36 and p. 44. See J.J.C, de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, Potosí, 3.11.1800, AGN, VII, 7 4 - 1 - 4 : ".. .pues así han ganado Ezcurra 25.000, Aramburu 40.000, González y otros revendiendo 50.000: pero cada uno con la leche que mamó; pues los de ahora 20 años no entran con este manejo volatil". J.J.C, de Anchorena to T.M. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VI.1799, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 2 - 1 . 61

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the merchants abroad, depended on a constant and reliable exchange of information. In fact, like the trade itself, the normal flow of information within the Spanish Empire was frequently interrupted daring the 1790s. Occasionally, no trading vessel or Spanish warship (navios de aviso) arrived at Buenos Aires for months, and Anchorena and his agents in the interior were left without any information. To be sure, the lack of news caused by an English blockade of the Río de la Plata affected everybody in the same way, including the crown's representative. In normal times, a letter sent from Buenos Aires to Cádiz needed approximately six weeks, an exchange of letters between both ports three months. But during the last decade of the eighteenth century Anchorena could wait up to ten months for a reply from Cádiz. Without doubt, the crisis of communication would only enter its full stage during the first decade of the following century when the interruption of the Atlantic navigation was combined with military conflicts on the territories of Spain and La Plata itself. But increasing isolation contributed even during the 1790s to disturb Anchorena. 62

6 . T H E C O R R U P T I O N OF M O R A L S

Many merchants like Anchorena experienced the 1790s as a period of growing moral decline. In a time of a fast changing local and global environment, their vision of the world was constantly questioned. They might embrace or refuse the new economic and political thinking, they might be delighted by or indignant with the new developments in the Old and the New World, the vision of their world, their mentality, had changed. 63 The correspondence shows Anchorena becoming increasingly alarmed about the influence of new intellectual currents which entered the 62

See Obregón Zevallos' letters to J.E. de Anchorena, 26.VI.1800, 26.VIII. 1800, 26.IV.1801, 26.IX.1802, all AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 6 . Viceroy Olaguer Feliu to Godoy, Montevideo, 5.VII. 1797, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Buenos Aires, Sección Estado, 81: ".. .también lo es probable, que de este bloqueo provenga la absoluta falta en que se halla este gobierno de noticias del estado de Europa"; Conde de las Cinco Torres to J.E. de Anchorena, Cádiz, l.XII. 1797; See also José M.Mariluz Urquijo, El Virreinato del Río de la Plata en la época del Marqués de Aviles (1799-1801) (Buenos Aires 1984), p. 77. 63 The French historian Robert Mandrou formed the notion of mentality as "una historia de las 'visiones del mundo'", see Michel Vovelle, Ideología y mentalidades (Barcelona 1985), p. 89.

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Río de la Plata via Spain. No matter how senseless these new ideas are, he commented in 1790, the porteños would exalt them to their fashion, and "the fashion of this time is a perversion and confusion of the senses". Anchorena was particularly scandalized about the situation of his native country. Two and a half years after his own journey to Spain, his brother in Pamplona sent him a discouraging description of the moral attitudes of his compatriots. Juan Esteban de Anchorena had made his career in America and he certainly did consider Buenos Aires his home. But at the same time he was a Spaniard and doubtless he always identified himself with Spain's history and culture. He felt irritated and indignant about changes in the metropolis. Apparently, Anchorena saw a direct connection between Spain's economic and political crisis and the moral decay of its society. Moreover, he believed the mother-country's troubles to be a result of its decadence. When sending his oldest son to Spain for business in 1803, Anchorena told him that he would be confronted by its moral decline. To be sure, Anchorena's concern about the character of his compatriots was not limited to Spain. As the economic crisis began to affect the Rio de la Plata, he became distrustful too of Spaniards in Upper Peru. Thus he warned his son in 1798: "It seems that the Spaniards devote themselves on purpose to horrible vices and infamies". And, according to Anchorena, the corruption of morals was not a matter of people's regional or social origin. In 1790 he deplored the idleness and vices of poor people living in the hinterland of Buenos Aires. He maintained that its fertility and abundance of livestock spoiled their character. 64

64 See J.E. de Anchorena to J.Ph. Roviilo, Buenos Aires, 20.V.1790, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 4 - 1 : " . . .todo se pone aquí al uso de España sin que haya desalino a que n o le den el carácter de m o d a , y corno ésta no es lo q u e significa nuestro diccionario, no lo entiendo y sí estoy pensando q u e la m o d a de este tiempo es perversión o confusión del sentido. Dios nos libre de e s t o . . . " . J.J. de Anchorena to J.E. de Anchorena, Pamplona, 23.Vil. 1790, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 2 : " . . , e s t a m o s en un tiempo, que no se piensa sino en engañar, por no estar sujetos al t r a b a j o . . . " . J.E. de Anchorena to J.J.C, de Anchorena, B u e n o s Aires, 26.VII.1798, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 2 - 6 : "y así, Juan Joseph, el principal mayorazgo temporal es la honra que se adquiere y sostiene con las buenas operaciones.. .ni dejes de leer buenos libros para recordarlos, con lo que conseguirás los mejores bienes t e m p o r a l e s . . J . E . de Anchorena a J.J.C. de Anchorena, Buenos Aires, 29.X.1803, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 3 4: " . . .ahora las mentiras y tramoyas que se oyen, te aconsejo que no apoyes y con prudencia si las oyes disimules porque m e parece están m u y corrompidos los sentidos de las g e n t e s . . . en E s p a ñ a si Dios te concede la feliz advertencia reconocerás bastante grosería.. .por eso te propuse tu viaje para que adquierieses c o n o c i m i e n t o . . . " . M.J. Pérez to J.E, de Anchorena, La Coruna, 15.XII.1790, A G N , VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 5 .

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The corruption of morals were viewed by the merchants in particular as a decay of the Christian faith. It was the decline in piety, the lack of fear of doomsday which allowed people to loose their integrity. When Obregón Zevallos heard about the fraud involving Pedro de Altolaguirre, late treasurer of Potosí's Real Casa de Moneda, he was enraged. "I do not doubt", he wrote to Anchorena, "there will be very few who will be saved, [and] only among those of us, we who are Roman Catholic Christians". According to the merchant, people not only failed to act in a proper Christian way, they had begun to embrace new fashions like "atheism". 65 It is difficult to judge the merchants' notion of Christianity during the 1790s without taking a closer look at their religious view during former times. Nonetheless, their special emphasis and interpretation of Christian dogma at the end of the eighteenth century were important. Within their belief, God as the Creator of heaven and earth was the master of all matters. The Lord as the judge of mankind ruled the world: His will determined all temporal affairs. He decided the fortune of people and nations, and he was the one who ruled over peace and war. If the world was full of sorrow and pain, if the wars, the revolutions, and the economic depression did not cease, then it was because of the Lord's punishing hand. And why did God send so much mischief to his people? Because they had committed so many sins. As a matter of fact, the merchants used this argument in their letters constantly. As they denounced the failing Spanish navy, the interruption of the Atlantic trade, or the decreasing supply of Spanish mercury, they always referred to "our sins". Juan José Cristobal de Anchorena had the same conviction: Europe's disastrous condition was punishment for "our innumerable offences", because "we do not believe in the immortality of our souls and in a creator who, knowing all, will judge things as they are". The world around the merchants had become dark and their own economic situation had turned wretched, but this vision of sin and punishment allowed the merchants to understand their world. With the help of their notion of Christianity they found an explanation 65 See Obregón Zevallos* letters to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.11.1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 : ".. .Crea Vd. que me confundo, viendo que los hombres confiesan y comulgan, manejándose de este modo, sólo Dios nos puede aguantar, pero al fin ha de llegar el día de las venganzas, y según van las cosas, parece que es en él que menos pensamos". Potosí, February 1799, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 , Potosí, 26.V1.1800, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 -

6.

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for Spain's and their own misery. No wonder that Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena eventually would trace the course of his business back to the will of God. 66 It is almost impossible to judge if the constant recourse to 'terrestrial calamity-God's punishment-people's sins' was mere rhetoric or the reflection of a deep religious concern. Such a conclusion would require a broader study of the merchants' religious behavior and a more detailed investigation of their business affairs. In our much more limited context it is significant that the traders frequently expressed apocalyptical views through their correspondence. Over and over again they mentioned in their letters the coming Last Judgement. The merchants were sure, heaven would await "good Catholics", and hell would await sinners. In a time of political, economic, and cultural change, Anchorena and his agents desperately tried to hold fast to their traditional Christian faith. Having lost so much ground, they did not want to lose their religion. To be sure, when Obregón Zevallos cried "every man for his soul!", it was not the world itself but Anchorena's and his agents' world which was close to collapse. 67

66 See Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.IX.1799, AGN, VII, 7 4 - 3 - 2 : ".. .conceptúo lo dilatado de la guerra presente, pues no se trasluce vislumbre alguna de su cesación, Dios lo remedie todo, pues sólo Su Majestad Santísima es el que todo lo gobierna y dispone". J. de Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VIII.1797, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 2 : "...me he impuesto de lo ocurrido por parte de nuestra marina.. .y firmemente creo, que nuestros pecados son la causa de todos nuestros males...". J.J.C, de Anchorena to J E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 2 - 6 ; and J.J.C, de Anchorena to R.J. López de Anaya, Cádiz. 12.VI.1809, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 2 - 4 ; "El hombre debe poner los medios, el resultado favorable o adverso no está en sus manos...". 67 See R.Saravia to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1798, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 . Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, 26.VI.1800, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 6 : ".. .sin ser profeta, [a Pedro Andrés García] le pronostico una eternidad de infierno, porque según las máximas de nuestra religión, según es la vida, es la muerte, y sabemos por la fe, que el que no se enmienda en esta vida, y no hace penitencia, la hará en la eternidad muy dura, e infructuosa". R.Saravia to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.III.1798; AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 3 - 1 : "Las cosas de Europa nada favorables nos son, como la comprensión de Vd. dicen sólo debemos pedir a Dios la estabilidad en nuestra Religión y acierto para morir como cristianos en nuestros dogmas." Obregón Zevallos to J.E. de Anchorena, Potosí, 26.VII.1800, AGN, VII, 7 - 4 - 1 - 6 : "...me parece, si no me engaño, no queremos de corazón ocurrir a la fuente de misericordias, que es Dios nuestro Señor, sino seguir con arreglo al mundo y la moda que siempre ha sido contraría a nuestro Señor Jesuchristo: Yo no diviso otro remedio, sino el que cada uno tire a salvar su alma, entregándose del todo en manos de la divina providencia, y corran las cosas como quisieren, pues no lo puede uno remediar, bajo la inteligencia de que ya poco podemos vivir".

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CONCLUSION

Historiography generally agrees that the Spanish-American Revolutions were sparked by the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian peninsula and the breakdown of the Spanish Bourbon monarchy. There seems to be a broad consensus that none of the underlying factors of the Spanish-American Independence like the Enlightenment, the Bourbon Reforms, the creole-peninsular controversy, and the late colonial revolts and protests, or any combination of them, possessed sufficent dimension to cause the disintegration of the Spanish Empire. Nonetheless this review of the crisis at the late 18 th century and its effects on the commercial world of the Río de la Plata demonstrates the extremely unstable and weak situation of Spain and its consequent crisis of the colonial system two decades before the outbreak of the revolutions. Our review of the crisis of the 1790s also shows the high degree of perception and awareness about the crisis within the Spanish Empire, and the high level of consternation and anxiety within parts of the economic and social elite at La Plata. It would be idle to speculate which course the history of the American colonies would have taken if in 1808 Napoleon had not attempted to eliminate Spain's sovereignty and authority. Nonetheless this article suggests that La Plata's movement for independence was not a product of an accident. Since the 1790s Spain had become the plaything of European power politics. Spain's political, economic, and military decay became evident for everybody within (and outside of) the Spanish Empire. Spain was no longer able to fulfill its role as a metropolis. In addition, beginning in the 1790s, the traditional Spanish system of a monopolistic trade ceased to exist. The La Plata area experienced a gradual structural transformation of its economy. Foreign merchants, livestock products, and the priority of a quantitative trade (cheap mass products, high volume, low profit margins) replaced Hispanic merchants, Upper Peruvian silver, and the priority of a qualitative trade (luxury articles, low volume, high profit margins). At the same time the porteño merchant community, a part of La Plata's economic, social, and political elite, divided into two groups. While one of the two groups welcomed economic change and took advantage of its consequent opportunities, the second refused any change in the traditional rules. The latter aspired to the restoration of the status quo ante. It was not willing or able to accommodate to the new circumstances. The more innovative group of

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the merchants increasingly defined La Plata's interests independently and in opposition to the mother-country. In contrast the more traditional group clung to the concept of an indissoluble union of interests between the colony and the metropolis. Both groups were motivated by their own interests. For the merchants who had built their career and their fortunes on an exclusive trade with Spain, the 1790s produced an intensification of a structural economic crisis. This crisis had begun in the 1780s and would culminate in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The merchant group oriented toward Spain perceived the crisis at the late 18th century as an all-embracing crisis which affected all areas of politics, economics, and culture.68 At first these merchants experienced an irritation and increasingly a breakdown of their traditional concept of Spanish and European politics. Confronted with the decline of Spain's power, the questioning of the traditional political and social orders by the revolutions in the Old and New World, and the menace to their own dominant position in La Plata's economy and society, the merchants reacted by resorting to their conservative-Catholic vision of the world. They interpreted the loss of their own world as an approaching apocalypse. The crisis of the 1790s was a part of a major crisis of Spain's colonial system. It prepared the soil for La Plata's May Revolution. The crisis explains why by 1810 part of Buenos Aires' elite was ready to seize the moment to realize their ideas and interests independently from Spain. The crisis of the Spanish colonial system explains as well why another part of the Buenos Aires' elite put up so little resistance to the revolution. The two last decades of the Spanish colonial regime weakened the reforms of Charles III, reforms which had elevated Buenos Aires to the political and economic center of southern Spanish America. Because of the new reality, because of Rio de la Plata's political and economical transformation at the turn of the nineteenth century, the traditionally minded merchants generally behaved during the crucial years of 1808-10 in a passive and defensive way. While some merchants were able to accommodate themselves to new conditions (Juan José Cristóbal de Anchorena and his brothers), others abandoned Argentina (Juan Esteban de Ezcurra). Because of the ** In this consisted the very specific character of the crisis of the 1790s compared to the frecuent commercial crisis which, caused by the international wars, frecuently affected Buenos Aires during the whole 18th century, see E. Saguier, "La crisis de circulación", p. 1 6 0 .

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ruin of the Spanish colonial power, many merchants did not only lose their traditional view of the world, but that world itself.

APPENDIX Poem: "La infeliz situación de la Francia conturba a un católico pecho y rendido a la violencia de Morfeo [Morpheus], vio a la Santa Verdad en su retulgente [?] trono a la que con humilde rendimiento hizo las siguientes preguntas, y ella se dignó satisfacerle con las respuestas siguientes: ¿Cómo está Francia que fue el Reino sabio y fecundo? hecho el oprobio del Mundo. ¿Y quién ha puesto a ia Francia sin fe, poder ni opulencia? La libertad de conciencia. ¿Quién es el fomeo [?] primero de casos tan asombrosos? Los escritos sediciosos. ¿Y estos escritos por qué causaron tal sedición? Porque no hay Inquisición. ¿Gozan de la libertad que tanto han vociferado? Nunca menos han gozado, ¿quién quitó el cetro a su Rey y la autoridad Real? La Asamblea Nacional. ¿Quién del Matrimonio Santo quiere destruir la idea? La excomulgada Asamblea. ¿Quién son los amontinados que persiguen tanto al Rey? Franceses, sin Dios, ni ley. ¿Quién a los nobles del Reino los puso tan abatidos? Los Franceses seducidos. ¿Y quién los sedujo a éllos para tan indigna acción? La falta de Religión. ¿Qué maestros enseñaron tan horrible desafiero?

¿Quién ha muerto cardenales, obispos, y sacerdotes? Los Franceses hugenotes. ¿Quién vierte a sangre propia y nunca su rabia cesa? La indócil plebe francesa. ¿Quién se alegra de las muertes que padecen sus hermanos? Los Franceses gaditanos. ¿Quién armó contra los Reyes a livosos corazones? Los Franceses franzasones . . . apellida a Su Rey ¿la infeliz francesa secta? La llama Luis, y Antoneta. ¿En qué parará este reino dividido en su opinión? En total devolación. ¿Quién pondrá terror a Francia Y sosegará su horror? El austriaco Emperador. ¿Quién a castigar a traidores acompañaría su fiel tropa? Prusia, Rusia, y toda Europa. ¿Quién eludió a la Asamblea y la hizo infeliz juguete? El gran Ma. Lafayete. ¿Quién a estos hombres impíos castigará finalmente? El gran Dios omnipresente. ¿Cómo quedará Paris en este infeliz vaivén?

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Bolter, Calvino, y Lutero. como otra Jerusalem. ¿Quién a las Vírgenes puras ¿Qué debemos hacer todos violó con pérfidas manos? por esta infeliz ciudad? Los Franceses luteranos. llamar a Dios por piedad". Enclosure to the letter of E¡ Conde de las Cinco Torres to Juan Esteban de Anchorena, Cádiz. 2. Oktober 1792, AGN, 7 - 4 - 1 - 3 .

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